California Land Pamphlets, Volume 4 by unknown
California State University, Monterey Bay 
Digital Commons @ CSUMB 
Land Pamphlets California Land Pamphlets 
4-10-2018 
California Land Pamphlets, Volume 4 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/hornbeck_usa_5_b 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, Education Commons, Law Commons, and the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
"California Land Pamphlets, Volume 4" (2018). Land Pamphlets. 3. 
https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/hornbeck_usa_5_b/3 
This Document is brought to you for free and open access by the California Land Pamphlets at Digital Commons @ 
CSUMB. It has been accepted for inclusion in Land Pamphlets by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons 
@ CSUMB. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@csumb.edu. 

CALIFORNIA
State Library.
* >»< •
Accession J^o...5^..0...L.<?.0.....
caii JV0...C/3.33--CI-5.3
;^_J




/^?P^xl****-
II. S. LAID COMMISSION
FOR CALIFORNIA.
e
$0/60
CLAIM NO. 237.
MANUEL LARIOS FOR LANDS NEAR SAN JUAN BAUTISTA.
CLAIMANTS BRIEF, BY HORACE HAWES OF COUNSEL*
The Proof is,
L The land claimed is less than one league, and has bound-
aries clearly defined, known and recognized by all for twenty years.
2. That Manuel Larios has lived on it with his family, occupied
it with his cattle, horses and sheep ; inclosed and cultivated portions of
the land, continuously and without any interruption, for twenty years at
least, and that during that whole period up to the American war, he has
been uniformly recognized as the undisputed rightful occupant and own-
er by all the Colindantes, the citizens, and the public authorities,
3. That on the 4th May, 1839, a grant in full property was exe-
cuted in favor of Larios, then having been many years in possession, by
Jose Castro, Prefect of the District, which grant was made not only in
the legitimate exercise of his functions, but in pursuance of an express
order of the Departmental Government.
[Note 1.—The division into sections is adopted for convenient reference.
2.—The organization of the Mexican Government is only referred to as it stood from the
beginning of 1837, to Oct. 1841, which embraces the date of the concession in this case.]
ofnhose who under the ample guanmt
4. Such are the facts witffifWWs$u^.^I^w wat^||me^ rights
of the claimant ? He is one Mho armi ies of
the eighth Article of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, has elected to
"continue where he now resides, and become a citizen of the United
States," accepting the pledged faith of the nation, that he should be
secured in the " free enjoyment of his liberty and property."
5. We know that this property of his was secure to him under
the former government, for his right was never disputed but acknowledg-
ed by all, and what that government would do is the criterion for us.
6. If the right or title of the claimant was defective, its confir-
mation by the government would be presumed from the fact of his con-
r
tinued possession and occupancy, as was determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of the U. States vs. Pellerin and
others, 13 Howard, 10, 11.
7. But we depend not on presumption
;
we have affirmative
proof of the fact that his right was recognized, by the official document
of the Prefect, duly executed, and authenticated in the legal form, in
which Larios is declared " owner in property in conformity with what
had been ordained by the Governor," (en conformidad con lo dispuesto
por el Senor Gobernador.)
8. Now the ninety-sixth Article of the Organic law of the 20th
March, 1837, provides that the Prefect " shall be the ordinary channel of
communication between the Governor and the subordinate authorities of
the District, and any application whatsoever of the latter to the former
must be accompanied bp his informe ,•" and the 187th Article of the same
law declares, " the channels of communication established in this law
cannot be departed from except in extraordinary circumstances, or in
case of complaint against one of the functionaries through whom the
communication has to be made."
9 The document referred to being attested by the Secretary in
due form, and moreover proved by the oath of the Prefect himself, to
have been executed at its date, is conclusive evidence of the facts stated
in it. Being an official and public document it imports absolute verity
by the common law of England, and equally so by the Spanish and
Mexican law, which denominates it an "authentic document." The
"instrumento autentico" which is an official document attested by the
Secretary or officer constituted by law to attest it, or else by two subscrib-
ing witnesses, attesting its execution by the public functionary whose act
it purports to be, is entitled to full credence per se, (hacefe por si mismo)
as may be seen by reference to Escreche Die. de Legislation, Madrid ed.
(in 2 vols.) title " Instrumento Publico," Feb. Mej. v. 5, p. 56, §100, and
generally every Spanish and Mexican author who treats of the subject.
The Prefect also testifies before the Board that it is true as stated in the
document, that he acted in pursuance of an express order of the Gover-
nor.
10. Again, the Prefect, who as may be seen by reference to the
said law of 20th March, 1837, Art. 61 to 104, is the Chief Executive
officer of the District, exercising nearly the same functions as the Gov-
ernor within those limits, is the only authority competent to transmit to
the subordinate authorities, or to the citizens individually, or collectively,
either the laws of Congress, orders and decress of the General Govern-
ment, Dispositions of the .Departmental Junta or Assembly, or of the
Governor. There is no other channel through which they can ordinarily
pass. When the Prefect officially declares that the Governor or the Gov-
ernment thus orders, it is conclusive.
11. The only power which Governors have to grant lands, is a
delegated poiver, derived not directly from any statutory provision, but
from an executive regulation made for the execution of a law, requiring
the Government to colonize or settle the country, and " the power thus to
regulate the execution of the law," says an eminent jurist now occupying
a seat on the bench of the Supreme Court of the Republic, "is one which
Rows naturally from the quality itself of the executive power," and is
equally competent to all the agents of the administration placed at the
head of each one of the Demarcations into which the national territory is
divided."
12. The power to distribute lands to settlers in conformity with
the laiv, may be delegated then, 'and always has been delegated, but it
ought to be committed to those subordinate agents of the administration,
constituted for the purpose of carrying the law into execution in ordinary
cases.
13. By the first art. of the Royal Instruction of 15th October,
1754, the sub-delegates appointed by the Viceroys, are authorized to sub-
delegate their commissions for the provinces and places distant from their
residences, as had been done before, and by the regulation of 21st No-
vember, 1828, the Supreme Government, that is, the President, has dele-
gated to the Governors of the Territories and the Territorial Deputations,
the authority which the law of 18th August, 1824, (art. 16) commits to
the Government alone.
15. To say therefore that the power which the law has entrusted
to one functionary, cannot be delegated, is to say that all grants made by
the Governor, with the approval of the Assembly or Deputation, however
conformable to the objects of the law, are totally void, for certainly the
law of 18th August, 1824, and especially the 16th article, does not even
mention these functionaries, and consequently not even a town lot in
the most distant part of the Republic, could be granted to an actual set-
tler, except by the President himself, to whom the law has entrusted the
business of colonization.
16. But will it be said that although the authority which the
law itself confers, may be delegated, and has been rightfully delegated by
the President, y;t that the authority conferred by an executive regulation
cannot 1 The reason for such a proposition is beyond my comprehen-
sion, although I could see some plausibility in the converse of it.
17. If the exercise of this power to colonize or settle the public
and vacant lands by functionaries and authorities subordinate to the
President, to whom the law has especially committed it, be by delega-
tion properly speaking, then I say, it may be delegated to those public
functionaries, who by the Constitution are authorized and required to see
to the execution of the law ; and in this sense the power in question has
often been delegated to the Governors, the Prefects, and in many instances,
to other authorities subordinate to the Prefect, as to Justices of the Peace,
Alcaldes, and Ayuntamientos, who, in some instances have been em-
powered to grant solares to settlers in towns, not by any provision of the
law itself, but by instructions communicated frftm time to time by the
superior authority.
18. But the exercise of this authority to distribute lands to actual
settlers, to execute the laws on the subject of colonization, to " bind the
conscience of the Government," so that it ought to redeem its pledged
faith to the settler, who has complied with the terms which it has offered,
and placed himself within the legal guaranties, is not by delegation in
the ordinary sense of that expression.
19. The object of the law of 18th August, 1824, like that of 18th
June, 1513, which is L. 1 T. 12 Lib. 4, R. I., is colonization, the settle-
ment of vacant lands. The latter, which is unqustionably in force in
Mexico in its most essential parts, provides : " In order that our vassals
may be encouraged in the discovery and settlement of the Indies, and
may live with the comfort and convenience which we desire, it is our
will that there be distributed houses, solares, lands, caballerias, and
peonias to all those who shall go to settle new lands in the towns and
places which by the Governor of the new settlement, shall be indicated
to|them*&c. ; . . . and having established their habitation in, and cultivated
them and resided in those towns four years, we grant them authority, so
that thence forward, they can sell and do freely as they will with them,
as of a thing which is their own {como cosa saya propiaP)
20. The whole power conferred upon the General Government
by the Mexican law of 18th Aug. 1824, so far as respects the territories,
is comprehended in the 16th Article. By this, the government is to pro-
ceed to colonize or settle the territories of the Republic. No power is di-
rectly given to grant or alienate lands or lots. This is an incident, and
can only be exercised as a necessary incident to the power which is given
to settle the country, to people the vacant lands, to colonize it, and only so
far as is essential in the execution of this power, in these two laws we
have the spirit of the whole system cf the distribution of lands in Spain
and Mexico.
21. Occupancy, not possession merely, but beneficial occupancy
is not merely, or properly a condition which the law itself annexes to the
distribution of lands. It is more—it is the principal direct means, the es-
sential and only mode by which the dominion is acquired. The public
functionary who receives petitions, institutes the requisite investigations
and extends to the applicant the document intended for his security, thus
admits and recognizes him individually with respect to the land or lot so-
licited in the class of settlers, and entitled to the benefits and advantages
proffered by the laws, but does not confer the right of property. This,
the settler acquires for himself; he earns it ; he makes himself the own-
er by accepting the proffered terms, and placing himself within the legal
guaranties. The public functionary does not give it ; he can not, for it
is not his to give, and nemo dat quod non habet. It is the law—it is the
nation—the sovereign, speaking by the statute that gives it
—
gives it to
the actual resident settler, the bona fide occupant.
22. Such is the object of the law. How then is it to be execu-
ted ? It does not create public agents, or confer special powers upon any
already existing. It does not designate any of the functionaries that are
to intervene in effecting the objects which it aims to accomplish. Con-
gress, in the exercise of its delegated powers—delegated by the nation,
and defined by the Constitution, decrees that the territories of the Repub-
lic shall be colonized, and that the government shall proceed to do this.
Who and what is the government? It is the executive power
; and the
Constitution specifies the executive agents, and their gradation and sub-
ordination, which constitute the unity of the Government. " As it is
not possible for the administration, by itself alone, to attend to all the di-
versified objects which are committed to its charge, throughout the whole
extent of the national territory, the division of this territory into districts,
and the placing at the head of the several divisions and sub-divisions,
of direct agents, with equal power to regulate the objects of their incum-
bency, are the only means of organizing the public administration. The
regulations, orders and decrees, which, for the fulfillment and execution
of the laws the executive power issues, are obligatory in all the territory
of the nation
;
while those of the subordinate agents are limited to the
respective demarcations in which they preside." (Derecho Administra-
tive), by Lares, p. IS.) "This Administrative jurisdiction, (that is, the
administrative functions of the executive power) we say, must be exerci-
sed by the agents of the administration ; and these agents are the minis-
ters and secretaries of dispatch, the Council of State, and the functiona-
ries placed at the head of each one of the demarcations into which the
territory of the State is divided, be they called Prefects, Oefes Politicos,
or otherwise, and the councils of these same agents." lb. 364.
23. 1. The political Divisions of the Territory of the Republic
established by the Constitution which went into operation on the 1st Jan.,
1837, are the Departments, the Districts or Prefectures, and the Partidos
or sub Prefectures, at the head of each of which is constituted a chief exe-
cutive officer, 6th Constitutional Law Art. 1.
2. By Art. 4, 6, Const. Law it is declared : " The interior government of
the Departments will be encharged to the Governors with subjection to the
General Government."
3. By art. 1st of the organic law of 20th March, 1837, it is declared that
the interior Government of the Departments shall be comitted to the charge
of the Governors, Departmental juntas, Prefects, sub Prefects, ayunta-
mientos, Alcaldes and Justices of the Peace.
4. By art. 17 of the 6th Constitutional Law, it is declared :—" In each
Capital of a District there shall be a Prefect nominated by the Governor
and confirmed by the General Government, who shall hold his office four
years and may be re-appointed." To be eligible he must be a Mexican
citizen in the exercise of his rights, over thirty years of age, a native or
vecino of the Department and possess a capital which yields him at least one
thousand dollars a year.
Among his attributions are specified :
—
1. " To take care of public order and tranquility in his district with en-
tire subjection to the Governor."
2. " To fulfil and cause to be fulfilled the orders of the Government of the
Department.'
3. " To watch over the fulfilment of the obligations of the Ayuntamientos,
and in general, over all that which concerns the branch of policia, (good
order and government.)"
5. By Art. 19, it is provided that :—*•
" In each Capital of a Partido there shall be a sub Prefect, named by the
Prefect and approved by the Governor, who shall hold his office for two
years, and may be re-appointed."
He must he a- Mexican citizen in the exercise of his rights, a resident citi-
zen of the Capital of the Partido, above twenty-five years of age and possess
a capital which yields him at least five hundred dollars a year, and it is de-
clared that
:
" The functions of the sub Prefect in the Partido are the same as those of
the Prefect in the District with subjection to the latter, and through him to
the Oovernor."
6. By the organic law of 20th March. 1837, article 63. it is made the
duty of the Prefect to publish without delay, observe and cause to be ob-
served the laws and decrees of Congress, which he may receive from the
Governor, and circulate them opportunely among the towns of his dis-
trict, through the medium of the Sub-Prefect ; and by article 167 the Al-
caldes, in the towns of their residence, are required to watch over the ex-
ecution and fulfillment of the police regulations, and of the laws, decrees
and orders which may be communicated to them by the Sub-Prefect, or
by the Prefect in defect of the former, &c.
7. The Alcaldes constitute one of the three classes of officers of which
the Ayuntamiento or Town Council is composed. (Art. 125.) and preside
in case neither the Sub-Prefect nor Prefect should be present, (Art. 174.)
Of course, then, the office is municipal. The office of Sub Prefect is also
municipal, being so expressly declared, (Art. 120 ;) so is that of the Jus-
tices of the Peace, (Art. 185,) which in cprtain cases, have all the powers,
and obligations of Ayuntamientos, (Art. 100, 180 ; see also Art. 120. and
law 28th Nov. 1836.)
8. But the Prefect is one of the functionaries of Government, properly
speaking, standing in the political order alone, and the office is supervi-
sory over all the towns, municipalities, and functionaries of every class in
his district, (Art. 65, 70, 79, 94, 95,) in which he is styled in law the first
political authority.
24. These are the depositaries and agents of
b
the Executive
power—the President, the Governor and the Prefect, in the municipal
organization there are the Sub-Prefects, Ayuntamientos or Justices of the
Peace, according to the population and other circumstances, which are to
exercise the functions assigned them in subjection to the Prefect and Gov-
ernor. But the only constitutional subdivisions of the national territory for
the complete organization and distribution of the Executive power are
the departments, the districts, and the partidos, over which preside the
Governor, the Prefect, and the Sub Prefect. The Departmental Junta is
the " Governor's Council" only, and has no legislative authority ; the whole
legislative power of the country being vested in Congress, as may be seen
by reference to articles 5 and 10 of the Constitutional Bases of 23d Oct.,
1835, and article 1st of the third constitutional law.
25 These are the constitutional agents of the Executive Power
—
the Government. Congress made it the duty of the Government to pro-
ceed to colonize the territories. The Government directed its immediate
subordinate agents, the Governors, to execute the law by a general regu-
lation, and in some instances by speciaTox&exs and instructions ; and the
Governor of the department of California, in the instance under conside-
ration, instructed the next subordinate constitutional agent of the Execu-
tive Power, to concede in conformity with the very spirit and intent of
the law, to a settler, the small piece of land which he had already actu-
ally occupied and cultivated for more than four years, the period of resi-
dent settlement acquired by law to require the absolute dominion.
26. Let it be supposed that Congress had said "the Governors
shall proceed to colonize the territories in which they preside," would
there be any doubt that the Governor might authorise any subordinate
executive agent to concede vacant lands in the same terms that they
themselves are now empowered by the Executive regulation of 1828, and
have been from time to time by special instructions'? is it because the
powers of the Govornor are derived from a general regulation, that he
cannotemploy in the execution of them any subordinate executive agent?
We have already seen, (section 22,) that every constitutional executive
agent has inherently the power to issue general orders, regulations and
decrees, and that "this is an act which emanates naturally from the
quality itself of the Executive power." It is only necessary to the valid-
ity of such acts that they be done in the execution of the law, and in
obedience to, or at least not in conflict with superior orders, regulations
or decrees. There can then be no doubc that any act of the Prefect
within his district, done in obedience to the orders of the Governor, has
the same force and effect, (and no more or greater,) as if done by the
Governor himself. There are, however, some cases of which it will be in
point to speak in the proper place, in which the law has constituted the
Prefect the primary agent for its execution, and in which consequently
no inceptive supeiior action would be requisite.
27. The Prefect is the constitutional functionary by and through
whom the Governor acts in the district over which he presides, and by
whose intervention all laws and superior orders are to be carried into ex-
ecution, (section 23.) He is the person designated by the Constitution
and by the organic law of 20th March, 1837, to authenticate the orders
of the Governor which are to be executed in his district, and through him
alone can they legally be communicated, except in extraordinary cases.
A document under his hand and properly attested by the Secretary of the
Prefecture^ purporting to be in pursuance of the Governor's instructions,
is by the Mexican law entitled to implicit credence per se, and the in-
structions need not be referred to till the Governor disavows it, for the
Alcaldes are to execute only the laws, decrees and orders which they re-
ceive from the Prefect by the hand of the Sub-Prefect, (sec. 23—6.)
28. The act of Don Jose Castro, therefore, was the act of the
Governor, and has precisely the same force in the view of the case taken
thus far, as if the document bore the Governor's signature in place of
that of the Prefect.
29. 1 do not say that in this view of the case, the title acquired,
would, according to the distinction made by American Courts, be any-
thing more than an equitable one. till approved by the Departmental
Junta, or that the right acquired would be anything more than the right
to insist upon the observance of good faith, and the redemption of its
pledge on the part of the State, given through its constitutional author-
ities to a settler, who had already, before it was given, fulfilled every
duty, condition and obligation incumbent on him by law, as such, and.
8wno was consequently subjected to no new conditions in the document
under consideration in this case. It imports but little to him, in what
class or category his property is placed in the nomenclature of legal sci-
ence. It is of more consequence to him to know whether he is to be
despoiled of his possessions, and driven from his own fireside ; whether
the very habitation in which twelve of his seventeen children have been
born and nurtured, is to be taken from him.
30. But I propose another view of this most equitable claim. It
is maintained that the concession of the Prefect would be valid and com-
plete without any superior instructions. Jose Castro, who filled at dif-
ferent periods, the offices of Prefect and Governor, and Manuel Castro,
who filled the former office, both testify that the constitution and the law
confer this power on the Prefect, and that it was the custom for them to
exercise it. That custom, then, though founded in mistake of the law,
is the law of this case. Congress has said so in the law establishing
this Commission (sec. 11). The Supreme Court of the United States
has said so in the case of McKeen vs Delancy's lessees, 5 Cranch 22
;
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in McFarran vs. Powers, 1 Sarg.
& R. 102. The Supreme Court of California have said so in the case
of Panaud vs. Jones, 1 Cal. R. 499
;
and this is consonant to the sound-
est principles of reason and justice. The United States, as the successor
to the Mexican Government do not undertake to rectify all the disor-
ders which existed in the administration of the latter. What has been
done must remain as we found it. What would be the rule in Spain
and Mexico ? In those countries, revolutions, conquests and re con-
quests have often occurred.
31. "If," says the law, 5 T. 3 lib. 10. of the Fuero Juzgo, " be-
fore the Goths came to the country, the Romans (the ancient' inhabit-
ants) gave to any man, a piece of landed property, or sold, or exchanged
the same, that must remain stable."
"Behold here,'' says a commentator, "a principle worthy of the
most civilized nation. That which the conquest finds existing, the
conquest must respect"
"Other kings," said Theodore, King of the Ostrogoths, "have aim-
ed in their conquests, at the destruction of property, and the ruin of
cities. I have proposed to myself to make such a conquest that the
conquered themselves shall regret that the}'" had net sooner fallen un-
der my dominion."
32. Fourteen centuries of civilization have not improved upon the
political maxims which guided the Gothic conquerors of Spain, and which
were incorporated in the Code just cited.
In respect to property that which the conquest finds existing, the con-
quest must respect. The possessors thereof must be left undisturbed. A
responsibility without measure rests upon that government which shall in-
vade so sacred a principle, and when it shall have passed away the detesta-
tion of the entire world will follow its memory.
3-3. In all Spanish American countries a great portion of lands have
been occupied under imperfect titles, and titles derived from functionaries
which were not authorized to confer them. But I doubt whether an instance
can be found in the history of three centuries in which the resident settler
was ever disturbed for this cause. If defects have been sought out, the
9motive has been to cure them and confirm the possession, always. Titles to
land in the Indies conferred by Ministers, who had no authority whatever
for that purpose, were confirmed by the King in the Supreme Council, as
is stated in the concluding part of L. 15 T. 12, Lib. 4 R. I.
34. In Cuba previous to 1797, many grants had been made of
tracts called hatos for cattle, consisting of from one to five and six leagues,
by the Ayuntamientos without authority, and a project was set on foot
but repudiated by the King and Council for reclaiming to the use of the
Royal Treasury, all lands for which the possessors could not exhibit le-
gitimate titles.
35. In an informe on this subject, presented to the Ministry by
Don Jose Pablo Valiente, after stating his conclusion, that the titles in
question were not valid, for the want of authority in the Ayuntamientos,
and because in many cases they did not purport to transfer the property
in the lands, he says :
36. " It may be said, and it is very true, that in a soil which has
been, without doubt, the sole property of the Sovereign, the Fisco has an
incontestable right to require every possessor, whatever, to show a legiti-
mate title, and not doing so, that he may reclaim the land without enter-
ing in+o any other discussions, leaving to each one his right reserved
against those who may be liable, since neither the transcourse of time,
nor long possession nor good faith, nor any of these are sufficient to cause
prescription against his (the Sovereign's) dominion. But this sum/mum,
jvs, so to speak, would it be convenient to the public revenue or the Royal
Treasury, or consistent with the beneficent intentions of the King towards
his subjects in the situation of affairs in the Island J The equity of your
Excellency will determine. hor my part, I conceive that such a mea-
sure would end in the entire ruin and depopulation of the interior towns,
and 1 will say moreover, that it would be most unjust in itself."
37. " In good faith the Fisco cannot be ignorant that the posses-
sors found their dominion hi the repartimenfos. If to make them and
transfer the property to the grantees, the Ayuntamientos had royal au-'
thority, this ought to exist in their archives, and not. in the titles of indi-
vidual possessors, to whom no other document is given, but a testimonial
of the resolution in which the grant is made to them, and consequently
there is no reason for exacting from them prool which they do not pos-
sess nor ought to possess."
38. The final result was that ail the grants made by the Ayunta-
mientos, up to the time when they had been expressly prohibited by a
royal ceduula were confirmed— that those who were in possession for
forty years without any documents whatever, were considered as having
a complete title by prescription, and the occupants for ten years, without
any documents, were also confirmed in their possessions and had legal
documents issued to them, for which they paid a small composition to
defray the expense of them. This will be found in the royal resolution of
19th July, ]819, promulgated after the subject had been maturely con-
sidered in the Supreme Council of the Indies. A multitude of similar
confirmations might be referred to. In all cases where colonizable lands
have been granted and actually occupied in conformity with the spirit of
the laws, the settler has been left undisturbed in his possessions, though
a mistake may have been committed, cither in respect to the legal power
9
10
of the officer who made the grant, or in the observance of any of the
legal formalities. If the settler has complied with his obligations, the
government has always rectified the mistakes of its agents, and the
title has been confirmed. What the Mexican Government would do,
ours must do if it would be just.
39. Put it is maintained that the custom referred to, in conform-
ity with which Don Jose Castro made this grant was not founded in a
mistake of the law, but was conformable to it.
40. By the aforesaid organic law of 1S37, the Prefect who pre-
sides over (Art. 94 and 95) all the towns and all the Authorities of his
District, is required (Art. 91) to cause that the scattered inhabitants be
collected and live in towns and settlements. This is what the Prefect
endeavored to do at an Juan Bautista, in conformity, he says, with the
policy of the Departmental Government. They are also required (Art.
76) to propose measures for the promotion of agriculture and all branches
of industry. &c.
41. Art. 77, "They shall regulate (arreglaran) executively (gu-
bernativamente) and conformably to the laws, the distribution (repartimi-
ento) of 7 ierras Comunes, in the towns of the District whenever there
is no litigation pending in the tribunals respecting them, reserving to the
parties their right to appeal to the Governor, who without further re-
course, will decide the matter as may be proper, with the concurrence of
the Departmental Junta."
42. To define what is the full import of the idea to regulate, I
will refer without further comment to the exposition of it given by Chief
Justice Marshall, in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 196. Speak-
ing of the constitutional power vested in Congress " to regulate" com-
merce.
43. Repartimento of lands is the distribution made to settlers
for their personal use and occupation. It is the word used in the original
law, (that already cited) authorizing the distribution of lands to settlers
in the Indies. " It is our will that, se puedan repartir y reparian
houses, lands, salares, <fcc. to all those who go to settle new lands, &c.
It is the word used in this sense in laws 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 15, T. 12 Lib.
4, R. I., In the Ordinanzas de Publaciones throughout, in article 15 of the
Decieto de Cortes, of 4th January, 1813.
44. The distribution or repartimento of tierras comunes in suertes
to resident settlers was decreed by the Spanish Cortes on the 4th January,
1813, in the law of that date, for the reduction to private property of the
" valdios y otros terrenos comunes." To comprehend fully the object of this
law, and what is meant by tierras or terrenos comunes, vie have to refer to
a few facts in Spanish history respecting the foundation of landed property.
45. "By right of conquest the Goths occupied two thirds uf the
improved and cultivated lands as soon as they had conquered Spain, and
established their monarchy therein, leaving the other third in each Pueblo
to the ancient inhabitants who were denominated Romans by the Gothic
laws. This division in which the private property and dominion in lands
and estates in Spain is founded, is, that referred to in L. 9, T. 1, Lib, 10,
of the Fuerojuzgo, in which is enjoined the observance of that rejiartimiento,
not only in favor of those who first acquired the improved lands included in
thd general distribution made at the time of the conquest, and irruption of
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the Goths in the Peninsula, but also in favor of their heirs and descendants.
The use of the monies and uncultivated lands, which were not included in
the general repartimiento
,
remained common, and promiscuous among the
Goths and Spaniards, as the general patrimony of the people, as may be
seen in L. 10, T. 1, Lib. 10, Fuero juzgo." {Escolano Practica del Con-
sejo Real V, p. 231 2.)
46. This system, which dedicated or rather loft to the common
use the vacant and uncultivated lands, has always continued in Spain
in its substantial characteristics, although it suffered some innovations
during the domination of the xlrabs and the Moors, and by various laws
the demarcations of each pueblo were designated within which its vecinos
or citizens had the exclusive privilege of using the pasturage, fuel, water-
ing places &.c, of these terrenos commies, and sometimes also of
those of private ownership, (lb. p. 232.)
47. The substance of the Spanish legislation in relation to ter-
renos comunes and the right of common pasturage, <fcc. will be found in
tit. 7 l»b. 7 Nueva Recopilacion, or in T. 21, 23, 24 and 25 of the Novl-
sima
;
from all which it will be seen that the general policy of Govern-
ernment and the public clamor in Spain has been in all ages til! the be-
ginning of the present century, opposed to the distribution and reduction
to the class of private property of these terrenos comunes, which included
all the public lands of the kingdom, as all were included within the de-
marcation of some one of its numerous towns and municipalities. Grants,
however, were occasionally made by the king, or with his especial license,
either subject to the common use of pasturage, in which case it was called
acotados, or excluding it, in which case the lands were cerrados, (Eli-
zondo Practica Universal Forense, Y. 5 p. 228.)
4S. In the Indies as early as 1541, all the lands not distributed
and reduced to the condition of private property were also declared in re-
spect to their use and enjoyment to be common ; and even granted lands
were subject to common pasturage, <fcc, to a certain extent in the same
manner as in Spain itself, as may be seen by reference to L. 5, 6, 7, 8 and
9, T. 17, lib. 4. R. I , the first of which is literally as follows:
49. " We have ordained that the pastos, aguas and monies, remain
common in the Indies, and some persons without our authority have occn-
pied a great part of territory and lands in which they do not allow any one
to put, corral, nor bring thither their cattle. We command that the use of
all the pastos, montes and aguas of the Provinces of the Indies be common
to all those who now are or hereaftor shall be vecinos thereof, so that they
may enjoy them freely, collect their flocks and bring their cattle there'as
they please, notwithstanding any ordinances, which, if need be, we so far
revoke and hereby declare null and of no effect. And we ordain that all
the consejos, (councils of towns,) justicias, (the judicial authority,) and
regidores, (one class of officers composing ayuntamientos,) observe and fulfil
and cause to be observed and fulfilled what is provided in this our law, and
any person whomsoever that shall centravene the same shall incur the for-
feiture of five thousand pounds of gold, to be executed against his person and
property for our exchequer ; and so far as respects the city of Santo Do-
mingo, of the Isla EspaTiola, let this law be observed : provided, however,
that this be understood as applicable within the space of ten leagues from
the said city in circumference, and without prejudice to third persons, and
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without the said space of ten leagues we have deemed it meet and permit
that each hato for cattle have a termino, (extent of territory,) one league all
around, (en contorno,) from the centre, so that within it no other one can
make any establishment for cattle, corral nor house
; provided however,
that the pasto thereof be likewise common, as above provided ; and where
there shall be hatos, sites (sitios) may be given to build mills and other
hereditaments, and in each asiento (location) let there be a stone house, and
not less than two thousand head of cattle, and if there should be six thous-
and head and upwards there may be two asientos ; and if ten thousand and
upwards, three asientos, and indispensably in each one of them its stone
house ; and no person can have more than three asientos ; and thus let it be
observed where there shall be no title or grant from us otherwise disposing."
JEJscreche Die. de Legislation, tife " Baldio" defines as follows :
—
Baldio. " The common land (terreno Comuri) of a Consejo or Pueblo which
is not cultivated nor turned into pasture, (adhesado). When the Vesi^oths
invaded Spain, after distributing (repartir') among themselves two thirds of
the conquered lands, and leaving one-third to the conquered (inhabitants)
they were obliged to leave abandoned and without an owner, all those lands
which the population reduced by the wars was not sufficient to occupy. To
these lands was applied the name of campos vacantes, and these are for the
most part our baldios. As these barbarians had learnt only to fiojit and to.
sleep, they preferred cattle raising to the gathering of crops, and pasturage
(pasto~) to agriculture. This system took still deeper root in the times of
the Moors since, as they had the enemy always in view, the greater part of
their subsistence was derived from their herds. After the expulsion of the
Moors, policy dedicated the baldios as exclusive property to the herds and
flocks, and a benevolent sentiment which looked upon them as the patrimony
of the poor, employed [itself in preserving the baldios for them ; without
reflecting that making the enjoyment of them common, it was natural that
the rich rather than the poor would reap the benefit. It is of the most
advantage that they be sold for money or on ground rent, and be distributed
(se reparian) in enfiteusis or on condition, thus constituting the means of
saving from misery, a great number of poor families, while they now only
furnish food for the cupidity of the wealthy graziers, and a useless resort
for the indigent ; " and in note three refers to the Decreto de Cortes of 4th
January 1818.
50. Vizcaino Perez, Advocate of the Royal Councils, observes
that Spain and the Indies, being conquered kingdoms, the full property and
dominion in all the lands therein, pertained to the sovereign, that portions had
been granted out or sold by the sovereign to individuals and corporations,
and that the use of the rest was granted to all his subjects in common, in
order that they might make use of the pasturage, fuel and other natural
productions, and maintain their cattle therein ; for which reason they are
called " tierras comunes". {Compendio del Derecho Publico y Oomun de
EspaTia V. 1 p. 334-6.) When a settlement is formed within these public
lands, and grows into a town which has a termino, or demarcation de-
signated by competent authority, then by the general laws, the use of
the public lands, within this demarcation, which were before comunes
(common) to all the citizens, will be restricted to the vecinos of the town,
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to whom only they remain tierras co?nu?ies, unless otherwise ordained, as
was done with respect to the City of Mexico, which had a termino assigned
of fifteen leagues in each direction from the center. L. 3, T. 8, Lib. 4,
R.I.
51. Neither the towns, however, nor the citizens thereof, have any
property in these public lands, which remain tierras comunes ; but they re-
main always subject to the disposition of the Sovei-eign.
52. " The kings," (of Spain) says Elizondo, in his Praetica
Universal Forense, (v. 3, p. 107) " fountains of jurisdiction, are the owners
of all the terminos situated in their kingdoms, and as such, may donate
them, divide, or limit them ; the same being true of the Pastos, although
the towns enjoy the use, it being presumed that they are conceded, only so
far as respects the use and administration ; the property remaining in the
Sovereign, so that he may afterwards limit, enlarge, restrict, or give any
new direction to the use and enjoyment thereof. And hence it is that the
Pueblos cannot alienate their terminos and pastos without precedent, royal
license and authority."
53. " Pueblos have no property except that which by royal privil-
ege, custom, or contract between man and man, may have been granted to
them. For although there may have been assigned to a town at the time of
its constitution a territorio y pertenencias, which is to be common to all the
residents, so that each one cannot separately use them, it is a right reserved
to the Sovereign to distribute the terminos of the provinces, and of the
villas, assigning to the latter the use, but the dominion remaining in the
Soveieigns themselves. For this reason, the Princes may alter, restrict, or
enlarge the terminos once assigned to any town, giving them new form, or
revoking the ancient ; so that no Pueblo can acquire any exclusive right to
their pastes as against the king, unless by his especial privilege or immemorial
prescription." (lb. v. 5, p. 226.)
54. The Spanish Cortes, in consequence of suggestions presented
by the Minister of Marine, on the 5th Oct. 1811, entered into an investiga-
tion respecting the utility of the policy which had then been pursued in
Spain on this subject, for fourteen centuries, which resulted in the conviction
that it was calculated to retard the progress of population, and destructive
to the interests of agriculture ; and that incalculable advantages would re-
sult from the sale and distribution of those public lands, in the towns, which
had been subject to the common use of the citizens, as well as those of the
propios, and tne reduction to private property of all the lands in Spain, as
well as in the provinces beyond the seas.
55. Says the Committee on Agriculture, in their report presented
to the Cortes, Dec. 22, 1812'—" Let the vacant lands be sold ; let them be
distributed (repartanse) either gratuitously or for a moderate rent. The
State will gain much, if proprietors are multiplied, if those become such who
are not so, and if at last there shall not be in Spanish soil, a single vara of
land, without a determined owner. The utility will be incalculable, as like-
wise it will be to reduce the jyropios to private dominion." " Your Majesty,"
(the Cortes were then so addressed) " may, however ordain one thing
—
that making a beginning in the distribution (repartimiento) of lands, a mul-
titude of citizens be sustained with great advantage to the nation ; that is,
granting a small allotment (suerte) of the vacant and royal lands (provided
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the total of these grants do not exceed the fourth part of the same) to all
the vecinos of the respective Pueblos of whatever class they may be who
petition therefor, and do not possess in property any other land."
56. In those Pueblos where there are no vacant lands, or they are
not sufficient for this distribution, there may be given to the vecinos not pro-
prietors, who desire it, a like suerte in the cultivated lands of the propios,
but with the condition that in this case the same suerte remain subjected to
a perpetual ground rent in favor of the propies, equivalent to that which it
may have yielded them in the five years ending with the year 1807."
Accompanying the report of the Committee, was the project of a law, which,
with some modifications not important in this case to be referred to, was,
adopted, and constitutes the law of 4th January, 1813.
57. On the 8th June, 1813, a final blow was given to the system of
commons of which I have been speaking, by the decree of that date which en-
acts that " all the clehesas (pastures) , hereditaments, and other lands of every
class whatsoever pertaining to private domminion, be they free or entailed
are declared to be henceforth and forever cerrados y acottydos (§ 47), and
the owners and possessors thereof may inclose them without prejudice to the
paths, watering places, roads, crossings and services, enjoy them freely and
exclusively, or rent them as they may think proper, and destine them to
cultivation, pasturage,!*or planting, or the use which may best suit them
;
being consequently abrogated all laws whatsoever which determine the use
that is to be made of these lands, for this is to be left entirely to the choice
of the owner." And, consequently, in many of the titles since issued by
the Government, it is expressed that the grantee may destine the land to
the use which best suits him, which means simply that when he has acquired
the full dominion by actual occupancy, and a compliance with the conditions
which the law annexes, he will be free to use his property as he pleases, ex-
empt from the common of pasture and fuel, and the numerous legal restric-
tions, which constitued a part of the ancient and complicated system which
was completely overthrown by the two acts referred to.
58. The preamble to the law of 4th January 1813, expresses the object
of it. " The general and extraordinary Cortes considering that the reduction
of terrenos comunes to private dominion is one of the measures most impe-
riously demanded for the welfare of the people, the fomentation of agricul-
ture and industry, and desiring at the same time with this class of lands to
furnish aid for the public necessities, a reward for the meritorious defenders
of the country, and assistance to the citizens not proprietors, decree etc."
among other things (art. 15) that there shall be given gratuitously, for
once only, a suerte proportioned to the extent of the lands, to every citizen
of the respective towns, who may petition therefor and has no other land of
his own, provided that the whole of the lands thus distributed (que asi se
reparian) do not in any case exceed the fourth part of the royal and vacant
lands. The other three fourths were reserved for sale on account of the
treasury, and to be distributed as rewards to the officers and soldiers of the
army. (Art. and 9).
59. The grants by gratuitous repartimiento to citizens are to be
in full property, but if they fail to make use of the land for two consecutive
years, it is to be forfeited and regranted to some one more industrious. The
grantees can not alienate the land given them till the expiration of four
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years, the period of time requisite to acquire the dominion by occupancy,
(see ante sec. 19), nor at any time entail or transfer it in mortmain.
60. The word suerte, when applied to land, does not designate a defi-
nite quantity, but simply an allotment which is segregated from the
rest, and is so called because in the original distribution of landed property
in Spain the portion of each was ascertained por suerte, by lot. Agellus,
sorte habitus, a small estate obtained by lot. As to extent or quantity
suerte is no more definite than sitio, situs, site, a place occupied by a house,
fortress, town, farm or rancho. By Tit. 14, Art. 5, Reglamento of 1781,
the suertes, or allotments to be assigned to the new pobladores Avere limited
to two hundred varas square, of which four were to be given to each.
61. When we regard the strictly proper sense of words, swerve will
be found to be the only generic expression to convey the simple and unqual-
ified idea of any allotment of land, and that is the way it is used generally,
as well as in the 10th and 15th articles of the law of 4th January, 1813,
which require that the suertes, the tracts, portions or allotments of land shall
be proportioned to the extent of land subject to repartimiento, and of greater
or less extent, accwding to the value and the countries where they are sit-
uated.
62. The 9th article of the law of 18th August, 1824, like the 3d
article of that of 4th January, 1813, recognizes, in the concluding part of it,
the preference due to those who are resident in the place to which the lands
belong, which may be distributed que se reparian.
63. The terms of the 77th article of the organic law of March, 1837,
being all made clear, it requires no argument to show what is the nature and
extent of the authority conferred, for the language is not ambiguous. It is only
necessary to know the meaning of the tvords, which I aimed to explain by
a brief reference to the legal history of the subject matter.
64. " They shall regulate" that is, they shall prescribe the rule by
which the repartimiento is to be governed. Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat.
196, and sec.) The power conferred over the subject, whatever that sub-
ject may be, is as full and complete as that conferred on the President over
the subject of colonization by the 16th article of the previously existing law
aj 18th August, 1824. It is suoject to no restriction, but what the laws
impose, requires, in order to its exercise, no seperior inceptive action, and is
liable to no control or review, except that which inherently or by some ex-
press dispositions of the public law of the State, resides in the superior func-
tionaries in the political order.
The matter thus to be regulated is the repartimiento, or distribution in
full property " conformablv to the laws," (sec 43, LI. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8,
10, 15 ; T, 12, Lib. 4, R. I. and sees. 45, 55, 58, 59, &2 ; L. 8, T. 22,
Lib. 7, Nov. R. arts. 12, 13, 22 ; L. 4, 5, 7, art. 5 ; L. 8, arts. 6, 7, 10,
same tit. and Lib. ; Decree 13th March 1811 ; ib. 4th June 1823, arts. 1,
2, 3 ; ib. 19th Julv 1823, art. 9 ; ib. 6th Aug. 1823, preamble and art. 3 ;
ib. 18th Sept. 1823 ; ib. 14th Oct. 1823, art. 7 ; ib. 18th April 1828, art.
1 and 2), of the tierras comunes.^ that is the public lands, which by the laws
of Spain and the Indies remaining vigentes in the Republic were dedicated
to common use and pasturage (sees. 47, 48, 49 and 50, L. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9,
T. 17, Lib. 4, R. I. ; L. 2, T. 21 ; L. 1 and 2, T. 23 and L. 1, T. 24, Lib.
7 N. R.) in the towns, that is within the termino or demarcation of the mu-
nicipality, which embraces frequently a very extensive territory, Mexico for
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example, had originally a termino, 15 leagues (say 75 miles) in diameter.
The municipal limits of Monterey extended to about 30 miles north of the
site on "which the present city exists
;
(vide sec. 50.)
The powers conferred are to be exercised guhernativamente or executively,
that is, in the manner and form, and in the constitutional order prtscribed
for the action of the Government or Executive, (same law art. 3, at. 12 ; arts.
4, 5, 64, 65, QQ,~) and not by invading the province of the legislature or the
judiciary, because the constitutional bases of 1835 art. 4th, declares that no
two of the three powers must ever be confided to the same person, a princi-
ple which has always been regarded as sacred, in Mexico, since the adop-
tion of the Constitution of 1824.
CONCLUSION.
The claim in this case is entitled to confirmation then, on the grounds
already stated at large, namely
:
1. Because the claimant was in undisputed possessKn of the property,
claiming and acknowledged to be the owner at the time of the conquest and
the treaty subsequently made, and had been continuously in possession for
many years before.
2. He had complied with all the requisites and conditions prescribed for
settlers in any anl all the laws and regulations, Mexican and Spanish.
3. The grant of May 4, 1839, being made by express order of the
Governor, was the Governor's act.
4. That it was made in pursuance of such order, cannot be disputed,
beeause it is so declared in the official document of the Prefect, proved to be
genuine and authenticated in the legal form.
5. The Prefect was authorized to make the grant on his OAvn authority,
by the express provisions of the 77th article of the organic law of 20th
March, 1837.
6. The custom, in conformity with which the grant was made, though
founded in mistake of the law, constitutes the^w of the case.
7. The approval and confirmation of the claimant's right by the former
Government, is to be presumed from his long and undisputed possession.
HORACE HAWES.
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W. Carey Jones, Esq.
Dear Sir :
The undersigned, members of the Bar, having listened with great interest to
your closing argument in the case of " Cruz Cervantes," before the TJ. S. Board of Land Commission-
ers, take the liberty of suggesting that its publication would greatly facilitate their oven labors before
the Board, as well by the thorough collation of American authorities which it contains, as by the
learning and research in Spanish and Mexican law which it exhibits. They would be greatly pleased,
therefore, if you would consent to publish the same at an early day.
"With the highest regard,
CLARKE, TAYLOE & BECKH,
SAUjSDERS, HEPBURN & BAGLEY,
SUTHERLAND & CARR.
San Francisco, June 8, 1852.
Gentlemen :
I have pleasure in acceding to your request, and am much obliged to you for the flatter-
ing manner in which it is conveyed. In compliance with your wishes, I will immediately cause my
argument to be delivered to the press, and shall be very happy if it can be of any avail in subsequent
labors before the Board.
Very Respectfully,
Tour ob't scrv't,
WM. CAREY JONES.
Messrs. Clarke, Taylor & Beckh,
Saunders, Hepburn <fc Bagley,
Sutherland & Cark.
COMMISSION 01 LAID CLAIMS
CASE OF CRUZ CERVANTES. •
ARGUMENT.
The objections taken to this claim, by the Law Agent of the Uni-
ted States, are substantially as follows :
1. That it has not been surveyed according to a certain ancient
ordinance of the Viceroy of Mexico, now published in the Law Di-
rectory of Bscriche.
2. That the claimant has not shown that he built a house on the
land within one year after the grant, according to one of the direc-
tions contained in the grant.
3. That the grant was of land which had been pertinent to a
Mission, and hence not grantable.
4. That the claimant has not shown that his grant was approved
by the Territorial Deputation.
5. That the land embraced in the grant had been proved, by the
proceedings prior to the grant, to be within ten leagues of the sea-
coast, and hence (whether in point of fact that was its position or
not) the grant was void.
This is not the order in which the objections were stated, but
they embrace, I believe all that were taken.
I. In regard to the survey : that made in the act of Juridical Deliv-
ery was substantially according to the ordinance quoted ; it ascertain-
ed the limits on all sides where there were adjoining neighbors, which
is the only object contemplated by surveys of grants under the Span-
ish or Mexican mode of distributing lands. This survey fixes three
of the lines
;
quantity fixes the fourth. If the lines were not run
by the compass, it was because there was not such an instrument in
the country ; because the boundaries expressed in the grunt did not
4^dmit of a survey by right lines
;
and because the adjoining neigh-
bors, the only persons interested, did not require it
;
a circumstance
contemplated and provided for in the ordinance. The only depar-
ture, then, from the ordinance is in the fact that the magistrate did
not begin in the centre of the land and measure outwardly. As this
rude mode of surveying, which has led to infinite mischiefwherever
adopted, and has long since gone into disuse, was not the best
mode of ascertaining the boundaries of the tract I think the magis-
trate will be excused for not adopting it.
This mode of measuring lands came into practice in the great
plateau of Mexico, and some other parts of Spanish America that
became suddenly populous
;
where the settlers dropped down, as it
were, on the domain, prior to receiving grants, and without system
;
then, the plan was adopted of considering each one's house as the
centre of his tract, or claim, and hence the plan of going to the cen-
tre to measure outwardly. It was never adopted in the great rural
grants, which were by natural boundaries—from mountain to moun-
tain—river to river—of which the only surveys were by vista de
ojos—occular inspection. The ordinance quoted, never was law in
California
;
as already stated, it has long since gone into disuse, even
in Mexico ; and it is reproduced in the Book of Escriche, as a curi-
osity—a remnant of antiquity, dug up from old manuscripts in a
private library, and is now for the first time printed. The original
intention of the ordinance was not for the measurement of grants,
but to settle private disputes, and ascertain priority of private rights,
as is shown in the note that follows its directions for measuring sitios.
Neither Spain or Mexico ever had any regular surveys of their do-
mains. The grants were almost invariably made according to the
selections of the grantees, and seldom surveyed until a multiplica-
tion of grants in the same neighborhood required it for the purpose
of determining coterminous lines.
Under the Mexican government, there was never a surveyor in
California. Under the Spanish government there was a royal engi-
neer, who occasionally made surveys to the extent of running out
disputed boundaries, as for instance, about the year 1802, the boun-
dary between the Mission of Santa Clara and the Pueblo of San
Tose
;
but in ascertaining the limits of those establishments, this en-
gineer did not consult the present distombed ordinance, nor begin
in the middle of the tracts and measure outwardly. We all know
that no such system prevailed in the Spanish provinces of Louisia-
na, Missouri or Florida.
2. The Mexican laws concerning grants of lands do not contem-
plate surveys. It is well known, that there was no person in Cali-
fornia competent to make a survey ; and if this ordinance was
required to be fulfilled, it was equivalent to forbidding any grant to
be made. If it were ever in force, either it repealed the Coloniza-
tion Laws and Rules, or they repealed it. The second section of
the law of 1824, shows that other means than surveys were con-
template*} for ascertaining the land to be granted. The law does
not require even judicial delivery. The reports of magistrates and
of witnesses, to identify the land, and declare whether it were
vacant, show that the lands were ascertained and known before
hand. The judicial possession was only in the nature of livery of
seisin—an act in pais—to make the possession, and the extent of
it, notorious : to settle and to avoid disputes. The right and the
fact of entry existed before.
3. That no where is a survey necessary to the validity of a grant.
In connection with a grant, the only object of a survey, is to ascer-
tain the land. If this is ascertained by the grant, oi; may be by
testimony dehors, the grant is good, and a survey a distinct matter,
neither hurting nor helping its validity. This is held by the Su-
preme Court, in relation to Spanish grants even in those provinces
where there was a royal surveyor, whose business it was to lay off
grants of land. In A?Tedo?ido Js case, 13 P. 134, the issuing of the
Spanish title was specially reserved till the grantee should cause
an official survey to be made, and return the plat, for the descrip-
tion to be entered in the patent. Yet the want of a survey was
held not to interfere with the effect of the title, or with the right of
the party to the land granted : and though no survey had been
made, nor even the locality definitely ascertained, the grant was
confirmed by the judgment of the Court, and the surveyor general
ordered to make a survey at the place named in the grant. Many
other cases are to the like effect.
4. That laws concerning surveys are directory to the officer, and
the grantee cannot suffer by his omissions or mistakes. (3 Wh. 594.
3 Pet. 320.) That this is specially the case, in the presence instance,
where the provision in the grant, is, first, without authority of law,
and, second, merely directory to the judge.
5. That whether a survey were made or not, or if made, whether
correct or erroneous, the natural objects called for in the grant would
govern. 9 Cr. 173.' Mclvers v. Walker, 6 P. 498.
II. To the objection that the claimant has not shown that he
built a house on the land within a year after the date of his grant,
I reply,
1. That the law does not make any requisition of that kind, and
hence that the condition inserted in the grant is not obligatory.
Section 11, of the Regulations of 1828, provides that a certain time
shall be fixed by the Governor within which improArements shall be
made
;
but this provision relates only to concessions made to em-
presarios, for colonization.
2. That by the provision inserted in the grant, non-performance
does not void the grant, only opens the land to denouncement until
which time the grant was good, and even then the grantee would
have had preference over any other who might desire it, and an
extension of time on proper snowing, be given him to occupy it.
The first section of the Regulation of 1828. authorizes the Governor
6jto grant lands to persons who may solicit them " with the object of
cultivating or inhabiting them " ; but no time is prescribed within
which this intention must be carried into effect. If earned into
effect, therefore, within a reasonable time—within a time to show
that the application was sincere—both the purpose and the letter of
the law will be answered. In the present case the occupation did
follow within a reasonable time, and in time to show that the grant
was solicited for the purpose contemplated in the law. Moreover,
the disturbed state of the country, and particularly of the neigh-
borhood where the land was situated, was a sufficient reason for
not opening^, new and exposed settlement, during the years 1836
and 1837. Before the revolution was completed, or order restored,
the grantee had made his settlement, built his house, and established
his family, as is shown in the testimony. This is as much diligence
as any law can require.
3. Even if the grant were voidable, for non-improvement of the
land within a year, the subsequent improvement, before advantage
was taken of the lapse or the land denounced, would cure the fault
and consolidate the title. That is, if after the expiration of the
specified year, and before the improvement, the land might be de-
nounced, and granted to another
;
yet, if not denounced, during
that interval, it could not be after the improvement or occupation.
The condition in the grant does not contemplate the forfeiture of
the land to the government ; only proposes to make it voidable, in
favor of another, more enterprising than the grantee, should any
other seek it in the prescribed mode. The title does not, and does
not profess, to reserve any power in the government to recall the
grant to itself. As this tract was never denounced, the necessary
inference is, that, according to law and the usages and customs of
the country, it was never opened to denouncement. At all events,
if ever denounceable, it ceased to be so after the improvement was
made or occupation commenced.
4. Moreover, the real concession, the document by which title
passes—the decree, in which the Governor parts with his discretion,
and " accedes," in the language of the law, " to the request of the
petitioner,"— does not contain the condition. The grant there is
unconditional, in fee simple. How could the Governor afterward
limit this title, by the insertion, in what is called the " title in form,"
and which is merely ministerial, of a material limitation like this ?
III. The objection that the land embraced in the grant had been
pertinent to a Mission. The objection is suggested by the law
agent, under the 17th section of the Regulation of 1828.
1. This section only forbids the colonization of lands occupied
by the Missions, and this is shown in the proceedings prior to the
grant not to have been then in occupation.
2. The section only forbids colonization, while the right of resi-
dent citizens to settlements in those lands is expressly recognized.
The language of the section is, that lands occupied by the Missions
shall not be colonized at present ; nor till it be determined if they
ought not to be considered as the property of the Indian pupils and
of the Mexican inhabitants. This phrase has been erroneously
translated " Mexican colonists"—as much as to say, that the lands
should not be colonized till it be determined if they were not the
especial property of colonists ; a mistranslation which is an apt ex-
ample of the confusion of terms which has arisen from a loose read-
ing of the colonization laws and rules. It has also been suggested
that the section alludes to Mexican settlers on the Mission lands.
But there were no Mexican settlers on the Mission lands. There
were no settlers on the Mission lands, except the Indian laborers,
servants of the Missions. So powerful were the heads of the Mis-
sions to keep off Mexican settlers from the lands which they had
once appropriated, that there is an instance of record, where a
Mexican settler came with a grant from the Viceroy and Audiencia
of Mexico, for a particular piece of ground ; and undertaking to
occupy it, was opposed by the priests of the nearest Mission, and
after a contest of several years, gave it up, and took another piece
which the Mission had not occupied. There were, then, no Mexi-
can settlers on the Mission lands ; and the section cannot be under-
stood in any other way, than as intended to discriminate between
grants for colonization and grants to resident settlers of the country
and for the 'protection ofthe latter. We are warned by the Supreme
Court (7 Peters 95) of the necessity of careful examination of
papers translated from a foreign language, containing uncertain and
incomplete references to things well understood by the parties, but
not perhaps understood by ourselves : and I cannot imagine a
stronger case for the application of this rule. It would be a gross
instance of perversion of language and mal interpretation, to con-
strue this section so as to rob the founders of California of the rights
it was inserted for the specific purpose of securing to them.
3. Whatever construction may be given to the 17th section, the
laws of secularization, and the subsequent instructions of the Su-
preme Government opened the Mission lands like others to grants.
It was stated by the Law Agent that the secularization laws did not
go into operation here till 1835. I do not know where he could
have received this idea
;
since it is well known that the regulations
established by the Governor and Deputation for carrying that law
into effect, went into operation in August 1834. There was also an
act of the Deputation as early as May, 1834, providing especially
that the vacant lands of the Missions might be colonized. The
question was also presented by the Law Agent in this specious
shape : whether the mere act of secularization, would determine
the question presented in the 17th section of the Regulation of 1828,
and so open the Mission lands to colonization? The matter does
not rest on the mere order of secularization ; though if it did it
would be quite sufficient for our purpose, as we shall see by refer-
ence to the 6th section of the decree of the Spanish Cortes of 1 3th
September, 1813, that secularization of Missions includes the distri-
bution of the lands, and their reduction to private ownership.* But
the Act of 26th November, 1833, directs the Government to take
active measures for the secularization and colonization, of the Mis-
sions of California ; and the Instructions given inconsequence of
that decree, to the Political Chief of Upper California and Director
of Colonization in Upper and Lower, in April, 1834, direct that he
shall " make beginning" of his colonization labors, by " occupying
all the Missions of both territories."t
IV. The objection that the claimant has not shown that the
grant was approved by the Territorial Deputation. On this point,
I contend :
1. That if the lack of confirmation by the Deputation affects the
validity or binding force of a grant, it belongs to the Government
to show that the confirmation has not been given
;
because the sup-
position of law is that it has been given. The supposition of law
is, that the long occupation ofthe land by Cervantes has been right-
ful
; that having the grant, and living on the land as its owner,
with the acquiesence of the government, the supposition of the law
is, that every thing necessary to the perfection of the grant had
been done, and that he held the land in fee. This presumption of
law becomes stronger in a case like the present, when all that re-
mained to be done after the issue of the grant, was in the hands of
the grantor, and not necessary or likely to be known to the grantee.
Nor is this presumption of the law to be rebutted by supposititious
testimony ; it must be met, if at all, by positive testimony, or by
such negative testimony as to be conclusive. As for instance, if
the proceedings of the Deputation existed complete and reasonably
easy of examination ; and a search of them did not show the con-
firmation, that perhaps might be held conclusive, or to throw the
proof on the claimant.
The facts shown in this particular are as follows :
On the part of claimant : That he received his grant in due
form 1 April, 1836 ; shortly after went into occupation and has so
continued ; that in February 1841, he received juridical possession,
from the proper magistrate, in presence of the only other parties
interested, the adjoining proprietors.
On the part of the Government : That all preliminary steps
were properly taken ; that the concession, with the proceedings on
which it was founded, was sent to the Deputation, and there refer-
red to the Committee on Vacant Lands ; that the Committee re-
ported, recommending the approval of the grant ; that the Deputa-
tion recommitted the Report for amendment.
* " Collection of Decrees of the Spanish Cortes in force in Mexico." Mexico, 1829 :
p. 107. Jones's Report on Land Titles in California, p. 13.
t MSS. Archives in possession of the Surveyor General, Figucroa's Manifesto,
p. 11. Jones's Report, p. 14.
9The proof here stops
;
and I contend that the Government having
proved so much, ought to prove more ; or rather that it cannot be
inferred from the proofwhich is in, that the approval was not given
;
but the contrary. First, because it was the duty of the Committee,
after the recommitment, to make an amended report, according to
their instructions, and the duty of the Deputation afterward to act
on the report ; and the inference of law, there being no proof or
semblance of proofto the contrary, will be that those officers perform-
ed their duty. Second, because it was the evident intention of the
Deputation to approve the grant ; and that the recommitment was
only intended to perfect the report. What was the nature of the
amendment we have no means of knowing. The book of proceed-
ings of the Deputation is not produced, as it ought to be, being the
best evidence, or its absence accounted for. The book, however,
does not exist, and hence we have no means of knowing what the
proposed amendment was
;
but whatever it was, an amendment is
always designed to improve, to perfect ; and an intention to destroy
cannot be argued from directions to amend. The books and records
are not extant ; the actors in the matter are either absent or dead
(as shown in the testimony of Pacheco) ; and, as it was properly
begun, there is no rule of law that will argue from mere inference,
that it was not properly finished. Whatever means of proof do
exist, exist in the hands of the Government ; they never were in
the hands of the claimant ; he is not* responsible for their non-pro-
duction
;
nor for their loss
;
and who will undertake to say that if
all the records for 1836, 1837, 1838, up to 1846, when the Depart-
mental Assembly finally dissolved, if those records were produced,
this approval would not appear ? It devolves on the party denying
it, and especially where that party has all the proofs that exist in
his own hands, it devolves on him, to prove the omission. The
record, as far as it goes, is now, and has been for years back, in the
general archives
; no longer in those of the committee ; back among
the archives of titles, and embraced in the list of " adjudicated lands."
2d. If however, the grant was not approved by the Deputation,
it could only have been from neglect on the part of the officers of
the Government. The grant was in every respect proper ; there
was no reason known to the law, or to the policy or custom of the
country, why it should not have been confirmed ; every reason of
law and policy combined, why it should have been ; and if it was
not approved, the cause was in that civil revolution which at the
moment the grant was before the Deputation, broke up the proceed-
ings of that body, and in the subsequent neglect of the successors
of that body to take up its unfinished business. From this neglect
or forgetfulness on the part of the agents of the grantor, the claim-
ant cannot lawfully and ought not to suffer.
Let us, however, examine what is in fact the nature of this ap-
prabatory function of the Territorial Deputation.
By Section 1, of the Mexican Executive Regulations of 1828.
B
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the Political Chiefs of the Territories were authorized to grant
lands—" conceder terrenoe"—to empresarios (that is, contractors to
bring in colonists) and to private persons. Section 2, 3, and 4 point
out the preliminary steps, and the mode of making concessions.
Section 5, declares that concessions made to individuals shall not
he held " definitively binding" or, as it may be translated, defini-
tively valid, without the consent thereto had of the Deputation.
Section 6 declares that when the Political Chief shall "'•fail to ob-
tain" the approbation of the Deputation, he shall report the case to
the Supreme Government, for its determination
; that is, he shall
appeal, on behalf of the grantee, from the Deputation to the Su-
preme authorities.
The necessary corrollary is, that it was the business of the Gov-
ernor to make the grant ; that the Deputation had the power to
affirm it, and thereby render it definitive
;
or they had the power to
refuse their affirmation, and thereby throw the final determination
of the grant on the Supreme Government.
Two further deductions also follow: 1st. That the Deputation
could not destroy a grant ; 2d. That after the making of the grant,
by the Governor, no other power, not even the Supreme Govern-
ment, could interfere with it, to question its validity, pending the
action of the Deputation.
Whilst, then, the Territorial Deputation of California existed, it
had power over grants of the nature of the one now before the
Board, to this extent, to wit : definitively to affirm them, or qualifi-
ed to negative them : pending this action, and until a direct refusal
of affirmation, the grant continued subsisting and valid, without
power, on the part of any other functionary or authority, to ques-
tion or interfere with it. Consequently, on the dissolution of the
Deputation, without exercising that qualified negative, the grant
necessarily became absolute, because there was no longer any per-
son or body to whom the power had been reserved to question it.
It is certain that the concession spoken of in the law, had vitali-
ty—had validity—immediately on being made by the Governor.
This follows from the positive terms in which the granting power
is given to the Governor, and to him alone ; from the usage and
custom of the country, as is shown in the proof, and which is like-
wise contemporaneous exposition of the law ; from the objects and
policy of the law ; and from the qualifying word definitively ap-
plied to the validity which the approval of the Deputation should
confer. It must have had some kind of validity before, since it
was now to be made definitively valid or binding.
The Attorney of the Government attempted, with great ingenuity,
to erase this word definitively ; but it is full of meaning and is in-
serted for a purpose, and to strike it out would change the character
of the law, and, as we shall see, reverse its purpose.
Now how was this original vitality and validity to be destroyed?
It could only be destroyed by the concurrent action of the Deputa-
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tion, begun by the Deputation, and of the Supreme, Government
affirming that of the Deputation ; because, from any negative ac-
tion of the Deputation, the Supreme Government reserved an appeal
to it itself ; but did not reserve any original right of negation. It
follows, then, as stated above, that when the only tribunal that had
power to originate a negative action has ceased to exist, that nega-
tive action has become impossible, and the grant per force absolute.
Again, the grant is made by the appointed agent of the Govern-
ment. It was made according to law ; but it is not definitely bind-
ing till it has gone through another prescribed process. It is not de-
finitely binding, because it may still be reviewed, annulled. But it
can only be reviewed in a particular way, by a particular tribunal
;
and can only be annulled by "the Government itself, after being thus
reviewed. Now when that particular mode of reviewing the title
by that particular tribunal, becomes impossible, the control of the
Government over the title is gone, because it did not reserve any oth-
er mode or means. The decisions which may be made, by this
Board in favor of claims, will be valid certainly ; but not definitive-
ly binding on the Government of the United States. The cases will
still be in the control of the government for review and possibly re-
versal
;
but in its control only through a particular mode and means.
Should that control, in the particular prescribed way, in the exercise
of a just discretion on the part of trie agents of the government, be
not availed of, or even in any way become impossible, then the con-
trol of the government is gone
—
gone absolutely
—
gone definitively
—
gone forever—and the decision of the Board becomes absolute.
The Mexican government did not then reserve any power to
negative grants to individuals, made by its territorial Governors,
except when the same should be first disapproved by the territorial
deputation. Its policy was. to have the lands distributed ; distrib-
uted by secure titles, and with as little expense and trouble as pos-
sible to the grantee
;
hence, it was not its policy to hold titles in
suspense, or reserve questions concerning them for settlement at
that remote capital, except where the local council, by disapproving
a grant, should raise a just doubt of its propriety. Hence, that gov-
ernment did not reserve any other power over grants once made by
its Governors
;
nor any other means of reaching them ; and hence,
I say, that that means being abrogated, or become impossible to be
exercised, the grant stands divested of that reservation to its difini-
tive validity.
It is easy to perceive the object of these provisions. It was the
intention of the Mexican Government, that the settlement of the
territories should be made conformably to the views of the central
authorities. Hence the law gives the central executive control over
the peopling of the territories
;
and the regulations depute the ex-
clusive granting power to an officer who held his appointment from
Mexico, came hence impressed with the wishes of the central govern-
ment and was responsible to it for bis conduct. At the same time
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a sufficient check was placed on the Governor's otherwise absolute
discretion to secure the rights of the native population of the terri-
tory, and to give the government notice of abuses. The qualified
negative reserved to the deputation—accomplished that object ; but
any power in the deputation beyond that qualified negative, would
have defeated the purpose of the government. Because an abso-
lute negative given to the deputation, or, what is the same thing, if
their positive concurrence had been made necessary to the vitality
of the Governor's concession, then the whole power would be vir-
tually taken out of the hands of the Governor—the federal ap-
pointee—and he compelled to fall into the views, however narrow
and exclusive, of the local council ; or the granting power come to
a dead lock. Neither of these alternatives was consistent with the
plan of the Central Government. It was not consistent with the
paternal policy that the people of California should be deprived of
a just participation in the distribution of the domain of their terri-
tory, by a Governor coming from abroad, and having perhaps no
sympathy with them ; nor, on the other hand, was a controlling
power in the hands of the local functionaries, consistent with its
enlarged views which that government ever entertained, but had
never energy or consistency to carry out, of peopling this country
with whatever enterprising population it could invite to it, and
opening that commerce with Oceanica and Asia, which is just now,
under other auspices, spreading its pinions.
Under this view of the policy and intent of the law, it is thor-
oughly consistent, and its provisions well framed and adapted. But
let us look at the consequences of the construction now attempted
to be given to the functions of the deputation. If this construction
be correct, that body had by implication, and might always have
exercised, what was denied to it both by the policy and letter of the
law. If the concession made by the Governor had no inherent
validity—no vitality till the breath of life was given it by a positive
vote of the deputation—then the deputation, by mere inaction—by
mere letting alone—was able to tie up the hands of the Governor,
hold the lands vacant, cut off the Supreme Government from its
reserved right of final decision, defeat the grant, defeat the views
of the government, and defeat the policy of the law. This would
be a "masterly inactivity" with a vengeance. Powers may and will
be sometimes implied to carry the purposes of law into effect, but
not to defeat its benevolent intentions, or enable inferior functiona-
ries to circumvent the reserved powers of the superior.
But the 5th and 6th sections of the Regulations, besides a quali-
fied restriction on his acts, impose also a duty on the Governor, viz :
to obtain for the grant the approval of the deputation ; or, failing
that, to report the case to the Supreme Government for its final
action. Now, I submit, that, in the absence of any proof to the
contrary, it must be presumed that the Governor performed this
duty, and did either obtain the approval of the deputation, or that
13
of the Supreme Government. And while I think that this is a
presumption which the law will per force give us the benefit of ,1
think the long quiet possession under claim of title, with knowledge
and acquiescence of the government and the public, and all the
authorities, establishes, in point of fact, and amounts to a declaration
on the part of the government that the grant had been completed.
Finally, we have shown that the usage and custom of the
country was that grants should be valid and subsistent from the
time of the Governor's concession, as is indeed expressly enacted
in section 22, of the Colonization Laws, of 1823, and which has
never been repealed, except so far as it is inconsistent with subse-
quent laws. The repeal of old laws is not effected by the enact-
ment of different provisions—the new provisions must be contrary.
7 Mar. La. Rep., N. S. 434.
The usage and custom, however, is sufficient for us, for this
usage and custom is made positive law by the act of Congress cre-
ating this Commission. Mitchell's case, 9 P. 734 ; Strother v. Lu-
cas, 12 P. 436. Smith v. U. S. 10 P. 329.
In Arredondo 6 P. 714, 715, the Supreme Court takes notice of, and
acts on the usage and custom of the province, though this is not
prescribed as a rule of decision for them, in the act of Congress
conferring the jurisdiction. Because, usage and custom, say the
Court, are a part of the law. That the proceeding would be a
mockery of justice if Congress had intended to exclude from their
consideration " usage and custom, which are the law of every gov-
ernment."
V. The " ten league" question.
1. The question does not arise in the present case, because it is
in proof that the land does not lie within ten leagues of the coast.*
As for the position taken by the Law Agent, that it has been judi-
cially proved in the proceedings .prior to the grant, that the land
does lie within ten leagues of the coast, and hence cannot now be
disputed, I take the true doctrine to be this, to wit : that the in-
quiries and investigations made by the Governor, prior to the con-
cession, are, in fact, in the nature of an inquest of office ; that, as
in any other inquest the particular facts reported, as for instance
this one, of the ten leagues, are not conclusive of the fact, but that
* The petition of the claimant in this case, to the Governor, soliciting the land,
was referred, according to the custom of the time, by the Governor to the Ayunta-
miento of Monterey, to report in regard to the locality and character of the land,
the fitness and claims of the petitioner, &c. The Ayuntamiento reported, among
other things, that the land was within the ten littoral leagues, concluding with the
opinion, however, that it was proper to be granted. Proof before the present
Board, shows the report of the Ayuntamiento touching the locality of the land with
reference to the sea coast, to have been erroneous. The Law Agent contended nev-
ertheless, that by the report of the Ayuntamiento the question of locality was judi-
cially ascertained and could not now be inquired into.
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the result, which may be likened to a verdict or judgment,
is conclusive ; and the sum of the report, when adopted by the
Governor and acted on. becomes res judicata. It cannot be said,
that each particular fact or opinion reported, is a fact judicially
found, because (if for no other reason) the different functionaries to
whom the subject was referred, might very well, and in fact often
did, make diverse reports : as in this case, one of the witnesses esti-
mates the land to be a league and a half, another a league, &c.
The particular facts and opinions, therefore, which are reported, are
not to be taken as proved ; and we cannot know what particular
ones of them were received by the Governor to determine his judg-
ment that the grant was proper to be made. But the inquiry itself
is to be taken, as before stated, as a judicial inquiry, in the nature,
as held by the Supreme Court, of an inquest of office at common
law, and its result—that is, the propriety of the grant—to be res
judicata. In MitcheWs case, 9 Peters, 711, the claimant held under
a grant from the Governor of Florida, of lands that were in the
occupation of the Seminole Indians at the time of the grant. The
grant was conditioned, that the grantee should not alien the lands
without the consent of the Government. In 1817, the grantee ap-
plied to the Captain General of Cuba for this consent. The Captain
General referred the matter to the Assessor General of the Province
for his advice, and he reported that the lands had been lawfully
granted, in full property
;
and upon this report, the permission ask-
ed for to dispose of the land was given. Before the Supreme Court,
it was contended on the part of the United States, that the lands
being Indian lands the grant was not within the functions of the
officer making it, and was consequently void. The Court held,
that the proceedings before the Assessor General was in the nature
of an inquest of office, in analogy to the writ of ad quod damnum,
which by the common law precedes the grant of any charter or
patent by the King, and that the report of the Assessor General be-
ing acted on by the Captain General as on an inquisition at common
law, the Court would not go behind it, to presume that those officers
had exceeded their powers. And more especially will the rule hold
good in the present case as to the result of the inquiry when acted
on by the Governor, if it be good to the extent argued by the Law
Agent. It was in view of the whole, and such other matter as he
judged proper, that the Governor acted and made the grant, as will
be seen in the decree of concession.
2. The clause in the Mexican Colonization law of 1824, which
prohibits lands to be colonized within twenty leagues of cotermin-
ous nations, and ten of the sea coast, is not intended as a general
prohibition of grants of land ; but refers only to foreign coloniza-
tion, and is applicable to the States only, not to the Territories, of
the Republic.
Mexico did not intend to leave her sea coast unpopulated—a de-
rilict, open to foreign invasion, and the incursions of adventurers
;
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or those settlements already established on the sea-board unstrength-
ened and unreplenished. The suggestion is too absurd to be en-
tertained
;
and if it be contrary to every motive that can be sup-
posed to actuate a government, it is especially contrary to the policy
and wishes of the Mexican Government, whose immense extent of
sea coast on the two oceans, and long line of exposed frontier on
the borders of the United States, made her particularly solicitous
for their population and defence. The statute books are filled with
laws and decrees in encouragement of this object.
We shall better understand the policy of the law of 1824, if we
consider the circumstances under which it was passed. Mexico
after achieving her independence, stimulated by the prosperity and
progress which she beheld in the United States, and anxious to
strengthen herself against further attempts, then still apprehended
of subjugation by Spain, determined on a departure from the old
restrictive ideas of the Spanish metropolitan government, and to
adopt a liberal policy toward the people of other nations, as a means
to replenish her sparse population by American and other foreign
colonists. To this end was enacted the broad foundation of the
colonization law of 1823, by the government of which the Emperor
Yturbide was the head. (This law was enacted 4 January, 1823,
and published in California 14 July, 1823). On the abrogation
however, of the consolidated government, and the establishment of
the federative system, that law was suspended, and on its re-enact-
ment 17 August, 1824, it appeared with the restriction under con-
sideration, and other restrictions, prompted by jealousy of foreigners,
and a desire to retain powers in certain particulars in the Supreme
Government. The structure of the law exemplifies the mingled
feeling of desire and distrust which actuated its framers : desire to
strengthen the resources of their country by an infusion of foreign
enterprise and energy, and distrust and jealousy of the means by
which it was to be effected. The motive of the restriction, how-
ever, by which the Central Government sought to retain in its own
hands the control of so important a matter as foreign colonization
of the sea coasts, is easily perceived ; since through this sea board
it must derive a large part of its revenue ; through this only (or
the border leagues which were included in the same rule) could it
be attacked by foreign powers, or could foreign colonists combine
with their former governments, or the States themselves combine
with foreign powers or individuals against the integrity of the Re-
public. But the same considerations that would lead to this distrust,
and this restriction on the settlement of foreigners within the said
leagues of the sea, would lead to the promotion and encouragement
of settlements of native citizens. Hence, we shall find, how ex-
tremely solicitous the Mexican Government was to this end. To
show that this was the cherished policy of Mexico, I will quote,
first, the law of 6 April, 1830. This law (section 7) offers to Mexican
families who will go to colonize the frontier States, payment of the
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expenses of the voyage, maintenance for a year, and donations of
lands and agricultural implements. Section 13, opens for the en-
couragement of this emigration the ports of Galveston and Mata-
gorda to the free introduction of houses and provisions. Section 12,
permits the coast trade to foreigners for the space of four years, to
facilitate the transportation of the effects of such emigrants to the
ports of Tampico, Matamoras, and Vera Cruz
;
appropriates half a
million of dollars for establishing settlements and fortifications on
the frontiers, and conducting thither and sustaining on their arrival
Mexican families and presidarios ; forbidding at the same time the
colonization of any part of those frontier States (not alone the ten
or twenty leagues but any part) by foreigners of nations adjoining
thereto. In pursuance of this law, the government in carrying it
into execution, made in repeated circulars and orders, the most liberal
arrangements to facilitate its objects, and particularly to establish a
settlement at Galveston. I refer to the Circular of 21 November,
1830,* and the Regulation of 3 May, 1833,t from which it will be
seen that every means in the power of the Government, was adopt-
ed to effect the object spoken of. Again, the decree of 4 February,
1834, % manifests a like solicitude, and proposes a large expenditure
for (among other objects) the same great one of establishing Mexican
families in the frontier State of Coahuila and Texas, and of " con-
sulting the security of the frontiers," especially designating for such
colonization the lands on the divisory line of the Republic.
Again, a law of 22 May, 1827, within three years of the date of
the Colonization Law, and passed by a Congress composed nearly
of the same members as that of 1824. This is a law for the ex-
press purpose of encouraging the formation, preservation and in-
crease of settlements on the coasts, and as it is short I will quote it.
" 1. The importation of lumber, free of duty, is permitted for the
term of two years, for the sole object of forming, conserving or
augmenting settlements on the coast, in the extent of twenty littoral
leagues.
" 2. Are equally free of duties such national lumber [ or, timber
of domestic production,] as shall be directed to the objects spoken
of in the foregoing article."
The statute book is full of such laws. Here is one of Mexico
for the organization of the civil militia, with provisions for defence
of the ports and points on the frontiers ; adopted 29 December, 1827.
(Arrillaga April to July, 1833, p. 24.) Here is one of 8 May, 1828,
for establishing six companies of permanent cavalry in Upper and
Lower California ; and distributing their respective forces, one com-
.
pany at San Francisco, one at Monterey, one at Santa Barbara, one
at San Diego, one on the frontier of Lo ver California, and the sixth
* Arrillaga's Collection, April to July, 1833. p. 136.
t Ibid, p. 132.
% Arrillaga 1834, p. 17.
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at Loretto. (Arrillaga 1S28, p. 118.) Now this military was in-
tended for the protection and security of the inhabitants of the set-
tlements, established and to be established ; but the construction
attempted to be given to the 4th section of the Colonization Law,
would separate the military from the settlements
;
place the latter
exposed and defenceless in the interior, among the wild and savage
tribes
; the former, isolated and useless on the coast. The absurdity
of this suggestion is sufficient to condem it. It was unity not di-
vision
;
strength not weakness : that the Mexican government was
seeking in all these enactments. .Again, the statute book is full of
instances, for the exclusion of foreigners from the coasts and fron-
tiers. There is one of 30 April, 1828, directing all Spaniards living
on the coasts of the Mexican gulf, to retire inland twenty leagues.
The immediate cause of this decree was the anticipated approach
of a Spanish squadron of invasion ; but Mexicans were not ordered
to retire, because, on the contrary, they were wanted on the coast
to defend against the threatened danger. The 1st section of the
law of 6 April, 30, as already shown, prohibits settlements by for-
eigners of coterminus nations in any part of those States which
should border on such coterminus nation. The law of 14 March,
1842, enacted to allow foreigners to purchase and hold real property,
restricts them to within five leagues of the coast, and forbids their
settlement in the States which border with other nations. In 1837
the agents of Mexico entered into a convention with her creditors
in London, to appropriate a large part of her vacant domain to the
payment of her debts, and to convert her bonds into land warrants.
In 1839, this convention was ratified by the Mexican Government,
but with such reservations as entirely to exclude from the frontiers
and coasts the foreign emigration which the circulation of those
warrants was expected to bring in : section 4 of the act of ratifi-
cation, prescribing that the government should take care, that the
frontier lands should not be assigned to any subjects of coterminus
nations, who might happen to get hold of the warrants ; section 5,
that the premiums offered to the independent army (of the Repub-
lic) should be given in .the lands of Yucatan and the Californias
—
the exposed territories of the sea board ; that the concession prom-
ised to certain Indian tribes should appropriate the extreme fron-
tiers
;
and that the premiums to co-operators in the proposed recovery
of Texas, should embrace the lands on the coasts of the Mexican
gulf, within twenty leagues of the sea. All these provisions are at
once premiums on the settlement of the coasts and frontiers, and
restrictive of their colonization by foreigners.
Here, in California, a distinguished citizen, General Guadalupe
Vallejo, was commissioned in 1835, to found a settlement on the
northern frontiers and coasts of this territory, for the express pur-
pose of arresting the progress and forming a barrier against the
Russian settlements of Bodega and Ross, which appointment, and
the proceedings under it were approved by the Central Government
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in 1839, and the desire expressed that the settlements should con-
tinue to increase " for the object mentioned." These documents are
contained in the papers accompanying my Report on the subject of
Land Titles in California, Senate edition, page 81. These docu-
ments also illustrate both positions, viz : that, the restriction was
aimed at foreigners alone
;
and that settlements of native citizens
was an object of encouragement and solicitude.
All these, and many other acts which I might enumerate if it
were necessary, exemplify the policy of the Mexican Government,
which led to the 4th section of the law of 1824; and show that
that policy was, to draw colonists from foreign countries, into the
interior ; and establish native settlements between them and ad-
joining nations, and between them and the sea coasts
;
and this be-
ing so evidently the policy of the law, why shall we go behind it
to interpolate an absurd proposition contrary to it ?
Having, as I think, shown what was the policy of the law of
1824, I now invite attention to the proper construction of it by its
own terms.
The subject of the law is declared in its title, to wit, Colonization,
and colonization implies immigration, and does not apply to a
native or resident community. There may be domestic colonization,
as a colony coming from another part of the same nation ; but the
word necessarily implies immigration of some sort, and the first sec-
tion of this law shows what kind of colonization is here intended,
namely, foreign colonization.
The subject, then, being Colonization, the first section of the
law declares what class of persons is intended to be embraced in this
colonization. The second section declares what description of lands
are embraced in it. The third section directs the Congresses of the
several States to make their particular rules for the regulation and
reception of that colonization. The fourth section restricts the pow-
er of the States with respect to such colonization (without the pre-
vious approbation of the federal executive) in certain portions of
their territories. The fifth section still farther restricts the power
of the states in the same particular, by authorizing the federal gov-
ernment to make reservations for public purposes. The sixth and
seventh sections are designed to assure foreigners who may propose
to avail themselves of the offers of the law, of its permanency and
of good faith in its administration. The 8th section is a reservation
on the part of the government of a right, notwithstanding the pre-
ceding, to take measures for the security of the federation as against
those foreigners who may be admitted to colonize.
The ninth section is the first one that speaks of Mexican citizens,
and this, and the two following sections, are inserted in this con-
nection, in my opinion, as a limitation to the colonization spoken of
in the preceding ones, and are intended to declare that foreign colo-
nists shall not be admitted to the prejudice of the objects expressed
in these 9th, 10th and 11th sections. And hero T ask attention to
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the change in the phraseology of the law, which occurs at the intro-
duction of these sections. In all the preceding sections, colonization
is spoken of, and foreigners are the persons alluded to. At the 9th
section, the term colonization is dropped, and the distribution of
lands spoken of. And, this, for the good reason that to have em-
ployed the term colonization in reference to the subject matter of
these sections would have been an absurdity. Yet it is colonization
only, as referred to in the 1st, 2d and 3d sections, and not the distri-
bution of lands spoken of in the 9th, 10th and 11th sections which
is restricted by the 4th section, within the twenty limitary and ten lit-
toral leagues, and I submit that when foreign colonization is the subject
matter of the law, and the whole subject of one part of it, and the
distribution of lands to citizens is prescribed in another part of
it, and a prohibition is inserted in connection with those sec-
tions which treat exclusively of colonization, and the prohibition
expressly mentions colonization, and does not mention the other,
that other, that is the distribution to citizens, is necessarily excluded
from its operation. "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a
universal rule in the construction of statutes." Arredondo Js case, 6
Peters.
To continue the analysis of the law. The 9th section is the first
in which Mexican citizens are referred to, and this prescribes as a
limitation on the operation of the preceding ones, that the distribu-
tion of lands to citizens shall have preference over the colonization
which those preceding ones treat of, and then directs the rule which
shall govern that distribution. The 10th and 11th sections treat also
of the allotment of land to Mexican citizens, military and others,
who may have become entitled thereto by special services or con-
tracts. And here if we refer again to the decree of 4th February,
1834, we shall find that the classes of persons treated of in these
10th and 11th sections of the act of 1S24, are the very classes whose
settlement on the frontiers was most, desired. The 12th, 13th and
15th sections lay down some general rules apparently intended to
apply to all subsequent acquisitions from the public domain, and
accordingly their phraseology applies to all titles however derived.
Section 14 is for a further assurance of the colonization contracts
treated of in the beginning. The 16th and last section will be no-
ticed in a subsequent branch of the argument.
Another point of view in which we may look at this law, is this :
as prescribing rules for the distribution of the public domain in three
different channels : namely by foreign colonization ; by gratuitous
distribution to citizens ; by distribution to citizens in discharge of
government obligations. In the rules prescribed for foreign coloni-
zation, the restriction is inserted
; in the rules prescribed for the oth-
er modes of distribution it is not inserted. By what ingenuity, and
to what end can the law be tortured so that the prohibition can be
supposed to apply where it is expressly omitted, and where it would
defeat its express intent ?
20
But besides being only applicable to foreign colonization, and not
to the distribution of lands to citizens, the clause had no relation
to the territories of the Republic, only to the States the scope and
object of the law is to prescribe general rules and principles to
govern the particular Colonization Laws which were to be adopted
by the Congresses of the States. Looking carefully through the
law, we shall find that the territories are but twice mentioned in it,
namely, in the 11th section where it is enacted that a certain class
of public burdens shall be borne by the lands in the territories, as
a counterpoise to other public burdens'which are required in section
10, to be borne by the lands of the States ; and again in section 16,
which requires, the government, (meaning the federal executive) to
proceed to the colonization of the territories. In addition to this, if
we examine together the 3d, 4th and 5th sections of the law, we
shall find that they all refer to the same lands, and thes3 the
lands of the States. Section 3 requires that the Congresses of the
States, to the end expresed in the two previous sections, shall form
Rules for Colonization within their respective limits. Section 4
prescribes that without the assent of the federal executive, lands
within the twenty limitary and ten littoral leagues shall not be col-
onized
;
that is, as I interpret it, shall be excepted from those rules
which the States in the preceding section are required to adopt
;
and section 5th fixes that interpretation, because it enacts that for
the purposes therein mentioned, the federal government may reserve
and use portions of those lands—estos terrenos—that is, of the
lands immediately before mentioned, and which must mean lands
of the States, since it would be idle to enact that the federal gov-
ernment might reserve lands for public uses in the territories, when
the territories were held as its own property. But again, section 16
makes it the duty of the federal executive to proceed to the colon-
ization of the territories. To what end enact in the 4th section
that certain portions of the territories should not be colonized with-
out the consent of the federal executive, when the 16th section
refers the whole business of the colonization of the territories to
the same executive ? This last section of the law of 1824, in my
opinion, necessarily withdraws the laws of the territories from the
operation of the restriction contained in the 4th section ; since if no
part of the territories could be colonized without the previous ap-
probation and consent of the executive, of course, the .ten littoral
and twenty border leagues could not be. He is no more charged
with the colonization of one than of the other.
We shall arrive certainly at this conclusion if we consider what
is the effect of this 4th section. It is in the nature of a restriction
on a general permit, and its object and effect is to limit the discre-
tion of some one—of some one, to whom the duty of colonization
was confided. Now, the duties of colonization in the States, was
confided to the Congresses thereof: and the duties of colonization
in the territories was confided to the federal executive. The 4th
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section is not intended to limit the discretion of the latter, for, on
the contrary, it enlarges his powers
;
it is, then, intended to limit the
discretion of the Congresses of the States, and of course can only
apply to the States.
Under the general law, foreigners were never permitted to settle
or own property in the Spanish American possessions, and until the
Colonization Law of 1823, before spoken of, there had been no
such thing known in the provinces composing the new empire of
Mexico. The gratuitous distribution of land to native born subjects,
however, was no new idea, and required no new laws to authorize
it. It was a faculty inherent in the executive office, and had been
constantly exercised for three hundred years, by the chief political
authority, wherever there was a Spanish province. It had been
exercised by the Viceroy of Mexico, and every chief of province
under him since the conquest. The Colonization Law. therefore,
was not intended to create that power ; and hence the distribution
of lands to citizens is only incidentally mentioned, as a restriction
on the new faculty created, namely, that of granting to foreigners.
The federation did not pretend to own the vacant lands of the
States, and did not. attempt or pretend to regulate the mode of dis-
tribution to citizens. The States had already all the powers over
them, that were given by proprietorship, and were consistent with
the general laws of the Republic. There are repeated laws in
which this right of property of the States in their vacant lands is
expressly recognized. I will only refer to that of 6 April, 1830,
and that of 25 April, 1835. It was not competent, then, for the
General Government, even had that been its design, to limit the
authority of the States in the uses of their domain according to the
existing policy and laws, nor to take away functions already pos-
sessed by the States. It could not limit or control their right to
distribute and grant lands to their citizens, because that was a
function already possessed by the States, and consistent with the
policy of existing laws. But in introducing a new law, connected
with the exterior policy of the country, which was peculiarly in the
province of the Central Government, it might well and properly
prescribe limits to the privileges of the States in respect of it, and
reserve to itself such part of its management as it judged expedient.
The first act to admit foreigners to settle and hold real estate in
Mexico, was that before mentioned of 4 January, 1.823. It contains
no other restriction than that natives of the country, and particu-
larly the military, shall be preferred in the distribution of lands.
The ten league restriction was not necessary in this law, even if the
same policy and ideas prevailed, because under it—the federative
system not then existing—the whole administration of the law was
in the hands of the central executive
;
and it would have been as
idle to enact in that the restriction of the 4th section, as now to
interpret that 4th section to apply to the territories.
This Colonization Act of 1823 was followed 7 October, same
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year, by an act to repeal all the laws which prohibited foreigners
from holding shares in mines. This was adopted to procure the
introduction of foreign capital for the resuscitation and rehabitation
of old mines.
Next followed the Colonization Law of 18 August, 1824, intro-
ducing the restrictions we have noticed.
Some other restrictions are introduced in the passport and natur-
alization law of 1 2 March, 1828, as also some additional privileges.
This law also (section 9 and 10) in establishing a new law, partly
to be administered by the States, adopts certain rules to govern that
administration. Those sections provide that unnaturalized foreign-
ers may propose for the purchase and colonization of lands of pri-
vate ownership, but to obtain the privilege, must have the special
permission of the General Congress; if the purchase and coloniza-
tion should be in the territories, and of the particular Congresses,
if in the States ; that the particular Congresses might give this per-
mission or not, as they chose, and impose such conditions as they
thought proper ; but stipulating the following which should serve
as a basis for every contract of the kind, with the understanding
that the legislatures might narrow them but couI,d not amplify them,
to wit: 1. That the fourth part of the colonists should be Mexicans.
2. That within seven years the estates should be divided into small
tracts. 3. That the empresario not naturalized should not reserve
a tract exceeding sixteen square leagues, and that this should be
sold within twelve years, counting from the time in which the
estate ought to be divided.
The next law touching the subject is that of 14 April, 1828, pre-
scribing rules for letters of naturalization, the 13th and 14th sections
of which enact, 1. That every empresario who comes to colonize,
in accordance with the law of the State where he may settle, shall
have a right to ask for a letter of naturalization, which shall be
conceded to him, he taking an oath of obedience to the Constitution
and Laws. 2. That colonists who come to settle the colonizable
lands shall be held as naturalized at the expiration of one year from
their establishment. These sections relate of course to persons who
may come in under the Colonization Laws, and show the sense in
which the term colonists is used.
The 11th article of the act of 6 April, 1830, as already shown,
again makes a very material restriction, that of prohibiting the
States which border with other nations from colonization by citizens
of such coterminous nations.
The act of 21 November, 1833, repeals that restriction.
The act of 25 April, 1 835, makes another very material restric-
tion, no less than forbidding absolutely the States of the frontier
and of the sea coasts from aliening their lands for the purpose of
colonization until rules should be established to govern it.
This section, again, shows the sense in which the term coloniza-
tion, in the Mexican law, is to be understood ; for it cannot be
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supposed that in this enactment the Mexican Congress intended so
suicidal a policy as to stop all acquisitions of land from the domain
of the border States ; but the object of the law was to prevent their
settlement by emigrants from abroad. The point, however, does
not stand on this hypothesis alone ; it is, demonstrable that the
terms are used both in the law under consideration, and in that of
1824, in regard to immigration alone, and that foreign immigration.
The following is the section entire :
" In use of the power, which the General Congress reserved, in
article 7, of the said law of 18 August, 1824, the border and coast
States are prohibited from alienating their vacant lands for the pur-
pose of colonizing them, until rules shall be established which they
shall observe therein."*
Now the faculty reserved by the General Congress, in said article
7, law of 1824, in exercise of which the above section is enacted,
extends only to the right of prohibiting the entrance of foreigners
—
" la entrada de estrangeros "— for the purpose of colonization. It
does not reserve the right to prohibit grants to citizens ; and we
must interpret the power exercised, with reference to the power
reserved ; and conclude that the term colonization, as understood
by those law makers, was equivalent, in the act of 1835, to the
term "entrance of foreigners to colonize," in the law of 1824.
Again, in the section quoted from the law of 1835, the prohib-
ition is not against the alienation of their lands by the States men-
tioned, but against their alienation, for the purpose of colonization ;
and the latter branch of the provision evidently qualifies and
limits the former.
The restriction contained in the 4th section act of 1824 ; that
contained in the 11th section, act G April, 1830, and that contained
in the law under consideration, of 25 April, 1835, must be understood
as of the same subject matter ; as relating to one and the same thing
;
the first named, as restricting foreign colonization within ten leagues
of the sea coast, and twenty of border nations ; the second as prohib-
iting the colonization by emigrants from border nations of the
States with which such nation bordered ; the third as prohibiting
any foreign colonization of the border and coast States.
To resume our summary of the fmctations of the law in the par-
ticular under consideration.
The act of 4 April, 1837, revives the restriction contained in that
6 April, 1830.
The decree of 14 March, 1842, again extends the privileges of
foreigners in regard to rural property, and with the exception of the
border and coast departments, gives them nearly the same rights as
citizens in the acquisition of real property. The 9th and 10th sec-
* " En uso de la facultad que se reservo el Congreso general en el art. 7° de la
tada ley de 18 de agosto de 1824, se proliibe a los estados limitrofes y litorales
lagenar alguna parte de sus terrenos valdios para colonizar en ellos, hasta qu<$
i establezcan las reglas que dehen observar para hacerlo." : ,f
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tions of this law I invite particular attention to, and assert without
hesitation that, taken in connection with them, the 4th section of
the law of 1824 will not bear the interpretation attempted to be
given it by the Law Agent.
The 9th section provides that the provisions of the law (that is,
the extention to foreigners of the right to hold real estate,) shall
not include the border departments, with respect to which spec-
ial laws of colonization shall be issued, provided that foreigners
shall never be able to acquire property in them, without the express
license of the Supreme Government of the Republic.
Section 10 provides that in those departments which are not
border, but which have coasts, foreigners can only acquire lands at
a distance of five leagues from the coast.*
The restriction contained in these sections are, in my opinion, to
be taken as a part of the same system of legislation, as those quoted
of 1824, 1830, 1835 and 1837, and the general term colonization,
as used in the 9th section, must be understood solely in connection
with the introduction of foreigners and the acquisition by them of
real property, and the provision with which the section closes, that
in the border States foreigners shall never be permitted to acquire
lands without the express license of the federal executive, is only
re-enacting in a larger extent and with additional rigor the restric-
tions of 1824.
The 18th section of the Colonization law of 1823, and the 9th
section of that of 1824, both provide specially that in the distribu-
tion of lands Mexicans shall he jireferred, (that is, be preferred
over foreigners). This is also consistent with common sense, since
every man, in the distribution of favors, prefers his own household,
and every nation its own citizens ; and none more than Spain and
Mexico, under whose laws the admission of foreigners to hold real
estate, is an exception, not a rule. But if the construction now
sought to be given to the 4th section of the law of 1824, be correct,
and it was intended to embrace both foreign colonization, and
grants to citizens, and to embarrass and restrain both alike, then by
the operation of the law of 1842, instead of citizens being preferred,
a discrimination is made in favor of foreigners ; because, if the 4th
section, law of 1824, applies both to foreigners and citizens, then
both are restrained from acquiring lands within ten leagues of the
sea
; and the law of 1842, without any reference to citizens, or any
concessions in their favor, admits foreigners to acquire within five
leagues of the sea. The conclusion is inevitable, that, to the minds
of the makers of the law of 1842, no such construction of the law
* The decree of March, 1842, here quoted, will be found in the Ordenanzas de
Tierras y Aguas, page 64 ; but in the 10th section, by a typographical error, the
pronoun standing for costas (coasts,) which ought to be feminine, is printed in the
masculine, thereby throwing a shade of doubt on the meaning of the section. It is
rightly printed, however, in the Segunda Guia Judicial, published in Mexico, Jan-
uary, 1847, and the meaning is unmistakably as above given.
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of 1824 had occurred
;
for it is plain (if any argument be needed
to such a proposition) from the whole tenor of the law of 1842, that,
though it was framed for the purpose of enlarging the privileges of
foreigners, it was not intended that they should enjoy the same
license as citizens, much less be preferred to them. Thus while the
first article prescribes that foreigners residing in the Republic, may
acquire real property by purchase, adjudication, denouncement, or
whatever title established by the laws, the third section provides that
they shall not acquire more than two tracts in any one department,
without license of the Supreme Government, and section 8 provides
that the foreign proprietor who shall absent himself with his family
two years, without license from the Government, shall make sale of
his estates, or otherwise the Government will proceed to sell them
;
both being restrictions that do not apply to citizens. Again, section
9, as already shown, provides that the privileges given in this law
to foreigners, shall not apply to the border departments, and even
makes a perpetual rule that foreigners shall not acquire lands in those
Departments, without special license of the Supreme Government
;
a disability that certainly does not apply to citizens. Again, the
9th and 10th sections taken together, and with the supposition that
the construction given by the Law Agent to section 4, law of 1824,
be correct, would involve this absurdity, that in the border Depart-
ments foreigners were entirely excluded, while in the coast Depart-
ments they were preferred over citizens.
The law of 1824, according to my understanding of it, may be
paraphrased as follows :
The Mexican nation offers protection to the persons and prop-
erty of foreigners who come to colonize within it, and for that
purpose opens those lands of the Republic, which not being pri-
vate property nor pertinent to any corporation or pueblo, may be
colonized. To this end, as far as the States are concerned, the
Congresses thereof shall make the necessary rules for the adminis-
tration of this law within their respective limits ; but they shall
not administer it with regard to the lands which lie within
twenty leagues of any other nation, or ten of the sea coast, without,
the consent of the federal executive, and if the federation should
find it necessary to reserve any portion of those lands for public
uses, it may do so. The nation undertakes, in further pursuance
of the objects of this law, that within four years no duty shall be
imposed on the persons of foreigners who come for the first time to
establish themselves in the nation
; nor prior to the year 1840 shall
the General Congress prohibit the entrance of foreigners to colonize,
unless under imperious circumstances with respect to the citizens of
some particular nation ; nevertheless the government may take such
measures of precaution as it judges proper for the security of the
federation against foreigners who come to colonize
;
furthermore, in
the distribution of lands, Mexican citizens [who have heretofore
had the exclusive right] shall still be preferred ; and the coloniza-
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tion herein provided for shall not be so extensive but that soldiers
who are entitled to bounty lands may receive them in the States, and
other public servants with whom the Government may be able to
compromise for lands may receive them in the territories ; nor shall
there be allowed to be united (under this law) in one hand, more
than eleven leagues ; nor shall the new settlers transfer their prop-
erty in mortmain, nor hold it themselves, if they reside out of the
Republic. Conformably to these principles, the Government will
proceed to the colonization of the Territories.
From all the numerous laws which I have quoted, it will be
seen that the Central Government of Mexico has always claimed
and exercised control over the whole matter of the acquisition of
real property by foreigners ; to license or to forbid it, and to pre-
scribe rules to regulate it. The books are full of legislation to this
point; the law of 1824; the 11th section of that of 1830; the
whole of that of 25 April, 1 825, are samples of it ; and the 12th
section of that of 1842, above quoted, shows the Central Govern-
ment so tenacious of this right, that, while it gives extensive privi-
leges to foreigners in respect to the acquisition of lands, yet provides
that they shall not be able to avail themselves of those privileges
in any of the Departments, unless they contract with the govern-
ment that " it possesses the right in representation of the Mexican
nation."
But while this right of control over settlements of foreigners, and
of their acquisition, in whatever way, of real property, has been
thus constantly and jealously exercised by the Central Government,
I have not found a single law in which that government has at-
tempted to interfere with the discretion of the States (or of those
Departments which, prior to the breaking up of the federation in
1835, were States,) in the disposition of their vacant lands for do-
mestic occupation, or of any of the laws of real property as between
citizen and citizen. Upon what ground can the 4th section of the
law of 1824 be wrested from its position in this general system of
legislation, and forced to apply to a subject 'over which the makers
of it never claimed any control ?
I shall now endeavor to show, that the same view which I have
expressed of the effect of the 4th and 16th sections of the law of
1824, was taken by the federal executive of Mexico in the Regula-
tions of 1828. Those regulations give there in advance the express
consent and direction of the federal executive to all kinds of grants
to all kinds of persons (embraced in the law,) in all parts of the
territories, inside and outside of the littoral and border leagues, and
appoint agents to carry out that express consent and direction, re-
serving only for a special review and permission that particular class
of grants which I contend alone come within the purview of the
4th section of the law of 1824, to wit : grants to empresarios or
contractors for bringing in foreign colonies ; and providing only that
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they be vacant lands, and (for purposes of colonization) not occu-
pied by Missions. Within or without the littoral and border leagues,
the federal executive very properly reserved a right of review and
negation on each particular grant for the object of a foreign settle-
ment
;
and having made this reservation in one class of cases, it is
necessarily inferred that in every other class mentioned in the reg-
ulations the consent therein given was full and unreserved.
Whatever view, therefore, may be taken of the force of the
restriction contained in the 4th section of the law of 1824
;
whether
it be conceded that such grants as the one at present before the
Board were not embraced in that prohibition, or whether it be deter-
mined that Cruz Cervantes, born here on the soil and living on it
ever since his birth, became suddenly a colonist, when he petitioned
for a piece of land ; whatever view may be taken of the reach of
that section, its demands were fully complied with ; because the
consent of the federal executive was all that was necessary ; and
that consent was given in the instructions, without restriction as to
locality, and to every description of grants, except those to empres-
arios
;
and the rule aleady quoted, that the insertion of one limita-
tion excludes all others, applies and settles the construction.
The act of 1824 requires that Mexicans shall be preferred in the
distribution of lands, and, as between them, residents in the place
where the lands lie. The Regulations of 1828, were, doubtless,
therefore, intended, in a large degree, for the benefit of the resident
inhabitants of the territories. Now, as far as California is con-
cerned, if the Regulations were only intended to operate outside the
ten leagues, it would have been worse than a dead letter. The
whole population lived on the sea coast ; they were not strong
enough to send out colonies or branches into the Indian territory
;
they rather needed nursing, strengthening and replenishing; and
any contrary policy, such as holding out allurements for the emi-
gration of the young and enterprising into the interior valleys,
would have provoked an Indian war for which the territory was
not prepared, and would probably have broken up the few strug-
gling settlements that were here. The law was intended to have a
practical, beneficial operation ; to give the people of the country
a chance of obtaining lands where they wanted them, and where
they could use them ; to keep families and settlements together,
and give them a chance to grow
;
not to break them up and scatter
them ; to confer benefits, not to bring destruction ; to populate and
advance the country, not to lay it waste ; and if, indeed, there be an
ambiguity (which, for my part, I am not able to discern, however,)
in the terms of the law, it is the duty of Courts, in the language
of Judge Marshall, (1 Peters, 95,) in a not dissimilar case, to adopt
that construction which would confer the bounty intended, and
effect the benevolent intention of the legislature.
The Regulations of 1828 are entitled General Dispositions, not
local or partial ; Regulations for the Colonization of the Territories
—all the territories, not parts of them.
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The preamble gives the reason for the adoption of the rules,
namely, because the 16th section of the law of 1824, makes it the
duty of the Government to proceed to the colonization of the Ter-
ritories—all the Territories, not portions of them—and shows that
the powers therein intended to be exercised were co-extensive with
that given in said 16th article.
The 1st section authorizes the Governor to make concessions
—
what of ? "vacant lands of their respective Territories," without
restriction as to locality, and under a law which provides for all
parts of the Territories.
Section 7 reserves one particular class of cases ; and this being
the only reservation, it cannot be questioned that, with this ex-
ception, the President delegated his power as fully as he received it.
It would be more rational, more in conformity with the object of
the law, and of those Regulations, in my opinion, to say that they
were intended to apply only to the ten littoral leagues, than that
these were excluded. More especially, if we view them in connec-
tion with the different laws for establishing the military, and with
the Order of 1838, authorizing grants to be made of the islands of
the coast. The military posts were all on the coast ; and when the
islands should be granted, and the present interpretation of the law
be carried into effect, the country would present this curious specta-
cle ; the islands populated ; the sea coast in a width of thirty miles
deserted, except three or four starving companies of military ; and
the settlements fighting for life with the Indians of the interior.
How is this absurdity to be got over 1 how is this incongruity to be
reconciled 1 I am curious, indeed, to hear, why, if an apprehension
of foreign adventurers seizing the islands, induced the President to
authorize the granting of them to citizens, the same apprehension
should not induce him to authorize the peopling of the coasts in the
same way ? I am curious to hear, what " commerce and fisheries"
they were which were to be endangered by foreigners seizing the
islands, if nobody could rightfully or lawfully inhabit the country
of the sea shore ? I am curious to know, why ports were opened
here, and custom houses established, unless the officers ofthe customs
were charitably intended to console the military, in their solitude.
Is it not plain beyond doubt, that no new permission was consid-
ered necessary to authorize grants to citizens on the sea coasts ; or
that it would have been given for the same reasons, infinitely
stronger, along with the authorization for granting the islands ?
Again, these Regulations embrace all the Territories ; and may
be supposed to have been intended to operate in all of them. But,
if the littoral leagues were excluded, we have seen how little oper-
ation they could have had, in Upper California : in Lower Cali-
fornia, they could have had none at all, unless it was intended the
inhabitants should desert the little valleys of the coasts, where
alone, in that country, the means of life are attainable, in order to
partake of the Government bounty by a grant of land on the sum-
mits of arid mountains.
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But, under all circumstances, and under whatever view of the
general provisions of the Regulations of 1828, I contend that the
claimant in this case is secured and his rights recognized and pro-
vided for in the 17th section, alluded to in a former part of my ar-
gument, and which is as follows :
" In those Territories where there are Missions, the lands which
they occupy shall not now he colonized, and until it be resolved
whether they ought to be considered as property of the reductions
of the neophyte-catechumens (communities of converted Indians),
and Mexican settlers (or inhabitants.)
I do not know what construction the Law Agent proposes to give
to this section
;
but to my mind it affords conclusive evidence that
the Government discriminated, and intended to discriminate specially
between colonization, properly so called, and concessions of lands
to native settlers or inhabitants, and to recognize, at least for the
present, the rights of the latter, to the exclusion of foreign colo-
nization, in the lands occupied by the Missions. In a legal point of
view, the Mission lands were undoubtedly the property of the na-
tion
; but a doubt if they ought not to be appropriated to the exclu-
sive use of those classes who had worked them and protected them,
led most properly to their reservation from colonization. The dis-
tinction is indeed drawn, in so many words, in this section, between
the people of the country and colonists, and by all just rules ofcon-
struction (to say nothing of the signification of words) forbids the
confounding of the two. I construe the section, in connection with
the other parts of the law, to mean, that while grants of all kinds
mentioned in the first section might be made in the Territory gener-
ally, yet in the lands occupied by the Missions, colonization grants
should not at present be made, nor until it was determined whether
others than the Federal Government had not a property in them.
What else can the section mean 1 It forbids colonization in those
lands, certainly ; but in the very act of prohibition recognizes the
rights of native inhabitants
;
how were those rights to be protected
except by grants, and how can a prohibition not to colonize, be con-
strued to forbid grants to persons whose rights are thus reserved ?
This 17th section alone has always seemed to me to afford a con-
clusive construction to the act of 1824, and of the meaning in
which the word colonization is used in it ; and a complete answer to
whatever might be said in support of the view of said 4th sec-
tion now taken by the Law Agent. What else can the distinction
mean which the section makes between colonization and the rights
of native settlers ? What else, but that colonization is forbidden, in
order to protect more completely those classes of the native popu-
lation ?
We need not, however, rely alone upon the Regulations of
1828, nor upon the protection which the 17th section was intended
to afford, to persons like the claimant. Whether or not, the Regu-
lations of 1828, give consent to grants wihin the littoral leagues
;
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whether or not, colonization and grants to children of the soil mean
the same thing ; whether or not we receive the protection which
the 17th section was intended to secure to us ; there are abun-
dance of other laws and executive orders which come to our aid.
The act of 17 August, 1833, providing for the secularization of
the Missions of the two Californias, enacts, among other things,
that all the lands of the Missions, except a cemetary and a lot of
two hundred varas square for the use of the curate, should be turn-
ed over to the administration of the civil authorities. Now the mis-
sion lands were all located on the sea coast, or within a few leagues
of it ; and the secularizing of those lands and turning them over to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil authorities, could be for no
other object than to facilitate their conversion into private property,
according to the principles of the secularization law of 1813, before
quoted.
The act of November 21, 1835, repeals the prohibition contained
in the 11th section of the act of April 6, 1830, which forbids the
colonization of the border States, by inhabitants of the nations ad-
joining, and then enacts that the government may expend whatever
amounts may be necessary in the colonization of the territories of
the federation, and all other vacant places it may have a right to
colonize, and as a part of this authorization includes the erection of
fortresses on the frontiers. The scope of this law, then, embraces the
whole extent of the border States, and all the territories, and author-
izes the colonization of the latter (without exception as to locality,)
under the sanction of the highest legislative act.
This general act was followed on the 26th of the same month;
by a particular one, applying to the very locality in dispute,
namely, the ten littoral leagues of California. This law em-
powers the government in so many words, to prescribe whatever
measures will assure the colonization, and make effective the secu-
larization of the missions of Upper and Lower California. And in
pursuance of this authorization the government sent a special agent,
with the office of Political Chief and Director of Colonization, and
instructions to " make beginning," under the law, by occupying all
the missions of the two territories. Now every mission of both
Upper and Lower California was within the ten littoral leagues, and
consequently, whatever lands the instructions of 1828 embrace, the
present law and instructions cover the exact locality in question,
and no other ; and give the special assent, both of Congress and
the executive to its colonization. It is true, the person to whom
this appointment was given, and instructions were delivered, was
superseded in his principal office, before he had an opportunity to
enter on its duties. But neither the law, nor the instructions were
ever rescinded, but were in force as long as the Mexican govern-
ment existed in California.
Again, the instructions to General Vallejo, before noticed, to pro-
mote the settlement of the Northern frontier, contemplate grants
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upon the sea coast. They were given by Figueroa, without reser-
vation. They were subsequently approved, as well as all proceed-
ings under them, and General Vallejo encouraged to continue in the
same labors, by the General Government. All this, without a word
on the subject of the coast leagues, which would have been remark-
able had it occurred to the General Government that Figueroa and
Vallejo had been transcending the law in that particular.
I maintain, therefore, that the approbation and consent of the
Central Government was given to the settlement of the coasts of
California, in each and all of the acts I have quoted to that point,
as fully as is possible for assent and approbation to be given.
But, apart from all this, the grant itself is prima facie evidence,
and, under the circumstances, conclusive evidence, of the power of
the officer who made it.
No Spanish or French grant has ever been refused confirmation
by the Supreme Court, on the ground of want of power in the
officer
;
nor on account of want of final ratification by the officer
or tribunal thereto authorized.
The first Spanish case, decided by the Supreme Court, was
that of Arredondo and others, reported in 6 P. 691. The grant was
for four leagues to each point of the compass, from a common cen-
tre, by the Governor of Florida. The United States depended upon
two points : 1. That the officer making the grant had exceeded
his powers. 2. That a condition inserted in the grant to settle the
tract with two hundred Spanish families, had not been complied
with. The Court held :
1 That they were bound to decide the case " as between man
and man."
2 That Congress had adopted as the basis of their acts in regard
to their newly acquired territories, that the law of the province, [as
evidenced by the usages and customs therein,] in which the land is
situated is the law which gives efficacy to the grant, and by which
it is to be tested, whether it was property at the time the treaties
took effect, (p. 717.)
3 That the United States had never claimed any part of what
could be shown by legal evidence and local law to have been sev-
ered from the domain. (lb.)
4 That in their whole legislation, Congress had not enacted a
solitary law requiring the claimant to produce the authority of the
officer making the grant. That the United States were too just to
exact from the grantees what no Court would require from one who
held lands under a grant from the United States, or a State, if fully
executed
; or, if inchoate, never compels a claimant to produce the
authority of the officer who issues the warrant. That it is pre-
sumed to be done regularly till the contrary appear, (p. 623, 24.)
5 That the United States never made the authority of the grant-
ing officer a point in issue between them and the claimants, " to be
even considered, much less adjudicated.'''' (p. 727.)
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5 That the authority of the granting officer is presumed by law,
and is fully evidenced by occupation, enjoyment, and transfers of
property, had and made under them, without disturbance by any
superior power, and respected by the co-ordinate and inferior officers
and tribunals of the state, province or colony, where it lies. (p. 728.)
7 That any objection to the admission in evidence of a public
grant made in the name and assumed authority of the sovereign
power, must be in the nature of a demurrer to evidence, on the
ground of its not conducing to prove the matter in issue.
8 That if admitted, it must be received as evidence both of the
facts it recites and those it declares, and of all other facts legally
inferable from what is thus apparent on its face. (p. 729.)
9 That it is a settled principle, that a public grant is to be taken
as evidence that it issued by lawful authority.
10 That the validity and legality of an act done by a Governor
of a province depends on the jurisdiction over the subject matter
delegated to him by the sovereign, and the local laws and usages.
11 If any jurisdiction is given, and not limited [and, consequent-
ly, as far as not limited,] all acts, done in its exercise, are legal and
valid.
All these principles apply to the case under discussion. The
grant had efficacy under the law, usages and customs of the terri-
tory in which it lies, and by the same test, the land was property
at the time the treaty took effect. It is shown by legal evidence
and local law to have been severed from the domain. The grant is
by the proper officer, professing to act within his powers, and while,
on the one hand his powers are not a question competent to be con-
sidered much less adjudicated," on the other they are ''presumed
by law," and are " fully evidenced " by occupation, enjoyment and
transfers of property under them, without disturbance by any su-
perior power, and respected by co-ordinate and inferior officers and
tribunals. The grant asserts on its face that it is made in pursu-
ance of faculties conferred ; it is received in evidence, and is conse-
quently full proof of what it asserts.
The principles of this decision of the Supreme Court have never
been overruled or questioned ; but have been affirmed and re-af-
firmed in all subsequent decisions in like cases. Its principles,
moreover, have been specially adopted by Congress, and incorpor-
ated in the volumes of land laws published, by its authority. They
are specially made the law for this tribunal ; and to my mind they
take away all necessity for arguing this objection of the ten leagues
;
an objection, which appears to me entirely futile and groundless, but
which I have felt bound to argue at length, because, from the appar-
ent earnestness with which the objection has been taken, an impres-
sion has gone abroad that there is really some foundation for it, and
hence it has done, and is doing much mischief, exciting illusory
hopes and awakening unnecessary alarms.
Does the guaranty of the 9th article of the treaty apply to Cali-
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fornia ? Where is the property it applies to ? where, if not on the
sea coast? Where was the population of California when the
American occupation took place 1 If there was any private prop-
erty in the Department, where was it situated? Did Mexico sup-
pose she was leaving her expatriated citizens in California entirely
unprotected ? Did she insert the guaranty of the treaty only to
protect the Americans and other naturalized citizens on the Sacra-
mento, leaving her own children, the founders of the country, and
their descendants, who had borne arms in her service, their ten,
fifteen and twenty years, with unratified grants and unguarantied
titles, to the tender mercies of a stranger government ?
Did Congress suppose this Commission had anything to do?
Did they give it a three years existence, with all this preparation
and expense, and with appeals to other tribunals, to settle the twen-
ty or thirty titles that may exist beyond tide water ?
But let us away with these idle discussions—discussions of ques-
tions and points overruled by the Supreme Court long ago. Let us
admit (as it is probable we may without any violent depreciation of
ourselves,) that the successive Governors of California, who made
grants, and successive executives of the Central Government, who
knew and acquiesced in the manner of those grants, let us admit
that they knew as much of the intent and policy of their laws, and
of what was proper under them, as we, strangers to their language,
unfamiliar with their legal ideas, and with the facts, circumstances,
and previous laws, on which their statutes are founded, can possibly
know. Let us admit, that what constitutes a transfer of property
from one to another, whether from individual to individual, or from
a government to its citizen, is the will to do so
;
that in these grants,
the will of the Mexican nation, the policy of its laws, justice to its
citizens, expediency, the purpose she mainly wished to promote,
namely, settlement of the country, all combined to vest in the gran-
tees, the ownership—the property—of the land. Let us admit, that
when Mexico owed these lands to her citizens for their services
:
when she desired her citizens to have them, and own them, as a
measure of public policy ; when she held them for no other purpose
than for distribution to her citizens, and invited them to come and
reduce them to ownership ; that when she wished and intended
to bestow them on her citizens, and with that intent gave grants to
them, let us admit that she succeeded in her intent ; that her citi-
zens did thus acquire rights and property, which she took care to
stipulate should be respected and protected.
This is the high, the honorable, the true aspect in which to regard
these cases. The claimant here has rights—rights of property. I
care not whether his grant ever or not received the approval of the
assembly, and that were necessary, or the consent of the Supreme
Government, and that were necessary ; he was within the policy,
intent and direct words of the law, and was entitled to the grant,
which he got, and was entitled to whatever approval or consent was
E
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necessary to its completion ; entitled to it by law and according to
the principles of equity, and the usages and customs of the country,
and would now be entitled to it, and could claim and receive it,
were the other government in existence. But he comes here in a
superior condition ; he comes here with all terms, qualifications and
restrictions of his grant cut off and released and his rights made
definitely binding and absolute. Admitting that the former govern-
ment, in the exercise of an arbitrary discretion, might have refused
this approbation of his grant to which the claimant was entitled }
the present government reserved no such power \ it reserved no
discretion in the case ,* no power over property, whether founded on
incipient titles or complete ones ; no power of approval or disap-
proval, refusal or consent ; it reserved no power, whatever, over
the case ; only undertook a solemn duty and obligation.
I am aware that it is said, that the powers and obligations of
the government are neither restricted nor increased by the stipula-
tions of the treaty in regard to private property ; that the laws of
nations would equally have protected it ; that it has also been held
that our government retained, under treaty stipulations almost in the
same words as those in the treaty of peace and limits with Mexico,
the same powers over imperfect titles that the former government
had or could have exercised.
With all deference, I must say, that should the points directly
arise and be discussed, it does appear to me that neither of these
positions will be found strictly correct.
On the point first specified, the true doctrine seems to me to be
this : that the laws of nations protects private property in conquered
or ceded countries
;
but leaves the rights therein in the same state
as the conquest or cession finds them ; so that if one happen to
be found with an imperfect title, or, to use the words of the Mexican
law, with something wanting to its " definitive validity," then the
law of nations gives him no remedy, whatever appeal he might
have to the justice and magnanimity of his new sovereign. But
the treaty does more than this ; the treaty undertakes that he shall
be maintained and protected in his property ; not left in a state
of uncertainty, much less his undetermined title be determined
against him.
On the second point, the true doctrine I believe to be this : that
without any treaty stipulation, a province changing sovereigns,
comes to the new with all the powers over it that were possessed
by the old ; hence, whatever discretion remained in the hands of
the old government, over incipient grants, would come to and might
be exercised by the new. But by the treaty stipulation, this power
is foregone
;
because, it being a well settled principle, that inchoate,
even incipient titles, are property, and the treaty undertaking to
protect and maintain property, it releases necessarily all rights of
forfeiture or voidance, and places all kinds of honest titles on an
equal footing—of course making all perfect, since it equalizes by
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elevating not reducing. This seems to me to be fully recognized
in the case of Chouteau's heirs, 9 P. 137.
I take the ground distinctly, then, that our title here stands
recognized, confirmed, completed, and forever valid and binding,
ipso facto by the treaty.
That we had property according to the laws of Mexico,
Property according to local usage and custom.
Property according to the contemperous and uniform and concur-
rent interpretation and construction of the law, running through
nearly twenty years, and continually acquiesced in by the federal
government.
Property recognized by six successive governments of California
;
by the public voice ; by all inferior authorities ; by many declara-
tions and admissions of the government.
Property for which we paid a valuable consideration ; the con-
sideration of settlement and occupation—the consideration of
military service—all the consideration which the government that
gave it, wished or required.
Property fully separated from the public domain, and to reattach
which no lawful power exists.
Property in which we are entitled to be maintained and protected,
by all the power of the federal government.
Property in which all the presumptions of law argue that there
is no imperfection ; but in which, if there be defects or imperfec-
tions, we have a right to have them cured and a treaty guaranty
that they shall be cured.
Property inviolate by the first laws of the social compact, and by
the positive enactments of the constitution and the treaty.
In the case of Chouteau's heirs, 9 P. 137, (a Missouri case) the
claim was founded on an order of survey and possession, made by
the Lieutenant Governor, and concluding as follows : " and after-
wards the applicant will have to solicit the formal title of concession, ,
of the Intendant General of these provinces, to whom belongs by
order of his Majesty, the disposing and conceding of every kind
of vacant lands of the royal domain." The claim was surveyed
about fourteen months after the date of the order, and was accom-
panied with about three years possession.
The Court held, that this order of the Lieutenant Governor, was
a foundation of title, and according to the acts of Congress, and the
general understanding and usage of Louisiana and Missouri,
capable of being perfected into a complete title."
" It is property, (say the Court,) capable of being alienated, of
being subjected to debts, and is as such to be held sacred and invi-
olate as other property."
The claim was declared valid. Another case of the same par-
ties, 9 P. 147, founded on a like order of survey, made 8 January,
1798, by the Lieutenant Governor, and concluded in like manner,
except referring the claimant for his title to the Governor General.
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This warrant was plainly in violation of the 9th article of the
Regulations of O'Reilly, exceeding largely in quantity the maximum
of those Regulations. The Court held that that article was only
applicable to a grazing country, and, consequently, that if the regu-
lations had been extended to Upper Louisiana, " it was probable
they were extended with modifications, at least of the 9th article?
Thus where the Court has been obliged to resort to probabilities,
they invented probabilities to sustain a good faith claim, and main-
tain the national obligation. They invented probabilities in behalf
of justice and honor ; for this was not a probability of fact, though
it was of law.
In this case the order of survey was not acted on by the claim-
ant till December, 1803, more than five years after its date ; but
the Court did not allow the objection to prevail. In this case, the
Court lays much stress upon the Governor's own representation of
his powers, and also upon the fact that, neither the Governor nor
Intendant General had ever refused to perfect an incomplete title
granted by a Governor or sub-delegate ; and we ask here like credit
to be given to the Governor's declarations of his powers, and to the
fact, that, as far as we know, no grant of a California Governor
has ever been annulled.
Nearly all the Missouri claims were founded on the same kind of
inceptive title, as those already named, provisional on their face, and
directing the grantee to apply either to the Governor General, (who
was first invested with the granting power) or to the Intendant
General, (who succeeded him) at New Orleans, for his title, for the
reason that it belonged alone to those officers to concede lands.
These instruments of the Missouri claimants were not grants, and
did not profess to be ; they were permits at will, and imposed a duty
on the party receiving them to apply to the granting officer, before
he could receive a concession. Now, even supposing the view
urged by the Law Agent in relation to titles here and the character
of the approbatory function of the Deputation, to be correct, yet
the difference is infinitely in favor of the unconfirmed grants here.
1 The Governor here was the granting officer, and made his
patent in due form of grant, dedi et concessi, which the Lieutenant
Governor at St. Louis, was not and did not.
2 The supposed necessary consideration here was the Governor's
to obtain ; there all the subsequent steps were the donee's, and his
laches if they were not performed.
3 In the Missouri cases, if the Governor General or Intendant
General should have refused the confirmation, the grant would fall
;
whereas, in California the authority whose province it was to com-
plete the grant, could not defeat it.
4 The California patents are grants, wherein the granting officer
parts with all his discretion in the matter; the Missouri permits
were not grants ; they were only informations or reports to the
granting officer in favor of grants.
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But in the Missouri cases the Supreme Court wiped away all
these objections
;
and took the high and only true ground, that by
the usages and general understanding of the province, those per-
mits being the foundation of a title, and meanwhile standing in
lieu of it, were vested rights ; were property ; and that property
inviolate. Not titles, but the foundations of titles
;
not grants, but
the foundation of grants
;
and that our government could not take
away that foundation, but must complete the superstructure.
Saturday, June 5th.
During my remarks of yesterday, my attention was called by an
honorable member of the Board, to the first section of the Regula-
tions of 1828, and to the fact that in that, there does not appear to
be any distinction made between citizens and foreigners, and hence
might seem to contradict my argument, that the law of 1824, on
which the Regulations are founded, makes such a distinction. I
have, therefore, taken occasion to examine the section with care, to
ascertain whether in fact, it does operate against the view I had
taken of the 4 section of the law of 1824, and I think it assists,
rather than hurts my argument.
The construction which I put upon the law is this : that in the
States the several Congresses had entire control of colonization, sub-
ject to the limitations of the law, in all their domain, except within
the ten coast and twenty border leagues ; that within those ten and
twenty leagues, they and the federal executive together had that
control. That in the Territories, the federal executive alone had
(under the law,) full control ; because, if the 4th section applies to
the territories, it still gives the control to the federal executive, and
the 16th section confides the whole subject matter, within the terri-
tories, to his discretion.
Now in the States, the Congresses alone might provide for coloni-
zation in the interior, and on the coasts and frontiers with the con-
sent of the federal executive
;
consequently, the federal executive
alone might colonize all parts of the territories, and that with either
foreign or domestic colonization. Hence, the first section of the
Regulations of 1828, will admit of either of these views, both of
them in harmony with the opinion I have expressed, namely : If
the Governor should understand the law as a prohibition against
grants to foreigners on the sea coast, then he would suppose his
instructions to be in pursuance of the law, and construe them thus :
you may make grants both to citizens and to foreigners, that is, to
citizens in every part of the territory
;
to foreigners where by law
they may hold, at a distance of ten leagues from the coast ; there is
land enough for and applicable to both. Or the instructions may
be construed thus : the President had full power over the subject of
colonization, whether foreign or domestic, and without regard to
locality, in the territories, and was willing to delegate the whole dis-
cretion which he had over the subject, to the political chief of his
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appointment, except so far as he reserved it, and hence to say
;
you
may grant lands in all the territory of California, to all persons who
under the existing laws may receive grants
;
you may grant to em-
presarios, to families, to single persons, Mexicans or foreigners
;
this is what is confided to me, under the law, and what I confide
to you, except as hereinafter reserved.
In my opinion, the latter is the proper interpretation of the law
and instructions. That the law gave the President absolute power
over colonization in the territories, subject to the general provisions
of the law, and that he delegated this power as fully as he received
it, with the exception of the reservation in relation to empresario
grants or contracts. It will be borne in mind, that only natural-
ized foreigners could hold land in the Republic, except they came
as colonists, properly so called, under the lead of an empresa-
rio ; and hence there would not seem to be any necessity or pro-
priety in making a distinction in the authority conferred on the
Governor, between natives and foreigners in regard to private
grants
;
(I use the phrase private grants in contradistinction from
empresarios grants); foreigners being understood here as naturalized
foreigners, since no others could obtain private grants. This will
be seen by the 6th section of the naturalization law of March 12th,
1828, which says, that foreigners who establish themselves in the
nation, according to the rules prescribed, or to be prescribed for
their admission, shall be under the protection of the law, and enjoy
the civil rights of Mexicans, with the exception of acquiring rural
landed property, which according to the laws in force, those not
naturalized cannot obtain.*
I do not think it Was individual grants that the government was
ever jealous of. I think it was of empresario or colonization grants,
properly so called ; that it was against these that the 4th section of
the law of 1824, was intended to apply. The government could
have no occasion to be jealous of grants to individuals ; but they
might well be jealous of, and wish to guard with extreme care,
great empresario grants, covering many millions of acres, (there was
one in Texas of forty-five millions of acres,) and intended for the
introduction in compact settlements, of thousands of foreign fami-
* The laws in force in 1828, as above shown, were modified by Article 13, of the
First Constitutional Law of December 15, 1835, and of December 29, 1836, so that
foreigners married to Mexican women, (as well as naturalized foreigners,) might
.also acquire fixed property. The article is as follows :
Article 13. " The foreigner cannot acquire fixed property in the Republic, if he
be not naturalized in it, marry with a Mexican woman, and conform himself to the
other requisites prescribed by the law relative to these acquisitions. Neither can
they transport to another country their moveable property, except with the requi-
sites and paying the quota which the laws establish. The acquisitions of colonists
shall be subject to the special rules of colonization."
Can anything be clearer than the distinction here made between acquisitions in
the ordinary course, and acquisitions by colonists and colonization, and that the
laws do not intend to confound the two ?
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lies, more or less clannish, and likely at any time to set up for
themselves.
I think the whole difficulty in the interpretation of this law, has
arisen from a confounding of terms—from mixing and confounding
things and words which have no affinity. Laws are always
framed with reference to other laws, and to facts, ideas, customs
and habits of thought already prevailing ; and it cannot be expected
that a foreigner can take up a naked statute, and by intuition trans-
port himself into the position of the framer of it, and know every
thing on which it was founded, so as to give it at once a correct in-
terpretation. Our own statutes are often difficult to interpret, with
all our knowledge of their intended operation, and of the reasons
and circumstances of their enanctment, and the simplest of them
often admit of diverse constructions. How much more so must
be the statutes of a foreign country, in a foreign language, and
adapted to a policy and ideas not less foreign to any views we have
ever entertained
; and when we come with this our limited know-
ledge of them, to measure rights by them, and to determine the for-
tunes of individuals, families and communities, how necessary,
labor, patience, attention, caution; and how proper to take the
largest and most liberal view they will admit of.
It was not necessary to say in the instructions of 1828, to the
political chiefs, in authorizing you to make private grants to for-
eigners, you must understand naturalized foreigners ; that was al-
ready explained in other laws. Yet, if we were for the first time
to read those Regulations, and jump hastily to a conclusion, we
should say that the section made no distinction.
I think the federal executive had a right, under the law, to grant
lands, or cause them to be granted in all the territories, first to na-
tive citizens
; second, to foreigners
;
private grants to naturalized
foreigners ; empresario grants to natives, and to foreigners, whether
naturalized or not ; that if the 4th section law 1824 applies to the
territories, that then he obtained his power over the subject matter,
within ten leagues of the sea, from that section, and his power over
the remainder from section 16 ; that if the 4th section does not apply
to the territories, that then he obtains full power in the premises
from section 16. In either case, and with either interpretation, he
has full administration of the law of colonization in the territories,
That he delegated that discretion, as fully as he himself received it
from the law, whether from the 4th section, or the 16th section, or
both, with the single exception of empresario grants to which he
reserved, in accordance with the spirit of the law, a special exami-
nation and consent. I say in accordance with the spirit of the
law ; for, though he might under the terms of the law, have dele-
gated fully his control over that as well as other points, yet it was
in the spirit of the law, that these grants should only be given
under the highest sanction, and he might well think them too
weighty and too responsible for final determination by an inferior
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magistrate. It was one of those precautions, which, under the 8th
section of the law of 1824, it was his duty to take for the security
of the nation with respect to foreigners who should come to colo-
nize it. And we shall see the propriety of this reservation the
more plainly, if we reflect that no certain rules could be laid down
to embrace colonization contracts, but that each would have its
special circumstances and conditions which the President would
naturally desire should pass under his supervision.
It was also suggested in remarks in the course of my argument
yesterday, that grants to citizens and foreigners were alike made
under the law of 1824, and hence would-seem to refute the distinc-
tion which I drew between colonization and grants to resident
citizens.
Undoubted, the colonization law makes some rules applicable to
all subsequent acquisitions from the public domain, and hence in
some particulars, it applies to individual as well as to colonization
grants. And so, undoubtedly, the Regulations of 1828, do combine
in a general order, directions for both species of grants, and would
seem, without a careful examination, to confound the two under the
general term colonization. But I think a careful examination will
show that throughout both the law and the Regulations the dis-
crimination is constantly observed.
The President was to colonize the Territories according to the
principles laid down in the law. One of those principles was that
Mexicans should be preferred in the distribution of lands. Hence,
in adopting general rules, the necessity and propriety of making
provision for the observance of that principle
;
and hence the pro-
priety of saying, in general terms, that grants to individuals as well
as colonization grants are made under those laws and rules
;
though
it will be observed that those laws and rules are never referred to
as the sole law of the subject.
In the preamble the President says, he dictates these rules in or-
der to give the most exact fulfilment to the law—of course the
whole law
; and hence those provisions which apply to individual
grants must, in my opinion, be referred to those sections of the law
which are inserted for the protection of the people of the country.
The President adopts rules for colonizing the territories, in exact
fulfilment of the law. He could not fulfil the law without, at same
time, making provision for grants to citizens.
The word colonize, in one or another shape, appears in the second,
seventh, sixteenth and seventeenth sections of the Regulations of
1828. In each case, it appears to me to apply to colonization, prop-
erly so called
;
while in the seventeenth section the distinction is
plainly drawn, rendering it impossible to misunderstand the sense
in which, there at least, the word is used.*
* The following are Spanish definitions of the word colony ; the first taken from a
late edition of the Dictionary of the Academy, the second from the Dictionary of
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1 desire to add a few words and quote some other authorities,
touching the matter of surveys.
In the case of Richards, 8 P. 470, the grant was confirmed not-
withstanding an erroneous survey.
In the case of Antonio Huertas, 8 P. 475, the grant was confirm-
ed, though the survey was not executed till September, 1818. The
Court received proof of the identity of the survey with the boun-
daries described in the grant.
In the case of Gomez, 8 P. 477, the grant was confirmed accord-
ing to the boundaries.
In the case of Fleming's heirs, 8 P. 478, a grant of twenty thous-
and acres was confirmed, " to the extent and according to the boun-
daries set forth in the grant." No survey.
In Levi's case, 8 P. 479, grant of sixty-five thousand acres, in
different parcels, confirmed ; all the surveys were executed after the
treaty and one of them was sent back by the Court for a re-survey.
In the case of Hernandez, 8 P. 485, the definitive title was not
issued till April, 1821, nor any surveys executed. The claim was
affirmed.
In the case of Huertas, 8 P. 488, the claim was affirmed, but
sent back for a corrected survey.
• In none of these cases, nor in any others, was any notice taken
by the Court of the survey, except to identify the land, and where
it did not conform to the grant, a re-survey was ordered.
In Smith's case, 10 P. 332, the Court held, that " Spain did not
allow her lands to be severed, by a private act, but always by a
public officer." Yet in the same case they declare that they have
frequently affirmed the validity of descriptive grants, though not
surveyed under the government which made the grant.
Now the Mexican law, on the other hand, contemplates the selec-
tion and designation of the land by the grantee, and its delineation
by means of a map, for the purpose of the grant, and does not con-
template its severance by a public surveyor.
Finally, on this point, there is no case in Louisiana, Missouri, or
Florida, where the Supreme Court have set aside a claim for want
Jurisprudence and Laws of Escriche, Madrid, 1846 ; the third from a Mexican edition
of the work of Escriche, with notes of a Mexican licenciate, prepared long since the
colonization laws and rules existed, and may he supposed, I think, to furnish the
Mexican legal definition of the word :
Colonia. s. f. Cierta portion de gente que se envia de orden de algun principe
6 republica a establecerse en otro pais, y tambien el sitio 6 lugar donde se establecen.
Latin, Colonia.
Colonia. Cierta portion de gente que se envia de orden de algun principe 6 re-
publica a establecerse en otro pais, 6 la reunion de gente que sale de un pais para
poblar otro
; y tambien el sitio 6 lugar donde se establecen.
Colonia. Cierta portion de gente que se envia de orden de algun principe 6 re-
publica a establecerse en otro paise
; y tambien el sitio 6 lugar donde se establecen.
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of a survey, or on account of an erroneous survey, prior to the ces-
sion. They have uniformly held, that a specific grant, or a grant
by reference to something that can he made certain, has equal merit
with one whose area has been ascertained by survey.
I desire also to add a few words, and authorities, in regard to
what Courts will presume in support of undisputed occupations,
and the powers of officers who assume to grant.
In the case of Pickering v. Lord Stanford, in Vesey jr. 583, the
High Court of Chancery held that " every presumption that can
fairly be made shall be made against a stale demand." " At law, in
suits where the title can be made good only by matter of record,
as letters patent, or even where a private act of Parliament was ne-
cessary, the presumption holds, though neither of those instruments,
which ought to be of record, can be found."
Now the records of the Privy Seal, where the records of the
King's patents ought to be found, and the rolls of Parliament, where
the private acts of Parliament ought to be found, cannot be less
complete, or less easy of search, than the old archives of the Terri-
torial Deputation and Departmental Assembly of California ; kept
in the first instance in loose sheets, or unbound blotters ; exposed in
twelve years to half a dozen civil revolutions ; shipped from Monte-
rey to Los Angeles, from Los Angeles to Monterey ; thence to Sono-
ra
;
thence to Benicia ; and finally to San Francisco
;
and during
nearly all the intervals of these migrations, open to whoever chose,
and liable to depredation, destruction and loss. To presume a
patent from the British Crown, or an act of Parliament, where no
record of them can be found, is a violent presumption ; a presump-
tion of law, to maintain the equity of ancient appropriation ; not a
presumption of fact, nor hardly warranted in fact. To presume a
private act of the Deputation or Assembly of California, or of one
of its Governor's, is not a violent but a natural presumption, and
especially in a case like this, where we know the proceeding was
begun, and required but a single step to complete it ; and where the
books in which it ought to be recorded, are not to be found.
In the case of Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East 215, Lord Ellenborough,
says : twenty years exclusive enjoyment (of water) affords a con-
clusive presumption of a right derived from grant or act of Parlia-
ment
;
and " less than twenty years may or may not according to
circumstances." And the Supreme Court have held (Ricard v.
Williams, 7 Wh. 59, and in other cases) that presumptions of this
class apply to corporeal as well as to incorporeal hereditaments.
True, we do not come in this case, with the twenty years occupa-
tion which, according to Lord Ellenborough, would afford a " con-
clusive presumption "
;
but that rule is only where the case stands
on presumption alone, and even then a shorter time will have the
same effect, if other circumstances (as in this case all circumstances
do.) conduce. The rule holds in all cases where the occupation
may have had a leiral beginning ; how much more where we have
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shown that it had, in fact, a legal beginning, and was in all partic-
ulars conformable to the laws and policy of the country.
In the case of the United States v. Clarke, 8 P. 462, the Supreme
Court 'presume the rightfulness and binding force of grants of the
kind under their consideration, from the power of making them
having been exercised since the year 1813 ; and that the King (sup-
posed to be informed of the acts of his officers) had not disapprov-
ed of it. The presumption there rested therefore on a practice of
five or six years, since it dates only from 1813, and the treaty was
formed in February, 1819. Here, we claim under a practice reach-
ing back to the year 1773, since which time the Governors of Cali-
fornia have made such grants, with the knowledge and assent of
those above them, and respected by those beneath : from 1773 to
1846—forty years under the Spanish Government, twenty-three
years under the Mexican. Leaving out, however, all the time prior
to the introduction of the law of 1824, as carried into effect by the
Regulation of 1828, we have still a period of eighteen years ; or
dating from the year 1833, when the administration of Governor
Figueroa commenced, we have a period of thirteen years of unin-
terrupted exercise of this power, by seven successive Governors of
California, with the full knowledge of the Supreme Government,
and without a syllable of disapprobation.
In the case last quoted, (Clarke's case, 8 Peters,) the grant recited
a particular royal order as the authority on which it was made, and
which order it was admitted did not authorize the grant. The
Court held that the recital of the order was an immaterial allega-
tion, and did not affect the instrument ; that it " would be presumed
that the Governor had acted within the limits of his authority,
though that authority was not shown." The same doctrine is held
in a multitude of other cases
;
and in Strother v. Lucas. 12 P. 43S,
is declared to be " too deeply founded in law and reason ever to be
successfully assailed."
But, apart from all these presumptions of law, the principles of
which, applied to the circumstances of this case, appear to me to be
conclusive, I hold that the claim before the Board has been abso-
lutely and unconditionally ratified and confirmed by the Mexican
Government, in a decree of its authorized agent, Governor Michel-
torena. This decree, which was a public act, was issued on the
29th March, 1843. It exists in the archives in Mss., and is pub-
lished, with the exception of the preamble, in the Senate editions of
the several reports that have been made to the Government on Land
Titles in this State. The preamble to this decree (from which ex-
tracts, together with the instructions on which it is founded, are
given in the Appendix,) asserts that it is made in pursuance of
ample faculties given by the Supreme Government. It relates
especially to the lands which had been granted subsequent to the
secularization laws of Mexico, out of the tracts previously occupied
by the Missions, and declares in regard to such grants that "policy
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renders irrevocable what has been already done ;" and concludes
with an assurance of protection to the Missions, and to private
property, " securing to the owners the possession and preservation
of the property they now hold," but stipulating not to make any
new grants (of Mission lands) "without consultation Avith the
priests," etc.
Micheltorena came into California on a mission of peace. After
the revolution of 1836, and the subsequent erection of California
into a " free and independent State," though this independent posi-
tion was not long maintained, little more than a nominal reconcili-
ation took place
;
and the war with Texas, the civil commotions,
and frequent successions of revolutionary governments in Mexico,
prevented the Central Government from giving proper attention to
this remote Territory. When the prevailing contests in Mexico
were cut short by the plan of Tacubaya, and the election of Santa
Anna as Dictator, an era of " political regeneration" was announced,
and Santa Anna, in pursuance of the extraordinary faculties given
by the 7th article of said Plan,* hastened to consolidate his
powers by the despatch into the different departments,! of trusty
agents attached to his cause, with the amplest faculties to redress
grievances and remove subjects of complaint. In pursuance of this
policy, Governor Micheltorena was sent to the department of the
Californias, to represent the powers of the Federal Executive, who
represented and wielded the powers of the nation. He was sent to
fulfil the neglected duties of the Supreme Government ; to restore
quiet ; to conciliate the inhabitants ; to develope the resources of
the country ; to hasten its settlement, and improve its commerce.
AH these are prescribed in the general instructions given him, with
ample powers to carry them out. These instructions not having
been heretofore printed, as far as I am aware, I have inserted them,
together with a translation, (both copies official) in an appendix
hereto. It will be perceived that they are written in the most con-
ciliatory spirit, and an earnest desire shown in them to have every
cause of anxiety or complaint existing in California toward the
Supreme Government, removed or rectified, and all public interests
and desires attended to. It was pursuant to these instructions, and
under the complete power which they conferred, that the decree of
*The Bases of Government established at Tacubaya, 28 September, 1841, by a
reunion of the military under Santa Anna, and ratified 6 October, 1841, by a con-
vention between the contending parties under Bustamente and Santa Anna respec-
tively, are contained in the first volume of the Observador Judicial, page 7. The
7 th article is as follows :
"Las facultades del ejecutivo provisional son todas las necesarias para la organ-
ization de todos los ramos de la administration publica." (The powers of the pro-
visional executive are all those necessary for the organization of all branches of the
public administration.)
fThe Mexican federation was broken up in the year 1835, and the States reduced
and territories created, into " Departments." The federative system (with the
constitution of 1824,) was restored in 1846-7.
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Micheltorena (as we are informed in its preamble) was made. The
decree, though intended mainly for those cases where lands formerly
pertinent to the Missions had been granted subsequent to the secu-
larization laws, is yet general in its character, and may well be
construed to a general intent. But, in the present case, we come
directly within its provisions. The grant of Cruz Cervantes was
one of those covered by its immediate intent. It had been pertinent
to a Mission ; mider the secularization laws it had been granted
;
and whatever asssent or approval it needed to its completion, it now
received from the highest granting power, and was thus made " irre-
vocable."
Our attention cannot fail to be struck by the fact, that neither in
the instructions to Micheltorena, enumerating the grievances he is
to correct, and the means of conciliation he is to employ, though it
is evident they intended to cover every disquieting cause in the de-
partment
;
nor in the decree of Micheltorena, intended for the reso-
lution of disturbing questions, and the quieting of private rights, is
a word said of the question of the " ten leagues."
Does not this fact put the matter at rest, as far as any acts of
those high functionaries can give an authoritative interpretation to
to the law ? Do not these instruments, at all events, convey the
federal approbation and consent, as fully as any interpretation of the
law can require, to rights of property up to that time acquired ?
I ask attention to this decree of Micheltorenna ; and I claim it to
be an absolute confirmation, with the approval of the Federal Ex-
ecutive, of the claim before the Board.
I stated yesterday that I take the ground, that our title, even if
imperfect, and even if subject to be vacated and resumed by the
former government, stands confirmed and absolute ipso facto by
the treaty.
In the case of Simms v. Irvine, 3 Dallas 425, Douglass acquired
a right under the British government to five thousand acres of land
for services in the French war. He assigned to Simms, who after-
wards obtained a warrant from the State of Virginia, and located it
on Montour's island, in the Ohio river. In determining the bounda-
ries between the States of Virginia and Pennsylvania, this island
went to Pennsylvania. Under Pennsylvania Simms obtained a
survey according to his warrant, but did not obtain a patent. Irvine
claimed under a statute of Pennsylvania, authorizing him to make
a pre-emption on the island, and proceedings under it. The Court
held (opinion by Chief Justice Ellsworth) that Simms by his war-
rant from Virginia and location of it on the island, acquired a com-
plete equitable title, and needed only a patent for a complete legal
title
; that a confirmation of this equitable title, as complete as
a patent could have been, was conferred in the compact be-
tween Virginia and Pennsylvania, " reserving and confirming" rights
previously acquired under Virginia ; that the terms of the compact
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must be expounded favorably for those rights, so that titles before
substantially good, should not, after a change of jurisdiction, be de-
feated or questioned for formal defects.
The terms of the compact between Virginia and Pennsylvania
were not nearly so conclusive as the guaranty of the ninth article
of our treaty with Mexico. "Reserving and confirming" rights
might very well be construed to mean reserving and confirming
them in the state in which they were found
;
but the stipulation to
" maintain and protect property" is much more comprehensive,
and imposes much larger obligations.
In the case of Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cranch 703, Denny Fairfax,
an alien enemy was devisee of Lord Fairfax of the property called
the Northern Neck of Virginia ; and in the year 1789 the State of
Virginia patented a portion of the lands to Thomas Hunter. The
suit was brought to eject Hunter.
The Court held that though Denny Fairfax could not have taken
the land by descent, i. e. by operation of law, he took it properly by
devise, i. e. by act of the party ; but that he took it not for his own
benefit, but for the benefit of the State
;
that from the time of the
death of Lord Fairfax in 1781, down to the treaty of 1794, the State
had, consequently, a right of entry into the lands, and by proper
proceeding by inquest of office, to consummate their title. But that
having omitted this proceeding, whether by mistake or design, prior
to the treaty of 1794, the right of the State was cut off by the
treaty ; that the possession and seisin of the plaintiff continued up
to and after the treaty of 1794, " which (i. e. the treaty) being the
supreme law confirmed this title to him."
The clause of the treaty of 1794, (article 9) quoted in this case,
Is, that " it is agreed that British subjects who now hold lands in
the Territories of the United States, and American citizens who
now hold lands in the dominions of his majesty, shall continue to
hold them according to the nature and tenure of their respective
estates ;" language that might without violence have been interpre-
ted that Denny Fairfax having, before the treaty, held this estate
in trust for the Commonwealth, and liable to entry by an inquest of
office, continued so to hold it. But the Court took cognizance of
the treaty, according to its intent, and held that it confirmed the
title of Fairfax, and cut off the right of forfeiture in the State.
So we contend, under the far more comprehensive and obligatory
terms of the treaty with Mexico, that by the treaty our title here is
confirmed, and whatever right of forfeiture or avoidance may have
been in the State before the treaty, has (in the language of the Court)
" by the operation of the treaty, become ineffectual and void."
In the case of Marlett v. Silk, IIP. 20, again, plaintiff claimed
under a right derived from the State of Virginia
;
defendant under
a title from the State of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff entered on the
land (in Western Virginia) in 1772, contrary to law, and consequently
as a trespasser
;
but in 1 779. the Legislature of Virginia recognized
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settlement rights in the plaintiff and others in like circumstances, and
authorized them to enter a certain number of acres each. The de-
fendant claimed under a warrant from Pennsylvania, taken out in
1773, and surveyed in 1778. Afterward by the settlement oflimits
between the two States, the land came under the jurisdiction of
Pennsylvania, and, by the compact, rights acquired under the States
respectively, were to be respected by the other according to priority.
The Court held, that the case was, so to speak, an international one,
between two States, and the rule of decision to be the compact ;
that Yirginia by the act of 1779, had recognized the right of plaintiff
as beginning in 1772, when he made his settlement ; that that right,
however inchoate and shallow, was protected by the compact ; and
the case was so decided.
The 11th section of the act creating this Board, prescribes as
rules of decision for the Board, the treaty, the laws of nations, the
laws, usages and customs of the country, the principles of equity,
and the decisions of the Supreme Court.
The treaty is first and supreme ; and the others, as it seems to
me, can only be considered as prescribed in subordination to that
higher law, and to be invoked only where they come in aid of it.
The inferior cannot override the superior : no law or rule ofdecision
can override the treaty : and we appeal to the treaty, which guaran-
ties the protection of our property, as the " rule of decision ;" by
the " operation of which" all rights of forfeiture (if any before ex-
isted) are " rendered ineffectual and void ;" and our title " confirmed,
as effectually as any patent could do it."

APPENDIX.
MEXICAN EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS OF 1828.
Disposiciones Generales, 6 Reglamento General Provisions, or Regulation for
para la Colonizacion de los Territo- the Colonization of the Territories
tios de la Republica. of the Republic.
Estando prevenido en el articulo 16 It being provided in the 16th article of
de la ley general de Colonizacion de 18 the general law of colonization of the 18th
Agosto de 1824, que el gobiernio, con- August, 1824, that the Government, con-
forme a los principios establecidos en formably to the principles established in
dicha ley, procedera ;i la colonizacion de said law, shall proceed to the colonization
los territories de la Republica
; y siendo of the Territories of the Republic ; and it
muy oportuno para darse a dicho articulo being fit, in order to give to said article the
el mas puntual y exacto cumplimiento, completest and exactest fulfilment, to pre-
dictar algunos disposiciones generales que scribe some general provisions to facilitate
facilitensuejecucionenloscasosque vayan its execution in the cases that may be oc-
ocuriendo, el E. S. Presidente ha tenido a curing, his excellency the President has
bien acordar los articulos que siguen : seen proper to appoint the following arti-
lo. Se autoriza a los gefes politicos de cles :
los territorios para que con arreglo a la 1. The political chiefs of the Territories
ley del Congreso general de 18 de Agosto are authorized, in conformity with the act
de 1824, y bajo las calidades que despues of the General Congress of 18th August,
se espresan, puedan conceder terrenos 1824, and under the conditions hereinaf-
valdios de sus respectivos territorios a los ter expressed, to concede vacant lands of
empresarios, familias, 6 personas particu- their respective Territories, to empresa-
lares Mejicanas 6 estrangeras que lo so- rios, families, or individuals, Mexicans or
liciten con el objeto de cultivarlos 6 habi- foreigners, who petition for them with the
tarlos. object of cultivating them or living on
2o. Todo pretendiente de terrenos, sea them,
empresario, cabeza de familia 6 persona 2. Every petitioner for lands, whether
particular, se presentara al gefe politico empresario, head of a family, or individ-
del respectivo territorio por instancia en ual, shall present himself to the political
que se esprese su nombre, patria, pro- chief of the respective Territory, by peti-
fesion ; el numero, naturaleza, religion, y tion, setting forth his name, country, pro-
demas circunstancias de las familias 6 fession, the number, description, religion,
personas con que quiere colonisar, mar- and other particulars of the families
cando asi mismo con la distincion posible, or persons with which he wishes to colo-
y discribiendo en un diseno el terreno que nize, defining also, as distinctly as possible,
solicita. and describing in a map, the tract which
3o. El gefe politico procedera desde he solicits.
luego a tomar el informequeseabastante, 8. The political chief shall then pro-
sobre si se encuentran 6 no en la solicitud ceed to take the information that
las calidades que requiere la citada ley de may be necessary, whether or not the
18 de Agosto, asi en el terreno, como en petition comprehends the qualities re-
el pretendiente, ya para que se atienda d quired by the said law of 18th August,
este sencillamente,ya para que [si ?] se le as well in regard to the tract as to the
prefiera oyendo al mismo tiempo a la auto- petitioner, so that the case may be con-
ridad municipal respectiva sobre si halla 6 sidered either simply on the petition, or
no algun reparo en la concesion.* if it be preferred, consulting at the same
* „,, . ,. , , , , , ,
.
time the proper municipal authority,
* 1 he construction of the latter branch of this sec- , ,i „„ii_. t, r l i_- i
tion is not clear. After consulting with several Span- whether or no there be found any hind -
ish and English scholars, I have adopted the interpre- ranee to the <Tant
talion here given, which agrees likewise with the °
official translation of Mr. HartnelJ.
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4o. En vista de todo, el gefe politico ac- 4. In view of the whole, the political
cedera 6 no a dicha solicitud, arreglan- chief shall accede or not to the said peti-
dose esactamente a las leyes aplicables a tion, conforming himself exactly to the
la materia, con especialidad a layacitada laws applicable to the matter, especially
de 18 de Agosto de 1824. to that before cited, of 18th August, 1824.
So. Las concesiones hechas a personas 5. Concessions made to individuals or
6 familias particulares no se tendran por families, shall not be held definitively
valederas definativamente, sin previo con- binding without the previous consent of
sentimiento de la Diputacion Territorial, the territorial deputation, to which effect
a cuyo efecto se pasaran a esta los espedi- shall be transmitted thereto the relative
entes respectivos. records.
6o. Cuando el gefe politico no obtu- 6. When the political chief shall not
viere la aprobacion de la Diputacion Ter- obtain the approbation of the territorial
ritorial, dara cuenta al Supremo Gobi- deputation, he shall report to the supreme
erno con el espediente de la materia, para government, with the records of the
su resolucion. case, for its resolution.
7o. Las concesiones hechas a empresa- 7. Concessions made to empresarios to
rios para que colonizen con muchas fami- colonize with several families, shall not
lias no se tendran por valederas deflnitiv- be held definitively binding until shall be
amente hasta no obtener la aprobacion obtained the approbation of the supreme
del Supremo Grobierno, a qtiien se dara government, to whom report shall be
cuenta con el espediente, agregandose & made, with the record of the case, adding
este el informe que paresca a la Diputa- to it the report which may appear fit
cion Territorial. to the territorial deputation.
8. The concession asked for, being
8o. Hecha definativamente la concesion definitively made, a document shall be
que se solicita se espedera un documento issued, signed by the political chief,
firmado por el gefe politico que sirva de which may serve as title to the interested
titulo al interesado, espresandose en este party, expressing therein that the conces-
que la concesion se entiende con entera sion is to be understood in entire : im-
conformidad a lo dispuesto por las leyes, formity to the dispositions of the iawd,
en cuya virtud se procedera a la pose- in virtue of which the possession shall
cion. be proceded to.
9o. De todas las solicitudes que se pre- 9. Of all the petitions that may be pre-
sentan y concesiones que se hagan, que- sented and concessions that maybe made,
daran los correspondientes asientos en un there shall be kept corresponding entries
libro destinado al efecto, con los diseiios in a book prepared to that end, with the
de los terrenos que se concedieren, y se maps of the tracts which are conceded,
pasara al Supremo Gobierno cada trinies- and there shall be sent to the supreme
tre una nota circunstanciada. government each three months, a circum-
stantial account.
lOo. No se podra admitir capitulacion 10. There shall not be admitted any
alguna para nueva poblacion, si no es contract for a new settlement, unless the
que el capitulante se obligue a presentar contractor obligate himself to present in
en calidad de pobladores a lo menos doce the character of settlers, at least twelve
familias. families.
llo. El gefe politico sefialara. al nuevo 11. The political chief shall appoint to
poblador un tiempo proporcionado, dentro the new settler, [or, more properly,
del cual precisamente debera cultivar u founder of a new settlement,] a suitable
ocupar el terreno en los terminos, y con time within which he shall necessarily
el numero de personas 6 familias que haya cultivate or occupy the land under the
capitnlado, en el concepto de que no ha- conditions, and with the number of per -
ciendolo, quedera nula la concesion del sons or families that he may have stipula-
terreno, pudiendo sin embargo el gefe ted, with the understanding that if he
politico revalidarla en proporcion a shall not perform it, the grant of the land
la parte en que hubiese cumplido el in- shall be null, being able, nevertheless the
teresado. political chief to revalidate it in propor-
tion to the part that the interested party
should have fulfilled it.
12o. Todo nuevo poblador, despues que 12. Every new settler, after he shall
haya cultivado ii ocupado el terreno con have cultivated or occupied the land, ac-
arreglo a su capitulacion, cuidara de jus- cording to his contract, shall take care to
tificarlo ante la autoridad municipal, para prove it before the municipal authority,
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que haciendose el asiento oportuuo, eou- in order that, the proper entry being
solide y aseguere su derecho de proprie- made, he may consolidate and secure his
dad, para poder disponer libremente de right of property, so as to be able to dis-
ella. pose freely of it.
13o. La reunion de muchas familias en 13. The reunion of a number of families
una poblacion, seguira en su formacion, in one settlement shall follow in its forma-
gobierno y policia interior las reglas es- tion, government and internal police,
tablecidas por las leyes vigentes para las the rules established by the existing laws
demas poblaciones de la.republica, tenien- for the other settlements of the Republic,
dose especial cuidado en las neuvas, de having special care in the new ones that
que se construyan con la posible regu- they be built with all possible regularity,
laridad. 14. The minimum of irrigable land that
14o. El minimum de terreno de regadio shall be given for colonization for each per-
que se de para colonizarse por una mano son, shall be two hundred varas square
;
sera de doscientos varas en cuadro ; el the minimum of that which is not irri-
minimum del de temporal sera de ocho gable shall be eight hundred varas ; the
cientos varas. El minimum del de abre- minimum of that for pasturing cattle [or
vedero sera de mil doscientos varas. having watering places for cattle,] shall
15o. El terreno que se de para un solar be one thousand two hundred varas.
ser de cien varas. 15. The tract given for a building lot
16o. Los huecos que quederan entre los shall be of one hundred varas.
terrenos colonizados podran distribuirse 16. The spaces which remain between
entre los poseedores limitofres que hayan the colonized tracts may be distributed
cultivado con aplicacion los suyos, y no among the adjoining possessors who shall
hayan recibido todo la estencion de ter- cultivate their own with assiduity, and
reno que la ley permite, 6 a los hijos de shall not have received the whole extent
los mismos poseedores que los soliciten of land that the law allows, or to the
para concretar las propriedades de sus children of the said possessors who may
familias, teniendose para esto muy pre- solicit them, to combine the possessions of
sente la moralidad e industria de los in- their families, having regard for this ob-
tersados. ject to the morals and industry of the in-
17o. En los territories en que haya terested parties,
misiones, los terrenos que estas ocupen, 17. In those territories where there
no podran colonizarse por ahora y hasta are missions, the lands which those occupy
que se resuelva si deben considerarse shall not be colonized at present, and until
como propriedad de las reducciones de it shall be determined if they ought to be
los neofitos catecmnenos y pobladores considered as property of the settlements
Mejicanos. of neophyte-catechumens [i. e. converted
Indians—neophytes, or pupils of the mis-
Mexico, 21 de Noviembre de 1828. sions,] and Mexican settlers [or citizens.]
Mexico, 21st Nov. 1828.
INSTRUCTIONS AND POWERS OF MICHELTORENA.
INSTRUCTIONS.* TRANSLATION.
f
Con fecha 11 de Febrero de 1842, me Under date of the 11th February,
dice el E. S. Ministro de la Guerra y Ma- 1842, the Minister of War says what
rina lo que copio : E. S. Deseando el E. S. follows.
Presidente provicional de que en el De- Most Excellent Sir : His Excellency
partamento de Californias se promuevan the President ad interim, being desirous
todos los recursos que tiene para prosperar that the Department of California should
* I have received this copv through the courtesv t This translation was made by Mr. Hartnell, as
of Capt. Halleck. It is taken from a copy com- I suppose, when he was government translator, m
municated bv Micheltorena to Don Pablo' de la charge of the Archives. I copied it, by permission,
Guerra, then Administrator of Customs at Mon- from a document in the Archives, in February,
terey. 1851, when they were in charge of Major Canby, at
Benicia.
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y ponerse en defenza y en el estado de take advantage of all the resources -which
felicidad al que aun la misma naturaleza it possesses for its prosperity, for placing
le invita; teniendo en consideration los itself in a state of defence, and for acquir-
sucesos que ha habido en el pais y que ing that happiness which nature itself in-
por la distancia no ha podido evitarlos el vites her to take possession of ; and bear-
Gobierno Nacional ; la situacion en que ing in mind the disturbances which have
V. E. va a encontrarse y las medidas que taken place in the country, and which, on
tendril que adoptar, cuyas consultas no account of the distance, the National
surtiran efecto, si aguardan el tiempo Government has not been able to avoid;
necesario para su resolucion; que hay the situation in which Y. E. will be
asuntos en los que el mas pequeno retardo placed and the measures which you will
no proporciona el remedio
; y confiado have to adopt, and which will produce the
en que V. E. no absuara del poder y que el desired effect if you wait for the proper
que se le concede lo empleara en bien del time to put them into execution, for there
servicio y de todos los habitantes del in- are matters which do not admit of the
teresante y feraz Departamento que el least delay, and in the persuasion that Y.
Gobierno Supremo ha puesto a su cargo y E. will not abuse your powers but that
responsabilidad, se ha servido conceder a you will exercise them for the welfare and
V. E. ademas de las atribuciones que le service of all the inhabitants of that in-
demarcan las leyes y ordenanzas vigentes, teresting and fertile Department which
como Gobernador, Comandante general e the Supreme Government has placed un-
Inspector, todas las facultades que puede der your charge and responsibility, he
delegarle el Gobierno Supremo para que (the President) has been pleased to grant
en uso de ellas, remueva a los empleados to Y. E. over and above the attributions
civiles y militares dependientes de el, que assigned to you by the existing laws and
no correspondan a sus deberes y a la con- regulations, as Governor, Commandant
fianza del mismo Supremo Gobierno,, General and Inspector, all the powers
reemplazandolos con ciudadanos dignos which the Supreme Government can con-
que entraran al ejercicio de sus destinos, fer upon you, in order that by virtue
sin perjuicio de que V. E. dara cuenta thereof you may remove from office all
para la aprobacion suprema con las cau- such civil and military officers dependent
sas de sus procedimientos. Lasmiras del on said Government who shall not fulfil
Supremo Magistrado no solo se reducen their duties or act up to the confidence
a la Alta California, sino que tambien se reposed in them by the same, and fill their
estienden a la Baja, en cuya demarcacion situations by appointing worthy citizens
han aparccedo conatos de eccision que who shall take their places and enter up-
fomentados por enemigos ocultos, han on their duties, but with the understand-
hecho que tomen parte algunos estranos, ing nevertheless that you report to Gov-
que su mismo origen les prohibe el in- ernment the motives of your proceedings
gerirse en querellas domesticas
; y como for its approbation. The views of the
este resuelto a proteger a las tropas, au- Supreme Magistrate do not only refer to
toridades y vecinos de la mencionada Upper California, but extend likewise to
peninsula, ha resuelto, que el mando Lower California, where certain seditious
militar de V. E. se estienda a dicha Baja movements have appeared, which being
California como esta en lo politico; sepa- fomented by hidden enemies, it has caused
ranclo lo de el de Sinaloa, sin embargo de some foreigners to take part when their
que el Sen or Commandante General de very quality of foreigners prohibits them
los Departamentos de Sonora y Sinaloa, from intermeddling in domestic strife ; and
rontinuara impartiendo a V. E. los re- as the President is resolved to protect the
cursos y aucilios de que hubiere menester troops, authorities, and citizens of said
por asegurar la paz, para socorrer las Peninsula, he has determined that your
tropas, para proveer al vecindario y por military command shall likewise extend
hacer que toda la demarcacion prospere to Lower California as well as the civil
y sea feliz. Aunque el art. 1, de 2 de command, separating it from Sinaloa,
Noviembre, de 1889, derogo los articulos and the Commandant General of the De-
del de 18 de Febrero de mismo ano que partment of Sonora and Sinaloa will con-
sugetaban a la dependencia de la Plana tinue to furnish you with the resources
Mayor del Ejercito, y el 13 del primer de- and assistance which you may require for
creto citado solo se deja a los Comman- the purpose of securing peace, furnishing
dantes Generales de los Departamentos the troops, providing for the wants of the
de Oriente y Occidente con las antiguas citizens and enabling you to provide for
atribuciones inspectoral que tenian en las the prospex'ity and happiness of the whole
companias precidinlos, el E. S. Presidente Department. Although the 1st article
referido ha resuelto, que las facultades of the law of 2d November, 1839, derog-
de V. E. se estiendan como inspector al ated the articles of that of the 18th Feb-
Batallon fijo de Californias y que en todo ruary^of the; same year which subjected
lo relativo obre en mecanica y se entienda the subordination of the staff of the
con la Plana Mayor del Ejercito. Va V. army, and the 13th article of the first
E. a esperimentar el arreglo 6 desorden mentioned decree merely leaves the Com-
en que se encuentran las aduanas mari- mandant General of the East and West
timas de Ambas Californias : tiene la with the former attributions of Inspector
necesidad de ecsaminar la situacion que which they possessed in the Companies of
guardan todas las misiones en su gobier- Presidios, His Excellency the President
no, adelantos y ramo de contabilidad ; has determined that your powers shall
tiene que proceder a la inspeccion y re- extend as Inspector to the permanent Ba-
organisacion de las conrpaiiias presidiales, talion of California and that you take
y para todadebieradejar ecsistente elmal charge of all the mechanism thereof and
mientras que se resolvia la consulta. El report to the staff of the army. You will
Gobierno Supremo confiando en la justifi- become acquainted with the good or bad
cacion y actividad de V. E. quiere desde management of the Maritime Custom
luego que el dano se evite, que el bien se Houses of both Californias ; you will have
establesca, y que desde luego ningun ob- to examine the situation of all the Mis-
staculo lo impida, y por lo mismo, las sions with respect to their management,
facultades que delega en V. E. las hace improvement and state of accounts ; you
estensivas a estos ramos y a cuantos mas will have to proceed to the inspection and
puedan contribuir a la dicha delpaiz con- reorganization of the Companies of Pres-
tando entre sus ramos la administration de idios, and in all cases (were you not to
correos,la colonisacion, el establecimiento act) the evil would have to remain until
de Presidios, la mejora de los puertos, Government could resolve. The Supreme
la seguridad de los Pueblos, la civilisa- Government trusting in your justice and
cion de los salvages, la educacion de activity, desires that you should meet with
la juventeed, la apertura de caminos, no obstacles, and therefore the powers
el fomento de las artes, la proteccion conferred upon you are made extensive to
de la agricultura y el comercio, el es- those branches and to all others which
tablecimiento de casas de correccion y may conduce to the welfare of the coun-
el hornato de las poblaciones. Conoce try, including amongst others, the admin-
V. E. las miras del Gobierno Supremo; istration of the Post Office Department,
sabe muy bien que amigo del progresso Colonization, the establishment of Presi-
solo anhela por la union entre los Megi- dios, the improvement of Ports, the safety
canos, y por que todos los pueblos dis- of Towns, the civilization of wild In-
fruten el amparo de las leyes y una dians, the education of youth, the open-
libertad tan estensa que solo la limite el ing of roads, the furtherance of the arts,
acatamiento a las leyes, la obediencia a the protection of agriculture and com-
sus autoridades, y el deber que tenemos merce, the establishment of houses of cor-
para procurar el bien y evitar a todos se rection, and the establishment of towns,
les haga perjuicio. En esta virtud no me
detengo en recomendarle propague estos You know the views of the Supreme
principios y unicamente le advierto que Government, and are well aware that be-
al dictar sus instrucciones el Supremo ing a friend to improvement it merely
Magistrado ha querido manifestar a V. desires the union of Mexicans, and that
E. su aprecio y la entidad del gobierno the community in general may enjoy the
que le confia y a los habitantes de Cali- protection of the laws, be obedient to
fornias el acreditarles que la presente their authorities, understand that it is
administracion desea su dicha, desconoce our duty to procure the welfare of eve-
la apatia, y esta pronta a impartir en ry one and avoid that all others be in-
favor de aquel Departamiento todos jured. I therefore will not detain myself
cuantos recursos apetesca y pueda pro- by recommending you to propagate these
porcionarle. Los dignos militares que principles, and will merely mention that
marchan a las ordenes de V. E. van d when the Supreme Magistrate dictated his
prestar un servicio en favor del territorio instructions, he wished to manifest to you
nacional digno sin duda de la grati- his esteem, and the importance of the
tud publica ; los habitantes de aquel De- command he has confided to you, and to
partamiento van a, esperimentar en ellos assure the inhabitants of California that
un modelo de honrades, de subordinacion the present administration desires their
y disciplina, y para que se acrediten happiness, disavows all apathy, and is
estas honorificas calidades es indispensa- ready to impart to that Department all
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ble que V. E. les recuerde continuamente the resources which it may desire and be
que su residencia no va d ser en unos pue- able to furnish it.
bios que si bien carecen sus habitantes I communicate this to Y. E. for your
de la civilisacion de cortesanos, tambien satisfaction. God and Liberty. Mexico,
es verdad que son dociles, hospitalarios, 11 February 1842.=Tomel.=To General
amigos del bien, y susceptibles de apro- Don Manuel Micheltorena.
vechamiento y libres de ese contagio que I certify that the foregoing copy is the
tambien perjudica en las grandes pobla- same as the one that was copied from the
ciones en donde corrompide la moral, solo original when I was in charge of the
se ensefia a criticar acciones inocentes Governor's Secretaryship.
que debieran servir de buen ejemplo." Monterey, July 6, 1850.
Lo que trascribo d V. para su inteli- (Signed) MANL. JIMENO.
gencia y fines consigiuentes.
Dios y Libertad.
Enero, 10, de 1843.
MANUEL MICHELTORENA.
Sor Admor. de la Aduana Maritima de
Monterey.
Extracts from the Decree of Micheltorena, 29 March, 1843.*
One of the ample instructions with which the undersigned, General and Governor,
finds himself invested, being that of examining the positions the Missions maintain,
in their administration, improvements and liabilities, and to regulate the same ; and
the National Supreme Government having invested him with all its powers, as shown
in the supreme order of 11 February, 1842 ; in accord and with consent of the most
Reverend Father Friar Jose Joaquin Jimeno, Friar Jose de Ma. de Jesus Gonzales
Rubio, whom to that end I caused to be called before this government, as well as the
Presidents of the other Missions, and in the name and representation of the most
Reverend Father President Vicar Foraneo Friar Narciso Duran ; being informed
of all that was necessary ; and considering that the vast and immense lands former-
ly property of the Missions have been distributed to private individuals, at a time
when it was made one of the exigencies of the country ; that those pious and bene-
ficial establishments are reduced nearly to the gardens and grounds of their temples
and edifices; that the most Reverend F. Ministers have no means of subsistence ex-
cept mercenary, and that the divine worship, without prospering, is scarcely main-
tained ; that the Indians by their natural reluctance to labor, suffer from scanti-
of food, and nakedness—those not in private employment, or subjection, pre-
ferring to flee away and die impenitent in the woody deserts, dragging out a life of
slavery, full of privations, and without any of the social enjoyments ; that the con-
tinual emigration of natives from private individuals to the Missions, and from the
Missions to private individuals, and to the wilderness, more and more hinders agri-
culture, and instead of attracting the heathen, drives them away from the bosom of
our Holy Religion ; that in the administration of the Missions some frauds and notori-
ous abuses have been committed, which all the inhabitants of the country lament
;
and that there are no other means to reanimate the skeleton of a giant, which the
remains of the ancient Missions are, than to have recourse to experience and to sus-
tain them with the levers of the civil and ecclesiastical powers ; all having been
considered and prudently weighed, I have thought proper to resolve the following
articles :
Article 1. The government of the Department will order the Missions of San
Diego, San Luis Rey, San Juan Capistrano, San Gabriel, San Fernando, San Buen-
aventura, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, La Purisima, San Antonio, Santa Clara, and
San Jose, to be delivered up to the very reverend fathers whom the respective pre-
late may appoint to each of them, and said Missions shall in future continue to be
* The original of this decree exists in the archives, in charge of the Surveyor General of the United
States in California.
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administered by the very reverend fathers, as tutors to the Indians, in the same
manner as they held them formerly.
Article 2. As policy makes irrevocable what has hitherto been done, the
Missions will not claim any lands already granted up to this date ; but they will
collect the cattle, property, and utensils, which may have been lent by the priests
or administrators, settling the time and manner in a friendly way with debtors or
holders.
Article 6. The departmental government, which prides itself in being religious,
and at the same time entirely Californian, and as such, interested in the same man-
ner as each and every one of the inhabitants of both Californias, in the progress of
the Holy Catholic Faith, and prosperity of the country, offers all its powers for the
protection of the Missions, and, as Commandant General, the force of arms to es-
cort, defend and sustain them, as it will likewise do in respect to individual and
private property, and guaranties, securing to the owners thereof the possession and
preservation of the lands which they this day hold, and it undertakes not to make
any new grants, except on information of said authorities, of the reverend fathers,
or where the lands are notoriously unoccupied, or in case of necessity.
Act of the Territorial Deputation of California, 12 May, 1884, in re-
lation to the Missions. (Mss. Archives.)
First—The vacant lands shall be distributed according to the Laws of Coloni-
zation.
Second—The Political Chief shall order a suspension of the extensive slaughter-
ings of cattle which are taking place at the Missions, and will only permit the same
in case of urgent necessity.
)'~;
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IN SUPREME COURT OE THE UNITED STATES.
CRUZ CERVANTES, APPELLANT,
vs.
THE UNITED STATES.
Argument.
The first questions that arise in this case relate to the assumed juris-
diction of the court below. The case is anomalous; as it has not, in
the manner of its institution or prosecution, a feature in common with
any case that ever before it was found in a court of law.
It was not instituted or prosecuted by either of the parties to it. It
was either self-instituted, self-begotten, self-born, or else it was insti-
tuted by Mr. George Fisher, signing himself secretary. I*, was prose-
cuted by the judge of the court, (not. by the court, for it was out of
term time, but by the judge,) and in virtue of notice served on the
clerk of the court.
It was instituted without any declaration, petition, or complaint, to
inform the court of its nature or scope. It was prosecuted without any
process or notice to the defendant to inform him of its grounds, or even,
of its existence.
It relates to land outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court,
and affects a defendant also outside of its jurisdiction, and never
brought within it by process.
It was instituted and prosecuted in defiance of an express stipulation
of one of the parties, and against the protest of the other.
The case that was instituted is not the case that was prosecuted; be-
cause, the prosecution commenced before the institution.
It is an appeal in advance of any original cognizance of the cause;
reversing the usual, and heretofore considered necessary order, which
requires an original action before an appellate can accrue.
1 am justified, therefore, in saying, that a cause so begun, and so
carried on, was never before entertained by a court of law, or a judge
professing to sit as such; and that his proceeding in the premises was
irregular, illegal, outside of his jurisdiction; not warranted in any of its
features by law, by justice, or by the usage or practice of any jurispru-
dence known in the world.
The case has grown out of proceedings instituted before a certain
commission or board of arbitrators, appointed under an act of Congress
of 3d March, 1851, entitled "An act to ascertain and settle the private
land claims in California." This act provides, among other things:
1. That a Board of Commissioners be appointed by the President
and Senate to sit in California, and take cognizance of such claims as
should be presenled to them of lands held in that State under any
right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments; and,
as such claims became respectively ready for hearing, to examine the
same, and decide on their validity, and within thirty days thereafter
certify their decision to the district attorney of the United States for
the district where it was rendered.
2. That the part}' against whom the decision of the commissioners
should be rendered might present a petition to the district court of the
district where the land lay, praying that court to revieio the decision of
the commission, and to decide on the validity of the claim; this peti-
tion, if presented on the part of the claimant, to set forth fully his title;
if presented on behalf of the United States, to set forth "fully and dis-
tinctly the grounds on which the claim is alleged to be invalid;" a
copy of the petition to be served on the adverse party, or his attorney,
and he allowed to answer or traverse the same.
3. That on the pleadings and evidence in the case, and such fur-
ther evidence as might be taken by its order, the district court should
proceed to render judgment; and, on application of the party against
whom the judgment was given, should grant an appeal to this supreme
court.
4. That to entitle either party to this review of the decision of
the commissioners, a notice of the intention of such party should,
within sixty days after the decision of the commissioners was made
and notified to the parties, be entered on the journal of the commis-
sion, and within six months after the decision was rendered the peti-
tion should be filed.
5. That for all claims finally confirmed by the commission, or by
the district or supreme court, a patent should issue, on the presentation
of a certificate of the confirmation, and a survey of the land approved
by the surveyor general, whose duty it should be, to that end, to cause
to be surveyed all the lands thus finally confirmed.
6. That the final decrees rendered by the said commissioners, or by
the district or supreme court, or any patent issued under the act, should
be conclusive between the United States and the claimant.
The Board of Commissioners thus provided forsatatSan Francisco,
on the 21st January, 1852, as the agents of the United States; and on
the 20th February, 1852, Cervantes—the appellant here—made them
his agents also, and accepted the mode and terms proposed, for ascer-
taining and settling his claim to the land in question, by presenting his
case according to the provisions of the act. The commissioners thus
became, by mutual consent, and they could not so become in any other
way, the referees or arbitrators between the United States and Cer-
vantes, with authority (by virtue of this same consent) to receive testi-
mony on either side, and to decide on the validity of the claim of
Cervantes, according to the principles laid down in the act.
It is, then, in this aspect that I shall regard the case; namely, as one
altogether between the United States and Cervantes, and the act of
1851 as an agreement of reference between them, and, for the purposes
of this cause, to be regarded solely as a private act of the parties; as
much so, as if entitled an act to ascertain and settle the land claim of
Cervantes, and conditioned to go into operation on his acceptance of it;
for, so far as he is concerned, it was so entitled and so conditioned.
The commission, then, or arbitrators, thus empowered, proceeded
in the cause until it became ready for hearing: heard it; and on the 3d
of August, 1852, decided it—decided the point submitted to them
—
decided "on the validity of the claim"—and decided it to be valid.
Subsequently, i. e. 6n the3lst of August, 1852, Congress made (he
following enactment, in the midst of the civil and diplomatic appropri-
ation act of that year, namely:
"And in every case in which the board of commissioners on private land claims in Cali-
fornia shall render a final decision, it shall be their duty to have two certified transcripts
prepared of their proceedings and decision, and of the papers and evidence on which the
same are founded, one of which transcripts shall be filed with the clerk of the proper dis-
trict court, and the other shall be transmitted to the attorney general of the United States,
and the filing of such transcript with the clerk aforesaid shall ipso faclo operate as an ap-
peal for the party against whom the decision shall be rendered; and if such derision shall
be against the private claimant, it shall be his duty to file a notice with the clerk aforesaid
within six months thereafter of his intention to prosecute the appeal; and if the decision
shall be against the United States, it shall be the duty of the attorney general, within six
months after receiving said transcript, to cause a notice to be fiied with the clerk aforesaid,
that the appeal will be prosecuted by the United State?; and on the failure of- either party
to file such notice with the clerk aforesaid, the appeal shall be regarded as dismissed."
(Stat, at Lar., Sess. 1851-2, p. 99.)*
And subsequent to this these proceedings took place in the commis-
sion, namely:
On the 18ih December, 1852, two of the members of said commis-
sion read each an opinion on points of said case, and also a paper enti-
tled a decree of final confirmation, (pp. 7, 44, 49, 50.)
On the same day, the Board made an order that the "opinion of the
Board," delivered on the 3d of August previous, together with the sev-
eral opinions and the "decree of final confirmation," that day deliv-
ered, should be "recorded on the journal." (p. 7.)
Under color, or supposed warrant, of which last mentioned enact-
ment and of those proceedings in the commission, we infer that these
subsequent acts were performed, namely:
On the 11th of July, 1853, Mr. dishing, Attorney General of the
United States, gave a notice (p. 98) "to the clerk of the district court
of the United States for the northern district of California," in the fol-
lowing words:
*[Note.—For convenience, the act providing for the organization of the board, and the
above clause, will be respectively referred to in this argument, as the act of 1851, and th«
act of 1852.1
" Cruz Cervantes, claimant, vs. The United States.
" Attorney General's Office,
" Washington, D. C, July 11, 1853.
" You will please take notice, that the appeal in the above case from the decision of the
commissioners to ascertain and settle the private land claims in the State of California, to
the district court of the United States, for the northern district of California, will be prose-
cuted by the United States.
" C. CUSHING, Attorney General, United States.
"To the Clerk of the district court of the United States,
for the northern district of California."
On the 22d July, 1853, George Fisher, signing himself secretary,
the person whom I say instituted the cause, if it were not self-instituted,
certified to certain manuscripts, purporting to be a transcript of various
proceedings and evidence on file in his office, (p. 98.)
What Mr. Fisher did with this transcript is not shown, by any en-
dorsement or entry; but as it is found in the clerk's office of the
court of the northern district of California, it may be reasonable to in-
fer that on or subsequent to said 22d July he placed it there; (though,
in any aspect of the case, the fact, and the time of it, ought positively
to appear.)
Cervantes, by outside report, heard of these proceedings; and went
before the court to protest against them, and move them to be dismissed.
But he did not enter any appearance in the case, nor forego any of his
rights in the premises, growing out of want of process, or in any other
respect. I argue, then:
I.—The court had not jurisdiction of the land or the defendant.
1. The subject matter of the cause (i. e. the land claimed by Cer-
vantes) is not in its jurisdiction.
The northern district of California comprises only that part of the
State north of north latitude 37°, (9 Stat, at Lar. 521,) and the land
in controversy is south of that line; consequently outside of the district,
and of the jurisdiction of the court.
This fact was brought directly to the notice of the court, by the de-
nial of Cervantes, in his protests and motions against the assumed pro-
ceeding of the court, (p. 102.)
No counter allegation was made, nor any attempt to prove the local-
ity necessary to give jurisdiction, or to obviate the difficulty in any
way. In fact, the case being the first that ever found itself before a court
of record without process or pleadings to ascertain the matters in issue,
precedents do not show, perhaps, what would have been the proper
course of the actor in the case. But the denial of the jurisdiction—i. e.
the denial of the fact necessary to give jurisdiction—by Cervantes,
made it incumbent on the other side to show that fact, in some legal
manner, affirmatively. This not having been done, the denial of
Cervantes stands good; for, even with the proper averment on the
other side, the traverse of it by Cervantes would make it necessary
for the fact to be proved. There are questions of jurisdiction, that
(the proper averment being made in the institution of the case) must
be raised by plea in abatement, and the burden lies on the one who
makes the plea. An example is in 14 How. 510. The plea was to
the jurisdiction, on the ground that the plaintiff was a resident of the
same State with the defendant; and the necessary allegation having
been made in the declaration, it was held to be prima facie evidence of
the fact alleged, and the burden of proof was consequently on the party
taking the exception. But this is not such a case. This is not a question
of residence, or of the right of the parties to sue, as incident to residence;
but it is a question whether the subject matter of the controversy is in
the jurisdiction, and could have been taken advantage of (even were
the case prima facie made out in a declaration or petition) on the gen-
eral issue, (2 Gal. 345,) where of course the plaintiff must make good
his averments.
[Before I pass from the case in 14 How., I ask the especial atten-
tion of the court to what is there so justly said of the necessity of
keeping out incongruities and anomalies in the proceedings of courts
of justice.]
If this cause, then, had been made up in the usual form, and this
denial of Cervantes had been to an averment properly made by the
plaintiff, it would have raised a question going to the gist of the action,
triable on the general issue, in which the plaintiff must make good his
position. Is the plaintiff better off by not having made any averment?
That would be profiting by his own laches, which justice will not
tolerate. On the contrary, the denial of Cervantes, standing alone,
is to be taken as a true allegation, which, not denied, must be held to
be confessed; on the same principle (as well as for other reasons) that
the necessary averment in the case in 14 How. was held to be prima
facie sufficient, and the burden of disproving it thrown on the party
who should impeach the alleged fact. Certainly, the rule is, that the
party alleging a fact is the one who ought to prove it; but a plaintiff
cannot escape the responsibility of maintaining his action, and throw
the burden of the cause on his adversary by omitting necessary aver-
ments, and so transforming the defendant's negatives into affirmatives.
As for the manner of the denial on the part of Cervantes, it was
the best he could do, since the case, as already shown, was before the
court without declaration, petition, complaint, citation, bill, or state-
ment, or notice or process of any kind to which he could respond by
plea or answer; and the only way open to him to bring the obstacles
to its jurisdiction to the notice of the court was, by motion to dismiss.
This was also the proper mode. (2 Peters, 554.)
If a suit be brought by a citizen of Ohio against a citizen of Mis-
souri in the proper federal court of that State, concerning a piece of
land, and the case come to this court by appeal or writ of error, and it
happen that the value of the land is not alleged, and does not posi-
tively appear, I suppose a suggestion of the fact would cause the dis-
missal of the case; and if the appellee added to this suggestion an
allegation that the land was not, in point of fact, worth the minimum
that would give this court jurisdiction of the case, I suppose he would
not thereby be put to the proof of that negative, unless, along with
8other anomalies of this case, it is henceforth to be held that the nega-
tion of a fact raises a presumption of its truth. The cases I consider
to be exactly parallel.
2. The parly defendant (the appellee, so called) was not in the
jurisdiction of the court.
This rests partly on the same ground as the foregoing, and partly on
the want of process and service. Cervantes resides on the land which
is in controversy, and that is in the southern, and not in the northern
district; and of the fact, he put the other party to the proof, by denying
that he was within the jurisdiction; and no proof (or even counter alle-
gation) was offered.
The fact of his non-residence in the district would not affect the case
had he been found within the district, and process been there served on
him. But no process was issued or served, at any time, or in any
place, nor any notice given to him, or to any one for him, of the pen-
dency of the action, or that any proceeding in the premises was in pro-
gress or in contemplation. This was against both positive and natural
law; against morals, against the " immutable principles of justice," as
this court has often said, and against the statute. The 1 1th section of
the judiciary act of 1789 prescribes that no civil suit shall be brought
before either the circuit or district courts, by any original process, in
any other district than that whereof the defendant is an inhabitant, or
may be found at the time of serving the writ.
But it will be said that this case was not before the court on original
process. It was there, however, on original process, or there was no
case there at all; because, the time that a case first appears in a court,
that court, if it entertain it, is in the exercise of original jurisdiction;
and appellate jurisdiction only arises when it passes into a second court;
and the district court was the first court into which this case was intro-
duced or entertained. In either aspect, however, Cervantes was under
the protection of that clause of the act of 1789.
The intention of the act of 1789, and of every act in relation to the
judiciary of the United States, is that no one shall be held to answer
in a civil suit without notice, nor without personal notice, except in
those cases where the exception is for his benefit, and the constitutional
rights of defendants cannot be otherwise saved. Section 12 sets forth
the only instances (with the exception of those cases that come from
the highest State tribunals into this court) in which a civil suit can get
into the federal courts without personal service of process on the de-
fendant. Those instances are where a suit is brought in a State court
against an alien, or by a citizen of the State against a citizen of an-
other State; in which case, the manner of the process has, of course,
been according to the local law; and the act of Congress steps in to
save the constitutional rights of the defendant, by providing for the
removal of the cause into the federal courts. And it is to distinguish
between these cases and cases commenced in the federal courts, that
the restrictive words " by original process" are used in the 11th sec-
tion. They are not used to intimate that causes may be got there
without any process at all.
9It will be contended, however, that this is a case of special jurisdic-
tion, depending on the special acts of Congress above quoted. In a
subsequent part of my argument, I shall expect to show that these pri-
vate acts cannot claim the same authority as (he judiciary act; both acts
of Congress, certainly; but one—the judiciary act—the work of that
body in its law-giving, governmental faculty, and so ranking in the
category of laws; the others—the special acts—mere private enact-
ments, of no authority, obligatory on nobody, except where the con-
sent of the parties to be affected by them shall have given them force
as contracts; consequently, that they could not operate to repeal a law.
At present, I confine myself to showing that those acts do not propose
to supersede the general law, or to get a defendant into court without
notice; that under those acts, considered alone, and supposing them to
have the effect of laws, Cervantes was not before the district court, nor
in its jurisdiction.
The first of those special acts provides a mode in which questions
between the United States and adverse claimants to lands in California
may be brought to trial in the federal courts; and this is in accordance
with ihe constitutional provision which makes all cases to which the
United States are a party cognizable in the federal courts. This act
provides not only for a notice of the institution of the action, but of its
nature and causes, and the ground on which it is prosecuted. It does
not require necessarily a personal service on the defendant, but it may
be on his attorney. Nor does this violate the general principle, because
it is still in the power of the defendant to compel personal service, by
not allowing an attorney to represent him; and he is thus maintained
in the privileges accorded by the judiciary act, since personal service is
a personal privilege, that may be waived.
This provision of the act of 1851, whatever else may be changed, is
not attempted to be superseded by the enactment of 1852. That act
seems to intend a change in the mode of proceeding before the district
court, and to substitute an appeal from the decision of the commission-
ers for the bill of review provided for by the act of 1851. But it does
not intimate that iW\s, appeal sho.\\ be brought without citation or notice
to the appellee. It does not in terms repeal any portion of the former
act, and of course cannot be construed to repeal any portion except
where the two may be irreconcilable. If we compare them, then, we
shall find there is no provision of the act of 1852 that is irreconcilable
with the act of 1851, except the single one of keeping the question of
a re-examination of the decisions of the commission open during a
longer space of time than the act of 1851 provides for. It may, also,
supersede the necessity on the part of the commission of reporting its
decision to the local attorney, because it provides that the notice which
was to have been given to that officer shall bo given to the attorney
general ; and also to do away with an entry on the journals of the Board
of the intention to prosecute the case in the federal tribunals, because
it provides other steps to answer the same purpose that that notice was
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intended for. Hence, it may be supposed that the act of 1852 intended
to supersede those provisions of the act of 1851.
But the act of 1852 does not provide any substitute for the notice
which the general law prescribes, and the act of 1851 undertakes,
shall be given to the party against whom the proceeding is had; con-
sequently, that provision is not attempted to be repealed or superseded.
A different enactment will not effect a repeal; it must be a contrary
one. (7 Mart. N. S. 434.) This is the ordinary rule, and much more
strictly applied where provisions are in question, which would change
the common course of proceeding; certainly not to be relaxed when it
is in question to disregard fundamental principles and invade univer-
sal lj7 recognised rights.
if it be said that the word appeal changes the character of the pro-
ceeding, and relieves it of the obligations in respect of process and ser-
vice prescribed for original suits, the reply at once occurs, that the act
of 1852 gives no directions for the manner of conducting the appeal,
and we must consequently look either to the general law of the subject
or to the special act of 1851. The general law in relation to appeals
requires a citation to the appellee, or, what is equivalent, that the ap-
peal be taken in open court, where both parties are supposed to be
present. (2 Wh. 132; 8 How. 106.) This is the law of bringing
appeals in the courts of the United States; and if the private act of
1852 be supposed competent to take this case out of the general rule,
yet it cannot be so construed unless its language were imperative;
and this it is not, but the legal and natural inference from the words
of the act is to the contrary.
I am convinced that it was not the intention of the authors of the act
of 1852 to change the act of 1851 in the respect now under considera-
tion, nor in any respect except to enlarge the time in favor of the
United States for exercising their discretion in respect of bringing the
review which the act of 1851 provides for, and to shift the discretion in
this particular from the district attorney to the attorney general. That
this was the sole object, I have no doubt; and to that effect it was in
fact announced by the chairman of the finance committee in the Sen-
ate, who introduced the' provision as an amendment to the general ap-
propriation bill; and it was adopted by the Senate on that representa-
tion. (Congressional Globe, v. 24, p. 2342.) It is nearly certain that
there was no purpose to change the mode of review. The word appeal
has a broad and a narrow interpretation. (1 Gal. 5, et seq.) The
Jaw* officers of the United States, both in California and here, have
given it in the present instance its narrowest and strict, technical appli-
cation; and it may be that the haste and inattention with which the
amendment was hurried through Congress may have left it. in such a
shape that this construction is necessarily given it, however well we
may know the contrary was intended. If this court should think so
also, then it can only be said, that the amendment has overshot its
mark, since an appeal, technically so called, could not, by virtue of
any enactment, be made to lie from a tribunal composed like this
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evanescent commission, to a court organized under the Constitution.
But, wheiher the act contemplates a bill of review, as prescribed in the
act of 1851, or proposes to change that proceeding into an appeal, it
gives no warrant for supposing that it was to be commenced and to go
through without process or notice.
But suppose it be the meaning of the act of 1852 that Cervantes
shall be ruled to be in court, and the court authorized to proceed and
adjudge his rights, without the service of any notice or process; that the
act itself be constructive notice, and he, by virtue of it, put upon his
guard to watch the clerk's office and know whether and when proceed-
ings were had against him; yet surely it could not thus put him on
his guard with reference to more than one district, and (hat "the pro-
per" one—the district where he lives and where his land lies. If an
enactment of Congress could have such an operation—could thus au-
thorize a litigious proceeding against him, without notice directed to
him personally—then it was at Monterey, or Los Angeles, where the
court sils in whose jurisdiction he and his lands are, that he should be
on the watch; otherwise, he might be required to attend all the dis-
trict courts of the Union; for this cause could, with as much propriety,
be brought in the district court of any of the Atlantic States, as in that
of the northern district of California. The act, then, at the most, was
not constructive notice to Cervantes in more than one district, and that
the district where his land lies, and where alone it can be litigated,
namely, the southern district.
Beyond this, however, lies what I consider to be fundamental law,
namely: that it is not in the power of Congress by a legislative en-
actment—by its own volition merely—to bring a defendant into court.
Congress has power to establish courts, and to prescribe, under the
Constitution, their jurisdiction and modes of procedure. But this grant
was given for the furtherance of justice, and must be exercised in pur-
suance of that end, and in subordination to those ideas and facts which
the establishment of judicial courts presupposes, namely, tribunals be-
fore which parties litigant, being fairly met, without chicane and with-
out surprise on either side, are capable of judging between them, and
speaking the law with reference to the persons and the subject matter.
iNow the ends of the constitutional grant would be thwarted, and
those principles which necessarily attach to the exercise of jurisprudence
be violated, if Congress could enact, even as between third persons, an
adjudication of the rights of defendants without process or notice to
them; and how much aggravated the case, if as between themselves
and another party the United States, through Congress, their agent,
could establish such a rule. The clause of the Constitution which pro-
vides that the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall extend to all cases
in which the United States are a party, intends the very opposite of
this: intends to provide a tribunal which, free from legislative or politi-
cal interference, shall judge impartially between the United States and
an adverse party, as between any other litigants. Yet what si attempted
here, (if the construction given by the court below to the act of 1852
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be correct,) is to legislate Cruz Cervantes into court as a defendant,
without process or notice. This was beyond the power of the United
States, as beyond the power of any other actor in a litigation: the United
Slates, in a litigation, being no more than any other legal person, and
no more entitled to make or to speak the law of the case.
"Jurisdiction is acquired in one of two modes: first, as against the person of the defend-
ant, by the service of process; or secondly, by a procedure against the property of the defend-
ant in the jurisdiction of the court.'" 9 How. 349.
"No principle is more vital to the administration of justice than that no man shall be
condemned in his person or property without notice.'''' lb.
"And every departure from this fundamental rule, by a procedure in rem in which a no-
tice by publication is substituted for a service on the party, should be subject to strict legal
scrutiny.'" lb.
"Jurisdiction is not to be assumed and exercised in such cases on the general ground that
the subject matter of the suit is in the power of the court." lb.
"No person is required to answer in a suit, on whom process has not been served, or
whose property has not been attached." 11 How. 459-60.
3. The circumstances to give jurisdiction are not averred, and do not
appear in the record.
The decisions of this court to the effect that the facts necessary to
give jurisdiction must be averred, are so numerous and pointed, and
the reason of them is so apparent and so obligatory, that it would seem
that the bringing of this single fact to the notice of the court below
ought to have disposed of the case in our favor, and of itself be suffi-
cient here. The decisions on this point begin almost with the exist-
ence of the court. In 3 Dal. 382, the court "were clearly of opin-
ion" that it was necessary to "set forth" the facts that should give
jurisdiction; and, because the record was defective in that particular,
dismissed the case. This decision was confirmed in 4 Dal. 7; and
the same principle maintained, after argument, in 4 Dal. 8. The case
came up on writ of error from the circuit court of North Carolina, and
the error assigned was an insufficient description, not of one of the
parlies, but of the original holders of a bill on which the action was
brought; and as section 11th of the Judiciary act requires the assignor
of a domestic bill, as well as the assignee who brings the suit, to have
been capable of suing in the federal tribunals, this court held that
there was error, because the facts were not sufficiently set forth in regard
to the assignor, and the judgment was reversed. In 1 Cr. 343, the de-
fendant took advantage by a writ of error of a like omission in refer-
ence to the parties to the action; and so precise and obligatory was held
the rule, that the judgment was reversed, without .argument, though
the objection was merely technical. The same in 2 Cr. 9, where the
omission was but a single word, the defendant being described as "of
the State of Georgia," instead of a "citizen of" &c. In 2 Cr. 126,
the rule was held so inflexible that the plaintiff below, who had been
cast in his own suit, was allowed to take advantage of it, because "it
was the duty of the court to see that it had jurisdiction, and consent of
parties could not give it." And so, 1 contend here, that even had
Cervantes consented to go on, the court would not, on the record, have
had jurisdiction, and its judgment would now be reversable for that
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cause. In 8 Pet. 112, the defendant was described as "citizen or resi-
dent," &c, and held that the use of the alternative was fatal. In 10
Pet. 160, this court, after the cause had been argued, took notice, of
its own motion, of the non-appearance on the record of the facts neces-
sary to give jurisdiction. The onus prohandi, say the court, is on the
party seeking to oblain a revision of the case to eslablish the jurisdiction
(of the revising court.) "It must appear on the record," or (under
the circumstances of that case) by affidavit. This was not the case,
and the writ was dismissed. The case of Cervantes is much stronger.
The party (the United States) seeking to obtain a revision not only did
not attempt to show affirmatively the jurisdiction of the revising court,
but it did not contradict the counter allegations of Cervantes. Per-
haps it would have been competent for the United States, in the case
before us, as the Supreme Court held it would have been for the plain-
tiff in error in this case in 10 Pet., to show the jurisdiction by affidavit;
but they did not do it. So, in 9 Wh. 650, the court of its own motion
directed the writ to be dismissed, because the facts necessary to its ju-
risdiction did not appear.
"Jurisdiction must appear from the facts staled, and those facts can be stated only on the
record." 5 Pet. 255.
"We state with confidence that this court has never taken jurisdiGtion unless the case
stated in the record'''' brought it within the jurisdiction. lb.
"The decisions of this court require that the averment of jurisdiction shall be positive
;
that the declaration shall state expressly the fact on which jurisdiction depends. It is not
sufficient that the jurisdiction may be inferred argumenlaliveli) from the record." 8 Pet. 115.
Like decisions might be quoted indefinitely from the reporfs of this
court. What is already cited is sufficient to show, that the case ought
not to have been adjudged in the court below, for want of the proper
averments of the facts necessary to give jurisdiction; because the party
seeking a revision did not affirmatively show the jurisdiction of the re-
vising court. A recent decision (of the present term, and not yet re-
ported) is supposed to have relaxed, in a degree, the stringency of the
foregoing cases. But I do not understand that decision as relaxing the
rule, that the circumstances to give jurisdiction must appear, but only
as holding that in that particular case the necessary averments were
made. The difference of opinion was not, whether the jurisdiction
must necessarily appear, but whether it did appear; and the decision
was, not that the showing was unnecessary, but that the showing was
made. Moreover, if (here have been, by the decision referred to, any
modification of the views of this court, it is to the end of giving fuller
scope to the constitutional right of resort to the federal courts by citizens
of one Stale impleaded by citizens of another. Whereas in this case,
the practice proposed to be recognised would take away valuable natu-
ral and constitutional rights.
It is impossible, however, that the rule which requires the circum-
stances which give jurisdiction to be set forth should be released. The
legislative power is not competent to dispense with it, because it is a
necessary consequence of the constitutional enumeration of the cases to
which the federal jurisprudence may extend. The legislature cannot,
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of course, authorize those courts to take cognizance of any other cases
than are thus embraced, nor, consequently, of any that do not appear
to be thus embraced. Nor is this rule confined to the federal courts.
It applies to all courts whose jurisdiction is defined. As, for example,
in (he different States ihe laws (perhaps universally) require that cases
concerning lands shall be tried in the county where the land is situated;
a declaration that should omit to state lhat the land sued for was in the
proper county would be held bad on demurrer; or the omission, if not
supplied by proof, might be taken advantage of at the last moment, or
on writ of error. The rule may therefore be laid down, in this broad
extent, that in all cases where courts have a defined jurisdiction, the
facts necessary to show the particular cause to be within the defined
limits must appear, or the proceedings are without authority. Inas-
much, then, as the territorial jurisdiction of the court below only ex-
tends southward to the 37° N. latitude, there ought to have been an
affirmative showing that this land is north of that line, and that for
want of it the jurisdiction ought not to have been entertained.
But suppose, contrary to the citation from 8 Pet. 115, the court
could have gone into the record to argue inferentially its jurisdiction.
The facts and inferences found there would not help the matter. The
claimant, in his original petition for a grant of the land, (Record, p.
84,) describes it as bounded on (he north by San Felipe, (meaning a
tract of land known by lhat name,) and on the west by the plain of
San Juan; and in his second and more definite petition, (p. 85,) accom-
panied with a map of the land, he describes it as bounded by a dry
creek opposite (south of) the creek of San Felipe, (which runs through
the tract of San Felipe.) and west by the plains of San Juan. Again,
the report of the ayuntamiento of Monterey, (p. 85,) to whom the gov-
ernor had referred the petition, states the land to be appurtenant to the
mission of San Juan Bautista; and all these indicate the southern dis-
trict, since all the objects mentioned (as we may see by any map of
the Slate) lie south of 37°, the plain of San Juan taking its name from
the mission of San Juan Bautisla. Mr. Commissioner Hall, in his
opinion, (p. 44,) says, indeed, that at the time of the delivery of the
opinion of the Board, it was a "matter of doubt" which district the land
lay in, "rendering it uncertain to what district attorney" the decision
should be certified, under the 8th section of the act of 1851. If (his
were, however, a matter of doubt with the commission, it was a doubt
lhat could have been removed by a very little examination and inquiry,
and the counsel of Cervantes took pains to remove any scruple (he
commission could have had in reference to it, by entering (p. 6) a
formal admission that the land lay (where it does actually lie) in the
southern district. Ii is very plain, however, from the subsequent state-
ments of Mr. -Hall, and from the "final opinion," as it is called, of
Mr. Commissioner Thornton, (p. 49,) lhat that "doubt" was not a
reason with the Board for withholding what they are pleased to call
their decree of final continuation; for they "suspended," in like man-
ner, three other cases in which there could be no possible doubt at all;
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two of them lying on the Bay of San Francisco, near the city, and (he
third on the Upper Sacramento; and moreover, tfie act of 1851 directed
in plain words that the commissioners should certify their decisions to
the district attorney of the district "where the decision was rendered."
But if it had been, and still were, a matter of doubt in which district
the land is, I do not perceive that the difficulty is obviated; but rather
that that doubt alone ought to have put the United Stales loan allega-
tion and to proof, lo clear up the doubt, since ihe proceedings of a court
are only valid to the extent (hat its jurisdiction appears. (4 Dal. 11.)
The attorney general (brief, p. 3) says thai the quesiion whether
the land is or is not in the northern district, is a quesiion of fact, not of
law, and that there is nothing in the record to show that it is not there.
I presume this is ihe first lime that it has ever been supposed that a
defendant had lost his case because he had failed, in (he absence even
of an allegation on (he pari of the plaintiff, lo prove the negative of the
case. Certainly it is a question of fact; but a facl necessary to be af-
firmatively shown by the plaintiff (or appellant) before his case can be
entertained, and proved by him if it be denied. So, if a case come
here on appeal, (as already said,) and Ihe value of the thing in contro-
versy is necessary to maintain the jurisdiction, I lint value is also a ques-
tion of fact, but the appellee has nothing to do with the proof of it;
the appellant must show it affirmatively, or the court will dismiss his
case.
But the attorney general also supposes that there is enough in the
record to argue ihe jurisdiction from. This is not admissible, as juris-
diction cannot be taken arguendo. That, must appear. But let us see
the argument. The claim of Cervantes, he says, is described in the
petition as situated in the county of Santa Clara, and "the county of San-
ta Clara" may be seen on ihe map, and the 37° of north Latitude leaves
by far the greater part, of the county north of that parallel. In the
first place, this petition of Cervantes is not binding on him, in any re-
spect, since it was not presented of his own motion, nor required by
law, but he was coerced into it by an arbitrary rule of ihe commission;
secondly, the whole of ihe county of Santa Clara is not north of 37°,
and the same map that shows I hat the largest part of it is so, also shows
that the arroyo of San Felipe, which is north of the tract, and so shown
both in Cervantes's petition lo the commission, in his petition to (he
governor for the grant, and in the grant itself; 1 say thai ihe same map
that shows the larger part of Santa Clara county to be in Ihe northern
district, shows (hat (he arroyo of San Felipe, which is north of the
northern line of Cervantes, is in the southern district, and that ihe arroyo
of Santa Anna, which is the south line of the tract, is at least a quar-
ter of a degree south of 37° N. The proof in the case shows, more-
over, (p. 63,) that the land is south of Pacheco's Pass, and the
same map quoted by the attorney general shows that Pacheco's Pass
is south of 37° N. The description in the petition to the board i3
erroneous in representing the land to be in Santa Clara county, and is
so shown in the proof. The land is in the county of Monterey, (Rec,
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pp. 63, 65,) and all of (he county of Monterey is in the southern dis-
trict. It is also erroneous in describing the tract as bounded on the
north by the arroyo of San Felipe. It is bounded by the tractor rancho
of San Felipe, through which the creek of San Felipe passes; and this
is shown in the second petition of Cervantes to the governor (pp. 78
and 85); in the juridical measurement, (p. 55,) and in the map of the
land. This documentary and oral testimony was the claim and the
proof of it offered in the case; so that it stands proved in the record,
that the land was in the southern and not in the northern district.
Even supposing the petition to the Board to be an admission, and
binding on the claimant, yet the same map that the attorney general
argues from, shows that all of Santa Clara county is not in the
northern district, and that the only object mentioned in the petition;
which is in that county, namely, the creek of San Felipe, is in the
southern district.
The attorney general is mistaken in supposing that the line of 37°
has not been run and marked in California by the constituted authori-
ties of the United States. It has been run and ascertained by the
deputy surveyors of the United States, and their returns are in the sur-
veyor general's office in San Francisco, and I presume in the land
bureau here, and the town (ancient mission) of Santa Cruz is the ini-
tial point on the seacoast, and these surveys exactly tally with the
official map of the State which I have referred to, and a proved copy
of which is in the record of Fremont's case, No. 182. The record,
therefore, and the authority cited by the attorney general, prove, not
inferentially only, but positively, that the land is in the southern dis-
trict. The judgment of the court argues nothing in the premises, as the
attorney general supposes; and is not to stand good if proof be not
brought against it; it only stands good according to what is actually
shown in its favor.
But I contend not only that there ought to have been an affirmative
allegation of the fact necessary to give territorial jurisdiction, but that
the record oughi to show & compliance in all particulars with the statute
which directs the appeal; for example, it ought to show that the com-
?)iissionei's caused the transcript to be filed, because that is what the
statute requires, and the record does not show it; and the fact is that
they did not cause it to be done or give any directions about it, and
there cannot be any intendment of law that they did unless the fact
appears; it ought to be shown when the transcript was received by the
attorney general, and when his notice to prosecute was received, that
it might be seen that the six months were not passed, and in the
same connection when the transcript was filed in the clerk's office.
Essential rights depend on these facts, and thus ought to appear,
that the courlf may know their jurisdiction, for without knowing it
they cannot proceed. It is not in the power of the appellee to prove
or disprove all these things, even if so unreasonable a demand could
be made of him. Yet they ought to be known, both for the security
of his rights, and to show the jurisdiction of the court; and ail the
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knowledge and all the evidence are in the hands of the appellant
below. If the court were allowed to conjecture on the subject, the
conjecture would most reasonably be in this case that the facts, if
they appeared, would oust the jurisdiction in these respects. The
last act assumed to be performed by the commissioners was on the
18th of December. Allowing twelve days—certainly an ample time
—for preparing the transcript, and thirty days each way for trans-
mission, which is the utmost space consumed, and we shall find that
more than the prescribed time had elapsed; thus, the transcript ought
to have been mailed 1st January, the time that the mail leaves San
Francisco, in which case it would be received by the attorney prior to
1st February, and he ought then to mail his notice at the latest on the
1st July; whereas it appears not to have been written until the lith,
and consequently could not have been mailed from New York till the
20ih, nor received in San Francisco till near the last of August. But
the facts ought to appear. If it be not necessary for them to appear,
how can it be known in any instance whether the jurisdiction is rightly
exercised? Whether the right has not accrued to the appellee that the
appeal shall be dismissed, and he have his survey and patent? I am
convinced this court will not sanction such a loose, indefinite, indeter-
minate practice, involving and endangering such important rights.
Official map of California, by Wm. M. Eddy, surveyor general : New York, 1854.
Fremont's map of Oregon and Upper California : VV ishington, 1849. Record, pp. 63,
84, 85. [These maps, in connection with the descriptions of the property in the re-
cord, show that the rancho or tract (that of San Felipe) which lies north of the land in
controversy is south of N. lat. 37°.J Jones's R port on Land Titles in California, Sen-
ate Doc. 18, 2d sess. 31st Cong., p. 118-19, (Mission S. Juan Bautista.)
II. That the action was not brought nor prosecuted in the court be-
low in the manner nor within the time prescribed by law.
1. As to the manner
:
It has been intimated, that the act of 1852 (or rather its authors) did
not intend to change the mode of reviewing the decisions of the com-
missioners prescribed by the act of 1851 ; but only to enlarge the time,
and to shift the discretion of determining on the propriety of instituting
proceedings in the federal courts ; and the more the question is ex-
amined, and the absence of any motive for changing the mode con-
sidered, the more clearly, I think, it will appear, that the word appeal
is used in the act through a misapprehension, and by inadvertence.
The chairman of the Committee on Finance, (Mr. Hunter, of Virginia,)
who reported the amendment to the Senate, used this language (Cong.
Globe, vol. 24, page 2342) in introducing it:
" The residue of the amendment [i. e. the part under consideration] is for the purpose
of protecting the interests of the United States, and extends the time wilhinwhich appeals
may be taken.''''
At that time there was no act or clause providing for :c appeals" to
the district court, but only the provision above cited for a review, in
the nature of an original action ; consequently, Mr. Hunter was cer-
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tainly under a misapprehension .in supposing he was providing an ex-
tension of time for taking appeals. Yet, in familiar language, and for
brevity, the proceeding provided for by the act of 1851-was often called
(and perhaps in some sense not improperly) an "appeal."
The distinguished lawyer (Mr. Berrien) who reported the bill of
1S51, from the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, himself, on one
occasion, (Cong. Globe, vol. xiii, p. 373,) so denominated it ; though
in his opening remarks, (ib. 384,) and other portions of the debate,
(ib. 438-'9,) he shows that he had present in his mind, in preparing
the bill, the signification and distinctive features of an appeal proper, and
did not propose such a proceeding from the commission to the district
court. 1 suppose, then, that there is not any doubt that the object of
introducing the amendment of 1852 was merely to enlarge the time
for prosecuting the remedy already prescribed, and that the term ap-
peal was used under the mistaken supposition that the existing provi-
sion was for appeals, and without reflecting on the incongruity of a
proceeding of that nature with the relative office and position of the
commission and the federal courts. It is said, in 1 Or. 35, "that a legis-
lative act, founded on a mistaken opinion of what is law, does not
change the actual state of the law as to pre-existing cases." How far
a court may go to presume a mistake in the legislature, and to save
the intent of a statute by disregarding its words; or whether, in the
present instance, the word, being found in a statutory enactment, must
not be held to its legal signification, and to the signification which it
has in other statutes of the United States, I do not think is material to
this case; because, if the intent be saved, and the manner of the reme-
dy of the act of 1851 be held not to have been changed, it is plain that
the necessary steps were not observed in this case ; or, if the words be
saved, and it be held that the review has been abolished by the at-
tempted substitution of an appeal, then I think it equally certain that
an appeal in such a case will not lie. The attorney general has
chosen the latter alternative, and I am willing he should have the bene-
fit of it. I will still, however, present the point for consideration; and
I find that, in a question bearing analogy to this, some of the circuit
courts have gone behind the positive words of a statute, to ascertain the
evils intended to be remedied, and narrowed the scope of the act to that
intent. I refer to the construction that has been given to the 2d section
of the judiciary act of 1803, (2 Stat, at Lar. 244,) which, though it
provides that " from all final judgments or decrees in any of the dis-
trict courts where the matter in dispute exceeds the value of fifty dol-
lars, an appeal shall lie to the circuit, court, and the circuit courts are
authorized and required to hear and determine such appeal," has
nevertheless been held (in view of the evils the act was supposed to be
designed to remedy, and confining it to that end) to intend only cases in
admiralty and equity, and appeals in common-law cases are not allowed
under it. (1 Gal. 5.) The word "appeal" is constantly applied to
every description of proceeding wherein a supefior tribunal revises those
of an inferior. 3 Bl. Com. 406-'7. The revisory power of the House
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of Lords over the decisions of the court of chancery in England , is tech-
nically called an appeal, though it begins by petition. lb. 554.
So again, in another sense, two persons who have a dispute proper
for judicial examination, not being able to determine it between them-
selves, may say: we will appeal to the law; or we will appeal to the
court; but (he court, nevertheless, into which it is introduced will be
in the exercise of original, not appellate, jurisdiction.
Taking the words of the act of 1852 as they are, however, and sup-
posing that it prescribes an " appeal" from the commission to the dis-
trict court, 1 contend that the act was not complied with in the institu-
tion of the case :
And first, that George Fisher, signing himself secretary, was not an
officer known to the law, or whose certificate, even authenticated by his
ii private seal," was competent to verify a judicial record. He was
not an officer of the United States, because such officers can onty be
appointed by (he president and senate, by the president alone, by the
courts of law, or the heads of departments, (Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2,
and 13 How. 51,) and he was not so appointed; such officers must also
fee commissioned by the president, (ib., sec. 3,) and he was not so com-
missioned ; nor does any act of Congress, public or private, authorize,
or assume to authorize, his certificate or verification to be received in a
court of justice for any purpose. If his certificate in the present in-
stance were in (he capacity of secretary of the Board, ihere is nothing
of which judicial notice can be taken to show that he was such secretary,
and moreover the duties of the secretary of the Board are all prescribed
in the act of 1851 , and that duty is not among them. If it had been
competent, then, under any exisling act, for (he proceedings of the
commissioners to verify themselves to a court of law by a mere certifica-
tion, then the certificate ought to have been from the commissioners, who
were at least officers commissioned by the President, and might be
officially known; whereas Mr. Fisher, whether their secretary or not,
was not an officer, in any legal sense, and could not be officially or
judicially known. But the commission appointed under the act of
1851 is not a court; or, whatever else it may be, it is not a court of
record; it has not a seal; and if it had a seal, it would be its seal, and
not Mr. Fisher's seal, that should be used; consequently, its proceed-
ings do not verify themselves; they must be proved like any other fact.
The district court, then, had nothing before it of a judicial character,
or with a sufficient verification (o authorize it (o proceed. In the cases
of (he United Stales vs. Hodge, 3 How. 534, and United States vs. Vil-
labolos, 6 How. 81, and other like cases, this court dismissed the ap-
peals because the citations were signed by the clerk of the court, insiead
of by the judge or by a justice of this court, as required by statute.
The clerk, however, was an officer of the United States, and of a tri-
bunal constitutionally organized; and the citation bore the seal ofahe
court, and gave actual notice to the adverse party, as well as if it had
been signed by the judge; but it did not conform to the statute, and
that was held to be as fatal as any the most substantial error. In this
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case, the objection is not to a defect in the manner of mere process, but
to a fault that cuts at the root of the whole case. The person who
undertakes to certify in this case, and on whose certificate the court be-
low undertakes to act, is not an officer; the tribunal whom he purports
to represent is extra-constitutional, and not judicial; it has not a seal,
and is not authorized to have one; its appointees are not even sworn;
they act under no legal sanction.
Bouvier's Law Diet., words, Record: Authentication. 1 Gr. Ev. sec. 501—505.
But if there could be any doubt on this point, the act of Congress
itself settles it. The act does not attempt to authorize the secretary of
the commission to certify its decisions, but expressly makes it the duty
of the commissioners themselves to do so. The eighth section of the
act of 1851 says: "It shall be the duty of the commissioners ....
to decide upon Che validity of the said claim, and within thirty days
after such decision is rendered, to certify the same, with the reasons on
which it is founded, to the district attorney," &c; and the only change
which the act of 1852 undertakes to make in this regard is, that the
decision, <fcc, instead of being certified to the local attorney, shall be
certified to the attorney general and to the district courts. It was not
necessary in the act of 1852 to direct who should certify, since that was
fully provided in the act of 1851, and no purpose was to be answered
by any change in that regard, and no change was attempted. The
duties and functions of the secretary of the commission are set forth in
section 2 of the act, namely, to act as interpreter to the board, and keep
a record of its proceedings; in section 8, to issue subpoenas; and in sec-
tion 18, to receive certain fees. It is attempted out the phraseology of
section 18 to draw, arguendo, an attempted authorization for the secre-
tary to certify. The section is as follows:
"That the secretary of the Board shall receive no fee except for fur-
nishing certified copies of any paper or record, and for issuing writs of
subpoena. For furnishing certified copies of any paper or record, he
shall receive twenty cents for every hundred words, and for issuing
writs of subpoena, fifty cents for each witness; which fees shall be equally
divided between the said secretary and the assistant clerk."
In the first place, this section only permits the receipt of fees for
furnishing, not for making certified copies. Secondly, it is only for
furnishing certified copies of any paper or record; not of those proceed-
ings and decisions which are to be the basis of judicial proceedings.
Thirdly, it contains no authorization of any sort; but only a mere license
to receive fees, and this is given as well to the "assistant clerk" as to
the secretary. No inference, therefore, can be drawn from this section
that the secretary was intended to be authorized to certify (at least not to
certify in a manner that his certificate should be judicially cogniza-
blef to any sort of paper; much less can it be construed to authorize
him to exercise a function which another section expressly makes the
duty of the commissioners. Moreover, it was not in the power of Con-
gress to confer that function on any one not an officer of the United
21
States, and who acted without any legal responsibility or sanction in the
premises.
I object to Mr. Fisher's certificate, also, because it does not certify
to what the statute under which he is supposed to have undertaken to
act requires. He does not certify that his roll of MSS. is a "transcript
of the proceedings and decision of the commission," and of "the pa-
pers and evidence on which the same are founded;" and I hold that
he was bound, in a proceeding departing so far from any heretofore
known in jurisprudence, to pursue the statute strictly, and, moreover,
that the variance in this case is material. It is one thing to certify to
"proceedings," and another to certify to "proceedings and decision;"
one thing to certify to "depositions of witnesses and other documentary
evidence on file in his office ,''' and another to certify to "the papers
and evidence on which the proceedings and decision werefounded."
And this variance, material as it is in respect of form—enough so, as
appears to me, for the court below to have said, the case is not before
us; we are not certified of the matters of which alone the statute au-
thorizes us to take cognizance—the certificate being thus erroneous
in form and substance, the record (so to call it) is also erroneous in
point of fact. The papers of which it is composed are not those which
the statute requires; at least not exclusively so; and this the document
itself shows. By reference to pages 4 and 5, it will be seen that
various documents are inserted which were not in the case when it was
submitted to the Board; two of these documents were admitted by con-
sent, (see p. 5,) but the others, if the record be true, do not and can-
not constitute a part of the case, and are erroneously put into the
transcript. This is what appears; but the fact is, and so the record
ought to show, that such of these documents as relate to the case were
put in evidence in open session of the board before the submission of
the cause; and if they were not "filed," as the secretary terms it, it
was his omission, not the counsel's; and, as for the others, if they were
put in at all, it was by an ex parte proceeding. Moreover, the opinion
of the Board (see Rec. p. 23,) shows that there was at least one docu-
ment that entered into their consideration of the case, which is not
given in the transcript, and it follows that the transcript does not consist
in, nor the certificate describe, what the statute requires.
I object to the matter on which the court below undertook to act,
that at the time of the "notice" addressed by the attorney general to
the clerk of the court, that ''the appeal would be prosecuted," there
ivas no appeal pending, and there was, consequently, nothing for the
noiice to act on. The act of 1852 prescribes that the filing of the tran-
script in the clerk's office shall operate as an appeal; and there is no-
thing in the record to show when (if at all) this transcript was so filed,
but it was certainly not before the 22d July, and for aught we know it
may have been long afterwards; whereas, the attorney general's notice
was given on the llth of July; and this "notice" is prescribed by the
act to apply to a proceeding already instituted—not to a thing there-
after. If it be said that the date of the notice at Washington is not
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evidence of the time of filing at San Francisco, and that this filing is
the act which the statute refers to, the reply is, that if that be not
evidence, there is no evidence of the time in the record; and, moreover,
that lhal date being ihe only one that appears, and (he respective dates
of (he transcript and the notice the only ones to show when either of
them was filed, if we depart from them we have nothing to resort to
but conjecture; and jurisdiction cannot be based on conjecture.
But supposing all these proceedings to have been regular and proper,
and effective for the purpose of depositing the "appeal" in the clerk's
office, and notifying the clerk not to cause it to be dismissed, because
it was the intention of the United Slates to prosecute it; then, the ques-
tion arises, how to prosecute it? Obviously, (if we are to consider the
proceeding strictly and technically <m "appeal,") the first step in the
prosecution of it was by a proper citation to the adverse party to come
in at a time stated, and defend. One party may take an appeal, or
(may be supposed for argument's sake) it may stand taken for him by
operation of law; but the prosecution of it is a different thing; and the
act of 1852, in its hardest construction, does not contemplate that the
appeal it proposes may be prosecuted in a manner different from the
common practice. In the case already cited from b* How. 81, this court
decided that under the act of 1828 for settling land claims in Florida,
the filing of a notice in the clerk's office of the court where the cause
was tried, of an intention to appeal, constituted an appeal; but this ap-
peal must be prosecuted according to the judiciary acts of 1789 and
1803. Because that had not been done, the case was dismissed, as, for
a like cause, was lhal of United Slates vs. Curry, 6 How. 106. in ihe
first of those cases, Ihe court traced, by references in the act of 1828 to
prior acts, ihe manner of prosecuting appeals under it, directly back to
the ads of 1789 and 1803. But this does not affect the precedent,
since ihe court decided (hat they had " no power to receive an appeal
in any other manner than that prodded by law;" and, of course, if
there had been no mode thus provided', it could not have been received
at all. It matters not, therefore, to the present case, whether it be held
that appeals under the act of 1852 ought to be prosecuted according
to the general law, or to pursue the steps prescribed in the act of 1851
for a review of the decisions of ihe Board, or that there is no mode pro-
vided by law for their prosecution. It will probably not be contended
that either ihe court below, or the attorney general, or district attorney,
could prescribe the necessary rules; but if they could, ihey must cer-
tainly be governed by analogy and practice, and could not make a
rule to disregard all rule. A case in point is presented in the act of
1851, which prescribes a mode for taking appeals from the district
courts lo I his court, but gives no special directions for the manner of
prosecuting them. Can this omission be construed into a release of
the appellant from all the customary rules for the prosecution of ap-
peals? No one will pretend (hat it does. His appeal must be in open
court, during the same term, or it must be prosecuted by a citation
properly signed and returnable. He must bring up to this court at the
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right time, and in the right manner, an authenticated, and not a pri-
vate record of the case. He must conform to all the rules with which
the prosecution of appeals is invested by the general law and the prac-
tice of the courts. This is not left, however, to conjecture or specula-
tion. The case Inst above quoted (6 How. 106) arose under the Mis-
souri act of 1824, (4 Slat, at Large, 52,') revived and extended to
Louisiana by act of 1844, (5 ib. 676,) which provides only that appeals
will lie, without specifying the manner of prosecuting them. And this
court held that ihey were subject to the general law in relation to ap-
peals, and must be brought and prosecuted according to the acts of
1T89 and 1803; and the cnse was dismissed because those rules had not
been observed. The act of 1852 slops at the same point, in relation
to the "appeals" it seems to propose from the commission to the district
court; and at the same point we must consequently take up the general
law, or else (he special act of 1851.
It would seem, taking the two acts (of 1851 and 1852) together, as
they undoubtedly ought to be construed together, that it was the act of
1851 that should have been pursued in prosecuting the case after it
reached the district court. There is nothing in that proceeding incon-
sistent with the act of 1852; nor any reason why the ordinary rules of
construction should not be observed with reference to the two, (suppos-
ing them both to be obligatory,) and the act of 1851 be followed to the
point where it becomes incompatible with that of 1852, and resumed
where the latter is fulfilled or the incompatibility ceases.
To the question, then, which arises when we find the "appeal"
safely instituted, and the clerk notified of the intention of the appellant
to prosecute it—to the question, how the prosecution is to be carried
on?—the ready answer is: by a petition to I he court with a copy served
on the appellee, setting forth fully and distinctly, why the claim was
alleged not to be valid, and praying the court to review the proceed-
ings of the commission, and decide on the validity of the claim, as the
act of 1851 requires, and which the act of 1852 does not, even by im-
plication, pretermit. This interpretation only of the two acts is tolera-
bly consonant with reason, and with the open and fair administration
of justice, because it was not only proper that the appellee should be
cited to defend, which, under the general law and practice of appeals,
is what would be necessary before the appeal could go on, but that,
under the circumstances of this case—called an "appeal," but with all
the qualities of an original suit—he should have notice of the causes
and grounds of the action, to inform him to what points to direct his
defence, by additional testimony or otherwise; anil because, in this
way only (if at all) could the constitutionality of the proceeding be
saved.
The attorney general (his brief, p. 6) thinks that the appeal was
prosecuted according to the act of 1852; but, plainly, he confounds in-
stitution with prosecution; for the act of 1852 gives no directions
whatever for the prosecution, only for the institution. The institution
of a suit is by filing the declaration or bill; the first step in its prosecu-
24
tion is to issue process, and cause it to be served. The institution of
an appeal is the removal of the record; the first step in the prosecution
is by a citation to the appellee if he have not already had notice. The
notice of the attorney general to the clerk is, that the appeal will be
prosecuted; hence that it is not to be held dismissed; the notice is, that
it will be prosecuted. Now, I contend that the first step for a legal
prosecution should have been by citation to the appellee
;
with notice
of the time and term to which it would be prosecuted.
2. As to time:
The act of 1852 does not, perhaps, prescribe expressly any limita-
tion of time for some of the acts which it directs to be performed; but
it does not, for that reason, I suppose, intend to abandon the idea of
time, and deliver the California cases over to indefinite litigation. Yet
such is the practical construction given to it in the court below, and
such is its necessary interpretation unless we find some limit in its rela-
tion to the act of 1851, or in the general law.
The act of 1851 gives thirty days to the party against whom the
decision of the commissioners may be rendered, to inform himself of
the fact; sixty more to determine his mind whether to prosecute the
case further, and ninety more to commence the proceeding—six months
in all. The act of 1852 provides that two certified transcripts, &c,
shall be prepared, one of them filed with the clerk of the court, and
the other sent to the attorney general—that filed with the clerk to ope-
rate as an appeal. Now, the preparation of these transcripts, and the
filing of the one and transmitting of the other, were intended to be
simultaneous acts, or the filing was intended to precede, as it does
precede in the injunctions of the statute, the sending to the attorney
general; and this for an obvious reason, that otherwise would be apt to
happen, as has happened in this case, that the attorney general should
determine to prosecute the appeal, and so give notice, when in fact
there was no appeal pending, and his notice had nothing to operate
on. If this were not the case, let us see how the parties would be
placed. Cervantes, we will say, gets a "final decision" (these being
the words of the act) on the 18th December, 1852; a transcript is pre-
pared by the 1st January, 1853, and sent to the attorney general, who
receives it, say on the 1st February; within six months from that time
he must have caused to be filed in the clerk's office in California his
notice to prosecute the appeal, or it will be dismissed; but within that
six months there is no transcript filed, and consequently no appeal
pending. Suppose he send no notice, the clerk cannot cause the ap-
peal to be dismissed, because there is no appeal there; yet, according
to the practice adopted in the court below, one might be instituted the
following day. Would the attorney general have then another six
months? Obviously not, because his notice to prosecute must be within
six months from the time he received the transcript; yet there is an ap-
peal there, and no known way for getting it off, or pushing it forward.
But suppose he send a notice of intent to prosecute ; he cannot prose-
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cute what is not begun, and though it be begun immediately after, his
time having already expired, the appeal cannot be saved from dismissal
as soon as it be ascertained that the attorney general has had, during
six months, his copy of the papers, and has not directed that it—it, the
pending appeal—be prosecuted. On the other hand, the private claimant,
if the case have gone against him before the commission, is liable to the
misfortune that his time for giving notice to prosecute the appeal shall
expire before it begins, and his appeal be dismissed before it is insti-
tuted. Thus, the act requires, that if the decision be against the private
claimant, he shall file a notice of his intention to prosecute the appeal
within six months from the time of the decision; so that, if the time
for filing the transcript, which operates the appeal, be unlimited, it
may happen (as up to this lime has, in every case, happened) that the
filing will not take place till after the six months (and consequently
his probation) has elapsed. Or if that be not the true interpretation of
the act, (and it is not the interpretation which Mr. Secretary Fisher
seems to have given it,) and the meaning of it be that he shall have
six months after the filing of the transcript with the clerk to make
up his mind whether he will cite the adverse party, and prosecute his
appeal; then this will happen, namely, that the time accorded to him
may commence after that of the attorney general has ended. Such
absurdities and incongruities were never intended. It was intended
that the appeal should be commenced—should be instituted—within
the same period of six months that is allowed, in the act of 1851,
for filing the petition which under that act was the mode of com-
mencing. This appeal was not so commenced, since the record
shows that the last act the commission assumed to perform was on the
18th of December, 1852. I contend that the last act the commis-
sioners had power to perform in the premises was performed on the
3d of August, 1852, when they decided " on the validity of the
claim;" but the last act they assume to have performed was on the
18th December, 1852, and that was more than seven months prior to
the shortest date that can be assigned for the institution of the appeal.
The inverse order in which the commission or the secretary undertook
to carry out the provisions of the act of 1852, has resulted, then, as it
seems to me, fatally to the jurisdiction of the court below in this case,
not only in inducing the notice of the attorney general to prosecute the
appeal, when there was no appeal in esse, but also in suffering the
time within which the appeal could be instituted to elapse.
If we do not adopt this construction of the act of 1852, the matter is
involved in insuperable absurdities, and the policy and intention of
Congress to promote a speedy settlement of these cases defeated. The
whole business is left to the discretion or convenience of the secretary
of the commission, not even an officer of the government, nor acting
under the sanction of an oath. It cannot be doubted, that it was the
intent of the act of 1852 to place the United States and the private
claimant on the same basis with respect to the right of appeal, with
this single difference, that the private claimant against whom the de-
4
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cision was rendered should be supposed to be informed of the fact and
of the institution of the appeal, from the moment of the filing of the
transcript with the clerk, while (he United States reserved the additional
time that was necessary to communicate the fact to their agent here,,
the attorney general; as it is also the intent that the appeal which the
filing of the transcript operates to install, is that to which the attorney
general's notice (or the notice of the claimant, as the case may be)
shall apply; and it is only by the construction for which I contend that
these intendments can be saved, or the rights of either the United States
or the claimant.
But, if it were the intention of Congress to involve these cases in this
web of contradictions, I contend that, at least, it was not in its power to
extend the time, on behalf of the United Slates, for taking appeals be-
yond the positive stipulations of the act of 1851. I propose to argue
this point more fully hereafter, and only now call attention to ihe
particular phraseology of the I2ih section of the act of 1851, that
"to entitle either party to a review/' &c, the proceeding must be
absolutely commenced within six months. Whether or not the
other provisions of that section might have been superseded, this one
at least involves a substantial right which Congress could not (and I
contend has not attempted to) takeaway. If they were not "entitled"
under the first act, they could not make themselves so by their own
volition merely. I heard if intimated in California, that the restriction
of the act of ISol applied only to bills of review; and although it was
true, that the United States had bargained that they would not bring
a bill of review unless within six months, they had not bargained
not to take an appeal; that is, that they could escape their stipulations
by a trick and a change of name. But, in the first place, such an
imputation on the good faith of Congress is to be scorned; and in the
second place, though a review may not technically be an appeal, yet,
to all intents, an appeal is a review, and it is against the right of review,
unless within six months, that the act provides. This provision, more-
over, even if Congress had power to repeal it, has not been repealed.
There is nothing in the act of 1852 repealing it in terms, nor irreconci-
lable with it.
Again, this appeal, if brought in time, has not been prosecuted in
time. In the cases above quoted (6 How. 81; ib. 106,) ihe court
decided, as we have already seen, (hat where appeals were authorized
in general terms, they were subject to the rules laid down in the acts
of 1789 and 1803; and, among the rest, it was held that the appeal
must be prosecuted to the term of the appellate court next follow-
ing. Now this appeal was not so prosecuted. The next term of the
appellate court, after the institution of this appeal, was held (9 Slat,
at Lar. 522) at Sacramento, on the first Monday of Sepiember, and
the next following that, at Stockton, on (he second Monday of October;
and this appeal was not prosecuted to either of (hem, but, if it can
properly be said to have been prosecuted at all, then to a special
(and unauthorized) term at San Francisco, after the lapse of two regu-
lar terms; it was not, therefore, prosecuted in the time required by law.
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3. As to manner and time, considered together:
I object to the manner and time of proceeding in the court below,
that the act of 1852, under which it assumes to have been brought, was
not applicable to this case. The act relates to decisions which "shall
be," not to those which have been, rendered; and the record shows
(p. 5) that the decision of the commissioners in this case was given on
the 3d of August, 1852, twenty-two days before the act of 1852 was
proposed in Congress, and twenty-eight days before it was enacted.
On the delivery of that decision the functions of the commission were
fulfilled, their discretion exhausted; and the claim, as far as their action
could accomplish it, stood confirmed. The 8th section of the act of
1851 prescribes their entire office in this regard, and that is, where the
case is ready for hearing, to proceed promptly to examine it, and de-
cide " on the validity of the claim?'' That is precisely what was done
in this case on the 3d of August, 1852. The claim was filed in Feb-
ruary, and after testimony on the part of the claimant and on the
part of the United States, it was set for hearing, argued elaborately,
taken under advisement by the Board on the 16th of June, examined,
and finally, on the said 3d August, its "validity" decided on, and
it declared to be valid. What more had the commissioners to do, in
which the claimant was concerned, except the merely ministerial duty
of furnishing him (as intended in section 13) with an authentic
certificate of the confirmation? Nothing; emphatically nothing.
They had another duty to perform for the United States: namely,
to certify their decision to the district attorney; but that was also minis-
terial, and, performed or neglected, could not affect the rights of the
claimant. As for the additional sentence which the secretary—or
the commission, I care not which—tacks to the entry of the fact, of
the delivery of the "opinion of the Board, declaring the claim valid,"
namely, that " the entering of a final decree of confirmation is re-
served for a future day;" it is of no more purport than if they had
said the issuing of a patent was reserved for a future day, unless they
supposed that they had another duty to perform, when their decision
should have ripened by the omission to give notice for a further prose-
cution of the case. This is the only presumption on which there is any
meaning in the sentence; for, without that, the office of the commission
in regard to the claim was discharged: they had decided on the validity
of the claim, and there is not a syllable in the act that authorizes them
to decide on anything else in relation to it, or that refers to a final con-
firmation, except in reference to the confirmations by the highest tribu-
nal, or those of the lower ones which had ripened by the time elapsing
in which they might have been further prosecuted. If that were the
meaning of the commissioners, they mistookthe intent of the act; if that
was not their meaning, then the sentence had no signification; and, in
either case, it was mere surplusage.
The decision given on the 3d of August was that " of the board.'"
That is shown at page 5, in the journal of that day's proceedings, and
at page 7, where the order is made for recording the opinion on the jour-
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nal. It is also 80 denominated by Mr. Commissioner Hall, in his sub-
lequent separate opinion, and by Mr. Commissioner Thornton in his
supplemental " final opinion or reason of decision." I do not question
the right of those gentlemen to have given (or now to give) any addi-
tional reasotis for the opinion and decision they had rendered; but that
they could by any such means lessen the effect, or retard the operation
of the decision itself, was, 1 think, a very mistaken opinion, if it was
entertained. That it was (subsequently) entertained, I admit there is
reason to believe, from the language of the papers delivered by the com-
missioners in the following December; as, for instance, Mr. Hall's con-
cluding sentence, that he " concurs" (speaking in the present tense)
"in the confirmation of the claim without a preliminary survey." But
that signifies nothing; because, for any pertinency a preliminary sur-
vey would have to the decision, he might as well have said he con-
sented to the confirmation of the claim, without a preliminary translation
of it into high Dutch. Or, if he meant to intimate that it was only
then tha.1 he " concurred," it only follows that the decision delivered in
August was the work of his two associates, because in his first sentence
he speaks of it as "the opinion of the Board;" and the concurrence of
two (i. e. of a majority) of the commissioners was necessary to give it that
character. Mr. Hall's subsequent concurrence was very acceptable, but
as it could give no additional validity to the decision, so neither can I
understand how it could have any effect to impair it. As to the sug-
gestion of Mr. Hall, (Rec. p. 44,) that at the time of the decision (on
the 3d of August) there was a bill pending before Congress to change
the law in respect of the officer to whom the decisions of the com-
missioners were to be certified, that was a mere slip of memory, since
there was not any such bill pending at that time, nor any proposition of
the sort mooted in Congress till the 25th of August, and it was not
known of in California until the latter part of September. So, also, Mr.
Thornton discovers in December that there was one point which the
" opinion of the Board" that had been "pronounced and filed" in Au-
gust had forgotten to discuss, and which, from a casual reading, would
seem in his opinion sufficient to re-open the case. But if we examine
this "opinion of the Board," we shall find that it takes precisely the
same view of the powers of the Board as that I have already presented,
and that the commissioners intended, and did, in that decision perform
their entire functions in the premises.
"The 8th section," says this opinion of the Board, "declares/w%
the subject matter on which we are to decide; that is, the validity of
any right or title derived from the source mentioned; it declares the
evidence on which alone that decision was to be rendered, being that
introduced by the claimant on the one side and the United States on
the other." Having thus shown that, in the "opinion of the Board,"
the validity of the claim was all that the Board could decide on, and
that it must make this decision on the testimony which the parties
should voluntarily introduce, and could not postpone it for a "prelim-
inary survey," or any other testimony the parties did not choose to offer,
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the Board go on, in view of "the grounds on which the Board is required
to act, both as to evidence and law," to " consider whether the claim
of the present claimant is valid or not," and finally, "from a full view
ofthe whole case." the claim isdeclared "valid." After which, I think,
it was too late for Mr. Thornton and Mr. Hall, separately or uni-
tedly, four months afterward to attempt to invalidate the action of the
Board, on the ground of an omitted point, or for any other cause. The
decision was rendered—it could not be taken away; certainly not with-
out a re-opening of the case, on a proper showing, and in due form,
and with notice to the claimant.
I insist on this construction of the act, and of the duties and func-
tions of the commissioners. Whether we regard them as officers of
the United States, or as a judicial tribunal, or (which is their true
position) as a board of arbitrators, their powers were alike limited to
the precise points specified in the act. As officers, the commission
could decide nothing that was not positively given it by statute to
decide, so as a judicial tribunal it could not go beyond its jurisdiction,
and as arbitrators could only make an award on the precise matter
mutually submitted; and this once done, in either capacity, the com-
mission was, quoad that matter, functus officio. As for the assumption
in Mr. Commissioner Thornton's opinion of December, that the Board,
in its "full view of the whole case," had omitted the important ques-
tion of "quantity " if it were intended to raise an excuse for disturbing
the original decision, it only presents those after-thought proceedings
in a still more obnoxious point of view. Cervantes had claimed but
two leagues; or rather he had claimed less than that, for the boundaries
by which he claimed do not contain so much, as is shown by the jurid-
ical measurement. But, whatever he did claim, the commission had
decided that he claimed with a valid title. Now, by their subsequent
speculations on the subject of "quantity," did they purpose to reduce
the limits of this valid claim, or to enlarge it, or neither? To reduce
or enlarge was alike beyond their power; they could not subtract from
what they had already decided to be valid, and was now be3Tond their
control, and to attempt it would be odious; they could not add to what
was already confirmed, because the confirmation covered all that was
embraced in the claim, and the claim was all they were empowered to
acton. To do neither, therefore; neither to reduce nor enlarge; not
to affect the matter at all, was all they could do; and, I respectfully
submit, all that they did.
I stand, therefore, on that decision of the 3d August. I plead it as
a full discharge by the commissioners of their functions and duties in
respect of the decision of the claim of Cervantes; as their full judgment
on the case presented to their discretion, as the full award of the referees
on the question submitted. I insist on it as a "fixed fact;" and a
fact so well fixed that there exists none that this well chosen phrase of
Mr. Attorney General would better apply to. It was a verdict given,
a judgment rendered, a decree entered, and which it was no more com-
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petent for the commissioners than for any other three men to disturb,
or lessen the force of.
Even Mr. Commissioner Thornton's opinion of December informs
us that the opinion delivered in August was a decision of the case. He
says that "the Board has already, by an opinion pronounced and filed
on the 3d August, decided on all the questions," &c. That opinion,
then, was a decision; and though Mr. Commissioner seems to be under
the impression that it did not decide "quantity," yet, having once
ascertained that it, is a decision, we can go to its own text to ascertain
what it decides. It decides, then, the validity of the claim, and the
claim (no discrimination being made in the decision) carries with it the
"quantity," the extent and limits, embraced in the claim. Quantity
was therefore considered in the first decision and also decided; and the
case being decided, there was no more power to diminish it in respect
of quantity than to modify it in any other respect, or to revoke it; a
diminution being, in fact, to that extent, a revocation.
The matter is capable, however, of being presented in a different
and better aspect. The opinion of the Board goes to and decides the
subject matter which the act of Congress authorizes the commission to
decide, namely, the validity of the claim ; and those subsequent acts
in December all look to something else, namely, a "decree of final
confirmation." As we have seen, the statute speaks of "final confirm-
ations" and "final decrees," in a particular sense, and different from
the sense in which the decisions of the commissioners, when first made,
are to be regarded. The 13th section provides that for "all claims
finally confirmed by the commissioners, or by the district or supreme
courts, " a patent shall issue; and makes it the duty of the surveyor
general to cause all lands which shall be " finally confirmed" to be
surveyed ; and section 15 provides that "the final decrees rendered by
the commissioners, or by the district or supreme court, shall be conclu-
sive," &c; in each instance plainly referring to those decisions which
had been made final by the approbation of the supreme court, or become
so by lapse of time, and the non-intervention of any proceeding to carry,
them into the courts. It would, therefore, be supposing in those com-
missioners a very indifferent knowledge of the force of language, and
of the rules concerning special statutes and special tribunals, which are
to be held to their strict, lines, to attribute to them any other purpose, in
those "final" acts of December, than to issue that final decree, which
the 13th and 15th sections of the statute speak of, and which they seem
to have supposed necessary after their first decision had matured by the
lapse of ninety days without notice on their journals of an intention to
petition for a review of it. I do not think this last action was necessary,
but that the ripening of the original decision made it final in the sense
of the statute; but if they thought differently they were right to act on
their belief, and there is this, at least, to say for it, that it.is only a work
of supererogation.
But it matters not what their opinions or intentions were. They
had no power to lessen the effect of their decision in Cervantes's favor;
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their decision that his claim was valid stands unaffected by their subse-
quent acts, whatever force those may have in themselves; and it was of
that, decision alone that a review could be had before the district court,
and that decision having been rendered prior to the act of 1852, that
act does not embrace it.
We shall be told, however, that it is precisely for "final decrees'*
that the appeals of the act of 1852 are provided. JNow the use of this
word "final" in the act of 1852 is only another proof of the inadver-
tence and misapprehension with which the act was drawn. If we are
to understand the word in the same sense that it is used in the act of
1851, as by the ordinary rule of construction we are bound to consider
it, then the provision is certainly nugatory, for an appeal cannot lie from,
a decree which is final in that sense; it would be as lawful to direct
that an appeal should lie from the patent. If, however, we are to
understand the word in the sense in which it is used, for example, in
the judiciary acts, then the decision rendered on the 3d of August is
precisely the kind of decision which the act of 1852 intends, but that
decision cannot come within its provisions, since they are prospective.
III. The court below could not have appellate jurisdiction in the
premises.
1. The commission established by virtue of the act of 1851 is not a
court under the Constitution, and consequently is not the depository of
any portion of judicial power. 2. The act was not passed in virtue of
any legislative authority, express or implied, possessed by Congress,
and, consequently, it does not rank as a law.
The first of these propositions is maintained by frequent decisions of
this court, and is too plain to need argument. Mr. Justice Story puts
the whole doctrine in a single sentence: "By the Constitution of the
United States all civil and criminal jurisdiction must be exclusively
confided to judges holding their office during good behaviour; and though
Congress may from time to time distribute the jurisdiction among such
inferior courts as it may create from time to time, and withdraw it at their
pleasure, it is not competent for them to confer it upon temporary
judges ox confide it by special commission." 3 Story's Com., sec.
1621. In the territories only of the United States—that is, in those
districts where the joint powers of the Federal and of a State govern-
ment are exercised by Congress—has it ever been pretended that Con-
gress could establish courts of other terms of office, or with other juris-
diction, than are prescribed in art. hi, sec. 2, of the Constitution; and
this authority (resting on a basis entirely different from those grants of
power which enable Congress to provide for the organization of the
federal courts) is lost, the moment that a State government supervenes.
1 Pet. 5L 1,546; 9 How. 243, 244; and 13 Ohio Rep. 48, Logan
Bank, &c.
The commission, then, is not a court under the Constitution—is not
a part of the judiciary. The second proposition, namely, that the act
under which the commission was organized was not enacted by Con-
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gress in pursuance of any grant of legislative power, and consequently
(as well as for other reasons) does not rank as a law, though perhaps
not hitherto in terms decided, seems to me equally clear, and to follow
from the other; for since it was not enacted under those clauses which
authorize the creation of the judiciary, to what possible portion of leg-
islative power can we refer it? It is not to be found in the cases enu-
merated in sec. 8, art. i., and it is not a measure necessary to carry into
execution any of the other powers conferred in the Constitution.
Among the powers of Congress, however, is that of disposing of and
making rules and regulations concerning the territory (i. e. the land)
and otherproperty of the United States. But this clause does not give
power to legislate in the manner of the acts under consideration, be-
cause, first, the general authority to pass laws necessary to carry into
effect given powers cannot be construed into authority to disregard spe-
cific limitations; that is, under pretence of enacting a law necessary to
carry into effect some other power, Congress cannot enlarge its power
in respect of the formation of a judiciary, and create another class of
tribunals than that prescribed, nor do away with the provision which
makes causes to which the United States are a party, cognizable (in the
States) only in those constitutional courts; secondly, the management
of property is not a legislative but an administrative function; and third,
it would be assuming the precise matter in issue, namely, whether this
land be the property of the United States, if Congress could legislate on
it as such. Congress had not, therefore, by virtue of any grant of legis-
lative power, authority to establish those acts.
Those acts, moreover, are not laws for other not less cogent reasons:
1. Controversies respecting the ownership of property must be settled by
the laws as they are, and cannot be made the subject of special legisla-
tion, or turned over to special, partial jurisdictions: the Constitution pro-
tects the American people from this injustice and calamity, and espe-
cially in cases to which the United States are a party. (Art. iii., §1,2;
amendments, arts. v. and vii.; 2 Kent's Com. 10, tit. 24; 3 Story's
Com. § 1783-4.) 2. It is not a rule of conduct; not obligatory on
any one who does not voluntarily submit to it; it has no inherent force;
commands obedience from no one; in all which it fails ofany resemblance
to a law. 3. It goes so far (§ 11) as to prescribe rules of decision for the
settlement of questions of right; which would be clearly an assumption
of judicial authority, and out of the power of Congress, if attempted
legislatively. 4. It declares that all lands to which the claims are not
presented within two years from the date of the act shall be deemed to
be lands of the United States; an enactment which, if made legislatively,
would be equivalent to an act of forfeiture, and obviously beyond the
legislative powers of the United States.
But 1 do not, therefore, question the competency of Congress to pass
the act of 1851, or rather to bind the United States by its provisions.
I trace the power to two sources: First, to that authority which Con-
gress has over the property of the United States, and consequently over
their claims to property and the adjustment of them. Second, to the
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immunity possessed by the United States from judicial process, and
their consequent power to prescribe the manner and terms on which
they will consent to be brought into a litigation. But neither of these
sources is legislative; because the power under them is not govern-
mental, but that of an agent; and consequently binds only the parly for
whom (i. e. by whose agent) the act is adopted.
Every people, in its organized capacity, has two characters; one pub-
lic, one private. In its public capacity, the Slate can give laws; but
in its private capacity, it must obey them; and it cannot abuse the pow-
ers which it basin its public capacity, so as to prescribe laws to suit par-
ticular cases in which it is interested in its private capacity. In its public
capacity its powers are according to the constitution of government which
it may have adopted : in its private capacity it is as a person, or corporation
aggregate, and has the same powers and rights as a natural person, and is
subject to the same obligations. (Vattel, Prelim, ch.
,
§2,5; lb. ch.
iv., § 40, 48, 49; lb. ch. xiii., | 164, 166; 1 Dal. 44; 15 Pet., 392;
1 1 How. 231.) in their private capacity, then, i. e. as a body politic,
or artificial person, the United States is capable of making contracts and
holding properly; and in that capacity it owns properly, or claims to
own property, in the State of California; and as such owner or claim-
ant it has the same rights as a natural person to settle its claims by
arbitration, by a reference, by an amicable suit, or by litigation accord-
ing to law. "The restraints of the Constitution," as this court say, in
the case last cited, (11 How. 231,) "on their sovereign powers, do not
affect their civil rights." Hence, in virtue of these their civil rights, the
United Stales, through Congress, their agent, could make such pro-
posal as it saw proper to Cruz Cervantes and other landholders in
California, for the adjustment of their respective claims. And this is
precisely what they did, in the act of 1851; but not legislatively; on
the contrary, in obedience and subject to the law, which recognises
such a right in every owner or claimant of property. It was not the
exercise of any higher power than if, instead of proposing to the coun-
ter claimant a proceeding before this commission, it had directed actions
at law to be brought in each case. This was in the option of Con-
gress. But, it will not be contested, had they adopted that alternative,
that the suits must have been brought in the federal courts, and could not
have been brought before this special tribunal, and must have been ad-
judicated by the law as it is, and not by any law that might have been
attempted to be made for the occasion.
The United States acted, then, in their private capacity in adopting
the act of 1851; and established a private tribunal, an arbitration, and
not a public tribunal or court. The power of Congress over the property
of the United States carried with it the power to adjust, on the part of
the United Slates, all their claims to property; and this is the manner
of adjustment they chose, and offered to the acceptance of the counter
claimants. This is not a new doctrine. In the debates in the Senate,
on this act, Mr. Ewing, of Ohio, repeatedly advanced this idea: " We
do not act here (he says) as legislators; we act as a. great landed pro-
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prietor;" "we make a proposition to individuals who claim/' &c. "Jf
an individual holds a title under the Spanish or Mexican government,
and does not see fit to come before the commissioners, he still retains
that title to the land. But we propose to give him an opportunity to-
come before the commissioners and adjust his title in a mode which
shall be easier, cheaper and better for him than to do it in a court of
justice; such is the object and effect of she bill." (Cong. Globe, xviii.,
361.) Again, "The bill is consistent. It is the proposition of a great
landholder." "It is a proposition on the part of the United States to
receive and investigate the claims of individuals to lands, artd confirm
those which are good, and put them out of controversy." "Now if we
look at this question in that point of l%ht, and consider the United
States as a great landholder, and these individuals as claiming lands not
secured from the public domain,, and if we consider this bill as a mere
proposition that will provide a tribunal before whom every one may pre-
sent his claim," &c, "it relieves the subject of every difficulty." (lb.)
Mr. Ewing was right; that view removes the difficulty of the case,
and no other view would remove it. In no other view would the act
stand the constitutional test a moment, since m no particular is it
warranted by the grants of legislative power given in the constitution,,
and (as we have seen) in several particulars it contravenes them.
The term laics seems to me to be entirely a misnomer when applied
to this class of acts of Congress, of which there are many on the statute
books. If we suppose the management and disposal of the property of
the United States to have been confided to the President instead of to-
Congress, as might have been the case without any departure from the
general plan of the government, we should never think of denomina-
ting as laws the measures which he should adopt in relation to them,
or for the adjustment of disputes concerning them. We should know
them for what they are—administrative measures; the execution of (not
a legislative, but an administrative) trust; not laws in any other sense
than the measures which any private landholder may choose to adopt
for the management of his estate, or the adjustment of disputes con-
cerning it, are laws. So, if the residuary interest of Mexico in Cali-
fornia had been purchased by an individual, it cannot be doubted that
it would have been competent to such purchaser to have made to the
prior grantees of his grantor precisely the proposal which the act of
1851 contains for the adjustment of the same questions; but we should
not denominate such an act of a private person a law; yet. it would be
a law in the same sense that the act of 1851 is a law, namely, a law
to the maker of it, when accepted by the other party, and so become a
contract. The ordinary functions of Congress, however, are legislative-;-
its acts are in the form of laws, and hence in familiar phraseology they
are all so called ; even the acts for admitting new States are so called, but
improperly, because if that function (directly given as it is to Congress)
were a legislative function, States might be put out of the Union by
the repeal of the act which brought them in. Hence, though all the
legislative power that is granted in the Constitution is vested in Congress,
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yet, we see that Congress has functions that are not legislative } from
which, when onc*e exercised, it cannot retreat, more than an individual
from his bond fairly given for a consideration.
The attorney general (Brief, p. IT) thinks the United States "hold
the public domain in their public capacity as a government, and no
otherwise." But this court has thought, in the case just quoted in 11
How., (hat they had civil rights as well as political powers, and that
their civil rights were not (though their political powers are) limited by
the restrictions of the Constitution, and that their civil rights are those
which attach to their property.
Going now, however, only on the ground that the commission is not
«. court under the constitution, and hence is not the depository of any
portion of the judicial power of the United States, and hence is not, in
any legal sense, a judicial tribunal
—
propositions which, 1 had supposed,
till seeing the attorney general's brief, would not be denied—could
Congress impart to the federal judiciary an appellate jurisdiction from
its decisions 1
The judge of the court below, in reply to suggestions of the counsel
-of Cervantes, intimated (and very much to my surprise the attorney
general assumes the same ground) from the bench, that he thought
such jurisdiction might be conferred on the same principle as appellate
jurisdiction is given to this honorable court, in certain cases, from the
highest judicial tribunals of the States. I am not able to discover the
analogy; and I think a short sentence will suffice for the suggestion:
Appellate jurisdiction will only lie from one judicial tribunal to another,
and the commissioners have never been made a judicial tribunal: No
State legislature has made it so; and Congress cannot. Again, the
appellate jurisdiction exercised in certain cases by this court, from the
courts of the States, is given to fulfil (he Constitution, and to secure
constitutional rights that could not otherwise be saved; since, of many
of the cases (o which the Constitution provides that (he judicial power
•of the United States shall extend, the Slate courts have also jurisdic-
tion which would oust that of the federal courts, if provision were not
made for their removal or appeal. (Federalist, Letter lxxxii; 6 Wh.
419; 1 ib. 339,350.) The laws, therefore, which provide for such
removals and appeals are necessary and proper for carrying into exe-
cution a power positively vested. Can any such thing be predicated
of the assumed jurisdiction of the court below in (his case? The only
pretence for it was, that the United States were a party to the case.
But the case nevertheless was not in the constitutional purview. A case
•to which the United States are a party could not arise, according to the
Constitution, before that commission; it could arise nowhere but in
the federal courts; not even in the State courts. It was not a case in
the constitutional, juridical sense. A case, in that sense, is a suit in
law or equity, instituted according to the regular course of judicial
proceedings. (3 Sto. Com. § 1640; 6 Wh. 408.) 1 am aware that
"cases" is not the word used in this connection in the Constitution.
The phrase is, that the judicial power therein authorized shall extend
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to "controversies to which the States are a party." Bui the word con-
troversies is well understood to be here used to confrne the power con-
ferred to civil causes; the word "cases" used in the previous parts of
the clause including criminal causes also. (1 Tucker's Bl. Com. App.
420, '21; 2 Dal. 419, 431, 432, cited in 3 Sto. Com. § 1668.) But
whether they be cases, or controversies, it isjudicialpower which is ex-
tended to them, and they must consequently be controversies of ajudicial
character, (since it is only to judicial controversies that judicial power
extends,) and must judicially arise, before they can become judicially
appellate. The author of No. lxxxii. of the Federalist, cited in 6
Wh. 419, regards the national and State system of judicature as "one
whole." The doctrine of the honorable judge of the court below
would take into the plan all private tribunals, as well—referees, arbi-
trators, umpires of all classes. This, however, cannot be sustained,
on general principles, by any precedent to be found in the history of
jurisprudence, and certainly not under the restricted functions of the
courts of the United States. Suppose, before such a commission as
that established by the act of 1851, a citizen of California and a citi-
zen of New York, for example, have an arbitration of a dispute be-
tween them: could an act of Congress constitute one of the fedeial
courts a court of appeals from that award? This will not ber pretended;
yet the federal courts have jurisdiction of "controversies between citi-
zens of different States;" quite as amply as of controversies to which
the United States are a party. "Jurisdiction," or "judicial power,"
means cognizance of a cause—or "controversy"—brought before a
court, according to the recognised forms of jurisprudence; and "appel-
late jurisdiction" means the power in the court which possesses it to
revise the proceedings and decision of some other court. (3 Sto.
§1601-1621.)
Again, the United States could not have commenced a judicial
proceeding, nor authorize the commencement of a judicial proceeding,
before a commission; because the United States can neither commence
nor authorize a judicial proceeding, except under the authority and on
the basis of the Constitution. The United Slates cannot confer any
judicial power except in that manner. The judicial power possessed
by the States, and from which in certain cases a removal or an appeal
may be had to the federal courts, is a consequence of such power in the
States prior to the Constitution. This did not embrace controversies to
which the United States were a party; because previous to that time no
such controversies, in the constitutional sense, existed. Consequently,
the only authority existing, by which provision can be made for a judicial
cognizance of such controversies, is the authority contained in the Con-
stitution. Consequently, no such controversy can have a judicial exist-
ence or cognizance except before courts exercising the judicial power
of the United States, organized by law according to the Constitution.
Consequently the matter before the commission could not be such a
case; and consequently the court below could not take cognizance of it.
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The act of 1851 was drawn by a lawyer; and, whatever opinions
there may be touching its justice and expediency, it was capable of
being carried lawfully into execution. It did not propose any such
anomaly as an appellate jurisdiction in the federal courts from the
decision of the commissioners. It did not indeed propose that the
decisions of the commissioners should be on their rendering final. It
reserved the right on the part of the United States, and in return gave
the necessary permission to the claimant who should submit himself to
the terms of the act^ to bring an action by petition, and in regular form
of law, in the proper district court, with an appeal from the judgment
of that court, in the case thus constitutionally existing, to this court.
The proceeding before the commission was necessarily by consent, as
are all submissions to tribunals other than courts, properly so called,
and capable of issuing compulsory process. The proceeding, then,
begun by consent; it was not competent to either parly, of his own
volition, to take it out of that category; but it must go on in the manner
that the original consent prescribed.
The problem admits of a brief solution. There are but two ways in
which the United States can become a party to a judicial controversy,
to wit, either by bringing an action against another, or by consenting
that another may bring an action against them; and there is but one
description of courts in which the action in either case can be brought,
namely, the courts of the United States, established under the Constitu-
tion. It follows, that as a case to which the United States are a party
cannot arise in any other description of courts, so there cannot be any
appellate cause to which they are a party that did not so arise. A case
to which the United States are a party cannot have an existence in any
other than the federal courts; and one cannot carry on either by appeal,
or otherwise, what has no existence.
But suppose it were otherwise. Suppose, in virtue of the immunity
of the United Stales from judicial process, and the consequent ability
of Congress to prescribe terms and conditions on consenting that the
United States might be sued, it had been competent to Congress to
make the commissioners a judicial tribunal, with appellate jurisdiction
thence to the district and supreme courts. Yet they have not done so:
they have not attempted to make a court of the commission ; have given
it none of the characteristics of a court; it has no clerk (in the judicial
sense;) it has no seal; it can issue no process, except subpoenas to wit-
nesses, and those not compulsory; the officer who attends to the inter-
ests of the United States before it is not even called an attorney, but an
agent; the proceedings are not conducted according to the forms of
courts of justice. By an arbitrary rule of the Board, the claimant was
compelled to file a petition; but the act did not require, nor contem-
plate it, (13 H. 49,) nor was there any answer required, or made. It
<s manifest, therefore, that the power given to the commission, though
in some respects judicial in its character, because judgment and discre-
tion must be exercised by them, was not conferred as a judicial func-
tion, to be exercised in the ordinary forms of a court of justice, but as
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the power ordinarily given to a commission to adjust claims. (13 How.
46, 48.)
Congress, however, could not, if it would, make the commissioners a
judicial tribunal. They could prescribe terms, certainly, to Cervan-
tes, before and on which only ihey would allow him to bring the Uni-
ted States into court, but they could not prescribe terms which would
enlarge their own constitutional powers. They could (and did) exact
of him, that before he could have the privilege of judicial process
against the United States, he should first submit his case to a commis-
sion or arbitration of their appointing; this is what, in the plenitude
(not of their authority, but) of their immunity, they could and did ex-
act of him; but they could not, by any acquiescence of his, either
forced or voluntary, make that commission or arbitration into a judicial
tribunal, or endow it with judicial functions, because that is a matter
determined by their constitutional grant of authority, to which neither
the assent nor the refusal of Cervantes, nor of all the land claimants in
California, nor any act of theirs, or agreement or arrangement with
others, could add anything. Congress, then, did not attempt to make
the commission a judicial body; if they had attempted it, they could
not do it, and consequently could not make a judicial appeal lie
from it.
The Senator who drafted the act of 1851 was well aware of all these
facts; and that, though by consent, the land claimants in California
and the United States might submit the question of their respective
rights to a special commission, yet the proceedings of that commission
could not make a case for the federal courts; and the only way of
saving the right of a judicial hearing of the cause to the party that
should be dissatisfied with the decision of the commission, was by a
provision for commencing an action there, and so creating a case in the
judicial, constitutional sense.
It is historically the fact, as I have always understood, of the act of
1851, that the interposition of the district courts was only provided as a
matter of necessity; that could it have been so arranged, the cases
would have come directly to this court from the commission, and so
saved the delay and expense of the passage through the district courts.
But it was well understood that appellate jurisdiction would not lie
from the commission to a court; and these were not a class of cases of
which original jurisdiction could be conferred on this court. Hence,
it was necessary to provide for jurisdiction in the district courts, to cre-
ate a cause there which could come by appeal here.
As for the suggestions and citations which the attorney general
makes to show that there are certain transactions of the Government
officers, which by law may create controversies for the courts, if they
show any tiling pertinent to his argument, it is equivalent to saying that
any two persons who have a dispute which one of them takes into
court, area judicial tribunal, since they have made a case for judicial
cognizance; and that the jurisdiction of causes heretofore called origi-
nal, is in fact appellate, since the parties between whom the contro-
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versy arises "appeal" to it. In all those cases that he cites from the
statutes, the actions contemplated are by original process- and that this
is competent nobody disputes; and the cases prove the reverse of what
the attorney general seems to suppose.
As for the suggestion that Congress might confer authority on the
courts to issue writs of mandamus to the public officers, (fee, un-
doubtedly that is true; and [ only regret it has not exercised that power.
If it had, I can assure the attorney general this case would have been
here long before this time, and in another shape; for nothing would
have given me more satisfaction than to have applied more than
eighteen months ago for a mandamus on the commissioners to give
me my certificate, and on the surveyor general for my survey. But
this court have decided that to give such power was conferring original,
and not appellate jurisdiction, and hence could not be conferred by
Congress on this court. Marbury's case, 1 Cr.
To our position, pertinent to this point, that the judiciary is not in
any sense a part of the State, when it comes to judge between the
State and an individual; the State, in fact, not appearing before the
judiciary in its political, but in its private capacity—the attorney
general replies:
"The State appears in fact as what it is in fact, that is as the State."
I admit the smartness of the saying. It has nearly as much pith,
and conveys quite as pointedly to the mind the idea of a vigorous, ac-
tive, concentrated, and consolidated despotism, as another not unlike
saying, attributed to Louis' XIV: L'jtttut? tfest ?noi! The State?
that is I! The saying of a monarch who is reputed, along with his
minister, Colbert, to have had many dexterous ways of transferring the
property of his subjects into his own coffers, but, as far as is related of
him, maintained an independent judiciary, and never undertook to in-
terfere with pending lawsuits ; consequently was not so free in his
notions of what the power of the State consists in, as our republican
rulers who assume the same style.
And notwithstanding the raciness of the attorney general's rejoinder,
the position is nevertheless true; the Stale comes before the judiciary
not as the law-giver, which is its State or public capacity, but as the
law-obeyer, which is its private capacity.
In 3 Vesey, 429, cited with approbation in 12 Pet. 738, 743, the
doctrine is clearly laid down, as well as the boundaries of political and
judicial functions.
But if it be also true, as I think I have shown , that the act of 1851
was not adopted in pursuance of any grant of legislative power, then it
follows that the act of 1852 is in the same category, and consequently
conveys no pretence of authority for changing the mode of proceeding
prescribed in the act of 1851, nor for the court below to take appellate
jurisdiction.
The act of 1852 is, moreover, unconstitutional and incompetent to
Congress, in several particulars, in whatever capacity attempted to be
enacted. The constitutional provision is, that the judicial power shall
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extend "to controversies to which the United States shall be a party ."
Now, does not the very condition of being a party to a judicial contro-
versy imply equality of condition with the other party; and can a party
to a litigation, though that party be the United States—or the United
States more than any other party
—
legislate on the subject matter,
and change the position of the cause pending its decision? This
would be incompatible with the condition of "a party,''' and in-
consistent with that impartial justice which the Constitution intends
to secure. The United States claim exemption from judicial process
in the first instance; and Congress having failed to provide a mode for
the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is true that the United States are so
exempt, except in cases where they consent to be sued. But where
they do consent, they part with any superior privilege they may have;
they submit their claims like any other litigant. And the same, if they
be the actor. Once in court, either as actor, of their own motion, or as
defendant, by their consent, their power over the cause is gone, as much
so as that of the opposite party. (6 Wh. 380; 6 Pet. 711.) All writers on
political law recognise this as a necessity of a free government. Vattel
says it is a rule in all well-regulated States, not the dominion of a des-
pot, that the tribunals decide those cases in which the sovereign is a
party with as much freedom as those between private persons; and that
every attempt to meddle with their decrees is an assumption of arbi-
trary power. (Vattel, ch. xiii., § 164, 166.) And we know that it
was to guard against any legislative or political interference with judi-
cial functions, or with cases pending in the courts, that the judiciary of
the United States was placed by the Constitution on the staunch and
independent basis which it occupies. (Federalist, No. lxxviii.; 3
Sto. Com.§ 1601, 1621; see also Dr. Paley's remark, cited 3 Sto.
p. 467.) If it be admitted, then, that the case before the com-
mission was such a judicial controversy as would justify the court
below in taking cognizance of it, yet that would only show posi-
tively that it was not in the power of Congress to legislate concerning
it, or to prescribe new rules for carrying it on , or a new basis for re-
moving it from court to court, or to enlarge the time for the ripening of
the decree of the commission, or to do any thing affecting the time or
manner of its decision, that the other party could not do; and fins, up-
on the ground, both that a party cannot be a judge in his own cause,
and that the legislation of the United States cannot interfere with the
course of justice. If Congress could interfere, then at what point need
they stop? Is there any legislative power over this cause now?. If not,
when did it cease? If there be, when will it cease? The courts of the
young Stale, whence this appeal comes, have given in a recent case
a striking instance of the manner in which they hold the State, sove-
reign though it be, and possessed (not like the Federal Government) of
general legislative powers, to be amenable to the laws. The general
law of California authorizes its courts to issue writs of injunction on
terms prescribed in the statute. The legislature, however, passing an
act for the appointment of commissioners to sell a supposed interest of
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the State in certain lands in the city of San Francisco, forbade the
courts to allow any injunction for interrupting the proposed sale. The
courts in (lie firmest manner disregarded the prohibition, issued an in-
junction on the terms prescribed in the general act; and on the commis-
sioners undertaking to proceed in defiance of the injunction, seized and
committed them for contempt. The courts held, that undoubtedly the
legislature might abolish the writ of injunction; but that they could
not exempt any particular parties or interests from its operation, while
it continued to be a remedy allowed by law; in other words, that the
Slate could not make one law for its citizens and another for itself; and
we shall perceive, in a clear and striking light, both the reason and the
reasonableness of this conclusion, if we reflect, that in the statute pre-
scribing general rules of jurisdiction and practice, the legislature was
acting for the State in its public—law-giving—capacity; whereas, in
passing an act for the sale of "property of the State, it was representing
the State in respect of its private interests, which are subject to the
same laws as other private interests.
Another point in which the act. of 1S52 is null presents itself in this,
that the appeals it proposes are to decisions already final, and beyond
the reach of revisal. There appears no reason in this case for departing
from the rule of construction that requires statutes on the same subject-
matter to be construed together; and hence it would seem, that the
"final decisions" spoken of in the act of 1852 must be understood in
the same sense as the "final decrees" spoken of in the act of 1851;
and these, we have already seen, are such decrees as have been pro-
nounced by the highest tribunal, or ripened by lapse of time, and so
become "conclusive between the United States and the claimant."
(Act of 1851, § 13, 15.) If, however, "finally confirmed," and
"final decrees," as used in these sections, and "final decisions," as
used in the act of 1851, do not mean the same thing, then there was
nothing in the action of the commissioners to appeal from, under the
act of 1852, as it was a "final decree" which the commission under-
take there to render. And a decree thus "conclusive," either by law,
or by agreement of the parties, is not in the power of Congress to dis-
turb. Several instances are given where the Slate legislatures have
attempted by legislation to open final judgments; but in no instance
has it been sustained. (See Smith's Statutory and Constitutional Law,
p. 518, et seq., and authorities cited.) In a Connecticut case this
court (3 Dal. 386) held, that an act of the legislature granting a new
trial after the time for appealing had elapsed, was not unconstitutional;
but this decision was on the ground that the legislature, or general
court of Connecticut, was possessed of certain judicial powers, and this
act, being judicial in its nature, would be held to have emanated from
the judiciary side of the assembly. The ground, therefore, on which
that act was sustained, is precisely that which would defeat a like one
on the part, of Congress; since the entire judicial power of the United
States is given to the courts, and consequently none of it to Congress.
A case in 7 Pet. 222 (Sampeyreac et al. vs. United States) may also be
6
42
properly noticed in this connection. Under the act of 1824 for ad-
judicating land claims in the territory of Arkansas, a number of claims
were confirmed which were subsequently ascertained to be fraudulent;
founded on forged instruments and prosecuted in fictitious names; and
in 1830 an act of Congress directed that the same court should take
cognizance of bills of review brought on the part of the United States
to set aside those unfounded confirmations. This act was held to be
constitutional, and competent to Congress, notwithstanding the time
for taking an appeal had expired, and the provision of the act of 1824
was, that on the expiration of that time, without an appeal having
been taken, the decision should be "conclusive between the parties."
The decision was undoubtedly correct; not alone on the ground on
which the opinion is mainly based, and beyond which it was not necessary
for the court to go, namely, that there were no parlies in the case origi-
nally— the supposed claimant being non-existent—and consequently no
one to whom the United States could be bound by the decree; not only
on this ground was the decision correct, but on various others: 1. The
act of 1824 only authorized the court to take cognizance of claims origi-
nating under the former governments of Arkansas; and if it took cogni-
zance of any other, whether through deceit or any other cause, its
judgments in the premises were null, and the United States had a right,
as an individual in like circumstances would have, to an action to set
it aside. 2. Fraud vitiates whatever it enters into; and if this simu-
lated claim had ever ripened into a patent, no one can doubt that the
United Slates might have commenced their action to vacate it. I go
farther than the court found necessary in deciding the case, and say,,
that even had there been a real party in the first instance, and he had
appeared and defended against the bill brought under the act of 1830,
yet, if his grant were forged, and his judgment consequently obtained
by fraud, it would still have been the privilege of the United States to
bring an action, and the duty of the court to entertain it. But I do
not base these opinions on the idea that the United States got any new
rights, or the court in Arkansas any new authority to decide the cause
in favor of the United Slates by virtue of the act of Congress under
which the bill of review was entertained. Far from it. The United
States cannot legislate themselves into rights, and they cannot instruct
the judiciary how, or on what principles, ihey shall decide a cause.
This kind of judicial legislation, as shown above, has often been at-
tempted, but never sustained; and is never so unjustifiable as when
attempted by the State in cases to which it is itself a party. All those
parts of this Arkansas act of 1830, therefore, which go to instruct the
court, or to declare the effect of its decisions, are merely null; those
parts which direct the suits to be commenced and authorize the court
to hear them are just and legal; but they are based not on new rights
which the legislature thus creates for the State, but on antecedent ex-
isting rights. A doubt, in fact, might be suggested whether the United
States, in pursuing a remedy in the premises, ought not to have been
confined to the laws as they were, and if the enactment of a new
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remedy for the occasion was competent to Congress. I start, however,
on the fundamental idea, that for every right there should be a corres--
ponding remedy, and a party against whom a fraudulent decree has
been obtained is entitled to a remedy—is entitled to a proceeding by
which the fraud may be exposed and the decree vacated ; and if the
existing laws do not give him a remedy, it is the duty of the legislature
to supply the omission and enable the courts to hear the cause. If,
therefore, the laws as they were gave no remedy for a fraudulent
judgment that might be rendered in the federal courts in favor of a
fictitious person, founded on forged papers, and sustained by a perjured
witness, it was the duty of Congress to supply that remedy, whether
the United States, or any the humblest citizen, were the party ag-
grieved. But, apart from any special legislation, the United Slates
have always the power to bring an action in the federal courts
—
pre-
cisely as any other parties whose cases are there cognizable—against
whomsoever, and if they show cause, can sustain the action; and this
was all that was done under the act. of 1830, and it could probably
have been done as well without an act of Congress as with.
There is nothing, therefore, in this case in 7 Pet. to show that Con-
gress can interfere with a sentence which has become definitive by
operation of law. The decision in this court is no more final, nor final
in any other sense, than the final decisions of the commission. Nei-
ther can be reviewed for error in any judgment, or proceeding con-
nected with them. But I suppose, if any decision rendered in these
California cases were hereafter discovered to be based on forged pa-
pers, and rendered to a fictitious name, even if the case had gone so
far as the issuing of a patent—that the United States might, with or
without an act of Congress, bring an action to ascertain the fraud, and
set aside the decree, and vacate the patent. At all events, if they had
not the right, they could not legislate themselves into the right. An
example in point, is presented in a late melancholy occurrence of a
fraud committed before the commission appointed to adjudicate claims
against Mexico which had been assumed by the United States. Large
amounts of the money thus fraudulently obtained from the United
States are reported to have passed into the hands of counsel engaged
in prosecuting the claim under which it was paid.
Now no one doubts that Congress might direct suits to be instituted
to pursue this money in the hands of its recipients; but no one will
pretend that Congress can direct the courts how or on what principles
they shall decide those suits, or provide that they may be either com-
menced;, or prosecuted other than by due process of law, or before any
other tribunals than the federal courts. Again, in the case above cited
of the United States vs. Ferreira, in 13 Howard, the court intimates a
doubt of the constitutionality of a certain act under which money had
been paid by the United Slates to claimants in Florida; and say, that
if it be unconstitutional the money might be recovered back; but the
case could only arise " in a suit by the United States," brought to that
end. Of course, Congress might direct such suits to be brought, but
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they could not direct the courts how (o decide them, nor institute them
before a special board, like the California commission. Obtaining
money by illegal means, whether from the United States, or any one
else, raises an assumpsit to pay it back, and the courts would be bound
to decide the case on the same principles between the United States
and an individual, as between two individuals; and this duly could not
be affected by any privileges an act of Congress might undertake to
reserve on behalf of the United States.
But I consider this point to have been already in terms decided by
this court in the two cases of Benner et al. vs. Porter, 9 How. 235, and
the United States vs. Ferreira, 13 How. 40.
The first of these cases decides, in so many words, that the admission
of a State into the Union brings the territory of which it is composed
under "the full operation of the Constitution, and the judicial power of
the Union can then be exercised only in conformity with its provisions;
and consequently the courts which Congress may establish within it
must be on the basis of the Constitution, and their judges must possess
the constitutional tenure of office, before they can become invested with
any portion of the judicial power of ihe Union; and that "there is wo
exception to this ride." It follows, then, as a necessiiy, that within
the limits of the Slate of California, Congress could not bestow on the
commission, nor the commission receive, any portion of the judicial
power of the United States; and as it certainly did not receive any por-
tion of the judicial power of the Slate, and as all judicial power within
the United States must be derived from one of these two sources,
namely, the authority of the Union or the authority of a Slate, there-
fore it did not possess any portion of judicial power; and a judicial case
could not arise before it.
The case of United States vs. Ferreira, in 13 How., arose as follows:
In the treaty with Spain of 1819, for the cession of Florida, the United
Slates stipulated to make satisfaction for injuries sustained by Spanish
inhabitants in the previous operations of the American army in Florida;
and to carry into execution that stipulation of the treaty, Congress in
1823 passed an act authorizing the judges of the superior courts at St.
Augustine and Pensacola to receive and adjust the claims that should
be presented to them; and in 1849 another act of like import, and sub-
stituting the district judge (Florida having in the meantime become a
Slate) for the judges of the superior courts. Under this latter act, the
claim of Ferreira was presented. The judge, supposing the case to be
judicially before him, gave to the proceedings as much as practicable
the form of a proceeding in a court of jusiice. A petition in form was
filed; and the district attorney appeared for the Uniied Slates, argued
the case, and prayed an appeal. But this court decided that (as in the
present case) the act of Congress did not require a petition; that the
claimant had nothing to do but to present his claim with the vouchers
and evidence to support it; and that the judge was not silling in a ju-
dicial character, but as a commissioner; and consequently an appeal
would not lie from his award. In one particular only, this case differs
from the one before the court, in respect of the point under considera-
tion. That particular is, that in the case of Ferreira no act of Congress
had assumed to authorize an appeal from the decision of the judge (or
commissioner.) But all the reasoning of the court goes to show that
such an appeal could not be, whether Congress prescribed it or not;
and the decision was on the ground that the decision of the judge was
not (lie judgment of a court of justice, but the award of a commissioner,
and suet) an appeal ''would be an anomaly in the history of jurispru-
dence." It would not be less an anomaly, I suppose, if Congress had
undertaken to authorize it. In that case the judge attempted, at least,
to make the proceedings judicial; but the court decided that the : <act
of Congress did not authorize him to convert a proceeding before a
commissioner into a judicial one." In the case of Cervantes, the com-
missioners did not attempt (beyond requiring the claimant to present a
petition) to make their proceedings judicial; nor if they had done so,
did (or could) the act of Congress so authorize them; and so, conse-
quently, the fundamental objection, on which the case of Ferreira was
decided, and this court, refused jurisdiction of it, stands in the case of
Cervantes to impeach the proceedings of the court below. Whatever
the act of Congress, the fundamental objection remains; (he proceeding
was not a judicial one; (he decision was not a judgment of a court of
law. The duties, the court further decided, performed by the judge
in the case of Ferreira, were "entirely alien to the legitimate functions
of a judge or court of justice;" whence it would follow, that had this
court undertaken appellate jurisdiction of the case, it also would have
been in the exercise of functions altogether alien from their judicial
functions under the Constitution. Again, when the court say that an
appeal might as well have been taken from (he awards of the commis-
sion on the Mexican indemnity, do they mean to say, tha( if Congress
had attempted to authorize such an appeal, it would have been compe-
tent for this court to entertain it. 1 am certain they do not mean to
intimate any such thing, but the contrary ; namely, that the difficulty
is in the Constitution, and in the nature of (he case: (hat a judicial ap-
peal will only lie from a judicial proceeding. The Constitution makes
this court an appellate tribunal in nearly all the cases that can come
before it. But its appellate power is judicial only, and can only be
judicially exercised. No doubt, in fact, this is the first instance in
which it has ever been pretended, that this or any of the federal courts
couid lake cognizance, either original or appellate, of a cause not judi-
cial, in the constitutional sense.
Again, in Ferreira's case, the court say: "Tt is too evident for argu-
ment, that such a tribunal is not a judicial one, and that the act of
Congress did not intend to make it one." So, neither did Congress
intend to make (he California land commission a judicial tribunal ; and
if it had so intended, we have seen (hat it had not the power. Again:
"A power (such as that exercised by the Florida judge) of this descrip-
tion may constitutionally be conferred on a secretary as well as on a
commissioner; but it is not judicial in either case, in the sense in which
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judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the courts of the United
Slates;" consequently, a judicial case could not arise before it, whether
with or without the aid of an act of Congress.
The court, in the case of Ferreira, refer to the old case of Hayburn,
which arose in 1792, and is reported in 2 Dal. 409. It arose under an
act of Congress, directing certain duties to the circuit courts of the Uni-
ted States, and directing that their opinions in the cases specified should
be certified to the Secretary of War, who might, if he thought proper,
suspend the execution of them, and report them to the ensuing session
of Congress; and the judges of each of the several circuits (and the
Supreme Court afterward) unanimously held, that as the duties im-
posed were not judicial they could not exercise them, and moreover it
was not competent for either the secretary or Congress to revise their
decisions. I apprehend that the converse of the proposition is equally
true; and that as a revisory power could not be given to a secretary or any
other officer, nor to Congress, over the decisions of the court, so neither
could a secretary, or any other officer, or Congress itself, become a ju-
dicial tribunal, so as to give the courts an appellate jurisdiction of their
decisions. (Ohio case.) The revisal of a proceeding or decision that
is not judicial, is not a judicial function, and hence cannot be exer-
cised by the courts of the United States. Cases are daily occurring in
the departments, where from a decision of a clerk, or head of a bureau,
appeals (so to speak) go to the secretaries; thence, for advice, and
sometimes for decision, to the attorney general, and finally to the
President. Now, will it be pretended, that an act of Congress might
constitutionally direct that appeals should lie from those decisions, in
any of their stages, to this court? No—no one will pretend it; and
why ? Because the exercise of that jurisdiction would be original and
not appellate, and it is not competent to Congress to confer on this
court any original jurisdiction. All the original jurisdiction it possesses
is in the Constitution. But it would be competent to Congress to es-
tablish an inferior court, before which such cases might be brought by
regular judicial proceeding, with an appeal thence to this court. And
so it was competent for them to enact, as they did enact, a mode in
which i he cases passed on by the courts in California might be brought
by original process into the courts below, and thence by appeal here.
And so they might (in the first instance) have enacted, that the
decisions of the commissioners should be reported to a secretary here, and
that he should thus pass on the claim secondarily. But could they then
have given this court appellate jurisdiction of the cause, from his decis-
ion? No, because it would then have been in this court original,
not appellate jurisdiction. If an appeal would not lie from a decision
of a clerk, or of a secretary, or the President, or from the commission
in California to this court, it would not lie to the district courts; but an
original proceeding could be commenced there, but not here. The
rule may be briefly stated, and is this: that in order for appellate juris-
diction to be exercised by the supreme or any other court of the United
Suites, the cause must have had somewhere a prior judicial cognizance.
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It seems to me, in fact, that Congress could as lawfully direct that
appeal should be taken from the district court to the commission, as
from the commission to the district court. If they be both courts, the
commission is certainly not the inferior one; its territorial scope is more
than double that of the district judge—being co-extensive with the
State ; it is three times more numerously composed ; the salaries of the
members are higher; their abilities and learning quite as respectable.
If both be alike judicial tribunals, I do not perceive why the commis-
sion should not be renewed from time to time, and be made a court of
appeals from the courts of the two districts over whose territorial limits
their jurisdiction extends. And if they be alike capable of originating
a judicial cause, there is no reason why that might, not be done, nor
why appeals might not come direct from the commission to this court.
I treat the two decisions last quoted (9 Howard and that in 13 How-
ard) together; and together they cover this point of our case perfectly.
The case in 9 How. decides that in the limits of a State, Congress can-
not establish any judicial tribunal other than on the basis of the Con-
stitution; and the case in 13 Howard decides that the federal courts
cannot take appellate jurisdiction of causes from any other than judi-
cial tribunals. (See also 1 Cr. 175.) "It is the essential criterion of
appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a
cause already instituted, and does not create that cause."
IV.—I now present the proceedings of the court below, as a breach
of contract with Cervantes, and in derogation of his rights, and that in
several aspects.
1. The act of 1851 was a proposal of one land claimant to a coun-
ter-claimant to settle their controversy in the manner and on the terms
therein set forth. Cervantes assented to those terms, by filing and
prosecuting his claim before the commission; and thereby the act of
1851 became a contract between the United Slates and Cervantes,
which neither party could alter or abandon without the consent of the
other.
According to the view that I take of the character in which Congress
enacted the statute of 1851 , it was an enactment quite as competent for
Cervantes to make as for Congress. That is, there being a dispute
concerning the ownership of the land in question between Cervantes
and the United States, I suppose them to stand, with reference to that
dispute, as equals before the law; consequently, one as free as the other
to propose or reject a mode for its adjustment without going into the
courts.
If this be true, it follows, that the act of 1851 affects the parties to
this controversy exactly in the same manner as if it had been origi-
nally devised by Cervantes, proposed by him to Congress, as repre-
senting the United States, and by Congress assented to on behalf of (he
United States; or, exactly as an agreement, or stipulation, in like terms,
if entered into between two individuals, counter-claimants to the land,
would affect the parties to it. If the act of 1851, then, had been the
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work of Cervantes, and assented to by Congress, instead of being the
work of Congress, and assented to by Cervantes, could he of his own
motion , after it had gone into operation , change its terms? If he could
not, it follows that, on the other hand, neither could the United States.
As between individuals, no one would think of calling a proposal and
accep'ance of terms like those of 1851, any thing else than an agree-
ment for the reference and adjustment of a controversy. For what
possible reason does it bear another character, because the United States
are one of the parties? If they could have given laws on the subject,
then Cervantes would have been obliged to obey them; but we know
that this was not the case; that Cervantes was at full liberty to disre-
gard the act, and would have lost no legal right, and subjected himself
to no legal penally, by disregarding it; that consequently his subjec-
tion to it is by his consent. Does it not follow, that his subjection to it
is only so far as he consented; and that as he did not consent to any
change in its conditions, so neither can he be affected by, or subjected
to, any such changes? And where the validity and obligation of an act
depends altogether on mutual consent, what, else can it be than a con-
tract, and can its stipulations be otherwise than mutually binding?
If we are right in supposing, as is assumed in our brief, that the same
acts constitute a contract on the part of a State as would constitute a con-
tract on the part of an individual, then there can be no question that
the act of 1851 and Cervantes's acceptance of it, by presenting and
prosecuting his claim according to its provisions, formed a contract be-
tween him and the United Stales. If two parties go with their dispute
before a tribunal inlo which neither could have compelled the other,
how is it that they go there except by agreement? And if they go there
by agreement, does not that agreement necessarily carry with it, and
make binding, all the pails of it? And if the same acts that, done by
an individual, would constitute a contract, do not bind a Slate in the
same manner; it would be interesting to know where (he line is drawn.
The distinction does not exist by virlue of any political or sovereign
power in the Slate; for, in the first place, t his Government has not any
such power with respect to the subject matter; and, secondly, there is
no contract more binding or sacred than legislative or sovereign ones,
as this court has often decided. 6 Cr. 87-148, (Fletcher vs. Peck.)
It was argued, however, in the court below, that though this might
be a contract, yet the Constitution does noi forbid Congress from passing
laws impairing contracts; that the prohibition was confined to the Slates.
1 did not anticipate a repetition of that argument here; but 1 neverthe-
less find it intimated in the attorney general's brief. It admits, how-
ever, of a summary answer. In the first place, the plan on which the
federal government is organized does not require that powers shall be
prohibiied to it, and we look for its authority, not to what is forbidden
to it, but to what is granted; secondly, the prohibition to the Slates
against passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts is not based
on the idea that without that prohibition the Slates would have authority
to pass such laws, but on the expediency of bringing cases in which
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such questions are involved within the federal jurisdiction: and lastly,
and more than all, the duty of performing contracts rests (not alone on
municipal, but) on universal law: the obligation is in the contract itself;
in the assent of parties, and in the sanction of universal law. (6 Wh.
27, Webster's argument, and authorities cited.) In the case of Fletcher
vs. Peck, Mr. Justice Johnson (6 Cr. 143) puts the doctrine in a strong
light. ' : l do not hesitate to declare (he says) that a State does not
possess the power of revoking its grants. But 1 do it on a general prin-
ciple, on the reason and nature of things; a principle which will impose
laws even on the Deity." I will venture reverently to add, that, at
least, it is a principle by which the Deity has imposed laws on men
and on States.
I will not argue this point farther; but assume, that if Cervantes
acquired rights or advantages under the act of 1851, by positive and
onerous acts of his own in pursuance of the provisions of the act, it
was not. within the functions of Congress subsequently to take away or
impair those rights. And if he did not acquire rights, what was the
object of the act? What was the object of the United States in incur-
ring the large expense of instituting and maintaining the commission?
or of Cervantes in the still larger (proportionately) expense and trouble
of prosecuting his claim before them? Was it all mere child's play,
intended for no good to either party? Will Cervantes have acquired
any rights or advantages when his case shall have been finally and
favorably passed on by this court, or may Congress still legislate him
to another process and another tribunal ?
As far as legislation goes, they will have, then, as good a right as
they had in the incipiency of this case, to send him before a commis-
sion. But, if the decision of this court in his favor will be final, and
place his case beyond Congressional action, on what principle is it that
his first acts of compliance with the requisitions of the act of Congress
did not give him the advantages (and all the advantages) set forth and
promised him in the act as the inducement for him to consent to its
onerous provisions?
Suppose Cervantes in consultation with counsel, with respect to the
propriety of submitting his cause to the commission, under the provi-
sions of the act.
" I don't understand English, (he says,) and therefore I come to you
to explain what are my rights under this act of Congress. I am told
there is nothing compulsory in it; and even that it is not in the power
of Congress to pass any act which will be compulsory on me in the pre-
mises, or bring me before this tribunal, without my consent. To come
before it, is expensive and troublesome; and particularly so to me, an old
man, who never had a lawsuit, and don't know how to carry one on;
living in a remote part of the country; poor and ignorant, and my
neighbors (and consequently all the witnesses I shall be able to bring)
of the same simple class. I wish to know, therefore, what my position
will be, if I comply with those conditions; if I incur this expense and
trouble? What obligations do I impose on myself? What are imposed
7
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on the Government? What rights or privileges accrue to me? All the-
conditions of the act seem to me to be hard; but I suppose that thaS
great and good Government at Washington knows what is proper, and
I am desirous, if I can, to meet their wishes, and test in the manner
they propose the validity of my right to the land that Mexico gave me.
I only want to know, as I am to be the actor in the proceeding, what
I am to gain by it, before f begin/' No doubt, if Cervantes- had had
the good fortune to consult in this manner with the attorney general, he
would have had a reply something like this : " I don't know, sir. what
your rights or advantages are under this act; they are not ascertained
by it; I can't tell what you gain, nor to what terms you bind )7our ad-
versary. I can read English very well, and know what this act pro-
mises lo you; but your adversary is great and powerful, and doesn't
hold himself bound by engagements; and after you begin, if he find
the case going against him, or repents him of his good nature, in doing
what was his duty, but what he couldn't be forced to do, he may
change the whole affair without your leave, and put you in a worse
box than you are now." This is no doubt what Mr. Attorney General,
enlightened as to the powers of Congressional caprice and authority,
would have replied to such questions from Cervantes. But, out in that
new and remote country we had not learned so much, and I believe
it was the universal supposition of the members of the bar, that they
eould reply to such inquiries, which were quite common, that the pro-
visions of the act were mutual, and when the claimant should decide
to accept of it, he would be entitled to have his case promptly decided
by the commission, according to the principles laid down in the llth
section of the act, and to all the other provisions of the act which would
be advantageous to him.
This is not a new doctrine with me. It seemed so clear to my mind,
so certain, and I had so little idea that a doubt of it had been or ever could
be entertained, that. 1 introduced—not the doctrine—but the fact, as-
J thought, into my argument of this case, before the commission—two-
years ago—by way of illustration of a point in the Mexican Regula-
tions of 1828; and 1 am certain no one who heard me doubted the
correctness of the proposition, whether the application of it was
correct or not. The brief of the attorney general confounds the
change of procedure proposed in the act of 1852 with those changes
which are frequently made in providing for the administration of
justice in the mode and the forum where remedies are to be sought
or perfected. I am persuaded he has not rightly considered the
case. Here, the mode and tribunal are of the res gestae,. It is a
part of the undertaking; the remedy prescribed for the particular thing,
and which Cervantes accepted as a whole, not. as a part. Changes of
mere remedy and forum, pendente lite, are however received with dis-
trust, and will not, be sustained if they violate a substantial interest;
and I do not believe there is an instance extant of a legislative transfer
of a cause from one court or one mode of procedure to another, except
where a change of government, or a remodeling of a system, made it
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necessary. Judge Kent says that any interference with private rights,
and pending suits, are to be looked on with disgust and indignation,
and our constitutions do not admit the power. (7 Johns. 477—cited
4 Wh. 578.) But in this instance, if the act of 1852 he a rightful
exercise of power, Cervantes not only did not acquire any advantages
to himself, or bind the United States to any thing, by acquiescing in the
provisions of the act of 1851, but he actually lost privileges by it, and
conferred on the United States a means of getting him and his claim
into court that they could not otherwise have had; for to have brought
him into the courts by a direct action, the regular process of law would
have been necessary, and the grounds of the action set forth. So, ac-
cording to the argument, Cervantes, by consenting to one part of a
proposition, lost not only his rights under the remainder of the propo-
sition, but also other most valuable civil and constitutional rights.
If one give his obligation to pay money, the mode and the forum
before which the obligation may be enforced are not of the substance
of the contract; but it may be enforced wherever (he obligor may be
found, or has property, before the tribunal, and in the manner pre-
scribed by the law of the place where the suit is brought. But if he
couple with his obligation a power to the payee to confess judgment
in case of non-pa}7 ment, and the legislature attempt to take away that
remedy, that would be to impair the obligation of the contract, because
the remedy is of the substance of the contract. Or, (the precise case in
hand,) if two disputants agree to refer their matter of dispute to a special
commission or board of arbitrators, conditioned that if either party were
dissatisfied with the decision he might carry the controversy, within a
certain time and in a certain manner, into the courts, this would be a
mutual release of all other actions (in reference to the subject matter)
than the particular one provided for; and at the expiration of the limited
time, without that action being commenced, both parties would be held
to have acquiesced in the decision, and no legislative act could interfere
for one or the other of the parties to provide another remedy, because
the remedy is of the substance of the contract. And I contend, if the
legislature could not thus interfere on behalf of an individual, they
could not on behalf of the State; that such an arrangement between in-
dividuals is in all respects a contract, and its character is noways altered
by the United Slates being one of the parties: in fact, that there was
no possible way for the United Slates to get Cervantes before that com-
mission than by a contract, by a bargain, with him. And to say, that
after making this bargain, the United Stales could not only back out of
it, but by virtue of backing out legislate Cervantes into court in the
manner proposed by the act of 1852, is not only to say that they can
legislatively impair the force of their contracts, but by means of that
iniquity can acquire rights they did not have prior to the contract. I
refer to the whole cases of Fletcher vs. Peck, in 6 Cr., and of Green
vs. Biddle, 8 Wh. 1, and to the other cases cited in the brief.
A contract, say this court in both those cases, is "the agreement of
two or more parties to do or not to do certain acts." Now do the
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United States agree or stipulate in the act of 1851 to do or not to do
any thing, on conditions specified? If it do, and those conditions be
accepted and complied with, then it is a contract. The}' do stipulate,
then, that, in order to be "entitled" to a review of the decision of the
referees which they offer to Cervantes, they shall give notice of their
intent to do so within ninety days, and shall absolutely commence the
proceeding within six months; and they promise that they will not
commence (as indeed by law they could not commence) that action
except in a fair and open manner, and with the grounds on which they
contested his right "fully and distinctly set forth;" and they also stipu-
late that the decisions of the commission, after the lapse of the specified
time, and of the courts, shall be conclusive; and if in favor of the
claimant, he shall be entitled to a survey and a patent; and also that
those decisions shall be rendered on certain just principles specified in
§11; and that the claimant himself, in case the decision be against
him, shall have a right to bring his action in the courts, in like time
and manner. In consideration of all which, Cervantes consented to
enter the terra incognita of that dependent, extra-constitutional tribu-
nal, to encounter the opposition of the attorneys employed to "attend
to the interests of the United States;" to employ counsel and bring
witnesses, (though to what ends or to what points, groping in the dark
to guess,) and take the risk of the protracted and expensive litigation,
which now, only, his counsel venture to hope they dimly see the end of.
Now, if this lacks any of the elements of a contract, it would be of
great interest to know what it is, that a new dictionary might be framed,
and simple-minded people no longer be deluded.
Let it not be supposed that Cervantes went willingly before that
commission. His fears consented, nothing else; i. e. not his will
nor his sense of right, but his apprehensions, produced his consent.
But he consented, and only now asks that he be saved in the terms
and conditions on which he consented.
Is he not entitled to that? If not, to what portion, if any, of the
stipulations or promises of the act is he entitled ? for none are written
with as much solemnity or explicilness as the precise ones which the
proceedings in the court below aimed to take away, namely, those that
relate to the time and manner of review of thos decisions of the com-
missioners. Is he entitled (beyond legislative control) to a survey and
patent, when he shall have got the favorable decision of this court
The survey or patent are not promised so explicitly. Is he entitlet
(beyond legislative control) to the principles laid down in §11 ? These,
the attorney general says, relate to the right, ad litis ticcisionem., and
remain unchanged, though he does not say unchangeable; and the
question is, could they have been changed; if not, why not? because
they relate to the right ad litis decision>,em,9 No. But because they
have the same force as all the other stipulations of the act; they are in
force by agreement; they are the rules of decision by agreement; they
could not have been legislatively prescribed, or else they might be
legislatively abolished. Suppose this case against Cervantes had been
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brought by the United States in the court below, could Congress, by
legislation, direct that court on what principles to decide it? By no
means. It would be quite as competent to direct how it should decide
it, as on what principles they should decide it. If they could legisla-
tively enact that the court should decide on the principles specified in
§ 11, they could have directed that it should have been decided on
the principles of the Twelve Tables, or the writings of Confucius.
They could direct that the suit should be brought, and that direction
would carry with it the direction that it should be tried according to
law. Any thing beyond that would be judicial, and not competent
to Congress. (12 Pet. 737, 742.) How then does § II get in and
become authoritative? By the same rule that Cervantes's case got into
the commission, viz., by consent; the United States, in consenting to be
sued, prescribed that as one of the terms of their consent, and Cervantes
agreed; and that is the way it got in, and the reason it cannot be got
out, except by the same mutual action. And this brings me to another
point, which to my mind presents the act of 1851 as a contract, in a
still more imposing aspect.
The immunity of the United Slates from judicial process enabled
them to prescribe conditions to their consent to afford Cervantes a rem-
edy in this instance, and to prescribe very hard ones. They did give this
consent, and prescribe these conditions, else it is certain that Cervantes
never could have instituted his claim—his '-'suit," as the attorney gen-
eral calls it. Whatever the nature of the proceeding, therefore, before
the commission, or whatever the character of the commission itself;
whether a court or an arbitration, it is ceriain that the proceeding before
it was by mutual consent, since the United States gave its assent, to
the institution of the proceedings, and Cervantes voluntarily instituted
them; it was then commenced by mutual consent, and on conditions
prescribed by the United Slates. Now what kind of consent is that
which, granted, and coupled with onerous conditions, when accepted,
and the conditions fulfilled, is no longer binding on the grantor? If
the United States were acting legislatively in giving that consent, then
the giving of it was a legislative grant—a grant of privileges, privileges
on condition, which conditions being complied with, the grant became
perfect.
It is assumed in our brief, that this immunity from judicial process
is the sole advantage [of course I mean with respect to the subject mat-
ter of this controversy] which the United States had over any individ-
ual who might have purchased the residuary interest of Mexico in Cali-
fornia. The attorney general does not agree to this view, which 1
regret; but am consoled with the reflection that the decisions of this
court, and the instincts of common sense, sanction it. In the case of the
United Slates vs. Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Pet. 392, this court say,
that when the United Slates "become a parly to negotiable paper,
they have all the rights, and incur all the responsibility of individuals
who are parties to such instruments. We know of no difference, ex-
cept that the United States cannot be sited.'''' Which, I venture to
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say, can with as full truth be rendered, " that when the United States
become parties to a controversy concerning lands, they have all the
rights, and incur all the responsibilities of individuals who are parties
to such disputes; and there is no difference except that the United
States cannot be sued;" and this, the court has said, in substance, in
Aredondo's case, 6 Pet. 711, and often besides.
But the attorney general thinks they got also "sovereignty and ju-
risdiction," and the "political powers' of government." Suppose they
did; sovereignty and jurisdiction, and the political powers of govern-
ment, would give them no advantage in a judicial controversy, or a
question of right of property, unless the sovereignty, and jurisdiction,
and political powers of government which they obtained, were of that
despotic kind that they were enabled to be the judges in their own
cause. Nor does the attorney general think that in passing the act of
1851, the United States parted with their "political sovereignty and
jurisdiction, nor tie their hands against future legislation." Granted:
but they did part with that power, in the act of 21st September, 1S50,
for the admission of the State of California into the Union. That act
left the United States barren of all political, or sovereign, or legislative
powers in California, which they acquired, or could have acquired, from
Mexico; not a jot or tittle of it remained; not a vestige. After the
admission of the Stale, all the power of the United States, on or over,
or with respect to California, of a political or legislative kind, came
and existed by virtue of the giants of power contained in the Constitu-
tion of the United States, not a shadow of that which they derived from
Mexico remaining; and if the position of the learned attorney general
were correct, that the sovereign power of the United Slates in Califor-
nia, and their proprietary rights were on the same footing, and derived
and held by the same tenure, then all the public lands in the Stale
would have gone, along with the sovereignty, to the State, on the same
principle, and by the same reasoning that the public or crown lands in
the different States went by the revolution, along with the sovereignty.
to those Slates respectively; and the reason that the public lands—the
lands of the United Slates—in California did not. pass with the sove-
reignly to California, was the same reason that prevented private lands
in the States from passing by the revolution to the States; namely, that
they were private property; the private properly of the United Stales;
the private property of that body corporate which has the seat of its
principal operations here in this city. (See 1 Dal. 41 , and 4 Wh. 667.)
The United States do not hold lands as a sovereign, or in virtue of sove-
reignty; if they did, their ownership would pass, along with the tenure
by which it was held, to the States. Neither does its sovereignly,
where it possesses it, depend on its ownership; otherwise it would cease
in the territories, technically so called, acre by acre, as the lands were
sold to private hands. The United States do not hold lands, and es-
pecially in the States, with any sovereign right or capacity; the ano-
maly of an empire within an empire does not exist in our system; nor
does the Constitution so suppose it, unless it also supposes that the
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United States hold all sorts of personal property in the same way; and
that when they send to auction a lot of refuse army stores, or an old
hulk of a vessel, or a spavined mule, they are giving a portion of their
political power to the hammer; for the Constitution treats (hem all in
the same way; it is "territorial and other property'1 '' that Congress is
authorized to—what? make laws about?—no, but to administer . The
argument of Cervantes, then, does not suppose as the attorney general
imagines, that the filing of the claim of Cervantes, and thus his ac-
ceptance of the provisions of the act of 1851, had the effect of taking
away the legislative power of the United States; but that the United
Stales never had any legislative power in the premises, any more than
they had the power of legislation over a dispute they might have had
with Cervantes concerning the ownership of a yoke of oxen.
Had an individual, then, instead of the United States, purchased the
residuary interest of Mexico in California, and Cervantes had an equita-
ble right to his land, but Jacked the legal title, he could have gone into
the courts of his own motion, and compelled the vendee of Mexico to
give him the additional muniment he was entitled to. But he could
not do this with the United States on account of (and for no other reason
than) their immunity from judicial process. He was not able, there-
fore, to enforce his right till, and then only on such terms as, the United
States should consent to. But when they did consent, and on terms
which Cervantes adopted and fulfilled, I say it became a contract of
the highest and most binding character; one of those contracts which,
once in the power of a court, it will hold with its tightest grasp, and
rigorously enforce, for the very reason, that in its inception it embraced
a trust that was precarious in its nature, depending on the good faith
of the trustee for its fulfilment.
Was it not competent, let me ask the attorney general, for Cervantes,
on examining the act of 1851, and considering all its terms, to decide
that he would rather take his chances with his title as it was? or to say
now, that if the provisions of the act of 1852 had been contained in
the act of 1851, he would not have accepted it; as, with my advice,
he certainly would not, and for two substantial reasons; namely, thai I
should not have been willing to risk the whole case in the hands of
those dependent temporary commissioners, and should have been per-
fectly sure that neither the court below nor this court could have taken
cognizance of my appeal in the manner proposed in the act of 1852; and,,
second, because, by the act of 1851, there were certain fixed periods,
landmarks by which we could know when the decisions of the com-
mission would ripen, and within what time further proceedings might
be commenced, and pretty nearly when the litigation would absolutely
end; whereas, the act of 1852 (if unaided by the intendments of that
of 1851) opens the litigation to indefinite continuance, and subject to
the convenience or caprice of an irresponsible third person, (the secre-
tary of the Board); and not only would I not have advised Cervantes
to enter the field under such circumstances, but I would not have taken
his case for the whole of his substance, because I would not have mort-
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gaged my time for so indefinite a period, or violated my sense of law
by undertaking such incongruous, fantastical proceedings. I should
have advised Cervantes, therefore, had the provisions of the act of 1852
been first tendered instead of the corresponding ones of 1851, not to
present his claim under it, but take the chances of maintaining his title
by a possessory action, or an ejectment against the first trespasser, or
to wait for a better disposition of Congress.
It is plain, then, that the act of 1851 was a matter tendered to Cer-
vantes's acceptance; and if tendered to his acceptance it was tendered
as a whole; and when accepted, and he had gone to trouble and ex-
pense to accept it, it. became his; as much so as when Congress offers
a pre-emption right or donation of land on conditions, and the condi-
tions are accepted, the right accrues. So when the United States of-
fered to Cervantes a certain manner and terms of adjustment of their
dispute, and Cervantes accepted the offer, the right—the right— the
right of adjustment in that manner, and on those terms, accrued to Cer-
vantes. Can there be a plainer case?
Or, again , will it be questioned that the United States may by an act
of Congress release a debtor, for example, or any one with whom
they have a dispute proper for a judicial examination; to release such
an one from all personal actions by them against him, or all actions
other than in a particular forum and manner; and might not. the party
plead that release in bar to an action that should be commenced contrary
to its provisions? And if that release were enacted {executed is the
proper word) on a condition to be fulfilled by the party released, and
he fulfilled it, could Congress repeal the act, and again make him
liable to the actions from which he had been released? Or, if they say
to Cervantes, if you will pursue this mode of our devising, put your
claim before this commission of our appointing, and risk a final action
on your title, in this special manner; we will likewise pursue our reme-
dy in the manner here set down, and, to be " entitled" to pursue it,
we will commence within a certain time; is it not equivalent to saying,
in so many words, that they will not pursue it in any other manner;
and hence is it not a release of Cervantes from an action in any other
mode in the premises; and a release on conditions which he has ful-
filled? If it is not, then it is a wile and a lure to the unwary, the
ignorant, and the simple.
The judge below, from his opinion, evidently mistook the entire
nature of this case. Judge Hoffman seems to think that a decision
against Cervantes would not take away the interest which he has in
the property, but leave him in the same condition as he was before the
filing of his claim, for he says (p. 4): "That the grant by the governor
had some validity , is not denied. It was the performance of a part,
perhaps the most important part of the acts to complete the title." And -
(p. 5), "There is no doubt, that under the treaty, as well as by the
laws of nations, such title as the claimant had acquired when the sove-
reignty was changed was secured to him as his private property. " And
(p. 7), "The question is not whether a forfeiture should be insisted
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on, but whether the United States are bound to complete a transfer,"
&c. But the judge is mistaken: this is a case that tries the right of pro-
perty, and is stipulated between the parties that it shall be conclusive
between them. It is not a question merely whether the United States
shall give Cervantes a further security of title, or leave him where he
is: it is a question to which of the parties, when the litigation is ended,
the property shall belong to. But Cervantes never agreed that a pro-
ceeding like that before Judge Hoffman should be conclusive against
him; and yet without his agreement the case could not have existed.
I say, therefore, that it is an effort to strip him of his property—or, put
it in the strongest light against him, his claim to property—by unlaw-
ful means, and without that due process of law which the Constitution
secures to him. This is a different kind of proceeding altogether
from that for which Cervantes agreed to forego that constitutional priv-
ilege, and agreed with the United States to test their respective claims
by, conclusively.
^
2. The proceedings in the court below were also a breach of con-
tract, and in derogation of the rights of Cervantes, growing out of the
guarantees of the treaty of peace with Mexico, and the act of 1851
passed to carry into effect those guarantees, considered together.
According to the decisions of this court, in other like cases, the guar-
antee of the treaty that the inhabitants of California shall be protected,
&c, is to be considered in the future tense, and hence was an execu-
tory and not an executed trust. The act of 1851 was the execution of
that trust, or the mode prescribed for its execution. It was conditional
in its terms; i. e. applicable only to those who accepted the terms of
the act; to do which Cervantes had to undergo great expense, and
forego his constitutional right of due process of law, and trial before
an independent judiciary. In view of the whole matter, however, he
elected to accept that proffered execution of the trust. The trust was
created in the treaty; Mexico being the grantor, the United States the
trustee, and Cervantes the beneficiary; and he having accepted the
terms (conditional on his acceptance of them) of fulfilment, the trust
was executed, and the trustee functus officio.
The Senators who debated and supported the act of 1851 agreed that
it was passed in consequence of the treaty, and to carry out the trust
which the treaty created and the United States had assumed. Mr.
Berrien, the framer of the bill, says: " Here is a bill which it is pro-
posed to enact into a law, the object of which is to carry into effect a
treaty stipulation of the United States." (Cong. Globe, vol. 23, pp.
372 and 427, remarks of Mr. Berrien.)
Mr. Ewing and other Senators made similar remarks, and Mr. Gwin
(Cong. Globe, vol. 23, App. p. 134,) held that not alone was the act
passed to fulfil that portion of the treaty which stipulates for the pro-
tection of private property, but that it was expressly demanded by
another clause of the treaty. This is the passage:
"And now the United States find themselves, as the successor of Mexico, pretty much
in the same position as Spain did towards France in Upper Louisiana. We have a mass
8
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of individual claims in California incomplete and imperfect, and whnt does the treaty re-
quire to be done? It stipulates that individuals shall be maintained and protected in the
enjoyment of their property, inceptive and incomplete as their rights may be. But the
treaty does not stop here. By a provision in the 11th article of it, this Government has
agreed 'now and hereafter' to 'pass without unnecessary delay, and always vigilantly
enforce such laws as the nature of the subject may require.' These are the express terms
of the treaty, and under its solemn covenants have I not a right, in the name of my con-
stituents, to call on the Senate for speedy and decisive legislation."
So, this court has always held, that like acts passed in relation to
claims in other territory acquired by the United States from foreign
powers were passed to fulfil a treaty stipulation—in other words, to
carry out a trust. The same is said in the case of Ferreira, in 13
How.; and in fact nothing else can be said of it. The attorney gen-
eral also so understands it.
If, then, the treaty created an executory trust in the United States,
and the act of 1851 was adopted as the means of executing that trust,
is it not a plain principle of law that, as for all those who accepted
that, means, the trust as for them became executed, and the trustee dis-
charged both of his powers and obligations in the premises. I am cer-
tain the attorney general will agree that the United States have thereby
discharged themselves of their obligations, and that the act of 1852 was
not on account of any obligation to the beneficiary of the trust. But
how is it that the power or authority of a trustee remains after his ob-
ligations are discharged? And how can a trustee change the mode
of executing his trust, and that in a mannerless beneficial to the cestui
que trust, after the latter has accepted the mode first adopted—i. e. has
accepted the execution of the trust? Is it because the trustee has an
interest in evading the trust, and harassing the beneficiary? That is
the very reason why he should be held more strictly to the perform-
ance of the mode he once adopts, and the beneficiary acquiesces in.
I have likened the right acquired by Cervantes under the treaty
—
namely, to be maintained and protected in his property by the United
States—to that right called in the Roman \a.\vjus precarium; because
it was a right which Cervantes had not power to enforce, and no legal
remedy for the enforcement of, but was dependent on the good faith
of the trustee for fulfilling. This description of trusts was so often abused
among the Romans, that they were afterwards made with an appeal to
the protection of the emperor; and Augustus, full of the generous sen-
timents which ought to animate the breast of a great ruler, whether it
be an emperor or a sovereign people, fired with indignation at the base-
ness which would abuse a defenceless trust, and created a tribunal for
their enforcement, and before which the trustee was held to the most
rigorous account, and every means given to the beneficiary for discov-
ering any evasion or concealment. Under the treaty with Mexico, this
Republic itself became the depository of one of those sacred, defence-
less, precarious trusts. They have undertaken to fulfil it; they have
established a means to ascertain and enforce it; and at this stage of it
this court stands in the position of the prcetorfidei commissarius—the
"particular chancellor for uses," as Lord Bacon calls him—of the
Agustan age; with this additional obligation, however, that it stands
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charged not alone with the duty of enforcing the trust, but also of
protecting the honor and faith of the trustee.
The attorney general is mistaken in supposing that the United Slates
have the right of eminent domain in California. The State of Cali-
fornia has the eminent domain there. If the rights of the United States
in the premises are then (as Mr. Attorney supposes, p. 18 of his brief)
to be held as '"'qualified by consideration of the eminent domain," it
must be hy the consideration that the eminent domain does not attach
to them, and that, consequently, they hold their lands on the same
footing—with certain exceptions which are matters of contract between
the United States and the State—as all other landholders.
The attorney general is also mistaken in supposing that the objec-
tion to the judgment of the court below, because it was delivered at a
special, unauthorized sitting—when in fact it could not be a court—is
answered by a reference to the third section of the act of 1850 for or-
ganizing that court. That section certainly authorizes the district
courts of California to hold "extra sessions;" and whether that means
adjourned terms, or regular terms, over and above what are specially
provided for, or that they are intended to be confined to ex parte pro-
ceedings or to cases taken up by consent, I do not profess to know. But
I do know that those extra sessions are not special terms; and also,
from the sections following that one, that it is not the intent of the act
that defendants or appellees are called on to take notice of any terms
other than those held at the times provided by law, or of which notice
shall be given as provided. (1 Yerger, 365-"67.)
Cervantes could not therefore be held to have had even constructive
notice that the action against him would be prosecuted at this special
term, the knowledge of which was confined to the breast of the judge;
and it is not the fact that he "appeared and defended the appeal;" he
only appeared to protest against the appeal; and even if he had ap-
peared and consented, the jurisdiction was not competent to the judge
out of term time. He could not act as a court. We never consented
to his acting in the premises at all; but protested against every step that
he took; and appeared for no other purpose than to protest; and I now
protest that the record, by designating the sitting as of a "special term,"
vitiates the judgment on its face. If we had consented (which we
never did) to that special term, we could still take advantage of it, as
it was a mistake of the court. (2 Cr. 126.)
We have objected also to the judgment of the court below, that it is
not rendered on the pleadings and evidence in the case; and the court
had not authority to render a judgment, except on the pleadings and
evidence.
This objection is founded on § 10, of the act of 1851, which con-
tains the only authority that I have found for the district court to ren-
der any judgment in the premises; and there are no pleadings whatever
in this case, and no evidence of which that court could lawfully lake
notice. The testimony taken before the commission could only be
used in a court, either by consent, or (admitting for argument's sake)
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by statute, and then only to the extent, and for the uses embraced in
the consent or prescribed by the statute; and this consent and these
uses are those set forth by the act of 1851. The commissioners were
empowered to take testimony, but only to a certain end, and the ap-
peal, so called, in the court below was not that end.
That the judge does not recite the facts necessary to show its juris-
diction, I think also well founded. (7 Yerger's Reports, 365-'67.)
The judgment of Judge Hoffman does not recite any fact at all; it
only recites conclusions. In the opinion of the court, the case was
properly before it; but what that opinion was founded on, the judge
does not tell us, and when we go into the record, we find that opinion
was mistaken. The judgment, for example, describes Fisher's trans-
cript, in the words and as the thing required by the statute of 1852; but
Fisher himself does not describe it so, and neither does the thing itself
answer the description. Does the opinion of the judge determine the
fact against the fact ? That would be taking away the appellate func-
tion altogether. The facts themselves are here before the court, and
not merely Judge Hoffman's opinion of them. So to the judge below
it u appears that the transcript had been duly and regularly filed," but
is that anything to this court, unless he shows how it so appears?
I am firmly convinced that every one of the objections 1 have taken
to the jurisdiction and proceedings of the court below is well taken;
and that the list is not exhausted. I am firmly convinced that if the
court found it necessary to go through the whole catalogue, every one
of those objections would be sustained by their unanimous judgment;
while at the same time any one of them is fatal to that assumed juris-
diction.
PAET SECOND.
THE TITLE OF CRUZ CEMANTES.
The commission decided that the claim of Cervantes to the land
in controversy was valid, on the following facts, namely:
On the 10th September, 1834, Cervantes made a petition in
writing to the Governor of Upper California, asking that the land
should be conceded to him, (Rec, p. 77, translation, p. 84.) On
the 20th September he presented another petition, with a sketch
or rude map of the premises. On the 22d, same month, Don Jose"
Castro, the governor, made a decree, in which he required the
ayuntamiento of the capital (Monterey) to report : " Whether the
petitioner possessed the requisite qualifications to be considered ;"
" whether the land was within the twenty-border or ten littoral
leagues;" as to its quality; "whether it belonged to any mission,
corporation, or pueblo ;" " with everything else that might serve
to elucidate the matter ;" and, afterwards, refer the matter to the
authority of the mission of San Juan Bautista, (pp. 77, 78, transla-
tion, pp. 84, 85.) This marginal decree was referred by the ayun-
tamiento to its committee on vacant lands, on whose report the
ayuntamiento resolved that the land petitioned for ought to be
granted, if no objections were made on the part of the mission of
San Juan Bautista, to which it was appurtenant ; and the pro-
ceedings being referred to the steward of that* establishment, he
reported on the 13th October, as follows:
" The place of San Joaquin petitioned for by the interested party may be adjudi-
cated to him as far as the hills, without touching the oak grove, which is the sum-
mer pasture land for the cattle belonging to this mission," (pp. "79, 80, translation,
pp. 85, 86.)
The proceedings being then returned to the governor, they were
referred on the 4th December, 1835, by his order to the alcalde, or
first magistrate of Monterey, with directions to take the testimony
of three witnesses, to points therein stated. In pursuance of this
order, the alcalde, Jose Ramon Estrada, examined and reported
the testimony of three required witnesses, who each testified that
the petitioner (Cervantes) was a Mexican by birth, married, had
children, and was of good character ; that the tract he asked for
did not belong to any village, mission, or individual, 6ce., (pp. 81,
82 ; translation, 87, 88.)
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The proceedings being in this stage again returned to the gov-
ernor, (Don Nicolas Gutierrez having in the mean time succeeded
to the governship,) he, on the 1st April, 1838, acceded to the peti-
tion of Cervantes, and made the following decree
:
"Monterey, April 1, 1836.
"Having examined -the petition heading these proceedings, the report of the mu-
nicipal authority, and everything bearing on the case, in conformity with the laws
and regulations in the matter, Citizen Cruz Cervantes is hereby declared owner in
fee of the parcel of land known by the name of San Joaquin, subject to the approval
of the excellent deputation. Seiior ISicolas Gutierrez, lieutenant colonel, command-
ant general, inspector, and political chief ad interim, do thu^ command, decree, and
sign, which I attest.
"NICOLAS GUTIERREZ.
"F'co Del Castillo N"egeete, Secretary."
On the same day he delivered to the party a patent, or'title in
form, to the land, setting forth that all the requirements of the
laws and regulations having bee'n complied with, he had, in a
decree of that date, in the name of the Mexican nation, granted
to him (Cervantes) the said parcel of land, and now " declaring it
to be his property by virtue of these letters patent," subject to the
approval of the deputation (or council) and to the following "con-
ditions," (so called) or more properly directions
:
" 1. He will submit to such conditions as shall be made by the regulations here-
after to be made for the distribution of vacant lands, and meanwhile neither the
grantee nor his heirs shall divide or alienate that which is adjudicated to them, nor
shall they submit it to rent, entail, bond, mortgage, nor to any incumbrance what-
ever, even if it should be for charitable purposes, nor convey it into mortmain.
" 2. He may fence it without obstructing the crossings, roads, and servitudes, put-
ting it to such use and culture as he may deem best, but within one year at furthest
he shall build thereon a house, and it shall be inhabited.
" 3. He shall solicit of the respective judge to give him judicial possession by vir-
tue of this patent, by whom the boundaries shall be mai'ked, at the limits of which,
besides the landmarks, there shall be set some fruit trees or else wild ones of some
usefulness.
"4. The land of which donation is made is of two sitios de ganado mayor, (two
square leagues,) according to the plat annexed to the proceedings. The judge, who
may give possession, will cause it to be measured agreeably to ordinance, leaving
the excess, (sobrante) which may result, to the nation for its purposes as may be
deemed convenient.
" 5. If he shall contravene these conditions he shall lose his right to the land, and
it may be denounced by another."
On the 10th February, 1841, Cervantes petitioned the proper
judge (the constitutional justice of the peace of that district) to
put him into possession of the tract according to the third of the
directions appended to the grant ; which the judge proceeded to
do, with the customary formalities, on the 18th of the same month,
setting forth specifically the metes and bounds, and first citing the
adjoining proprietors. (Pp. 53, 56; translation, pp. 58, 61.)
The genuineness of the grant, and of the proceedings in the mat-
ter of the juridical delivery, is proved by the testimony of Spence,
(p. 50,) and of Pacheco, (p. 65,) the latter of whom was one of the
witnesses and adjoining proprietors summoned and present on the
occasion of the juridical measurement and delivery. The other
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documentary evidence above referred to was drawn from the pub-
lic archives, the copy submitted being certified by the officer in
charge of them, offered on the part of the United States, and ad-
mitted by the counsel of Cervantes to be genuine.
Pacheco (p. 65) and Alexis Godey (p. 63) prove the occupation
and possession of the rancho by Cervantes and his family.
Pacheco testifies that it was about two years after the revolu-
tion of Governor Chico and Gutierrez, when Cervantes commenced
residing on his rancho; and Hartnell (p. 68) fixes the time of this
revolution at about the latter part of 1836.
The counsel of Cervantes, being of opinion, that, under this
state of facts, Cervantes has a perfect and indefeasible title, labor
in the dark in attempting to meet the objections that may be urged
against it. Had the act under which only Cervantes consented
to involve his title in an extra-constitutional litigation been com-
plied with by the adverse party, the way would be clear, because
we should have had "fully and distinctly set forth" before us "the
grounds on which the claim is alleged to be invalid ;" and we could
have met the supposed difficulties by testimony (in the court be-
low) or argument, according to their nature. As the case stands,
however, we*are left to conjecture the line of defence which we
have to follow, and the Attorney General's brief is not yet in our
hands. He has furnished me a brief memorandum, however, with
the following points of objection
:
" 1. The mission question.
" 2. The littoral question.
" 3. The points in Judge Hoffman's opinion."
From which statement I conjecture that the Attorney General
will take pretty much the same line of argument as was taken
by the law agent of the United States, in the hearing of the claim
before the commission, and proceed to meet it accordingly.
The "mission question," alluded to by the Attorney General, he
will raise, as I suppose, under section seventeen of the regulations
of 1828, which is in these words:
"En los territories en que haya misiones, los teiTenos que estas ocupen, nopodran
colonizarse por ahora y hasta que se resuelva si debenconsiderarsecomopropriedad
de las reducciones de los neofitos catecumenos y pobladores Mejieanos." [In those
territories where there are missions, the lands "which those occupy shall not be col-
onized at present, and until it shall be determined if they ought to be considered as
property of the settlements of neophyte-catechumens (i. e. converted Indians, neo-
phytes, or pupils of the missions) and Mexican settlers (or inhabitants.)"]
Any objection to the validity of Cervantes's grant that can be
taken under this section, must be on the hypothesis that the pro-
hibition against colonization is intended as a prohibition of all
grants. If this were the sense in which the word is used, the re-
ply then would be, that the prohibition is only to lands occupied
by the missions, and this tract is shown by the proceedings prior
to the grant not to have been so occupied. The ayuntamiento of
Monterey report (Rec. p. 79) that it is attached (pertenese—wrongly
64
translated, p. 85, " belong,")—to the mission of San JuanBautista^
but the subsequent depositions taken before the alcade of Monte-
rey, and the report of the steward of the mission, show that the
tract, in whatever sense appurtenant to the mission, was not in
its occupation. But,
2. The section only forbids colonization, and expressly reserves
the right of resident citizens to settle in those lands. The language
of the section is, that the lands occupied by the mission shall not
be colonized at present ; nor till it be determined if they ought not
to be considered as the property of the Indian pupils and of the
Mexican inhabitants. This phrase has been erroneously translated
in some of the public documents, "Mexican colonists"-—as much
as to say, that the lands should not be colonized till it be deter-
mined if they were not the especial property of colonists ! a mis-
translation which is an apt example of the confusion of terms
which has arisen from a loose reading of the colonization laws
and rules of Mexico. The section cannot be understood in any
other way, than as intended to discriminate between grants for
colonization and grants to resident settlers of the country and for
the protection of the latter. We are warned by the Supreme
Court (7 Peters 95) of the necessity of a careful examination of
papers translated from a foreign language, containing uncertain
and incomplete references to things well understood by the parties,
but not perhaps understood by ourselves ; and there cannot be a
stronger case for the application of this rule. It would be a gross
instance of perversion of language and mal-interpretation, to
construe this section so as to rob the founders of California of the
rights it was inserted for the exact purpose of securing to them.
3. Whatever construction may be given to the 17th section, the
laws of secularization, and the subsequent instructions of the Su-
preme Government opened the Mission lands like others to grants.
The regulations established by the Governor and Deputation for
carrying that law into effect, went into operation in August, 1834.
There was also an act of the Deputation as early as May, 1834,
providing especially that the vacant lands of the Missions might
be colonized. The question has also been presented in this shape :
whether the mere act of secularization, would determine the
question presented in the 17th section of the Regulation of 1828,.
and so open the Mission lands to colonization ? The matter does
not rest on the mere order of secularization ; though if it did it
would be quite sufficient for our purpose, as we shall see by refer-
ence to the 6th section of the decree of the Spanish Cortes of 13-th
September, 1813, that secularization of Missions includes the dis-
tribution of the lands, and their reduction to private ownership.
But the act of 26th November, 1833, directs the Government to
take active measures for the secularization and colonization, of the
Missions of California; and the instructions given in consequence
of that decree, to the Political Chief of Upper California and Di-
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sector of Colonization in Upper and Lower, in April, 1834, direct
that he shall " make beginning " of his colonization labors, by " oc-
cupying all the Missions of both territories."
The restriction contained in section 17 of the Regulations of
1826^ is of the same character as that in section 2 of the law of
1824, and both show that the term "colonization" is intended in.
its proper sense, and does not include grants or other acquisitions of
the resident population. Lands appertaining to corporations and
villages are held for the express purpose of distribution or grant,
as will be perceived from the common sense of the thing, and
from whatever Spanish or Mexican regulation for the formation
of towns
; 3
ret they are as expressly excepted from " colonization "
by section 2 of the law, as the lands occupied by the missions are
in section 17 of the regulations ; and for the same reason, namel}r
,
that they have another appropriation. The logic would be the
same, therefore, which should say that in the towns and rural
settlements of Mexico there were to be no more house and farm-
ing lots granted, as that which would preclude the "mission
lands" (so to call them) from distribution, with this difference,
that the land occupied by the missions are expressly reserved to
the resident population, while the corporation and village lands
are all inferentially so.
Further views of the points embraced in this question are given
in the remarks on the next.
[Jones' Report, Senate Doe. 18, 2d Ses. 31st Cong., p. 6, et seq.
Instructions of 1773 to the commandant of the new establishments
of Monterey and San Diego, Jones' Report, p. 41 ; Regulations of
1781, titles xiv, xv, Arrillaga's Collection for 1828, pp. 162, 175;
Jones' Rep., 44-50. Letter of the Viceroy of New Spain to the
King, December, 1793, ib. pp. 51, 55 ; Collection of Decrees of the
Spanish Cortes in force in Mexico, p. 107 ; Decrees of the Mexican
Congress of 17th August and 26th November, 1833, Arrillaga for
August to December, 1833, pp. 19 and 311 ; Instructions from the
Central Government to Don J. M. Hijar, April 1834, Jones' Rep.,
pp. 11, 63, MS. Archives of California; Micheltorena's Procla-
mation, 29th March, 1843, Jones' Rep., 71, and MS. Archives of
California ; Reports of the Junta de Fomento de Californias,
pamphlet, Library Dep't of State ; Act of California Deputation,
12th May, 1834, MS. Archives; Appendix A C and D to this ar-
gument.]
The second point suggested by the Attorney General is what is
called the littoral question, and is supposed to arise under §4 of
the Mexican Colonization law of 1824, of which this is a trans-
lation:
" The lands embraced within the twenty leagues bordering on any foreign nation,
or within the ten littoral leagues, cannot be colonized without the previous appro-
bation of the supreme executive power."
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1. The question does not arise in the present case, because it is
in proof that the land does not lie within ten leagues of the coast.*
As for the position taken by the Law Agent, that it has been ju-
dicially proved in the proceedings prior to the grant, that the land
does lie within ten leagues of the coast, and hence cannot now be
disputed, I take the true doctrine to be this, to wit: that the in-
quiries and investigations made by the Governor, prior to the con-
cession, are, in fact, in the nature of an inquest of office ; that, as
in any other inquest the particularfacts reported, as for instance
this one, of the ten leagues, are not conclusive of the fact, but that
the result, which maybe likened to a verdict or judgment, is con-
clusive
; and the sum of the report, when adopted by the gover-
nor and acted on, becomes res judicata. It cannot be said, that
each particular fact or opinion reported, is a fact judicially found,
because (if for no other reason) the different functionaries to whom
the subject was referred, might, and often did, make diverse re-
ports
: as in this case, one of the witnesses estimates the land to
be a league and a half, another a league, &c. The particular
facts and opinions, therefore, which are reported, are not to be
taken as proved ; and we cannot know what particular ones of'
them were received by the governor to determine his judgment
that the grant was proper to be made. But the inquiry itself is
to be taken, as before stated, as a judicial inquiry, in the nature,
as held by the Supreme Court, of an inquest of office at common
law, and its result—that is, the propriety of the grant—to be res
judicata. In Mitchell's case, 9 Peters, 71 1 , the claimant held under
a grant from the governor of Florida, of lands that were in the
occupation of the Seminole Indians at the time of the grant. The
grant was conditioned, that the grantee should not alien the lands
without the consent of the government. In 1817, the grantee ap-
plied to the captain general of Cuba for this consent. The captain
general referred the matter to the assesor general of the province
for his advice, and he reported that the lands had been lawfully
granted, in full property ; and upon this report, the permission
asked for to dispose of 'the land was given. Before the Supreme
Court, it was contended on the part of the United States, that the
lands being Indian lands the grant was not within the functions
of the officer making it, and was consequently void. The court
held, that the proceeding before the assessor general was in the
*The petition of the claimant in this case, to the Governor, soliciting the land,
Avas referred, according to the custom of the time, by the Governor to the Ayunta-
miento of Monterey, to report in regard to the locality and character of the land,
the fitness and claims of the petitioner, <&c. The Ayuntamiento reported, among
other things, that the land was within the ten littoral leagues, concluding with the
opinion, however, that it was proper to be granted. Proof taken before the Board,
shows the report of the Ayuntamiento touching the locality of the land with refer-
ence to the sea coast, to have been erroneous. The Law Agent contended never-
theless, that by the report of the Ayuntamiento the question of locality was judicially
ascertained and could not now be inquired into.
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nature of an inquest of office, in analogy to %the writ of ad quod
damnum, which by the common law precedes the grant of any
charter or patent by the King, and that the report of the assessor
general being acted on by the captain general as on an inquisition
at common law, the court would not go behind it, to presume that
those officers had exceeded their powers. And more especially
will the rule hold good in the present case as to the result of the
inquiry when acted on by the governor, if it be good to the extent
argued by the law agent. It was in view of the whole, and such
other matter as he judged proper, that the governor acted and
made the grant, as will be seen in the decree of concession.
2. The clause in the Mexican Colonization law of 1824, which
prohibits lands to be colonized within twenty leagues of cotermin-
ous nations, and ten of the sea coast, is not intended as a general
prohibition of grants of land ; but refers only to foreign coloniza-
tion, and is applicable to the States only, not to the Territories, of
the Republic.
Mexico did not intend to leave her sea coast unpopulated—
a
derilict,open to foreign invasion, and the incursions of adventurers
;
or those settlements already established on the sea-board un-
strengthened and unreplenished. The suggestion is too absurd
to be entertained ; and if it be contrary to every motive that can
be supposed to actuate a government, it is especially contrary to
the policy and wishes of the Mexican Government, whose im-
mense extent of sea coast on the two oceans, and long line of ex-
posed frontier on the borders of the United States, made her
particularly solicitous for their population and defence. The
statute books are filled with laws and decrees in encouragement
of this object.
We shall better understand the policy of the law of 1824, if we
consider the circumstances under which it was passed. Mexico
after achieving her independence, stimulated by the prosperity and
progress which she beheld in the United States, and anxious to
strengthen herself against futher atttempts, then still apprehended,
of subjugation by Spain, determined on a departure from the old
restrictive ideas of the Spanish metropolitan government, and to
adopt a liberal policy toward the people of other nations, as a
means to replenish her sparce population by American and other
foreign colonists. To this end was enacted the broad foundation
of the colonization law of 1823, by the government of which the
Emperor Yturbide was the head. (This law was enacted 4 Jan-
uary, 1823, and published in California 14 July, 1823.) On the
abrogation however, of the consolidated government, and the es-
tablishment of the federative system, that law was suspended, acid
on its re-enactment 17 August, 1824, it appeared with the restric-
tion under consideration, and other restrictions, prompted by jeal-
ousy of foreigners, and a desire to retain powers in certain par-
ticulars in the supreme government. The structure of the law
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exemplifies the mingled feeling of desire and distrust which ac-
tuated its framers : desire to strengthen the resources of their coun-
try by an infusion of foreign enterprise and energy, and distrust
and jealousy, of the means by which it was to be effected. The
motive of the restriction, however, by which the central govern-
ment sought to retain in its own hands the control of so impor-
tant a matter as foreign colonization of the sea coasts, is easily
perceived ; since through this sea board it must derive a large part
of its revenue ; through this only (or the border leagues which
were included in the same rule) could it be attacked by foreign
powers, or could foreign colonists combine with their former gov-
ernments, or the states themselves combine with foreign powers
or individuals against the integrity of the republic. But the same
considerations that would lead to this distrust, and this restric-
tion on the settlement of foreigners within the said leagues of the
sea, would lead to the promotion and encouragement of settlements
of native citizens. Hence, we shall find, how extremely solicitous
the Mexican Government was to this end. To show that this
was the cherished policy of Mexico, I will quote, first, a law of 6
April, 1830. This law (section?) offers to Mexican families who
will go to colonize the frontier States, payment of the expenses
of the voyage, maintenance for a year, and donations of lands
and agricultural implements. Section 13, opens for the encour-
agement of this emigration the ports of Galveston and Matagorda
to the free introduction of houses and provisions. Section 12,
permits the coast trade to foreigners for the space of four years,
to facilitate the transportation of the effects of such emigrants to
the ports of Tampico, Matamoras, and Vera Cruz ; appropriates
half a million of dollars for establishing settlements and fortifica-
tions on the frontiers, and conducting thither and sustaining on
their arrival Mexican families and presidarios ; forbidding at the
same time the colonization of any part of those frontier States
(not alone the ten or twenty leagues but any part) by foreigners
of nations adjoining thereto. In pursuance of this law, the gov-
ernment in carrying into execution, made in repeated circulars
and orders, the most liberal arrangements to facilitate its objects,
and particularly to establish a settlement at Galveston. I refer
to the Circular of 21 November, 1830, (Arrillaga's Collection,
April to July, 1833, p. 138,) and the Regulation of 3 May, 1833,
(Ibid, p. 132,) from which it will be seen that every means in the
power of the Government, was adopted to effect the object spoken
of. Again, the decree of 4 February, (1834, Arrillaga 1834, p. 47,)
manifests a like solicitude, and proposes a large expenditure for
(among other objects) the same great one of establishing Mexi-
can families in the frontier State of Coahuila and Texas, and of
"consulting the security of the frontiers," especially designating
for such colonization the lands on the divisory line of the Repub-
lic. Again a law of 22 May, 1827, within three years of the date of
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the Colonization Law, and passed by a Congress composed nearly
of the same members as that of 1824. This is a law for the ex-
press purpose of encouraging the formation, preservation, and in-
crease of settlements on the coasts, and as it is short I will quote it
:
" 1. The importation, of lumber, free of duty, is permitted for the term of two years,
for the sole object of forming, conserving or augmenting settlements on the coast,
in the extent of twenty littoral leagxies.
" 2. Are equally free of duties such national lumber (or, timber of domestic pro-
duction,) as shall be directed to the objects of the foregoing article."
The statue book is full of such laws. One of Mexico for the
organization of the civil militia, with provisons for defence of the
ports and points on the frontiers; adopted 29 December, 1827.
(Arrillaga April to July, 1833, p. 24.) Another of 8 May, 1828,
for establishing six companies of permanent cavalry in Upper
and Lower California; and distributing their respective forces,
one company at' San Francisco, one at Monterey, one at Santa Bar-
bara, one at San Diego, one on the frontier of Lower California, and
the 6th at Loretto. (Arrillaga, 1828, p. 1!8.) Now this military was
intended for the protection and security of the inhabitants of the
settlements, established and to be established ; but the instruction
attempted to be given to the 4th section of the Colonization Law,
would separate the military from the settlements ; place the lat-
ter exposed and defenceless in the interior, among the wild savage
tribes ; the former, isolated and useless on the coast. The ab-
surdity of this suggestion is sufficient to condemn it. It was unity
not division : strength not weakness ; that the Mexican govern-
ment was seeking in all these enactments. Again, the statute
book is full of instances, for the exclusion of foreigners from the
coast and frontiers. There is one of 30th April, 1828, directing
all Spaniards living on the coasts of the Mexican gulf, to retire in-
land twenty leagues. The immediate cause of this decree was
the anticipated approach of a Spanish squadron of invasion; but
Mexicans were not ordered to retire, because, on the contrary,
they were wanted on the coast to defend against the threatened
danger. The 1st section of the law of 6th April, 1830, as already
shown, prohibits settlements by foreigners of coterminous nations
in any part of those States which should border on such cotermi-
nous nation. The law of 14th March, 1842, enacted to allow for-
eigners to purchase and hold real property, restricts them to within
five leagues of the coast, and forbids their settlement in the states
which border with other nations. In 1837 the agents of Mexico
entered into a convention with her creditors in London, to appro-
priate a large part of her vacant, domain to the payment of her
debts, and to convert her bonds into land warrants. In 1839, this
convention was ratified by the Mexican Government, but with
such reservations as entirely to exclude from the- frontiers and
coasts the foreign emigration which the circulation of those war-
rants was expected to bring in : section 4 of the act of ratification,
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prescribing that the government should take care that the fron-
tier lands should not be assigned to any subjects of coterminous
nations, who might happen to get hold of the warrants ; section
5, that the premiums offered to the independent army (of the Re-
public) should be given in the lands of Yucatan and the Cali-
fornia?—the exposed territories of the sea board; that the con-
cession promised to certain Indian tribes should appropriate the
extreme frontiers ; and that the premiums to co-operators in the
proposed recovery of Tex^s, should embrace the lands on the
coast of the Mexican gulf, within twenty leagues of the sea.
All these provisions are at once premiums on the settlement of
the coasts and frontiers by Mexicans, and restrictive of their colo-
nization by foreigners.
In California, a distinguished citizen, General Guadalupe Val-
lejo, was commissioned in 1835, to found a settlement on the
northern frontiers 'and coasts of that territory, for the express
purpose of arresting the progress and forming a barrier against
the Russian settlements of Bodega and Ross, which appointment,
and the proceedings under it were approved by the central gov-
vernment in 1839, and the desire expressed that the settlements
should continue to increase "for the object mentioned." These
documents are contained in the papers accompanying my report
on the subject of Land Titles in California, Senate edition, page
81. These documents also illustrate both positions, viz: that,
the restriction was aimed at foreigners alone ; and that settle-
ments of native citizens was an object of encouragement and
solicitude.
All these, and many other acts which I might enumerate if it
were necessary, exemplify the policy of the Mexican Government,
which led to the 4th section Of the law of 1824; and show that
that policy was to draw colonists from foreign countries, into the
interior ; and establish native settlements between them and ad-
joining nations, and between them and the sea coasts ; and this
being so evidently the policy of the law, why shall we go behind
it to interpolate an absurd proposition contrary to it?
Having, as I think, shown what was the policy of the law of
1824, I now invite attention to the proper construction of it by
its own terms.
The subject of the law is declared in its title, to wit, Coloniza-
tion, and colonization implies immigration, and does not apply to
a native or resident community. There may be domestic colo-
nization, as a colony coming from another part of the same na-
tion ; but the word necessarily implies immigation of some sort,
and the first section of this laws shows what kind of coloniza-
tion is here intended, namely foreign colonization.
The subject, then, being Colonization, the first section of the
law declares what class of persons is intended to be embraced in
this colonization. The second section declares what description
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of lands are embraced in it. The third section directs the Con-
gresses of the several States to make their particular rules for
the regulation and reception of that colonization. The fourth
section restricts the power of the States with respect to such
colonization (without the previous approbation of the federal
executive) in certain portions of their territories. The fifth sec-
tion still further restricts the power of the States in the same
particular, by authorizing the federal government to make reser-
vations for public purposes. The sixth and seventh sections are
designed to assure foreigners who may propose to avail them-
selves of the offers of the law, of its permanency and of good
faith in its administration. The 8th section is a reservation on
the part of the government of a right, notwithstanding the pre-
ceding, to take measures for the security of the federation as
against those foreigners who may be admitted to colonize.
The ninth section is the first one that speaks of Mexican citi-
zens, and this, and the two following sections, are inserted in this
connection, in my opinion, as a limitation to the colonization
spoken of in the preceding ones, and are intended to declare that
foreign colonists shall not be admitted to the prejudice of the
objects expressed in these 9th, 10th and 11th sections. And here
I ask attention to the change in the phraseology of the law,
which occurs at the introduction of these sections. In all the
preceding sections, colonization is spoken of, and foreigners are
the persons alluded to. At the 9th section, the term colonization
is dropped, and the distribution of lands spoken of. And, this,
for the good reason that to have employed the term colonization
in reference to the subject matter of these sections would have
been an absurdity. Yet it is colonization only, as referred to in
the 1st, 2d and 3d sections, and not the distribution of lands
spoken of in the 9th, 10th and 11th sections which is restricted by
the 4th section, within the twenty limitary and ten littoral leagues,
and I submit that when foreign colonization is th*e subject matter
of the law, and the whole subject of one part of it, and the dis-
tribution of lands to citizens is prescribed in another part of it,
and a prohibition is inserted in connection with those sections
which treat exclusively of colonization, and the prohibition ex-
pressly mentions colonization, and does not mention the other,
that other, that is the distribution to citizens, is necessarily ex-
cluded from its operation. " Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
is a universal rule in the consruction of statutes." Arredondo's
case, 6 Peters.
To continue the analysis of the law. The 9t>fe section is the
first in which Mexican citizens are referred to, and this prescribes
as a limitation on the operation of the preceding ones, that the
distribution of lands to citizens shall have preference over the
colonization which those preceding ones treat of, and then di-
rects the rule which shall govern that distribution. The 10th
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and 11th sections treat also of the allotment of land to Mexican
citizens, military and others, who may have become entitled
thereto by special services or contracts. And here if we refer
again to the decree of 4th February, 1834, we shall find that the
classes of persons treated of in these 10th and 11th sections of
the act of 1824, are the very classes whose settlement on the
frontiers was most desired. The 12th, 13th and 15th sections lay
down some general rules apparently intended to apply to all
subsequent acquisitions from the public domain, and according-
ly their phraseology applies to all titles however derived. Sec-
tion 14 is for a further assurance of the colonization contracts
treated of in the beginning. The 16th and last section will be
noticed in a subsequent branch of the argument.
Another point of view in which we may look at this law, is
this : as prescribing rules for the distribution of the public do-
main in three diflerent channels : namely by foreign coloniza-
tion ; by gratuitous distribution to citizens; by distribution to ci-
tizens in discharge of government obligations. In the rules pre-
scribed for foreign colonization, the restriction is inserted ; in the
rules prescribed for the other modes of distribution it is not in-
serted. By what ingenuity, and to what end can the law be
tortured so that the prohibition can be supposed to apply where
it is expressly omitted, and where it would defeat its express in-
tent ?
But besides being only applicable to foreign colonization, and
not to the distribution of" lands to citizens, the clause had no re-
lation to the territories of the Republic, only to the States ; the
scope and object of the law is to prescribe general rules and prin-
ciples to govern the particular Colonization Laws which were
to be adopted by the Congresses of the States. Looking care-
fully through the law, we shall find that the territories are but
twice mentioned in it, namely, in the 11th section, where it is en-
acted that a certain class of public burdens shall be borne by the
lands in the territories, as a counterpoise to other public bur-
dens which are required in section 10, to be borne by the lands
of the States ; and again in section 16, which requires the gov-
ernment, (meaning the federal executive,) to proceed to the co-
lonization of the territories. In addition to this, if we examine
together the 3d, 4th and 5th sections of the law, we shall find
that they all refer to the same lands, and these the lands of the
States. Section 3 requires that the Congresses of the States, to
the end expressed in the two previous sections, shall form Rules
for Colonization* within their respective limits. Section 4 pre-
scribes that without the assent of the federal executive, lands
within the twenty limitary and ten littoral leagues shall not be
colonized ; that is, as I interpret it, shall be excepted from those
rules which the States in the preceding section are required to
adopt ; and section 5th fixes that interpretation, because it en-
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acts that for the purposes therein mentioned, the federal govern-
ment may reserve and use portions of those lands—estos terrenos
•
—that is, of the lands immediately before mentioned, and which
must mean lands of the States, since it would be idle to enact
that the federal government might reserve lands for public uses
in the territories, when the territories were held as its own prop-
erty. But again, section 16 makes it the duty of the federal ex-
ecutive to proceed to the colonization of the territories. To what
end enact in the 4th section that certain portions of the territo-
ries should not be colonized? without' the consent of the federal
executive, when the 16th section refers the whole business of the
colonization of the territories to the same executive? This last
section of the law of 1824, in my opinion, necessarily withdraws
the laws of the territories from the operation of the restriction
contained, in the 4th section ; since if no part of the territories
could be colonized without the previous approbation and consent
of the executive, of course, the ten littoral and twenty border
leagues could not be. He is no more charged with the coloniza-
tion of one than of the other.
We shall arrive certainly at this conclusion if we consider
what is the effect of this 4th section. It is in the nature of a re-
striction on a general permit, and its object and effect is to limit
the discretion of someone—of some one, to whom the duty of co-
lonization was confided. Now, the duties of colonization in the
States, was confided to the Congresses thereof; and the duties of
colonization in the territories was confided to the federal execu-
tive. The 4th section is not intended to limit the discretion of
the latter, for, on the contrary, it enlarges his powers ; it is, then,
intended to limit the discretion of the Congresses of the States,
and of course can only apply to the States.
Under the general law, foreigners were never permitted to set-
tle or own property in the Spanish American possessions, and
until the Colonization Law of 1823, before spoken of, there had.
been no such thing known in the provinces composing the new
empire of Mexico. The gratuitous distribution of land to native
born subjects, however, was no new idea, and required no new
laws to authorize it. It was a faculty inherent in the executive
office, and had been constantly exercised for three hundred years,
by the chief political authority, wherever there was a Spanish
province. It had been exercised by the Viceroy of Mexico, and
every chief of province under him since the conquest. The Col-
onization Law, therefore, was not intended to create that power;
and hence the distribution of lands to citizens is only incidentally
mentioned, as a restriction on the new faculty created, namely,
that of granting to foreigners. The federation did not pretend
to own the vacant lands of the States, and did not attempt or
pretend to regulate the mode of distribution to citizens. The
States had already all the powers over them, that were given by
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proprietorship, and were consistent with the general laws of the
Republic. There are repeated laws in which this right of prop-
erty of the States in their vacant lands is expressly recognized.
I will only refer to that of 6 April, 1830, and that of 25 April,
1835. It was not competent, then, for the General Government,
even had that been its design, to limit the authority of the States
in the uses of their domain according to the existing policy and
laws, nor to take away functions already possessed by the States.
It could not limit or control their right to distribute and grant
lands to their citizens, because that was a function already pos-
sessed by the States, and consistent with the policy of existing
laws. But in introducing a new law, connected with the exterior
policy of the country, which was peculiarly in the province of the
Central Government, it might well and properly prescribe limits
to the privileges of the States in respect of it, and reserve to itself
such part of its management as it judged expedient.
The first act to admit foreigners to settle and hold real estate
in Mexico, was that before mentioned of 4 January, 1823. It
contains no other restriction than that natives of the country, and
particularly the military, shall be preferred in the distribution of
lands. The ten league restriction was not necessary in this law,
even if the same policy and ideas prevailed, because under it
—
the federative system not then existing—the whole administration
of the law was in the hands of the central executive ; and it
would have been as idle to enact in that the restriction of the
4th section, as now to interpret that 4th section to apply to the
territories.
The Colonization Act of 1823 was followed 7 October, same
year, by an act to repeal all the laws which prohibited foreigners
from holding shares in mines. This was adopted to procure the
introduction of foreign capital for the resuscitation and rehabilita-
tion of old mines.
Next followed the Colonization Law of 18 August, 1824, intro-
ducing the restrictions we have noticed.
Some other restrictions are introduced in the passport and natu-
ralization law of 12 March, 1828, as also some additional privi-
leges. This law also (section 9 and 10) in establishing a new
law, partly to be administered by the States, adopts certain rules
to govern that administration. Those sections provide that un-
naturalized foreigners may propose for the purchase and coloni-
zation of lands of private ownership, but to obtain the privilege,
must have the special permission of the General Congress, if the
purchase and colonization should be in the territories, and of the
particular Congresses, if in the States; that the particular Con-
gresses might give this permission or not, as they chose, and
impose such conditions as they thought proper; but stipulating
the following which should serve as a basis for every contract of
the kind, with the understanding that the legislatures might nar-
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row them but could not amplify tbem, to wit: 1. That the fourth
part of the colonists should be Mexicans. 2. That within seven
years the estates should be divided into small tracts. 3. That the
empresario not naturalized should not reserve a tract exceeding
sixteen square leagues, and that this should be sold within twelve
years, counting from the time in which the estate ought to be
divided.
The next law touching the subject is that of 14 April, 1828,
prescribing rules for letters of naturalization, the 13th and 14th
sections of which enact, 1. That every empresario who comes to
colonize, in accordance with the law of the State where he may
settle, shall have a right to ask for a letter of naturalization,
which shall be conceded to him, he taking an oath of obedience
to the Constitution and Laws. 3. That colonists who come to
settle the colonizable lands shall be held as naturalized at the
expiration of one year from their establishment. These sections
relate of course to persons who may come in under the Coloni-
zation Laws, and show the sense in which the term colonists is
used.
The 11th article of the act of 6 April, 1830, as already shown,
again makes a very material restriction, that of prohibiting the
States which border with other nations from colonization by cit-
izens of such coterminous nations.
The act of 21 November, 1833, repeals that restriction.
The act of 25 April, 1835, makes another very material
restriction, no less than forbidding absolutely the States of the
frontier and of the sea coasts from aliening their lands for the
purpose of colonization until rules should be established to gov-
ern it.
This section, again, shows the sense in which the term coloni-
zation, in the Mexican law, is to be understood ; for it cannot be
supposed that in this enactment the Mexican Congress intended
so suicidal a policy as to stop all acquisitions of land from the
domain of the border States; but the object of the law was to
prevent their settlement by emigrants from abroad. The point,
however, does not stand on this hypothesis alone ; it is demonstra-
ble, that the terms are used both in the law under consideration,
and in that of 1824, in regard to immigration alone, and that
foreign immigration. The following is the section entire :
"In use of the power, which the General Congress reserved, in article 7, of the
said law of 18th August, 1824, the border and coast States are prohibited from alien-
ating their vacant lands for the purpose of colonizing them, until rules shall be estab-
Congreso general en el art. 1° de la citada ley de 18 de agosto de 182-4, se prohibe a los
lished which they shall observe therein." ("En uso de la facultad que se reservo el
estados limitrofes y litorales enagenar alguna parte de sus terrenos valdios para
colonizar en ellos, hasta que se establezcan las reglas que deben observar para
hacerlo.")
Now the faculty reserved by the General Congress, in said arti-
cle 7, law of 1824, in exercise of which the above section is en-
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acted, extends only to the right of prohibiting the entrance of for-
eigners
—
"la entrada de estrangeros"—for the purpose of coloni-
zation. It does not reserve the right to prohibit grants to citizens
;
and we must interpret the power exercised, with reference to the
power reserved; and conclude that the term colonization, as un-
derstood by those law makers, was equivalent, in the act of 1835,
to the term "entrance of foreigners to colonize," in the law of
1824. Again, in the section quoted from the law of 1835, the
prohibition is not against the alienation of their lands by the States
mentioned, but against their alienation, for the purpose of coloni-
zation ; and the latter branch of the provision evidently qualifies
and limits the former.
The restriction contained in the 4th section act of 1824; that
contained in the 11th section, act Gth April, 1830, and that con-
tained in the law under consideration, of 25th April, 1835, must
be understood as of the same subject matter—as relating to one
and the same thing ; the first named, as restricting foreign colo-
nization within ten leagues of the seacoast, and twenty of border
nations ; the second as prohibiting the colonization by emigrants
from border nations of the States with which such nation border-
ed; the third as prohibiting any foreign colonization of the border
and coast States.
To resume our summary of the fluctuations of the law in the
particular under consideration.
The act of April 4, 1837, revives the restriction contained in
that of April 6, 1830.
The decree of March 14, 1842, again extends the privileges of
foreigners in regard to rural property, and, with the exceptionof
the border and coast departments, gives them nearly the same
rights as citizens in the acquisition of real property. The 9th
and 10th sections of this law I invite particular attention to, and
assert, without hesitation, that, taken in connexion with them, the
4th section of the law of 1824 will not bear the interpretation at-
tempted to be given it on the part of the United States.
The 9th section provides that the provisions of the Jaw—that
is, the extension to foreigners of the right to hold real estate
—
shall not include the border departments, with respect to which
special laws of colonization shall be issued, provided that foreigners
shall never be able to acquire property in them, without the ex-
press license of the supreme government of the republic.
Section 10 provides that in those departments which are not
border, but which have coasts, foreigners can only acquire lands
at a distance of five leagues from the coast.
The restriction contained in these sections are, in my opinion, to
be taken as a part of the same system of legislation as those quoted
of 1824, 1830, 1835, and 1837, and the general term colonization,
as used in the 9th section, must be understood solely in connexion
with the introduction of foreigners and the acquisition by them of
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real property, and the provision with which the section closes, that
in the border States foreigners shall never be permitted to acquire
lands without the express license of the federal executive, is only
re-enacting in a larger extent, and with additional rigor, the re-
strictions of 1824.
The 18th section of the colonization law of 1823, and the 9th
section of that of 1824, both provide specially that, in the distri-
bution of lands, Mexicans shall be preferred—that is, be preferred
over foreigners This is also consistent with common sense, since
every man, in the distribution of favors, prefers his own house-
hold, and every nation its own citizens; and none more than Spain
and Mexico, under whose laws the admission of foreigners to hold
real estate is an exception, not a rule. But if the construction
now sought to be given to the 4th section of the law of 1824, be
correct, and it was intended to embrace both foreign colonization
and grants to citizens, and to embarrass and restrain both alike,
then by the operation of the law of 1842, instead of citizens being
preferred, a discrimination is made in favor of foreigners ; because,
if the 4th section, law of 1824, applies both to foreigners and citi-
zens, then both are restrained from acquiring lands within ten
leagues of the sea; and the law of 1842, without any reference
to citizens, or any concessions in their favor, admits foreigners to
acquire within five leagues of the sea. The conclusion is inevit-
able, that, to the minds of the makers of the law of 1842, no
such construction of the law of 1824 had occurred; for it is plain
(if any argument be needed to such a proposition) from the whole
tenor of the law of 1842, that, though it was framed for the pur-
pose of enlarging the privileges of foreigners, it was not intended
that they should enjoy the same license as citizens, much less be
preferred to them. Thus while the first article prescribes that
foreigners, residing in the republic, may acquire real property by
purchase, adjudication, denouncement, or whatever title estab-
lished by the laws, the third section provides that they shall not
acquire more than two tracts in any one department, without
license of the supreme government, and section 8th provides that
the foreign proprietor, who shall absent himself with his family
two years, without license from the government, shall make sale
of his estates, or otherwise the government will proceed to sell
them ; both being restrictions that do not apply to citizens. Again,
section 9th, as already shown, provides that the privileges given
in this law to foreigners, shall not apply to the border depart-
ments, and even makes a perpetual rule that foreigners shall not
acquire lands in those departments without special license of the
supreme government—a disability that certainly does not apply
to citizens. Again : the 9th and 10th sections taken together, and
with the supposition that the construction given by the Attorney
General to section 4th (law of 1824) be correct, would involve this
absurdity—that in the border departments foreigners were entirely
2
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excluded, while in the coast departments they were preferred over
citizens.
The law of 1824, according to my understanding of it, may be
paraphrased as follows:
The Mexican nation offers protection to the persons and prop-
erty of foreigners who come to colonize within it, and for that
purpose opens those lands of the Republic, which not being pri-
vate property nor pertinent to any corporation or pueblo, may be
colonized. To this end, as far as the States are concerned, the
Congresses thereof shall make the necessary rules for the admin-
istration of this law within their respective limits ; but they shall
not administer it with regard to the lands which lie within
twenty leagues of any other nation, or ten of the sea coast, with-
out the consent of the federal executive, and if the federation
should find it necessary to reserve any portion of those lands for
public uses, it may do so. The nation undertakes, in further pur-
suance of the objects of this law, that within four years no duty
shall be imposed on the persons of foreigners who come for the
first time to establish themselves in the nation ; nor prior to the
year 1840 shall the general congress prohibit the entrance of for-
eigners to colonize, unless under imperious circumstances with
respect to the citizens of some particular nations ; neverthe-
less the government may take such measures of precaution as it
judges proper for the security of the federation against foreigners
who come to colonize ; furthermore, in the distribution of lands,
Mexican citizens (who have heretofore had the exclusive right)
shall still be preferred ; and the colonization herein provided for
shall not be so extensive but that soldiers who are entitled to
bounty lands may receive them in the States, and other public
servants with whom the Government may be able to compromise
for lands, may receive them in the territories ; nor shall there be
united (under this law) in one hand, more then eleven leagues
;
nor shall the new settlers transfer their property in mortmain,
nor hold it themselves, if they reside out of the Republic. Con-
formably to these principles, the government will proceed to the
colonization of the territories.
From all the numerous laws which I have quoted, it will be
seen that the Central Government of Mexico has always claimed
and exercised control over the whole matter- of the acquisition of
real property by foreigners; to license or to forbid it, and to pre-
scribe rules to regulate it. The books are full of legislation to
this point; the law of 1824; the 11th section of that of 1830;
the whole of that of 25 April, 1825, are samples of it ; and the
12th section of that of 1842, above quoted, shows the Central
Government so tenacious of this right, that, while it gives exten-
sive privileges to foreigners in respects to the acquisition of lands,,
yet provides that they shall not be able to •avail themselves of
those privileges in any of the Departments, unless they contract
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with the government that " it possesses the right in representa-
tion of the Mexican nation."
But while this right of control over settlements of foreigners,
and of ther acquisition, in whatever way, of real property, has
been thus constantly and jealously exercised by the Central Gov-
ernment, I have not found a single law in which that government
has attempted to interfere with the discretion of the States (or
of those Deparments which, prior to the breaking up of the feder-
ation in 1835, were States,) in the disposition of their vacant
lands for domestic occupation, or of any of the laws of real prop-
erty as between citizen and citizen. Upon what ground can the
4th section of the law of 1824 be wrested from its position in this
general system of legislation, and forced to apply to a subject
over which the makers of it never claimed any control?
I shall now endeavor to show, that the same view which I have
expressed of the effect of the 4th and 16th sections of the law of
1824, was taken by the federal executive of Mexico in the regu-
lations of 1828. Those regulations give there in advance the ex-
press consent and direction of the federal executive to all kinds
of grants to all kinds of persons (embraced in the law,) in all
parts of the territories, inside and outside of the littoral and border
leagues, and appoint agents to carry out that express consent and
direction, reserving only for a special review and permission that
particular class of grants which I contend alone come within the
purview of the 4th section of the law of 1824, to wit : grants to
empresarios or contractors for bringing in foreign colonies ; and
providing only that they be vacant lands, and (for purposes of
colonization) not occupied by Missions. Within or without the
littoral and border leagues, the federal executive very properly
reserved a right of review and negation on each particular grant
made for the object of a foreign settlement ; and having made this
reservation in one class of cases, it is necessarily inferred that in
every other class mentioned in the regulations the consent therein
given was full and unreserved.
Whatever view, therefore, may be taken of the force of the
restriction contained in the 4th section of the law of 1824 ; whether
it be conceded that such grants as the one at present before the
Board were not embraced in that prohibition, or whether it be de-
termined that Cruz Cervantes, born here on the soil and living on
it ever since his birth, became suddenly a colonist, when he pe-
titioned for a piece of land ; whatever view may be taken of the
reach of that section, its demands were fully complied with ; be-
cause the consent of the federal executive was all that was ne-
cessary ; and that consent was given in the instructions, without
restriction as to the locality, and to every description of grants,
except those to empresarios ; and the rule already quoted, that the
insertion of one limitation excludes all others, applies and settles
the construction.
The act of 1824 requires that Mexicans shall be preferred in
the distribution of lands, and, as between them, residents in the
place where the lands lie. The Regulations of 1828, were, doubt-
less, therefore, intended, in a large degree, for the benefit of the
resident inhabitants of the territories. Now, as far as California
is concerned, if the regulations were only intended to operate
outside the ten leagues, it would have been worse than a dead
letter. The whole population lived on the sea coast ; they were
not strong enough to send out colonies or branches into the Indian
territory; they rather needed nursing, strengthening and replen-
ishing ; and any contrary policy, such as holding out allurements
for the emigration of the young and enterprising into the interior
valleys, would have provoked an Indian war for which the terri-
tory was not prepared, and would probably have broken up the
few struggling settlements that were there. The law was in-
tended to have a practical, beneficial operation ; to give the peo-
ple of the country a chance of obtaining lands where they want-
ed them, and where they could use them ; to keep families and
settlements together, and give them a chance to grow ; not to
break them up and scatter them ; to confer benefit, not to bring
destruction ; to populate and advance the country, not to lay it
waste ; and if, indeed, there be an ambiguity (which, for my part,,
I am not able to discern, however,) in the terms of the law, it is
the duty of Courts, in the language of Judge Marshall, (1 Peters,
95,) in a not dissimilar case, to adopt that construction v\*hich
would confer the bounty intended, and effect the benevolent inten-
tion of the legislature.
The Regulations of 1828 are entitled General Dispositions, not
local or partial ; Regulations for the Colonization of the Territo-
ries—all the terrirories, not parts of them.
The preamble gives the reason for the adoption of the rules,
namely, because the 16th section of the law of 1824, makes it the
duty of the Government to proceed to the colonization of the
Territories—all the Territories, not portions of them—and shows
that the powers therein intended to be exercised were co-extensive
with that given in said 16th article.
The 1st section authorizes the Governor to make concessions—
what of? " vacant lands of their respective territories," without
restriction as to locality, and under a law which provides for all
parts of the territories.
Section 7 reserves one particular class of cases j and this being
the only reservation, it cannot be questioned that, with this ex-
ception, the President delegated his power as fully as he received it.
It would be more rational, more in conformity with the object
of the law, and of those Regulations, in my opinion, to say that
they were intended to apply only to the ten littoral leagues, than
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that these were excluded. More especially, if we view them
in connection with the different laws for establishing the military,
and with the Order of 1838, authorizing grants to be made of the
islands of the coast. The military posts were all on the coast
;
and when the islands should be granted, and the present interpre-
tation of the law be carried into effect, the country would present
this curious spectacle—the islands populated; the sea coast in a
width of thirty miles deserted, except three or four starving com-
panies of military ; and the settlements fighting for life with the
Indians of the interior. How is this absurdity to be got over?
how is this incongruity to be reconciled? I am curious, indeed,
to hear, why, if an apprehension of foreign adventurers seizing
the islands, induced the President to authorize the granting of
them to citizens, the same apprehension should not induce him to
authorize the peopling of the coasts in the same way ? I am cu-
rious to hear, what " commerce and fisheries" they were which
were to be endangered by foreigners seizing the islands, if nobody
could rightfully or lawfully inhabit the country of the sea shore?
I am curious to know why ports were opened here, and custom
houses established, unless the officers of the customs were chari-
tably intended to console the military, in their solitude.
Is it not plain beyond doubt, that no new permission was con-
sidered necessary to authorize grants to citizens on the sea coasts ;
or that it would have been given for the same reasons, infinitely
stronger, along with the authorization for granting the islands?
Again, these Regulations embrace all the Territories; and may
be supposed to have been intended to operate in all of them. But,
if the littoral leagues wTere excluded, we have seen how little op-
eration they could have had, in Upper California : in Lower Cali-
fornia, they could have had none at all, unless it was intended that
the inhabitants should desert the little valleys of the coasts, where
alone, in that country, the means of life are attainable, in order
to partake of the government bounty by a grant of land on the
summits of arid mountains.
But, under all circumstances, and under whatever view of the
general provisions of the Regulations of 1828, I contend that the
claimant in this case is secured and his rights recognized and pro-
vided for in the 17th section, alluded to in a former part of my ar-
gument, and which I again quote :
"In those Territories where there are Missions, the lands -which they occupy shall
not now be colonized, and nntil it be resolved whether they ought to be considered
as property of the reductions of the neophyte-catechumens (communities of convert-
ed Indians) and Mexican settlers (or inhabitants.")
I do not know what construction the attorney general propo-
ses to give this section ; but to my mind it affords conclusive evi-
dence that the government discriminated, and intended to dis-
criminate specially between colonization, properly so called, and
concessions of lands to native settlers or inhabitants, and to re-
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cognize, at least for the present, the rights of the latter, to the ex-
clusion of foreign colonization, in the lands occupied by the
Missions. In a legal point of view, the Mission lands were un-
doubtedly the property of the nation; but a doubt if they ought
not to be appropriated to the exclusive use of those classes who
had worked them and protected them, led most properly to their
reservation from colonization. The distinction is indeed drawn,
in so many words, in this section, between the people of the coun-
try and colonists, and by all just rules of construction (to say no-
thing of the signification of words) forbids the confounding of
the two. I construe the section, in connection with the other
parts of the law, to mean, that while grants of all kinds
mentioned in the first section might be made in the Territory gen-
erally, yet in the lands occupied by the Missions, colonization
grants should not at present be made, nor until it was determined
whether others than the Federal Government had not a property
in them. What else can the section mean? It forbids coloniza-
tion in those lands, certainly ; but in the very act of prohibition
recognizes the rights of native inhabitants ; how were those
rights to be protected except by grants to persons whose rights
are thus reserved? This 17th section alone has always seemed
to me to afford a conclusive construction to the act of 1824, and
of the meaning in which the word colonization is used in it ; and
a complete answer to whatever might be said in support of the
view of said 4th section taken by the government attorneys.
What else can the-distinction mean which the section makes be-
tween colonization and the rights of native settlers ? What else,
but that colonization is forbidden, in order to protect more com-
pletely those classes of the native population?
We need not, however, rely alone upon the Regulations of 1828,
nor upon the protection which the 17th section was intended to
afford, to persons like the claimant. Whether or not, the Regu-
lations of 1828, give cpnsent to grants within the littoral leagues;
whether or not, colonization and grants to children of the soil
mean the same thing ; whether or not we receive the protection
which the 17th section was intended to secure to us; there are
abundance of other laVs and executive orders which come to our
aid. The act of August 17, 1833, providing for the secularization
of the Missions of the two Californias, enacts, among other things,
that all the lands of the Missions, except a cemetery and a lot of
two hundred varas square for the use of the curate, should be turn-
ed over to the administration of the civil authorities. Now the
mission lands were all located on the sea coast, or within a few
leagues of it ; and the secularizing of those lands and turning them
over to the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil authorities, could be
for no other object than to facilitate their conversion into private
property, according to the principles of the secularization law of
1813, before quoted.
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The act of November 21, 1835, repeals the prohibition contain-
ed in the 11th section of the act of April 6, 1830, which forbids
the colonization of the border States, by inhabitants of the na-
tions adjoining, and then enacts that the government may expend
whatever amounts may be necessary in the colonization of the
territories of the federation, and all other vacant places it may
have a right to colonize, and as a part of this authorization in-
cludes the erection of fortresses on the frontiers. The scope of this
law, then, embraces the whole extent of the border States, and all
the territories, and authorizes the colonization of the latter (without
exception as to locality,) under the sanction of the highest legis-
lative act.
This general aet was followed on the 26th of the same month,
by a particular one, applying to the very locality in dispute,
namely, the ten littoral leagues of California. This law empow-
ers the government in so many words, to prescribe whatever mea-
sures will assure the colonization, and make effective the secula-
rization of the missions of Upper and Lower California. And in
pursuance of this authorization the government sent a special
agent, with the office of political chief and director of coloniza-
tion, and instructions* to "make beginning," under the law, by
occupying all the missions of the two territories. Now every
mission of both Upper and Lower California was within the ten
littoral leagues, and consequently, whatever lands the instructions
of 1828 embrace, the present law and instructions cover the ex-
act locality in question, and no other ; and give the special as-
sent, both of Congress and the executive to its colonization.
The person to whom this appointment was given, and instruc-
tions were delivered, was superseded in his principal office,
before he had an opportunity to enter on its duties. But neither
the law, nor the instructions were ever rescinded, but were in
force as long as the Mexican government existed in California.
Again, the instructions to General Vallejo, before noticed, to
promote the settlement of the northern frontier, contemplate grants
on the seacoast. They were given by Figueroa, without reser-
vation. They were subsequently approved, as well as all pro-
ceedings under them, and General Vallejo encouraged to con-
tinue in the same labors,by the General Government. All this,
without a word on the subject of the coast leagues, which would
have been remarkable had it occurred to the General Govern-
ment that Figueroa and Vallejo had been transcending the law
in that particular.
I maintain, therefore, that the approbation and consent of the
Central Government was given to the settlement of the coasts of
California, in each and all of the acts I have quoted to that point,
as fully as is possible for assent and approbation to be given.
During my discussion of this question before the Commission,
my attention was called by a member of the board, to the first
section of the Regulations of 1828, and to the fact that in that;
there does not appear to be any distinction made between citizens
and foreigners, and hence it might seem to contradict my argu-
ment, that the law of 1824, on which the Regulations are founded,
makes such a distinction. I have, therefore, taken occasion to
examine the section with care, to ascertain whether in fact, it does
operate against the view I had taken of the 4th section of the
law of 1824, and I think it assists, rather than hurts my argument.
The construction which I put upon the law is this : that in the
States the several Congresses had entire control of colonization,
subject to the limitations of the law, in all their domain, except
within the ten coast and twenty border leagues; that within those
ten and twenty leagues, they and the federal executive together
had that control. That in the territories, the federal executive
alone had (under the law,) full control ; because, if the 4th sec-
tion applies to the territories, it still gives the control to the federal
executive, and the 16th section confides the whole subject matter,
within the territories, to his discretion.
Now, in the States, the Congresses alone might provide for co-
lonization in the interior, and on the coasts and frontiers with the
consent of the federal executive ; consequently, the federal execu-
tive alone might.colonize all parts of the territories, and that with
either foreign or domestic colonization. Hence, the first section
of the Regulations of 1828, will admit of either of these vif ws,
both of them in harmony with the opinion I have expressed, namely:
If the Governor should understand the law as a prohibition against
grants to foreigners on the sea coast, then he would suppose his
instructions to be in pursuance of the law, and construe them
thus : you may make grants both to citizens and to foreigners,
that is, to citizens in every part of the territory ; to foreigners
where. by law they may hold, at a distance of ten leagues from
the coast ; there is land applicable to both. Or the instructions
may be construed thus : the President had full power over the
subject of colonization, whether foreign or domestic, and without
regard to locality, in the territories, and was willing to delegate
the whole discretion which he had over the subject, to the political
chief of his apppointment, except so far as he reserved it, and
hence to say : you may grant lands in all the territory of Cali-
fornia, to all persons who under the existing laws may receive
grants ; you may grant to empresarios, to families, to single per-
sons, Mexicans or foreigners ; this is what is confided to me, under
the law, and what I confide to you, except as hereinafter reserved.
In my opinion, the latter is the proper interpretation of the law
and instructions. That the law gave the President absolute power
over colonization in the territories, subject to the general provi-
sions of the law, and that he delegated this power as fully as he
received it, with the exception of the reservation in relation to
empresario grants or contracts. It will be borne in mind, that
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only naturalized foreigners could hold land in the Republic, except
they came as colonists, properly so called, under the lead of an
empresario ; and hence there would not seem to be any necessity
or propriety in making a distinction in the authority conferred on
the governor, between natives and foreigners in regard to private
grants
; (I use the phrase private grants in contradistinction from
empresario grants;) foreigners being understood here as natural-
ized foreigners, since no others could obtain private grants. This
will be seen by the 6th section of the naturalization law of March
12th, 1828, which says, that foreigners who establish themselves
in the nation, according to the rules prescribed, or to be prescribed
for their admission, shall be under the protection of the law, and
enjoy the civil rights of Mexicans, with the exception of acquiring
rural landed property, which according to the laws in force, those
not naturalized cannot obtain.*
I do not think it was individual grants that the government was
ever jealous of. I think it was of empresario or colonization
grants, properly so called ; that it was against these that the 4th
section of the law of 1824, was intended to apply. The govern-
ment could have no occasion to be jealous of grants to individuals
;
but they might well be jealous of, and wish to guard with extreme
care, great empresario grants, covering many millions of acres,
(there was one in Texas of forty-five millions of acres,) and in-
tended for the introduction in compact settlements, of thousands
of foreign families, more or less clannish, and likely at any time
to set up for themselves.
The whole difficulty in the interpretation of this law, has arisen
from a confounding of terms—from mixing and confounding things
and words which have no affinity. Laws are always framed with
reference to other laws, and to facts, ideas, customs and habits of
thought already prevailing ; and it cannot be expected that a for-
eigner can take up a naked statute, and by intuition transport
himself into the position of the framer of it, and know every thing
on which it was founded, so as to give it at once a correct inter-
pretation. Our own statutes are often difficult to interpret, with
all our knowledge of their intended operation, and of the reasons
and circumstances of their enactment. How much more so must
*The laws in force in 1828, as above shown, were modified by Article 13, of the
First Constitutional Law of December 15, 1835, and of December 29, 1836, so that
foreigners married to Mexican women, (as well as naturalized foreigners,) might also
acquire fixed property. The article is as follows
:
Article 13. "The foreigner cannot acquire fixed property in the Republic, if he
be not naturalized in it, marry with a Mexican woman, and conform himself to the
other requisites prescribed by the law relative to these acquisitions. Neither can
they transport to another country their moveable property, except with the requisites
and paying the quota which the laws establish. The acquisitions of colorists shall
be subject to the special rules of colonization."
Can anything be clearer than the distinction here made between acquisitions by
purchase, &c, and acquisitions by colonists and colonization, and that the laws do
not intend to confound the two ?
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be the statutes of a foreign country, in a foreign language, and
adapted to a policy and ideas not less foreign to any views we
have ever entertained; and when we come with this our limited
knowledge of them, to measure rights by them, and to determine
the fortunes of individuals, families and communities, how neces-
sary labor, patience, attention, caution; and how proper to take
the largest and most liberal view they will admit of.
•It was not necessary to say in the instructions of 1828, to the
political chiefs, in authorizing you to make private grants to for-
eigners, you must understand naturalized foreigners ; that was al-
ready explained in other laws. Yet, if we were for the first time
to read those Regulations, and jump hastily to a conclusion, we
should say that the section made no distinction.
I think the federal executive had a right, under the law, to
grant lands, or cause them to be granted in all the territories,
first to -native citizens ; second, to foreigners; private grants to
naturalized foreigners; empresario grants to natives, and to foreign-
ers, whether naturalized or not ; that if the 4th section of the law
of 1824 applies to the territories, that then he obtained his power
over the subject matter, within ten leagues of the sea, from that
section, and his power over the remainder from section 16 ; that
if the 4th section does not apply to the territories, that then he
obtains full power in the premises from section 16. In either
case, and with either interpretation, he has full administration of
the law of colonization in the territories. That he delegated that
discretion, as fully as he himself received it from the law, whether
from the 4th section, or the 16th section, or both, with the single
exception of empresario grants to which he reserved, in accord-
ance with the spirit of the law, a special examination and con-
sent. I say in accordance with the spirit of the law ; for, though
he might under the terms of the law, have delegated fully his
control over that as well as other points, yet it was in the spirit
of the law, that these grants should only be given under the
highest sanction, and he might well think them too weighty and
too responsible for final determination by an inferior officer. It
was one of those precautions, which, under the 8th section of the
law of 1824, it was his duty to take for the security of the nation
with respect to foreigners who should come to colonize it. And
we shall see the propriety of thrs reservation the more plainly, if
we reflect that no certain rules could be laid down to embrace
colonization contracts, but that each would have its special cir-
cumstances and conditions which the President would naturally
desire should pass under his supervision.
It was also suggested in remarks in the course of my argument
before the commission, that grants to citizens and foreigners were
alike made under the law of 1824, and hence would seem to re-
fute the distinction which I drew between colonization and grants
to resident citizens.
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Undoubtedly, the colonization law makes some rules applicable
to all subsequent acquisitions from the public domain, and hence
in some particulars, it applies to individual as well as to coloni-
zation grants. And so, undoubtedly, the Regulations of 1828, do
combine in a general order, directions for both species of grants,
and would seem, without a careful examination, to confound the
two under the general term colonization. But I think a careful
examination will show that throughout both the law and the
Regulations the discrimination is constantly observed.
The President was to colonize the territories according to the
principles laid down in the law. One of those principles was
that Mexicans should be preferred in the distribution of lands.
Hence, in adopting general rules, the necessity and propriety of
making provision for the observance of that principle; and hence
the propriety of saying, in general terms, that grants to individu-
als as well as colonization grants are made under those laws and
rules ; though it will be observed that those laws and rules are
never referred to as the sole law of the subject.
In the preamble the President says, he dictates these rules in
order to give the most exact fulfilment to the law—of course the
whole law ; and hence those provisions which apply to individual
grants must, in my opinion, be referred to those sections of the
law which are inserted for the protection of the people of the
county. The President adopts rules for colonizing the territories,
in exact fulfilment of the law. He could not fulfil the law with-
out, at the same time, making provision for grants to citizens.
The word colonize, in one or another shape, appears in the sec-
ond, seventh, sixteenth and seventeenth sections of the Regula-
tions of 1828. In each case, it appears to me to apply to coloni-
zation, properly so called ; while in the seventeenth section the
distinction is plainly drawn, rendering it impossible to misunder-
stand the sense in which, there at least, the word is used.
If I had entertained any doubt of the correctness of the inter-
pretation of which I have given to section 2 and section 4 of the
law of 1824, and section 17 of the regulations of 1828, it would
have been removed by the perusal of a document to which I now
ask attention. «
In 1824-25 the attention of Mexico was specially directed to
strengthening her interests on the California coast, and the sub-
ject was referred to a committee or council named by the Gov-
ernment to that end. This council, called the "Junta de Fomento
de Californias," (committee for the advancement of the Califor-
nias,) sat about two years, and had, during that time among its
members, many of the ablest and most enlightened men of Mexi-
co ; among them, Don Pablo Vincente de Sola, who had been
governor of California under the Spanish dominion from 1815 to
1821, and, after the independence, was sent as a deputy to the
first sovereign constituent Congress at Mexico—a man of much
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talent and enlightenment, as were nearly all the Spanish provin-
cial governors. The labors of the committee have been preserved
in a small pamphlet, a copy of which is in the possession of the
Attorney General, from which I have been permitted to make
some extracts, a translation of which is inserted in an appendix,
(A.) These labors embrace several reports to the Government,
and, among them, on the proper mode of adapting the coloniza-
tion law of 1824 to the territory of the Californias, and proposing
two plans or system of rules—one for foreign and one for domes-
tic colonization ; out of which report and plans were framed the
regulations finally adopted and known as those of 1828. The
views which I have endeavored to maintain of the signification
of the law, are identical with those which the committee express,
not argumentatively, but as a matter understood. In both Cali-
fornias, say the committee in their report, "the width of the land
occupied by the Mexican republic [meaning the part actually
conquered from the aborigines] is very unequal, stretching from
nine to ten leagues, in Upper California, ****** unless it be at
one of the missions, where it may extend to fifteen leagues ; under
which supposition, there is no space there (no hay alii cabada) for
foreign colonization ; and, moreover, in those interiorparts of Lower
California where there might be space," it is necessary to provide
against invading the rights of the Indians, &c; and the plan pro-
posed for foreign colonization carries out the same idea. As for
the restriction contained in section 17 of the regulations, this com-
mittee are they who recommend it, except in a more absolute
form, and give the reasons for it—namely, that the lands occu-
pied by the missions were the best parts that could be found, and
the same as those which, before the conquest, the Indians had
occupied with their villages and fishing and hunting grounds; and
though they had never experienced the benefit of division of landed
property, they were entitled to it in their native soil, and ought to
be instructed in the benefits and use of it; therefore, in these lands,
"the said ancient Christian Indians, neophytes, and catechumens
ought to he considered with a right of preference in the distribution,
which ought to be arranged between them and the settlers, in the
proportion that their circumstances respectively admit." In their
proposed "plans" of colonization, the committee expressly reserve
these lands from either foreign or domestic colonization, and cou-
ple the proposed reservation with that contained in section 2 of
the law of 1824, and propose that the lands occupied by the mis-
sions shall be declared to be "the property" of the settlements of
Indians and Mexicans already established in the country, and
insusceptible of any other distribution than among them. And
these are the recommendations (and the reasons for them) which
are carried out in a modified and restricted form in the regula-
tions of 1828. The Government is not willing, for example, to
declare, absolutely, the existing population of California to be the
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owners of all the lands occupied by the missions ; but they re-
served the question, and meanwhile interdicted " colonization "
upon them. (See apppendix A.)
There could not be a more melancholy example of mal-inter-
pretation than would be the distorting of this humane provision,
devised for the protection of equitable and honest rights, into a
scheme for taking them away. And if the attorneys of the Uni-
ted States feel themselves bound to insist on a decree of confisca-
tion going out against the old inhabitants of California, I do say
that it ought to be on some more decent and becoming pretext
than this.
As for the points embraced in Judge Hoffman's opinions, to
which, as objection No. 3, the Attorney General calls my atten-
tion, this reference is peculiarly indefinite; so loose, and inconclu-
sive is the "opinion." As well as I can gather, however, Judge
Hoffman's " opinion " is based on two ideas, namely, the want of
a positive showing that the grant of Cervantes had been approved
by the territorial deputation, and of a positive showing that he
had built a house on the land, and it had been inhabited within
a year from the date of the grant, and a fancied application to
this last idea of some late decisions of the Supreme Court.
The objection that the claimant has not shown that the grant
was approved by the Territorial Deputation, I reply to as fol-
lows:
1. That if the lack of confirmation by the Deputation affects
the validity or binding force of a grant, it belongs to the Govern-
ment to show that the confirmation has not been given ; because
the supposition of law is that it has been given. The supposition
of law is, that the long occupation of the land by Cervantes has
been rightful : that having the grant, and living on the land as
its owner, with the acquiescence of the Government, the supposi-
tion of the law is, that everything necessary to the perfection of
the grant had been done, and that he held the land in fee. This
presumption of law becomes stronger in a case like the present,
when all that remained to be done after the issue of the gr^nt,
was in the hands of the grantor, and not necessary or likely to be
known to the grantee. Nor is this presumption of the law to be
rebutted by supposititious testimony ; it must be met, if at all, by
positive testimony, or by such negative testimony as to be con-
clusive. As for instance, if the proceedings of the Deputation
existed complete and reasonably easy of examination, and a
search of them did not show the confirmation, that perhaps might
be held conclusive, or to throw the proof on the claimant.
The facts shown in this particular are as follows:
On the part of the claimant : That he received his grant in due
form 1st April, 1836; shortly after went into occupation and has
so continued; that in February, 1841, he received judicial poses-
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sion from the proper magistrate, in presence of the only other
parties interested, the adjoining proprietors.
On the part of the Government ; That all preliminary steps
were properly taken ; that the concession, with the proceedings
on which it was founded, was sent to the Deputation, and there
referred to the Committee on Vacant Lands ; that the committee
reported, recommending the approval of the grant ; that the De-
putation recommitted the report for amendment.
The proof here stops ; and I contend that the Government hav-
ing proved so much, ought to prove more ; or rather that it can-
not be inferred from the proof which is in, that the approval was
not given ; but the contrary. First, because it was the duty.of
the Committee, after the recommitment, to make an amended
report, according to their instructions, and the duty of the Depu-
tation afterward to act on the report ; and the inference of law,
there being no proof or semblance of proof to the contrary, will
be that those officers performed their duty. Second, because it
was the evident intention of the Deputation to approve the grant
;
and that the recommitment was only intended to perfect the re-
port. What was the nature of the amendment we have no
means of knowing. The book of proceedings of the Deputation
is not produced, as it ought to be, being the best evidence, or its
absence accounted for. The book, however, does not exist, and
hence we have no means of knowing what the proposed amend-
ment was; but whatever it was, an amendment is always de-
signed to improve, to perfect; and an intention to destroy cannot
be argued from directions to amend. The books and records are
not extant ; the actors in the matter are either absent or dead
(as shown in the testimony of Pacheco); and, as it was pro-
perly begun, there is no rule of law that will argue from mere
inference, that it was not properly finished. Whatever means
of proof do exist, exist in the hands of the Government ; they
never were in 'the hands of the claimant ; he is not responsible
for their non-production ; nor for their loss ; and who will under-
take to say that if all the records for 1836, 1837, 1838, up to
1846, when the Departmental Assembly finally dissolved, if those
records were produced, this approval would not appear ? It de-
volves on the party denying it, and especially where that party
has all the proofs that exist in his own hands, it devolves on him,
to prove the omission. The record, as far as it goes, is now, and
has been for years back, in the general archives; no longer in
those of the committee ; back among the archives of titles, and
embraced in the list of " adjudicated lands." (See Rec, p. 76.)
2d. If, however, the grant was not approved by the Deputation,
it could only have been from neglect on the part of the officers of
the Government. The grant was in every respect proper ; there
was no reason known to the law, or to the policy or custom of
the country, why it should not have been confirmed ; every reason
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of law and policy combined, why it should have been ; and if it
was not approved, the cause was in that civil revolution which
at the moment the grant was before the Deputation, broke up
the proceedings of that body, and in the subsequent neglect of the
successors of that body to take up its unfinished business. From
this neglect or forgetfulness on the part of the agents of the
grantor, the claimant cannot lawfully and ought not to suffer.
Let us, however, examine what is in fact the nature of this
approbatory function of the Territorial Deputation.
By section 1, of the Mexican Executive Regulations of 1828,
the Political Chiefs of the Territories were authorized to grant
lands—" conceder terrenos "—to empresarios (that is, contractors
to bring in colonists) and to private persons. Section 2, 3, and 4
point out the.preliminary steps, and the mode of making conces-
sions. Section 5, declares that concessions made to individuals
shall not be held " definitively binding" or, as it maj^be translated,
definitively valid, without the consent thereto had of the Deputa-
tion. Section 6 declares that when the Political Chief shall "fail
to obtain " the approbation of the Deputation, he shall report the
case to the Supreme Government, for its determination ; that is,
he shall appeal, on behalf of the grantee, from the Deputation
to the supreme authorities.
The necessary corrollary is, that it was the business of the
Governor to make the grant ; that the Deputation had the power
to affirm it, and thereby render it definitive ; or they had the
power to refuse their affirmation, and thereby throw the final
determination of the grant on the Supreme Government.
Two further deductions also follow : 1st That the Deputation
could not destroy a grant; 2d. That after the making of the grant,
by the Govenor, no other power, not even the Supreme Govern-
ment, could interfere with it, to question its validity, pending the
action of the Deputation.
Whilst then, the Territorial Deputation of California existed,
it had power over grants of the nature of the one now before the
Board, to this extent, to wit : definitively to affirm them, or quali-
fied to negative them : pending this action, and until a direct re-
fusal of affirmation, the grant continued subsisting and valid,
without power, on the part of any other functionary or authority,
to question or interfere with it. Consequently, on the dissolution
of the Deputation, without exercising that qualified negative, the
grant necessarily became absolute, because there was no longer
any person or body to whom the power had been reserved to
question it.
It is certain that the concession spoken of in the law, had vi-
tality—had validity—immediately on being made by the Gover-
nor. This follows from the positive terms in which the granting
power is given to the Governor, and to him alone ; from the
usage and custom of the country, as is shown in the proof, and
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which is likewise contemporaneous exposition of the law; from
the objects and policy of the law; and from the qualifying word
definitively applied to the validity which the approval of the Depu-
tation should confer. It must have had some kind of validity
before, since it was now to be made definitively valid or binding.
The Attorney of the Government attempted, with great inge-
nuity, to erase this word definitively ; but it is full of meaning and
is inserted for a purpose, and to strike it out would change the
character of the law, and, as we shall see, reverse its purpose.
Now how was this original vitality and validity to be destroy-
ed ? It could only be destroyed by the concurrent action of the
Deputation, begun by the Deputation, and of the Supreme Govern-
ment affirming that of the Deputation ; because, from any nega-
tive action of the Deputation, the Supreme Government reserved
an appeal to itself; but did not reserve any original right of ne-
gation. It follows, then, as stated above, that when the only
tribunal that had power to originate a negative action has ceased
to exist, that negative action has become impossible, and the
grant per force absolute.
Again, the grant is made by the appointed agent of the Gov-
ernment. It was made according to law ; but it is not definitively
binding till it has gone through another prescribed process. It is
not definitively binding, because it may still be reviewed, annulled.
But it can only be reviewed in a particular way, by a particular
tribunal ; and can only be annulled by the Government itself,
after being thus reviewed. Now when that particular mode of
reviewing the title by that particular tribunal, becomes impossible,,
the control of the Government over the title is gone, because it
did not reserve any other mode or means. The decisions which
may be made, by this Board, in favor of claims, will be valid cer-
tainly; but not definitively binding on the Government of the
United States. The cases will still be in the control of the gov-
ernment for review and possibly reversal ; but in its control only
through a particular mode and means. Should that control, in
the particular prescribed way, in the exercise of a just discretion
on the part of the agents of the government, be not availed of, or
even in any way become impossible, then the control of the gov-
ernment is gone
—
gone absolutely
—
gone definitively
—
gone for-
ever—and the decision of the Board becomes absolute.
The Mexican government did not then reserve any power to
negative grants to individuals, made by its territorial Governors,
except when the same should be first disapproved by the terri-
torial deputation, Its policy was, to have the lands distributed;
distributed by secure titles, and with as little expense and trouble
as possible to the grantee ; hence, it was not its policy to hold
titles in suspense, or reserve questions concerning them for settle-
ment at that remote capital, except where the local council, by
disapproving a grant, should raise a just doubt of its propriety.
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Hence, that government did not reserve any other power over
grants once made by its Governors ; nor any other means of
reaching them ; and hence, I say, that that means being abrogated,
or become impossible to be exercised, the grant stands divested
of the reservation to its definitive validity.
It is easy to perceive the object of these provisions. It was the
intention of the Mexican Government, that the settlement of the
territories should be made conformably to the views of the central
authorities. Hence the law gives the central executive control
over the peopling of the terrritories ; and the regulations depute
the exclusive granting power to an officer who held his appoint-
ment from Mexico, came hence impressed with the wishes of the
central government, and was responsible to it for his conduct.
At the same time a sufficient check was placed on the Governor's
otherwise absolute discretion to secure the rights of the native
population of the territory, and to give the government notice of
abuses. The qualified negative reserved to the deputation ac-
complished that object ? but any power in the deputation beyond
that qualified negative, would have defeated the purpose of the
government. Because an absolute negative given to the deputa-
tion, or, what is the same thing, if their positive concurrence had
been made necessary to the vitality of the Governor's concession,
then the whole power would be virtually taken out of the hands
of the Governor—the federal appointee—and he compelled to fall
into the views, however narrow and exclusive, of the local coun-
cil; or the granting power come to a dead lock. Neither of
these alternatives was consistent with the plan of the Central
Government. It was not consistent with its paternal policy that
the people of California should be deprived of a just participa-
tion in the distribution of the domain o'f their territory, by a Gov-
ernor coming from abroad, and having perhaps no sympathy witk
them; nor, on the other hand, was a controlling power in the
hands of the local functionaries, consistent with the enlarged
views which that government ever entertained, but had never
energy or consistency to carry out, of peopling this country with
whatever enterprising population it could invite to it, and open-
ing that commerce with Oceanica and Asia, which is just now,,
under other auspices, spreading its pinions.
Under this view of the policy and intent of the law,, it is
thoroughly consistent, and its provisions well framed and adapted..
But let us look at the consequences of the construction now at-
tempted to be given to the functions of the deputation. If this
construction be correct, that body had by implication, and might
always have exercised, what was denied to it both by the policy
and letter of the law. If the concession made by the Governor
had no inherent validity—no vitality till the breath of life was
given it by a positive vote of the deputation—then the deputa-
tion, by mere inaction—by mere letting alone—was able to tie
3
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up the hands of the Governor, hold the lands vacant, cut off the
Supreme Government from its reserved right of final decision,
defeat the grant, defeat the views of the government, and defeat
the policy of the law. This would be a "masterly inactivity"
with a vengence. Powers may and will be sometimes implied
to carry the purposes of a law into effect, but not to defeat its
benevolent intentions, or enable inferior functionaries to circum-
vent the reserved powers of the superior.
But the 5th and 6th sections of the Regulations, besides a qual-
ified restriction on his acts, impose also a duty on the Governor,
viz : to obtain for the grant the approval of the deputation ; or,
failing that, to report the case to the Supreme Government for its.
final action. Now, I submit, that, in the absence of any proof to
the contrary, it must be presumed that the Governor performed
this duty, and did either obtain the approval of the deputation, or
that of the Supreme Government. And while I think that this is
a presumption which the law will per force give us the benefit of,
I think the long quiet possession under claim of title, with knowl-
edge and acquiescence of the government and the public, and all
the authorities, establishes, in point of fact, and amounts to a dec-
laration on the part of the government that the grant had been
completed.
Finally, we have shown that the usage and custom of the
country was that grants should be valid and subsistent from the
time of the Governor's concession, as is indeed expressly enacted
in section 22, of the Colonization Laws of 1823, and which has
never been repealed, except so far as it is inconsistent with sub-
sequent laws. The repeal of old laws is not effected by the
enactment of different provisions—the new provisions must be
contrary. 7 Mar. La. Rep., N. S. 434.
The usages and custom, however, is sufficient for us, for this
usage and custom is made positive law by the act of Congress
creating this Commission. Mitchell's case, 9 P. 734 ; Strother v.
Lucas, 12 P. 436. Smith v. U. S. 10 P. 329.
In Arredondo 6 P. 714, 715, the Supreme Court takes notice of,
and acts on the usage and custom of the province, though this is
not prescribed as a rule of decision for them, in the act of Con-
gress conferring the jurisdiction. Because, usage and custom,
say the Court, are a part of the law. That the proceeding would
be a mockery of justice if Congress had intended to exclude from
their consideration "usage and custom, which are the law of
every government."
Testimony of Hartnell, Rec. p. 67; Colonization Law of 1823,
§ 22, I IS hite's Recop. p 588 ; 7 Mart. La. R., N. S. 434 ; Mitchel's
Ca., 9 Pet. 734; 12 Pet. 436; 10 ib. 329; Arredondo's Ca., 6
Pet. 329.
To the objection that the claimant has not shown that he built
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a house on the land within a year after the date of his grant, I
reply,
'
1. That the law does not make any requisition of that kind, and
hence that the condition inserted in the grant is not obligatory.
Section 11, of the Regulations of 1828, provides that a certain
time shall be fixed by the Governor within which improvements
shall be made ; but this provision relates only to concessions
made to empresarios, for colonization.
2. That by the provision inserted in the grant, non-performance
which time the grant was good, and even then the grantee would
does not void the grant, only opens the land to denouncement, until
have had preference over any other who might desire it, and an
extension of time on proper showing, be given him to occupy it.
The first section of the Regulations of 1828, authorizes the Gov-
ernor to grant lands to persons who may solicit them " wi|h the
object of cultivating or inhabiting them ;" but no time is pre-
scribed within which this intention must be carried into effect.
If carried into effect, therefore, within a reasonable time—within
a time to show that the application was sincere—both the pur-
pose and the letter of the law will be answered. In the present
case the occupation did follow within a reasonable time, and in
time to show that the grant was solicited for the purpose contem-
plated in the law. Moreover, the disturbed state of the country,
and particularly of the neighborhood where the land was situated,
was a sufficient reason for not opening a new and exposed settle-
ment, during the years 1836 and 1837. Before the revolution was
completed, or order restored, the grantee had made his settle-
ment, built his house, and established his family, as is shown in
the testimony. This is as much diligence as any law can require.
3. Even if the grant had been void, for non-improvement of the
land within a year, the subsequent improvement, before advan-
tage was taken of the lapse or the land denounced, would cure
the fault and consolidate the title. * That is, if after the expira-
tion of the specified year, and before the improvement, the land
might be denounced, and granted to another; yet, if not de-
nounced, during that interval, it could not be after the improve-
ment or occupation. The condition in the grant does not contem-
plate the forfeiture of the land to the government ; only proposes
to make it voidable, in favor of another, more enterprising than
the grantee, should any other seek it in the prescribed mode.
The title does not, and does not profess, to reserve any power in
the government to recall the grant to itself. As this tract was
never denounced, the necessary inference is, that, according to
law and the usages and customs of the country, it was never
opened to denouncement. At all events, if ever denounceable, it
ceased to be so after the improvement was made or occupation
commenced. [Owing to an intimation from the court, prior to
the passing of these sheets through the press, that the case would
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probably be decided on a question of jurisdiction, and the merits
consequently not be considered, I have not thought it necessary
to enlarge on this point, or insert the collation, of authorities
which elucidate it. A proceeding before the Mexican authorities
in California, pertinent hereto, is inserted in Appendix B.]
4. Moreover, the real concession, the document by which title
passes—the decree, in which the Governor parts with his discre-
tion, and "accedes," in the language of the law, "to the request
of the petitioner"—does not contain the condition. The grant
there is unconditional, in fee simple. How could the Governor
afterward limit this title, by the insertion, in what is called the
" title in form," and which is merely ministerial, of a material
limitation like this?
I believe we may admit (without any violent depreciation of
ourselves,) that the successive Governors of California, who made
grants, and successive executives of the Central Government, who
knew and acquiesced in the manner of those grants, knew as much
of the intent and policy of their laws, and of what was proper
under them, as we, strangers to their language, unfamiliar with
their legal ideas, and with the facts, circumstances, and previous
laws, on which their statutes are founded, can possibly know.—
That what constitutes a transfer of property from one to another,
whether from individual to individual, or from a government to
its citizen, is the will to do so ; that in these grants, the will of
the Mexican nation, the policy of its laws, justice to its citizens,
expediency, the purpose she mainly wished to promote, namely,
settlement of the country, all combined to vest in the grantees,
the ownership—the property—of the land. That when Mexico
owed these lands to her citizens for their services ; when she
desired her citizens to have them, and own them, as a measure of
public "policy ; when she held them for no other purpose than for
distribution to her citizens, and invited them to come and reduce
them to ownership ; when she wished and intended to bestow
them on her citizens, and with that intent gave grants to them,
that she succeeded in her intent ; that her citizens did thus acquire
rights and property, which she took care to stipulate should be
respected and protected.
This is the honorable and true aspect in which to regard these
cases. The claimant here has rights—rights of property. I
care not whether his grant ever or not received the approval of
the assembly, and that were necessary, or the consent of the
Supreme Government, and that were necessary, 'he was within
the policy, intent and direct words of the law, and was entitled
to the grant, which he got, and was entitled to whatever approval
or consent was necessary to its completion; entitled to it bylaw
and according to the principles of equity, and the usages and
customs of the country, and would now be entitled to it, and
could claim and receive it, were the other government in exist-
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ence. But be comes here in a superior condition ; he comes here
with all terms, qualifications and restrictions of his grant cut off
and released, and his rights made definitely binding and absolute.
Admitting that the former government, in the exercise of an
arbitrary discretion, might have refused this approbation of his
grant to which the claimant was entitled ; the present govern-
ment reserved no such power ; it reserved no discretion in the
case ; no power over property, whether founded on incipient titles
or complete ones ; no power of approval or disapproval, refusal
or consent ; it reserved no power, whatever, over the case ; only
undertook a solemn duty and obligation ; a trust.
I am aware that it is said, that the powers and obligations of
the government are neither restricted nor increased by the stipu-
lations of the treaty in regard to private property ; that the laws
of nations would equally have protected it ; that it has also been
held that our government retained, under treaty stipulations
almost in the same words as those in the treaty of peace and
limits with Mexico, the same powers over imperfect titles that
the former government had or could have exercised.
With all deference, I must say, that should the points directly
arise and be discussed, it appears to me that neither of these
positions will be found strictly correct.
On the point first specified, the true doctrine seems to me to be
this : that the laws of nations protects private property in con-
quered or ceded countries ; but leaves the rights therein in the
same state as the conquest or cession finds them ; so that if one
happen to be found with an imperfect title, or, to use the words
of the Mexican law, with something wanting to its "definitive
validity," then the law of nations gives him no remedy, whatever
appeal he might have to the justice and magnanimity of his new
sovereign ; or at least in this case, the trust created is only an
implied trust. But the treaty does more than this; the treaty
undertakes that he shall be maintained and protected in his prop-
erty ; not left in a state of uncertainty, much less his undeter-
mined title be determined against him ; and this is an express
trust.
On the second point, the true doctrine I believe to be this : that
without any treaty stipulation, a province changing sovereigns,
comes to the new with all the powers over it that were possessed
by the old ; hence, whatever discretion remained in the hands of
the old government, over incipient grants, would come to and
might be exercised by the new. But by the treaty stipulation,
this power is foregone ; because, it being a well settled principle,
that inchoate, even incipient titles are property, and the treaty
undertaking to protect and maintain property, it releases necessa-
rily all rights of forfeiture or voidance, and places all kinds of
honest titles on an equal footing—of course making all perfect,
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since it equalizes by elevating, not reducing. This seems to me
to be fully recognized in the case of Chouteau's heirs, 9 P. 137.
I take the ground distinctly, then, that our title here stands
recognized, confirmed, completed, and forever valid and binding,
ipsofacto by the treaty.
That we had property according to the laws of Mexico.
Property according to local usage and custom.
Property according to the contemporaneous and uniform and
concurrent interpretation and construction of the law, running
through nearly twenty years, and continually acquiesced in by the
federal government.
Property recognized by six successive governments of Califor-
nia ; by the public voice ; by all inferior authorities ; by many
declarations and admissions of the government.
Property for which we paid a valuable consideration ; the con-
sideration of settlement and occupation ; all the consideration
which the government that gave it, wished or required.
Property fully separated from the public domain, and to re-
attach which no lawful power exists.
Property in which we are entitled to be maintained and pro-
tected, by all the power of the federal government.
Property in which all the presumptions of law argue that there
is no imperfection ; but in which, if there be defects or imperfec-
tions, we have a right to have them cured and a treaty guaranty
that they shall be cured.
Property inviolate by the laws of the social compact, and by
the positive enactments of the constitution and the treaty.
In the case of Chouteau's heirs, 9 P. 137, (a Missouri case) the
claim was founded on an order of survey and possession, made
by thg Lieutenant Governor, and concluding as follows : " and af-
terwards the applicant will have to solicit the formal title of con-
cession, of the Intendant General of these provinces, to whom
belongs by order of his Majesty, the disposing and conceding of
every kind of vacant lands of the royal domain." The claim was
surveyed about fourteen months after the date of the order, and
accompanied with about three years possession.
The Court held, that this order of the Lieutenant Governor, was
a foundation of title, and according to the acts of Congress, and
the general understanding and usage of Louisiana and Missouri,
capable of being perfected into a complete title."
"It is property, (say the Court,) capable of being alienated, of
being subjected to debts, and is as such to be held sacred and invi-
olate as other property"
The claim was declared valid. Another case of the same par-
ties, 9 P. 147, founded on a like order of survey, made 8 January,
1798, by the Lieutenant Governor, and concluded in like manner,
except referring the claimant for his title to the Governor General.
This warrant was plainly in violation of the 9th article of the
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Regulations of O'Reilly, exceeding largely in quantity the maxi-
mum of those Regulations. The Court held that that article was
only applicable to a grazing country, and, consequently, that if
the regulations had been extended to Upper Louisiana, it was
probable they were extended with modifications, at least of the 9th
article."
Thus where the Court has been obliged to resort to probabilities,
they invented probabilities to sustain a good faith claim, and main-
tain the national obligation. They invented probabilities in behalf
of justice and honor ; for this was not a probability of fact, though
it was of law.
In this case the order of survey was not acted on by the claim-
ant till December, 1803, more than five years after its date ; but
the Court did not allow the objection to prevail. In this case,
the Court lays much stress upon the Governor's own representa-
tion of his powers, and also upon the fact that, neither the Gov-
ernor nor Intendant General had ever refused to perfect an incom-
plete title granted by a governor or sub-delegate ; and we ask
here like credit to be given to the Governor's declarations of his
powers, and to the fact, that, as far as we know, no grant of a
California Governor has ever been annulled.
Nearly all the Missouri claims were founded on the same kind
of inceptive title, as those already named, provisional on their face,
and directing the grantee to apply either to the governor general,
(who was first invested with the granting power) or to the inten-
dant general, (who succeeded him) at New Orleans, for his title,
for the reason that it belonged alone to those officers to concede
lands.
These instruments of the Missouri claimants were not grants,
and did not profess to be ; they were permits at will, and imposed
a duty on the party receiving them to apply to the granting offi-
cer, before he could receive a concession. Now, even supposing
the view urged for the United States in relation to titles here and
the character of the approbatory function of the Deputation, to be
correct, yet the difference is infinitely in favor of the unconfirmed
grants here.
1. The Governor here was the granting officer, and made his
patent in due form of grant, dedi et concessi, which the Lieuten-
ant Governor at St. Louis, was not, and did not.
2. The supposed necessary conformation here was the governor's
to obtain ; there all the subsequent steps were the donee's and his
laches if they were not performed.
3. In the Missouri cases, if the governor general or intendant
general should have refused the confirmation, the grant would
fall ; whereas, in California the authority whose province it was
to complete the grant, could not defeat it.
4. The California patents are grants, wherein the granting offi-
cer parts with all his discretion in the matter ; the Missouri per-
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mits were not grants ; they were only informants or reports to the
granting officer in favor of grants.
In regard to what courts will presume in support of undisputed
occupations, and the powers of officers who assume to grant : In
the case of Pickering vs. Lord Stanford, in Vesey, jr., 583, the
High Court of Chancery held that "every presumption that
can fairly be made shall be made against a stale demand."
" At law, in suits where the title can be made good only by mat-
ter of record, as letters patent, or even where a private act of
Parliament was necessary, the presumption holds, though neither
of those instruments, which ought to be of record, can be found."
Now the records of the Privy Seal, where the records of the
King's patents ought to be found, and the rolls of Parliament,
where the private acts of Parliament ought to be found, cannot
be less complete, or less easy of search, than the old archives of
the Territorial Deputation and Departmental Assembly of Cali-
fornia; kept in the first instance in loose sheets, or unbound blot-
ters ; exposed in twelve years to half a dozen civil revolutions
;
shipped from Monterey to Los Angeles, from Los Angeles to
Monterey ; thence to Sonora ; thence to Benicia ; and finally to
San Francisco ; and during nearly all the intervals of these mi-
grations, open to whoever chose, and liable to depredation, de-
struction and loss. To presume a patent from British Crown, or
an act of Parliament, where no record of them can be found, is a
violent presumption ; a presumption of law, to maintain the
equity of ancient appropriation ; not a presumption of fact, nor
hardly warranted in fact. To presume a private act of the De-
putation or Assembly of California, or of one of its Governor's, is
not a violent but a natural presumption, and especially in a case
like this, where we know the proceeding was begun, and required
but a single step to complete it ; and where the books in which
it ought to be recorded, are not to be found.
In the case of Bealey vs. Shaw, 6 East. 215, Lord Ellenborough,
says, twenty years exclusive enjoyment (of water) affords a con-
clusive presumption of a right derived from grant or act of Parlia-
ment ; and " less than twenty years may or may not according to
circumstances." And the Supreme Court have held (Ricard vs\
Williams, 7 Wh. 59, end in other cases) that presumptions of this
class apply to corporeal as well as to incorporeal hereditaments.
True, we do not come in this case, with the twenty years occu-
pation which, according to Lord Ellenborough, would afford a
" conclusive presumption ;" hut that rule is only where the case
stands on presumption alone, and even then a shorter time will
have the same effect, if other circumstances (as in this case all
circumstances do) conduce. The rule holds in all cases where
the occupation may have had a legal beginning ; how much more
where we have shown that it had, in fact, a legal beginning, and
was in all particulars conformable to the laws and policy of the
country.
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In the case of the United States vs. Clarke, 8 P. 462, the Su-
preme Court presume the rightfulness and binding force of grants
of the kind under their consideration, from the power of making
them having been exercised since the year 1813; and that the
King (supposed to be informed of the acts of his officers) had not
disapproved of it. The presumption there rested therefore on a
practice of five or six years, since it dates only from 1813, and
the treaty was formed in February, 1819. Here, we claim a
practice reaching back to the year 1773, since which time the
Governors of California have made such grants, with the knowl-
edge and assent of those above them, and respected by those be-
neath : from 1773 to 1846—forty years under the Spanish Govern-
ment, twenty-three years under the Mexican. Leaving out, how-
ever, all the time prior to the introduction of the law of 1824, as
carried into effect by the Regulations of 1828, we have still a
period of eighteen years; or dating from the year 1833, when the
administration of Governor Figueroa commenced, we have a
period of thirteen years of uninterrupted exercise of this power,
tty seven successive Governors of California, with the full knowl-
edge of the Supreme Government, and without a syllable of dis-
approbation.
In the case last quoted, (Clarke's case, 8 Peters,) the grant re-
cited a particular royal order as the authority on which it was
made, and which order it was admitted did not authorize the
grant. The Court held that the recital of the order was an im-
material allegation, and did not affect the instrument ; that it
"would be presumed that the Governor had acted within the
limits of his authority, though that authority was not shown."
The same doctrine is held, in a multitude of other cases ; and in
Strother vs. Lucas. 12 P. 438, is declared to be "too deeply
founded in law and reason ever to be successfully assailed."
But, apart from all these presumptions of law, the principles of
which, applied to the circumstances of this case, appear to me to
be conclusive, I hold that the claim before the Board has been
absolutely and unconditionally ratified and confirmed by the
Mexican government, in a decree of its authorized agent, Gov-
ernor Micheltorena. This decree, which was a public act, was
issued on the 29th March, 1843. It exists in the archives in Mss.,
and is published, with the exception of the preamble, in the Sen-
ate editions of the several reports that have been made to the
Government on Land Titles in this State. The preamble to this
decree, (from which extracts, together with the instructions on
which it is founded, are given in the Appendix,) asserts that it is
made in pursuance of ample faculties given by the Supreme
Government. It relates especially to the lands which had been
granted subsequent to the secularization laws of Mexico, out of
the tracts previously occupied by the Missions, and declares in
regard to such grants that " policy renders irrevocable what has
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been already done ;" and concludes with an assurance of protec-
tion to the Missions, and to private property, " securing to the
owners the possession and preservation of the property they now
hold," but stipulating not to make any new grants (of Mission
lands) " without consultation with the priests," etc.
Micheltorena came into California on a mission of peace. After
the revolution of 1836, and the subsequent erection of California
into a " free and independent State," though this independent po-
sition was not long maintained, little more than a nominal recon-
ciliation took place ; and the war with Texas, the civil commo-
tions, and frequent successions of revolutionary governments in
Mexico, prevented the Central Government from giving proper
attention to this remote Territory. When the prevailing contests
in Mexico were cut short by the plan of Tacubaya, and the elec-
tion of Santa Anna as Dictator, an era of political regeneration
was announced, and Santa Anna, in pursuance of the extraordi-
nary faculties given by the 7th article of said Plan,* hastened to
consolidate his powers by the despatch into the different depart-
ments,! °f trusty agents attached to his cause, with the amplest
faculties to redress grievances and remove subjects of complaints.
In pursuance of this policy, Governor Micheltorena was sent to
the department of the Californias, to represent the powers of the
Federal Executive, who represented and wielded the powers of
the nation. He was sent to fulfil the neglected duties of the Su-
preme Government ; to restore quiet ; to conciliate the inhabi-
tants ; to develope the resources of the country ; to hasten its
settlement, and improve its commerce. All these are prescribed
in the general instructions given him, with ample powers to
carry them out. These instructions not having been heretofore
printed, as far as I am aware, I have inserted them, together with
a translation, (both copies official,) in an appendix hereto. It
will be perceived that they are written in the most conciliatory
spirit, and an earnest desire shown in them to have every cause
of anxiety or complaint existing in California toward the Supreme
Government, removed or rectified, and all public interests and de-
sires attended to. It was pursuant to these instructions, and under
the complete power which they conferred, that the decree of
*The Bases of Government established at Tacubaya, 28th September, 1841, by a
reunion of the military under Santa Anna, and ratified 6th October, 1841, by a con-
vention between the contending parties under Bustamente and Santa Anna respec-
tively, and contained in the first volume of the Observador Judicial, page 7. The
7 th article is as follows
:
"Las facultades del ejeeutivo provisional son todas las necesarias para la organi-
zacion de todos los ramos de la administracion publica." (The powers of the pro-
visional executive are all those necessary for the organization of all branches of the
public administration.
f The Mexican federation was broken up in the year 1835, and the States reduced
and territories erected, into "Departments." The federative system (with the con-
stitution of 1824,) was restored in 1846—7.j
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Micheltorena (as we are informed in its preamble) was made. The
decree, though intended mainly for those cases where lands formerly
pertinent to the Missions had been granted subsequent to the se-
cularization laws, is yet general in its character, and may well
be construed to a general intent. But, in the present case, we
come direct!}' within its provisions. The grant of Cruz Cervan-
tes was one of those covered by its immediate intent. It had
been pertinent to a Mission ; under the secularization laws it
had been granted ; and whatever assent or approval it needed
to its completion, it now received from the highest granting
power, and was thus made " irrevocable."
Our attention cannot fail to be struck by the fact, that neither
in the instructions to Micheltorena, enumerating the grievances
he is to correct, and the means of conciliation he is to employ,
though it is evident they intended to cover every disquieting cause
in the department, nor in the decree of Micheltorena, intended
for the resolution of disturbing questions, and the quieting of pri-
vate rights, is a word said of the question of the " ten leagues."
Does not this fact put the matter at rest, as far as any acts of
those high functionaries can give an authoritative intepretation
to the law ? Do not these instruments, at all events, convey the
federal approbation and consent, as fully as any interpretation of
the law can require, to rights of property up to that time ac-
quired?
I ask attention to this decree of Micheltorena ; and I claim it
to be an absolute confirmation, with the approval of the Federal
Executive, of this claim.
I take the ground, also, that our title, even if imperfect, and
even if subject to be vacated and resumed by the former govern-
ment, stands confirmed and absolute ipso facto by the treaty.
In the case of Simms vs. Irvine, 3 Dallas 425, Douglass acquired
a right under the British government to five thousand acres of land
for services in the French war. He assigned to Simms, who after-
wards obtained a warrant from the State of Virginia, and located
it on Montour's island, in the Ohio river. In determining the
boundaries between the States of Virginia and Pennsylvania, this
island went to Pennsylvania. Under Pennsylvania, Simms ob-
tained a survey according to his warrant, but did not obtain a
patent. Irvine claimed under a statute of Pennsylvania, author-
izing him to make a pre-emption on the island, and proceedings
under it. The court held (opinion by Chief Justice Ellsworth)
that Simms, by his warrant from Virginia, and location of it
it on the island, acquired a complete equitable title, and needed
only a patent for a complete legal title ; that a confirmation of
this equitable title, as complete as a patent could have been, was
conferred in the compact between Virginia and Pennsylvania,
" reserving and confirming " rights previously acquired under Vir-
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ginia; that the terms of the compact must be expounded favor-
ably for those rights, so that titles before substantially good,
should not, after a change of jurisdiction, be defeated or ques-
tioned for formal defects.
The terms of the compact between Virginia and Pennsylvania
were not nearly so conclusive as the guaranty of the ninth article
of our treaty with Mexico. "Reserving and confirming" rights
might very well be construed to mean reserving and confirming
them in the State in which they were found ; but the stipulation
to " maintain and protect property " is much more comprehensive,
and imposes much larger obligations.
In the case of Fairfax vs. Hunter, 7 Cranch 703, Denny Fairfax,
an alien enemy, was devisee of Lord Fairfax of the property called
the Northern Neck of Virginia ; and in the year 1789 the State of
Virginia patented a portion of the lands to Thomas Hunter. The
suit was brought to eject Hunter.
The court held, that though Denny Fairfax could not have
taken the land by descent, i. e. by operation of law, he took it
properly by devise, i. e. by act of the party j but that he took it
not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of the State ; that from
the time of the death of Lord Fairfax in 1781, down to the treaty
of 1794, the State had, consequently, a right of entry into the
lands, and by proper proceeding by inquest of office, to consum-
mate their title. But that having omitted, this proceeding,
whether by mistake or design, prior to the treaty of 1794, the
right of the State was cut off by the treaty ; that the possession
and seisin of the plaintiff" continued up to and after the treaty of
1794, "ivhich (i. e. the treaty) being the supreme law confirmed
this title to him."
The clause of the treaty of 1794, (article 9) quoted in this case,
is, that " it is- agreed that British subjects who now hold lands in
the Territories of the United States, and American citizens who
now hold lands in the dominions of his majesLy, shall continue
to hold them according to the nature and tenure of their respective
estates ;" language that might without violence have been inter-
preted that Denny Fairfax having before the treaty, held this
estate in trust for the Commonwealth, and liable to entry by an
inquest of office, continued so to hold it. But the Court took
cognizance of the treaty, according to its intent, and held that it
confirmed the title of Fairfax, and cut off the right of forfeiture
in the State.
So we contend, under the far more comprehensive and obliga-
tory terms of the treaty with Mexico, that by the treaty our title
here is confirmed, and whatever right of forfeiture or avoidance
may have been in the State before the treaty, has (in the language
of the Court) " by the operation of the treaty, become ineffectual
and void."
In the case Marlett vs. Silk, 12 P. 20, again, plaintiff claimed
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under a right derived from the State of Virginia ; defendant un=
der a title from the State of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff entered on
the land (in Western Virginia) in 1.772, contrary to lav/, and con-
sequently as a trespasser ; but in 1779, the Legislature of Virginia
recognised settlement rights in the plaintiff and others in like
circumstances, and authorized them to enter a certain number
of acres each. The defendant claimed under a warrant from
Pennsylvania, taken out in 1773, and surveyed in 1778. After-
ward by the settlement of limits between the two States, the land
came under the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania, and, by the compact,
rights acquired under the States respectively, were to be respect-
ed by the other according to priority. The Court held, that the
case was, so to speak, an international one, between two States,
and the rule of decision to be the compact ; that Virginia by the
act of 1779, had recognised the right of plaintiff as beginning in
1772, when he made his settlement ; that that right, however
inchoate and shallow, was protected by the compact ; and the
case was so decided.
The 11th section of the act of 1851, prescribes as rules of de-
cision, the treaty, the laws of nations, the laws, usages and cus-
toms of the country, the principles of equity, and the decisions of
the Supreme Court.
The treaty is first and supreme ; and the others, as it seems to
me, can only be considered as prescribed in subordination to that
higher law, and to be invoked only where they come in aid of it,
The inferior cannot override the superior ; no law or rule of deci-
sion can override the treaty ; and we appeal to the treaty, which
guarantees the protection of our property, as the " rule ofdecision ;"
by the "operation of which" all rights of forfeiture (if any before
existed) are "rendered ineffectual and void ;" and our title " con-
firmed, as effectually as any patent could do it."



APPENDIX.
A.
Extracts from the Mexican pamphlet entitled "Coleccion de los Trabajos
Principales en que se ha ocvpado la Junta nombrada para meditar y
proponer cl Supremo Gobierno los medios necesarios para promover el
progreso de la cultura y civilizacion de los territorios de la Jltta y la Eaja
California: anno de 1827." (Collection of the Principal Labors in
which has been occupied the Junta appointed to consider and propose to
the Supreme Government the measures necessary to promote the progress
of cultivation and civilization in the territories of Upper and Lower
California.)
Dietamen de la Junta, #c, sobre las Tnstrucciones del gefe superior politico
de estos territorios. (Report of the Junta on the Instructions to the su-
perior political chief of those territories.)
Extracts.
"All the chapters [of the Instructions] which direct themselves to prevent the interference
of the missionaries in temporal affairs of the missions, the bad treatment they give to the
neophytes, the influence which this has to prevent the gentiles from being reduced, and
the opposition of the said monks to the formation of haciendas, rural estates, and the dis-
tribution of lands, need, in the opinion of the junca, the greatest explicitness."
The chapters of the instructions relating to the distribution of lands has given occasion
to the junta for various reflections which ought not to be passed over in silence. The
J4;h title of said Spanish regulation [Regulation of 1731, for the government of the Cali-
fornias, published in Arnlluga for 1828, and in Jones's Report, pp. 25, 50] explains clearly
the design of promoting the population, not only by means of a proportionate distribution
of lands, but by the conditions of it, and the other aids which the same regulations granted
to make them profitable. All that has been executed in pursuance of this ought to appear
in the book of population that the 17th article provides for. Our law of colonization is, in
itself, directed to the invitation of foreigners, although it declares explicitly the preferences
all Mexican citizens should have. It has for its object the lands of the nation, which, not
being private property, nor appertaining to any corporation or town, may be colonized.
Besides, it declares that lands cannot be colonized which are comprehended between the
twenty boundary leagues with any foreign nation, nor ten litoral leagues, without the pre-
vious approbation of the supreme general executive power. They provide, also, with
great prudence, that the State Congresses should make, with the greatest brevity, the
rules of colonization of their respective limits, conforming in all to the constitutive act,
general constitution, and rules established in the law itself; though in this respect it
charges that, without prejudging the objects of the law, the government shall take such
measures of precaution as they judge necessary for the security of the federation, with
respect to the foreigners who shall come to colonize.
Although, then, the same law directs that the government, conformably to the principles
established in it, shall proceed to the colonization of the Territories of the Republic, it ap-
pears that to put it in execution in whatever of the Territories, there ought to precede, and
it is absolutely necessary there should precede, some regulation formed with a knowledge
of the particular circumstances of each Territory, which shall determine the conditions
and obligations on which the lands shall be distributed, so that by these means the desired
end of settlement and cultivation may be obtained, and so that the introduction of the colo-
nies shall not be burdensome to the natives. In California there are very especial circum-
stances which make this regulation more necessary, namely, on account of the existence
of a prior one, [i. e. the Reglamento-of 1781, above mentioned,] whose effects will be perpe-
tuated if some provision do not alter them, and make uniform the new distribution; also,
that in both Californias, the width of the land occupied by the Mexican Republic is very
unequal, stretching from nine to ten leagues in Upper California, which is the land held as-
most fertile, beautiful, and picturesque, unless it be at one of the upper missions, where it
may extend to fifteen leagues ; under which supposition, there is no room there for foreign
colonization; and moreover in those interior parts of Lower California, in which there
might be room, it is necessary to provide against the spirit of invasion upon the lands oc-
cupied by the native tribes, since the inquietude caused by dislodging them from their
lands would bring no advantage either to the said Indians or to the Republic, as social com-
munication and friendship ought to be directly desired; and because it ought not to be
forgotten, that occupation having been made'of all the land, since the existing missions
have, in forming themselves, taken possession before the conversion and reduction of the
gentiles, according to the rigorous law of discoveries, and planted at the same time the
cross and the standard ; that regularly they have chosen for the missions the rancherias
themselves of the gentiles, or those places which they, as acquainted with and owners of
the land, had destined for the greater convenience and vicinity to the rivers or springs for
their gatherings and campings ; that although the California gentiles have not known the
right of the division of landed property, it cannot, therefore, be denied that they have it in
the soil where they were born, according to the principles of the law of nations, it being
the first and inexcusable step toward their civilization, to cause them to know and recom-
mend to them how appreciable is that right ; and in this view, the said ancient Christian
Indians, neophytes and catechumens, ought to be considered with a right of preference in
the distribution, which ought to be arranged between them and the settlers, in the propor-
tion which their circumstances respectively admit, since, for the catechumens, and strictly
neophytes, it may be necessary that they shall be directed in the cultivation, or that they re-
main in community; and lastly, because the distribution of estates being so interesting
a work, and any mistake, once made, is not easily repaired, care ought to be taken in each
instance in giving to those who have the disposition and necessary means for cultivating
it; for there never will be a society of cultivators, supposing each man who wishes land
has nothing to do but to come and ask it, and scratch it over, in order that it shall at once
produce immediately and daily what is necessary for the subsistence of themselves and
family.
The junta think, therefore, that the instructions which are given to the new chief on this
point ought to be reduced to this: that he infirm himself of what has been done in pursu-
ance of the said provisions in the Spanish regulations; in what state he finds the distribution
of lands; which are those occupied by the missions; if there be any vacant lands, and
their quality and extent; what number of persons of the settlers or Indinns have the ca-
pacity of cultivating for themselves; and in case there are some of them who undoubtedly
have it, that they provide that of the common lands of the respective missions to which
they are attached, and taking care that there remain enough for the maintenance of the
neophytes and catechumens; they shall assign to them that which appears proportionate
for their culivation; with the reservation of rendering an account to the supreme govern-
ment for its approbation; and saving the provisions of the regulations whii h shall be
formed to prescribe the conditions and obligations to which the divisions of lands shall be
subject.
The chapters of the instructions which treat of the care and vigilance which the chief of
the Californias ought to take to hinder foreign introductions, are of the greatest import-
ance. The last [Spanish] governor of Upper California, who is vocal (speaker) of this
junta, relates that he sent to the Spanish viceroyalty an account of the reclamations he
made upon the Russian establishment in the port of Bodega; and thfse reports may be
found in the archives of the secretary of the said viceroyalty, or among the papers which
have been drawn from them. Moreover, in the opinion of the junta, the chapters with
which the new chief is charged need some explicitness in the respect that he infirm himself
whether the Anglo-Americans have descended the river Columbia, if they observe reli-
giously the treaty of limits of the 22d of February, of 1819, and that he impress on the in-
habitants ofthe Californias and the colonists that the dividing line shall not pass the 42°.
Mexico, 3 January, 1825.
Ill
"Plan op Foreign Colonization.—[Extracts.'}
"Regulation to which colonization should be subjected, in fulfilment of the
law of the 18/A August, of 1824.
"Art. 1. In the lands of Upper California, shall be distinguished, for the purposes of
this regulation, the part reduced and actually occupied by the republic, and that which is
possessed, occupied, or inhabited by the gentile natives.
"2. The lands actually occupied by the missions shall be reckoned as comprehended in
the provision of the article 2d, of the law of colonization of the 18th of August, of 1624,
and shall be considered as property of the reductions of the neophytes, catechumens, and
Mexicain settlers, and insusceptible of other distribution than among themselves.
"3- For the admission of the colonization of foreigners in the part occupied by the re-
public, the previous approbation of the supreme executive general power will be necessary;
it being considered that there is not capacity in the land which remains free, under the pro-
visions of the foregoing articles, to distribute any to foreigners in the littoral and limitrofal
distances, which article 4th of the said law of colonization mentions, and which should be
rigorously observed in the territories of both Californias, as well with respect to its exte-
rior coasts as its interior ones, and in the limitrofal points with the tribes or nations of
native gentiles.
"4. The supreme executive general power shall only give its approbation to the distri-
bution to foreigners of lands which are absolutely known to be vacant in the part occupied
by the republic, when the said foreigners may be capitalists or operative agriculturists.
"7. The right any foreigner may have to denounce lands which are recognised as ab-
solutely vacant in the part occupied by the republic, shall be limited to the boundaries
designated in the articles 3 and 4; and, in this case, it shall commence to reckon from the
day in which, conformably to the agreement in the article 5, he is established in that
settlement; besides, submitting himself to the measures and forms established by law.
''8. The contracts that foreigners may propose for one or more new settlements shall
be regulated to the principles established in the foregoing articles, and to that which is pro-
vided with respect to the Mexicain settlers.
"28. No foreigner or private person shall be able to make an entrance, acquisition of
territorial property, nor establish any commerce with the gentiles, without previous per-
mission of the supreme government; which shall grant it, according as the general Con-
gress shall determine, in use of faculty 11, which is conceded in article 50, of the fede-
ral constitution, ar.d with a preceding examination of the advantage which may result
from it, as well to the native gentiles as to the public, holding to be still in force in this
respect, law 4, tit. 1°, lib. 4°, of the municipal laws.
•'Mexico, April 21, 1825."
Report accompanying a plan for Domestic Colonization.
[Extracts. ]
"Most excellent Sir-
"The junta, desirous of fulfilling the offer which it made to your excellency when the
project of regulations for colonizing foreigners in California was passed into your hands,
has formed that which now accompanies for Mexican colonization or population of the
said territories.
"The junta, accommodating itself to the slight notices which it has been able to collect of
those territories, have proposed in the regulation— First, that the national colonization and
population be efficiently aided in that peninsula as the means most proper and apt for the
republic to preserve that most important point, and enjoy the incalculable advantages
which it is capable of affording. Second, that the new settlements shall be established
without prejudice to the catechumen-neophytes, ancient Christians, and settlers existing in
that county ; and the third, that this increase of population shall facilitate by good treat-
ment, communication, commerce, and amicable relations the reduction of the numerous
gentiles, and their incorporation in the territories which the Mejicain Republic occu-
pies
"The junta has extended the calculation of the said estimates to a hundred families
transferable to Upper California, by the observations which they made in the 2d article of
the acta diversa, also copied from 2d of the present month; and although there is not all the
.necessary knowledge of the disposable lands in that territory according to the provisions
of the projected regulations, it is not doubted that there is room for a hundred families,
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accommodating them with the discretion that the same regulation provides in reference to
the climate in the lands nearest San Francisco, Monterey, Canal de St. Barbara, and San
Diego.
Regulationfor the colonizationfor families of the Federal States of Mex-
ico, in the territories of California.
[Note.—The first and second articles are the same as those of the foregoing plan of
domestic colonization.]
Art. 3. In the lands actually occupied by the missions, all that is absolutely necessary
shall be separated for the occupation and commodious subsistence of the catechumens and
neophytes, who are to be maintained in common, having consideration to the number
of gentiles who may be added to the missions.
4. In the lands remaining, shall be distributed in preference to all other persons, to the
native Indian Christians who may be rtady for self-government, the land they are consid-
ered capable of cultivating.
_
5. To those natives shall be given for their subsistence, and for its cultivation, the same
aids proposed for a certain number of settlers and Mexican colonists.
6. To the natives who prefer to exercise themselves in other offices and works than
the cultivation of the land, aid shall be given, also land for a house-lot the same as assigned
for a like number of Mexican settlers of that class.
7. To the individuals and families who are settlers in the pueblos and missions of the
territories of the Californias, the lands which have been given to them according to the
regulation of the 1st June, of 1779, which prevails in that peninsula. [The regulation here
referred to is that of 1781 before referred to; it was prepared in 1779, and approved by
Royal decree of J 781.]
8. To those to whom no division at all has been made, and who lack other territorial pro-
perty, shall be distributed the land they are considered capable of cultivating.
1U. In the remaining lands there shall be made to the Mejicain citizens, who shall
be removed to the California territory, with preference over all foreign colonists, a distri-
bution conformable to the provi.-ions of the following articles.
11. To promote the Mejicain population in California there shall be conceded to a
certain number of settlers of Mexican colonies the following aids. [The aids here speci-
fied, consisting of money, agricultural implements, &c, are omitted.]
16. When the settlers who have removed to California do not designate the mission or
town in which they wish to establish themselves, care will be taken to distribute them in
climates, and temperatures analogous to those of their birth.
17. Any Mfjicain, though not domiciliated in the territory of this republic, can, by
himself, or forming a company with Mf-jicains, contract for the establishment of one or
more new settlements in vacant lands ; to do which he shall present his new project of
settlement to the political chief of the territory in whose district the land is in which he
wishes to establish it. The respective political chief shall examine the project presented,
and, finding it to conform to the laws in force, or rectifying it according to them, shall
approve of it, and have it carried into effect, giving notice to the government for its appro-
bation.
18. The political chiefs of the territories can admit no contract whatever for a new set-
tlement, unless the contractor bind himself to present in the character of settlers for each,
one at least twelve families, that is, twelve married free men. The respeciive political
chief shall signify to the contractor a fixed time in which he shall present in the new set-
tlement the number of families for whom he has contracted, under penalty of losing, in
proportion, the rights and privileges offered in his favor in the contract, and this to be
null.
21. Shall be admitted with the greatest frankness compatible with the dispositions of
the laws in force, the contracts that may be proposed for the settlement of the ulands
adjacent to the peninsula of California.
24. The right to denounce lands in the Californias shall commence to be reckoned to
the Mejicain citizen from the day, that conformably to provision in art. 17, he remains dom-
iciliated in those territories, subjecting himself in other respects to the measures and forms
established by law.
B.
Proceedings in the case op Garcia vs. Bone.
Most Excellent Senor Governor: Francisco Garcia, native of this department, and
resident of ihe jurisdiction of the Pueblo of San Jose, before Y. E., in the proper form of
law, says, that in 1842, needing a tract for the increase of the stock he possesses, he con-
cluded the treaty shown in the document which duly is sent herewith to Y. E., by which
he purchased from Thomas Bone the place named "Can da de San Felipe y las Animas,"
under the supposition that he had acquired in it the leiial right, and that he was able to
sell it; but knowing now by informed persons that Bone, when he alienated the tract to
•which 1 refer, was not master of it, because in three years which passed he had not built,
nor cultivated, and that he was in no manner authorized to sell it : I have come to suppli-
cate Y. E. to exonerate me from the obligation under which I still find myself by reason of
the before cited contract, because 1 have not finished paying what 1 offered to Bone, for the
right with which mistakenly I considered he had in the said land. Likewise denouncing
this in all form as vacant in respect of Bone, and in consideration that 1 have established,
in it some works, and of the outlay which 1 have unjusily made in favor of Bone, I have
some merits that the wise justice of Y. E. will concede to me in property the tract in the
same extent which the title I have in my power designates, and which also 1 respectfully
transmit: Wherefore, I implore Y. E. to deign to take into consideration both petitions,
of which favor I shall live grateful, swearing what is necessary, &c. Monterey, Au-
gust 1, 1844.
(Signed) FRANCISCO GARCIA.
Monterey, Jlugust 1, 1844.
Let the secretary of the despatch report, taking other (reports) if he shall need them.
M.CHELTORE,NA.
Most Excellent Senor Governor: I do not find any objection why the interested
party sh< u d not occupy as his own the tract named San Feli|>i , by the ri**ht which Don
Tomas Bone ceded to him; but as to exonerating him from the payment in which,
the resident Francisco Garcia purchased, I believe it belongs to the superior tribunal to
resolve, there having been executed a writing resp> cting the sale of the tract to which 1 refer.
The superior judgment of Y. E. will be that, which is most proper.
Date the same.
MANUEL JIMENO.
Monterey, Jlugust 1, 1844.
Conformably in all respects with the preceding report, I declare fur his own the tract to
the petitioner; and as to the second part, in respect to the payment of that contracted before
the judjje, the title not having the condition, he could not transfer or sell it, &c, let it be
directed to the superior tribunal for its resolution.
M1CHELTORENA.
Superior Tribunal of Justice.
Let the Seiior Judge of the Pueblo of San Jose report whether from the 7th of Ausrust,
1839, in which by superior title was conceded the tract known by the name of the Canada
de las Animas, and San Felipe, to Don Tomas Bone.it has bepn without enclosure, house,
planting, or cultivation up to the 7th of October, 1842, when he transferred it by sale to
Don Francisco Garcia. Monterey, August 2, 1844.
On account of the sickness of the Senor President,
(Signed) JOSE MARIA CASTANARES.
In fulfilment of the foregoing superior decree, I have to say that the tract conceded to
Don Tomas Bone has never had improvement of house, cattle-pen, or enclosure, until in
the month of December, of the past year, Don Francisco Garcia made a cattle-pen, which
exists at present, with which I believe I have given due fulfilment. Pueblo of San Jose,
August 8, 1844.
(Signed) ANTONIO MARIA PICO.
VI
Monterey, September 12, 1844.
As the contract made between Francisco Garcia and Tomas Bone appears perfected by
the delivery which the first made to the second of a part of the value in which he pur-
chased, and the occupation of the tract by him, Bone not having been reconvened for the
sale which he made, the petitioner cannot be exonerated of the payment; and of that which
he owes to Bone, although it is true that he in three years did not occupy the tract, and
therefore, according to the title which he had, lost his ri^ht; so likewise it is, that both
contracting parties having consented in the delivery and receipt without there having
been interposed any denouncer of the land, the seller made use of that which with just title
he had acquired, and in such view Garcia is obligated to pay Bone.
Pass this to the Judge of San Jose that he may notify both parties, returning all to him
who petitions.
(Signed) MALARIN.
c.
Instructions and Powers of Micheltorena.
Instructions.*
Con fecha 11 de Febrero de 1842, me
dice el E. S. Mmistro de la Guerra y Ma-
rina lo que copio : "E. S. Deseando el E. S.
Presidente provisional deque en el Departa-
mento de Galifornias se promuevan todos
los recursos que tiene para prosperar y
ponerse en defenza y en el estado de felici-
<dad al que aun la misma naturaltza le invita;
lenietido en consideracion los sucesos que
ha habido en el pais y que por la distancia
no ha podido evitarlos el Gobierno Nacional
;
la situacion en que V. E. va aencontrarse y
las medidas que tendra que adoptar, cuyas
consultas no surtiran efecto, si agvardan el
tiempo necesario para su resolucion ; que
hay asuntos en los que el mas pequeno re-
tardo no proporcionael remedio ; y confiado
en que V. E. no absuaia del poder y que el
que se le concede lo empleara en bien del
servicio y de todos los habitantes del intere-
sante y feraz Departamento que el Gobierno
Supremo ha puesto a su cargo y responsibi-
lidad, se ha servido conceder a V. E. ade-
mas de las atribuciones que le demarcan las
leyes y ordenanzas vigentes, como Gober-
nador, Comandante general e Inspector, to-
dis las facultades que puede delegarle el
Gobierno Supremo para que en uso de el-
las, remueva a los empleados civiles y mili-
tares dependientes de el, que no correspon-
dan a sus deberes y a la confianza del mismo
Supremo Gobierno, reemplazandolos con
ciudadanos dignos que entraran al ejercicio
de sus destinos, sin perjuicio de que V. E.
* I have received this copy through the courtesy
•of Captain Hallcck. Il is taken from a copy com-
municated by Micheltorena to Don Pablo de la
Guerra, then Administrator of Customs at Monte-
rey, and was subsequently proved in a case before
the commission.
Translation^
Under date of the 11th February, 1842,
the Minister of War says what follows :
"Most Excellent Sir: His Excellency, the
President ad interim, being desirous that the
Department of California should take ad-
vantage of all the resources which it pos-
sesses for its prosperity, for placing itself in
a state of defence, and for acquiring that
happiness which nature itself invites her to
take possession of; and bearing in mind the
disturbances which have taken place in the
country, and which, on account of the dis-
tance, the National Government has not
been able to avoid ; the situation in which
Y. E. will be placed and the measures which
you will have to adopt, and which will pro-
duce the desired effect if you wait for the
proper time to put them into execution, for
there are matters which do not admit of the
least delay, and in the persuasion that Y. E.
will not abuse your powers, but that you
will exercise them for the welfare and ser-
vice of all the inhabitants of that interesting
and fertile Department which the Supreme
Government has placed under your charge
and responsibility, he (the President) has
been pleased to grant to Y. E. over and
above the attributions assigned to you by
the existing laws and regulations, as Gover-
nor, Commandant General, and Inspector,
all the powers which the Supreme Govern-
ment can confer upon you, in order that by
virtue thereof you may remove from office
all such civil and military officers dependent
f This translation was made by Mr. Hartnell, as
I suppose, when lie was government translator, in
charge of the archives. I copied it, by permission,
from a document in the archives, in February,
1851, when they were in charge of Major Canby, at
Benicia.
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dara cuenta para la aprobacion suprema con
las causas de sus procedimientos. Las mi-
ras del Supremo Magistrado no solo se re-
ducen a la Alta California, sino que tambien
se estienden a la Baja, en cuya rlemarcacion
han aparacido conaios de eccision que fo-
mentados por enemigos ocultos, ban hecho
que tonien parte algunos estranos, que su
mismo origen les prohibe el ingerirse en
querellas domestieas; y como este resuelto
a proteger a las tropas, aiitoridades y veci-
nos de la mencionada peninsula, ha resuelto,
que al mando militar de V. E. se eslienda a
dicha Baja California como esta en lo poli-
tico; separando lo de el de Sinaloa, sin em-
bargo de que el Senior Comandante General
de los Departamentos de Sonora y Sinaloa,
continuara impartiendo a V. E. los recursos
y aucilios de que hubiere menester por ase-
gurar la paz, para socorrer las tropas, para
proveer al vecindario y por hacer que toda
la demarracion prospere y sea feliz. Aun-
que el art. 1, de 2 de Noviembre, de 1839,
derogo los ai ticulos del de 18 de Febrero de
mismo pno que sugetaban a la dependencia
de la Plana Mayor del Ejercito, y el 13 del
primer decreto citado solo se deja a los Com-
mandanies Generates de los Departamentos
de Oriente y Occidente con las antiguas
atribuciones inspectores que tertian en las
eompanias presidiales, el E. S. Presidente
referido ha resuelto, que las facultades de
V. E. se estiendan como inspector al Batal-
lon fijo de Californias y que en todo lo rela-
tivo obre en mecanica y se emienda con la
Plana de I M ayor Ejercito. Va V. E. a esperi-
mentar el arreglo 6 desorden en que se en-
cuentran las aduanas maritimas de Ambas
Californias : tiene la necesidad de eesaminar
la situacion que guardan todas las misiones
en su gobierno, adelantos y ramo de conta-
bilidad ; tiene que proceder a la inspeccion
!j reorganisacion de las eompanias presidia-
es, y para toda debiera dejar ecsistente el
mal mientras que se resolvia laconsulta. El
Gobierno Supremo confiando en la justifica-
cion y actividad de V. E. quiere desde luego
que el dano se evite, que el bien se estab-
lesca, y que desde luego ningun obstaculo lo
impida, y por lo mismo, las facultades que
delega en V. E. las hace estensivas aestos
ramos y a cuantos mas puedan contribuir a
la dicha del pais contando entre sus- ramos la
administracion de correos, la colonisacion,
el establecimiento de Presidios, la mejora de
los puertos, la seguridad de los Pueblos, la
civilisacion de los sa'vages, la educacion de
la juventeed, la apertura de caminos, el fo-
mento de las artes, la proteccion de la agri-
cultura y el comercio, el establecimiento de
casas de correccion y el hornato de las pob-
laciones. Conoce V. E. las miras del Go-
bierno Supremo ; sabe muy bien que amigo
del progresso solo anhela por la union entre
on said Government who shall not fulfil
their duties or act up to the confidence re-
sosed in them by the same, and fill their
pituations by appointing worthy citizens
who shall take their places and enter upon
their duties, but with the understanding
nevertheless that you report to Government
the motives of your proceedings for its ap-
probation. The views of the Supreme Ma-
gistrate do not only refer to Upper Califor-
nia, but extend likewise to Lower Califor-
nia, where certain seditious movements
have appeared, which being fomented by
hidden enemies, it has caused some foreign-
ers to take part when their very quality of
foreigners prohibits them from intermeddling
in domestic strife; and as the President is
resolved to protect the troops, authorities,
and citizens of said peninsula, he has de-
termined that your military command shall
likewise extend to Lower California as well
as the civil command, separating it from
Sinaloa, and the Commandant General of
the Department of Sonora and Sinaloa will
continue to furnish you with the resources
and assistance which you may require for
the purpose of securing peace, furnishing
the troops, providing for the wants of the
citizens, and enabling you to provide for
the prosperity and happiness of the whole
Department. Although the first article of
the law of 2d November, 1839, derogated
the articles of that of the 18th February of
the same year, which subjected the subordi-
nation of the staff of the army, and the 13th
article of the first mentioned decree merely
leaves the Commandant General of the East
and West with the former attributions of
Inspector, which they possessed in the Com-
panies of the Presidios, His Excellency, the
President, has determined that your powers
shall extend as Inspector to the permanent
Battalion of California, and that you taKe
charge of all the mechanism thereof, and re-
port to the staff of the army. You will be-
come acquainted with the good or bad
management of the Marine Custom-houses
of both Californias; you will have to ex-
amine the situation of all the Missions with*
respect to their management, improvement,,
and state of accounts ;; you will have to pro-
ceed to the inspection and reorganization of
the companies of Presidios, and in all cases?
(were you not to act) the evil would have
to remain until Government could resolve.
The Supreme Government trusting in your
justice and activity, desires that you should
meet with no obstacles, and therefore the
powers conferred upon you are made exten-
sive to those branches, and to all others
which may conduce to the welfare of the
country, including, amongst others, the ad-
ministration of the Post Office Department,
Colonization, the establishment of Presidios.,
via
tos Mejicanos, y por que todos los pueblos
disfruten el amparo de las leyes y una liber-
tad tan estensa que solo la limite el acata-
miento a las leyes, la obedieneia a sus auto-
ridades, y el deber que tenemos para procu-
rar el bien y evitar a todos se les haga per-
juicio. En esta virtud no me detengo en
recomendarle propague estos principios y
unicamente le advierto que al dietar sus in-
strucciones el Supremo Magistrado ha que-
rido manifestar a V. E. su aprecio y la enti-
dad del gobiernn que le confia y a los habi-
tantes de Californias el acred itarles que la
presente administracion deseasu dicha, des-
conore la apatia, y esta pronta a imparlir en
favor de aqnel Departamento todos cuantos
recuraos apetesra y pu»da proporrionarle.
Los dignos militares que rmrchan a las or-
denes de V. E. van a prestar un servicio en
favor del territorio nacional digno sin duda
de la gratitud publica ; los habitantes de
aquel Departamiento van a esperimentar en
ellos un modelo de honrades, de subordina-
cion y disc ; plina, y para que se acred iten
estas honorifiras calidades es indispensable
que V. E. les recuerde continuamente que
su residencia no va a ser en unos pueblos
que si bien carecen sus habiumtrs de la civi-
lisacion de cortesanos, tambien es verdad
que son docilts, hospitalarios, amigos del
bien, y susceptibles de aprovecbamiento y
libres de ese contasjio que tambien perjudica
en las grandes poblaciones en donde cor-
rompide la moral, solo se enseni a criticar
acciones inocentes que debieian servir de
buen ejemplo."
Lo que irasriribo a V. para su inteligencia
y fines consiguientes.
Dios y Libertad.
Enero 10, de 1843.
MANUEL iVIICHELTORENA.
So'r Admor. de la Aduana Maritima de
Monterey.
the improvement of Ports, the safety of
Towns, the civilization of wild Indians, the
education of Youth, the opening of Roads,
the furtherance of the Arts, the protection
of Agriculture and Commerce, the establish-
ment of Houses of Correction, and the estab-
lishment of Towns.
You know the views of the Supreme
Government, and are well aware that being
a friend to improvement, it merely desires
the union of Mexicans, and that the com-
munity in general may enjoy the protection
of the laws, be obedient to their authorities,
understand that it is our duty to procure the
welfare of every one, and avoid that all
rthers be injured. 1, therefore, will not de-
tain myself by recommending: you to propa-
gate these principles, and will merely men-
tion that when the Supreme Magistrate dic-
tated his instructions, he wished to maniftst
to you his esteem, and the importance of the
cmmand he has confided to you, and to
assure the inhabitants of California that the
present administration desires their happi-
ness, disavows all apathy, and is ready to
impart to that Department all the resources
which it may desire and be able to fur-
nish it.
1 communicate this to Y. E. for your
satisfaction. God and Liberty. Mexico,
ll'h February. 1842=Tornel.:=To General
Don Manuel Micheltorcna.
I certify, that the foregoing copy is the
same as the one that was copied from the
original when I was in charge of the Gover-
nor's Secretaryship.
Monterey, July 6, 1850.
(Signed) MANL. JIMENO.
D.
Extracts trom the Decree of Micheltorena, 29 March, 1843.*
One of the ample instructions with which the undersigned, General and Governor, finds
himself invested, being that of examining the positions the Missions maintain, in their
administration, improvements, and liabilities, and to regulate the same; and the National
Supreme Government having invested him with all its powers, as shown in the supreme
order of 11 February, 1842; in accord and with consent of the most Reverend Fa'her
Friar Jose Joaquin Jimeno,; Friar Jose de Ma. de Jesus Gonzales Rubio, whom to that
*The original of this decree exists in the archives, in charge of the Surveyor General of the United
States in California,
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end I caused to be called before this Government, as well as the Presidents of the other
Missions, and in the name and representation of the most Reverend Father President
Vicar Foraneo Friar Narciso Duran ; being informed of all that was necessary ; and con-
sidering that the vast and immense lands formerly property of the Missions have been
distributed to private individuals, at a time when it was made one of the exigencies of the
country ; that those pious and beneficial establishments are reduced nearly to the gardens
and grounds of their temples and edifices ; that the most Reverend F. Ministers- have no
means of subsistence except mercenary, and that the divine worship, without prospering,
is scarcely maintained; that the Indians, by their natural reluctance to labor, suffer from scanti-
ness of food, and nakedness—those not in private employment, or subjection, preferring
to flee away and die impenitent in the woody deserts, dragging out a life of slavery, full of
privations, and without any of the social enjoyments; that the continual emigration of
natives from private individuals to the Missions, and from the Missions to private indi-
viduals, and to the wilderness, more and more hinders agriculture, and instead of attract-
ing the heathen, drives them away from the bosom of our Holy Religion ; that in the
administration of the Missions some frauds and notorious abuses have been committed,
which all the inhabitants of the country lament ; and that there are no other means to re-
animate the skeleton of a giant, which the remains of the ancient Missions are, than to
have recourse to experience and to sustain them with the levers of the civil and ecclesias-
tical powers ; all having been considered and prudently weighed, I have thought proper
to resolve the following articles:
Article 1. The government of the Department will order the Missions of S[an Diego,
San Luis Rey, San Juan Capistrano, San Gabriel, San Fernando, San Buenaventura,
Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, La Purisima, San Antonio, Santa Clara, and San Jose, to be
delivered up to the very reverend fathers whom the respective prelate may appoint to each
of them, and said Missions shall in future continue to be administered by the very rever-
end fathers, as tutors to the Indians, in the same manner as they held them formerly.
Article 2. As policy makes irrevocable what has hitherto been done, the Missions
will not claim any lands already granted up to this date ; but they will collect the cattle,
property, and utensils, which may have been lent by the priests or administrators, settling
the time and manner in a friendly way with debtors or holders.
Article 6. The departmental government, which prides itself in being religious, and
at the same time entirely Californian, and as such, interested in the same manner as each
and every one of the inhabitants of both Californias, in the progress of the Holy Catholic
Faith, and prosperity of the country, offers all its powers for the protection of the Missions,
and, as Commandant General, the force of arms to escort, defend, and sustain them, as it
will likewise do in respect to individual and private property, and guaranties, securing to
the owners thereof the possession and preservation of the lands which they this day hold,
and it undertakes not to make any new grants, except on information of said authorities,
of the reverend fathers, or where the lands are notoriously unoccupied, or in case of
necessity.
E.
Act of the Territorial Deputation op California, 12 May, 1834, in relation
to the Missions. (Mss. Archives.)
First. The vacant lands shall be distributed according to the Laws of Colonization.
Second. The Political Chief shall order a suspension of the extensive slaughterings of
cattle which are taking place at the Missions, and will only permit the same in case of
urgent necessity.
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The present case is the first in the order of the calendar, and a
leading one as to the questions of law involved, among the ap-
peals to this court from the district courts of California, under the
act of March 3, 1851, entitled 6 an act to ascertain and settle the
private land claims in the State of California,' (ix Stat, at Large,
p. 631,) and the provisions in addition thereto contained in the
12th section of the act of August 31, 1854, entitled 'an act making
appropriations for the civil and diplomatic expenses of the Gov-
ernment for the year ending the 30th of June, 1853, and for other
purposes,' (Session Acts, 1851-'52, p. 99.)
It opens to the court the whole field of the legislation of the
Mexican Republic, and the action of the local authorities in the
Territory of Upper California, in regard to land titles in that Ter-
ritory prior to the time of its cession to the United States ; so that
the novelty of the questions raised by the case, and the magnitude
of the interests at stake in it, require and justify the most careful
discussion and investigation.
Many of the questions presented by the Record and by the
Brief for the appellant, are preliminary merely, wholly indepen-
dent of the merits, not calling lor or admitting any light from the
laws of Spain, or of the Mexican Republic, and exclusively de-
pendent on the consideration and construction of the Constitution,
of acts of Congress, and of the familiar doctrines of the ordinary
jurisprudence of the United States.
It seems convenient to consider all these questions by them-
selves separately, and they are accordingly so submitted in the
present Brief.
The preliminary questions in this case arise upon the motions
made in the district court of the United States for the northern
district of California, to dismiss the appeal prosecuted by the
United States, from the decision of the court of the land commis-
sioners for California, which had affirmed the title of Cruz Cer-
vantes to the land in question.
In that court the counsel for the claimant, Cruz Cervantes,
make five points of objection to jurisdiction of the District Court
of the United States, for the Northern District of California.
I. That the District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia had not jurisdiction of the land, or the defendant.
The act of 28th September, 1850, ix Stat, large, by L. & B. p.
521, chap. 86-7 divides the State of California into two judicial
districts, called the Northern and Southern,—"divided by the
thirty-seventh parallel of North latitude."
Whether this tract of land, claimed by Cervantes, is situated in
the northern district, or in the southern district, is a question of
fact ; not a question of law,
By the 9th sec. of the act, approved March 3d, 1851, (ix Stat.
at large, by L. & B., p. 332, chap. 41,) as well as by the act of
31st August, 1852, (Session acts, by Little and Brown, p. 99,
sect. 12,) the appeal from the final decision of the commissioners
is given "to the district court of the district in which the land
claimed is situated ;" and the commissioners were required to
have two certified transcripts of their proceedings, and decision,
and of the papers and evidence, prepared,—"one of which shall
be filed with the clerk of the proper district court, and the filing
of such transcript shall ipso facto, operate as appeal for the party
against whom the decision shall be rendered ;" * * *
The commissioners caused the transcript to be filed in the dis-
trict court for the northern district; and the district court for the
northern district upon motion to dismiss, (p. 99, 100, 101, 4th
point,) decided the fact that the land was within the jurisdiction
of the northern district.
The decision of the district court must be presumed to be right,
until there be affirmative proof that it was erroneous. There is
nothing in the Record to show that it wa? erroneous. There is
not a particle of proof in the Record to show that the land claimed
by Cervantes, is situated south of the thirty-seventh parallel of
north latitude.
The claim of Cervantes is described in the petition, (printed
Record, p. 1,) as situated in the county of Santa Clara, and known
by the name of San Joaquin or Rosa Morada, bounded on one
side by the Arroyo of San Felipe, on the second side by the hills
or mountains of San Joaquin, on the third by the Arroyo of Santa
Anna, and on the fourth, by a line drawn through the plain of San
Juan.
The county of Santa Clara is to be seen on the map of Cali-
fornia; the thirty-seventh parallel of north latitude leaves by far
the greater part of the county north of that parallel of latitude, if
not the whole. The land of Cervantes is not represented on the
map. Under such circumstances it would be rash to presume
that the tract of two square leagues, claimed by Cervantes, was
4situated south of the line, against the acts and knowledge of the
commissioners and the judge of the district court.
The question of fact whether the land claimed by Cervantes
was situated in the northern or in the southern district, was com-
prised in several motions made by his counsel—all of which were
overruled.—Printed Record, p. 9 and 100-102, point 4.
The motion to dismiss " because the land in controversy in this
case is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the court," brought
the fact of its locality directly in issue. The court decided the
fact against Cervantes ; nothing is in the record to authorize this
court to reverse the decision upon this question of fact. The
mover has embodied no evidence in the record to prove to this
court that the decision of this question of fact by the district
court was erroneous.
This motion to dismiss "because the land in controversy is not
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court," and the overruling
thereof, are equivalent to a plea to the jurisdiction founded on the
locality of the tract of land, and the finding of the fact against
the plea: to reverse that finding there is no evidence in the record,,
This thirty-seventh parallel of north latitude through the State
of California has not been run, and visibly marked upon the
ground, by the constituted authorities of the United State. There-
fore, whether a particular tract of land of two squares in the
county of Santa Clara was in the northern or in the southern ju-
dicial district, was a matter of reputation in the neighborhood
and with the courts, until otherwise ascertained and proved by
scientific experiment and demonstration.
By the fourth section of the act of 1850, which created the
northern and southern judicial districts in California, " the judge
of the northern district shall hold two regular sessions, annually,
at San Francisco, and one regular session, annually, at San Jose,
Sacramento, and Stockton ;" and San Jose is in the county of
Santa Clara.
The board of commissioners, for ascertaining and settlingprivate
land claims in California, have, in performing their duty prescribed
by the 12th section of the act of 1852, caused a certified transcript
of their final decision for this land to be lodged with the clerk of
the northern judicial district; the judge of that northern judicial
district has received the transcript, and heard the appeal, and de-
cided the question of jurisdiction.
The decision of the district court must be presumed to be cor-
rect, until the contrary be proved.
The jurisdiction of the court did not depend upon the person of
Cervantes, but upon the act of commissioners in causing the.
record of their final decision to be lodged with the clerk of the
district court.
II. " It is alleged that the action was not brought nor presented
in the court below in the manner nor within the time prescribed
by law."
Under this head various objections are specified :
1. It is said " the act of 1852 did not intend to change the mode
of reviewing the decision of the commissioners."
To this the answer is, that, the said 12th section of the act of
1852, as to the mode of reviewing the decisions of the court of
commissioners, is so different from the mode prescribed in the act
of 1851, and so repugnant in the very matter, as that the two can-
not be reconciled. Therefore the maxim applies, " Leges poste-
riores priores contrarias abrogant"
2. Another objection, under this head, that " it was not compe-
tent for Congress to establish a jurisdiction in the Federal courts
by wa}r of appeal from the commission," is repeated, as the par-
ticular subject of the third general head, and will be there an-
swered.
3. Another objection is, that " Fisher, signing himself secretary,
was not an officer known to the law, or whose certificate could
verify any proceeding to a judicial tribunal."
The answer to this is, that the second section of the act of 1851,
authorized the commissioners to appoint their secretary, (i whose
duty shall be * * * to keep a resord of the proceedings
of the board in a bound book, to be filed in office of the Secretary
of the Interior on the termination of the commission;" and by
section eighteen it is seen, that it is the duty of the secretary of
the board to furnish " certified copies of any paper or record,"
and his fees therefor are prescribed ; and by the twelfth section
of the act of 1852, it is the duty of the commissioners "to
have two certified transcripts prepared of their proceedings and
decision * * * one of which transcripts shall be filed with
the clerk of the proper district court, and the other shall be trans-
mitted to the Attorney General of the United States, and the filing
of such transcript with the clerk aforesaid shall ipso facto operate
as an appeal for the party against whom the decision shall be
rendered ;" * * * Upon these two acts, made in pari
materia, the secretary of the board, who is the keeper of the re-
cords, is made the proper officer to" certify all transcripts of all
copies of the record.
4. It is objected, that " the notice addressed by the Attorney
General to the clerk of the court, did not operate as a notice in
regard to this appeal, it not having been then instituted."
The notice by the Attorney General (p. 98) bears date, 11 July,
1853. It correctly describes the case of " Cruz Cervantes vs. Uni-
ted States," and gives notice that "the appeal in the above case
from the decision of the commissioners to ascertain and settle the
private land claims in the State of California, to the district court
of the United States for the northern district of California, will
be prosecuted by the United States." This description is full,
identical, and sufficient to apply to the transcript of the final de-
cision of the case, upon the record thereof when filed with the
clerk of the district court on the 22d of July, 1853. The idea is,
that as the notice by the Attorne)^ General bears date at Wash-
ington, D. C, July 11th, 1853—and the transcript of the record
Was not filed with the clerk of the district until 22d July—that
the notice is insufficient. But the decision had been made by the
commissioners in December, 1852 ; the transcript had been trans-
mitted to the Attorney General, who correctly ^escribed the case
in his notice of appeal. That is sufficient By the time the
written notice of the Attorney General had been conveyed from
the city of Washington to the clerk of the northern judicial dis-
trict of California, the transcript of the record of the decision of
the commissioners must have been filed with the clerk ; inasmuch
as by no means of conveyance, between the city of Washington
and the city of San Francisco in California, yet known and used,
could the Attorney General's letter have been transmitted to the
clerk at San Francisco before the 22d July, 1853.
5. Another objection is, " that if the case was properly brought,
however, it wras not properly prosecuted ; it ought to have been
prosecuted either by a citation to Cervantes, or else according to
the provision of the act of 1851."
To this objection it is a sufficient answer, that the appeal was
prosecuted in conformity with the said section 12, of the act of
1852. That act required no citation to Cruz Cervantes, he was
bound to take notice of what was done in that respect in the
clerk's office, and accordingly appeared and defended the appeal.
6. Another objection is made, (appellant's Brief, p. 4, 2 of
second head, as to time,) that "the act of 1852 intends that the
appeal for which it provides, shall be instituted within the same
period (six months) as is provided in the act of 1851."
The 12th section of the act of 1852, August 31, (Sess. Acts by
Little & Brown, p. 99, chap. 108,) is an express refutation of this
objection.
Neither does that act require " that appeals shall be prosecuted
to the term of the appellate court next following the institution
of the appeal." The 12th section of the act of 1852, was duly ob-
served in the prosecution of this appeal.
7. Another objection under this head is, "that the act of 1852
does not apply to this case only, but relates to decisions which shall
be rendered, not to such as had been rendered ; and the decision
in this case was rendered on the 3d August, 1852, twenty-eight
days before (the act of 1852) it was adopted.
To this the answer is, that the appeal is from the final decision
of the commissioners, not from an interlocutory one. The decree
alluded to as of 3d August, 1852, (printed Record, p. 5,) was but
interlocutory, not final ; " the entering of the decree of final con-
firmation being reserved for a future day."
The final decision was pronounced December 18, 1853, (printed
Record, pp. 49, 50,) in which it will be seen that the question was
held in reserve whether the claimant should hold all the land
within the exterior boundaries alluded to, or only the quantity of
two square leagues; and the final decision confined him to the
exact quantity mentioned in the grant.
III. It is objected that "the court below could not have appel-
late jurisdiction in the premises ;" that the commission established
by virtue ofthe act of 1851 is not a court under the Constitution, and
consequently not the depository of any portion of judicial power
:
that the act was not passed in virtue of any legislative authority,
express or implied, possessed by Congress, and consequently does
not rank as a law.
These propositions imply, that a case or controversy, in the con-
stitutional sense, could not arise before the commissioners, of
which an act of Congress could confer jurisdiction by way of ap-
peal to the federal courts, and that the act of 1852 is not constitu-
tional ; that the act of 1851 was enacted, "not in the public
or law-giving capacity of the state, but in its private capacity as
landholder, in virtue of the judiciary functions of Congress given
in the second clause of the third section of article 4 of the Consti-
tution, and this does not confer legislative, but administrative
powers."
Such are the objections made by the counsel for the appellant
in this court, stated in their own words, in order to avoid misre-
presentation.
The first article and eighth section of the Constitution of the
United States ordains that the Congress shall have power to le-
gislative on various subjects therein mentioned, among which
is the power "to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court;" and concludes thus: "To make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any department officer
thereof."
The third section of article fourth ordains : " The Congress
shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting territory or other property belonging to the
United States."
The motion to dismiss the appeal supposes that the act of
1851, (Vol. IX, p. 631, chap. 41,) entitled "An act to ascertain
and settle the private land claims in the State of California,"
which establishes the commission to hear, examine, and decide
the claims of all persons to lands in California, derived from the
Spanish or Mexican Government, with all the rules and regula-
tions contained in the eighteen sections thereof, proceeds solely
and exclusively from the power given to Congress, by the third
section of the fourth article, " respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States."
But the act of 1851 makes the board of commissioners a tribu-
nal of record, with a secretary " to be appointed by the said com-
missioners" to authenticate the proceedings of the commissioners
;
with clerks " to be appointed by the commissioners ;" with a per-
son learned in the law, " to be appointed by the President of the
United States," to attend before the board to the interests of the
United States ; it makes it the duty of each and every person
claiming lands in California by virtue of any right or title derived
from the Spanish or Mexican Governments, to present the same
to the commissioners when sitting as a board, u- with such docu-
mentary evidence, and testimony of witnesses, as the claimant
relies upon ;" it authorizes the agent of the United States " to
collect testimony in behalf of the United States, and to attend on
all occasions when the claimant * * shall take depositions ;"
it authorizes the commissioners to issue writs of subpoena for
witnesses, to administer oaths, examine witnesses, take deposi-
tions ; to be attended by a deputy marshal ; the commissioners as
a board are authorized to hear, examine, and decide upon the
validity of each claim presented, according to the evidence and
the laws applicable to the case, and particularly according to the
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ; the decisions and proceedings are to
be recorded ; and, on the expiration of the commission, the records
to be filed in the office of the Secretary of the Interior. The act
provides for a review of the decisions of the commissioners, first
before the district court of the United States, and finally before
the Supreme Court of the United States.
Upon looking at the various sections of this act, it is apparent
that it constitutes a judicial tribunal, to hear and determine be-
tween the United States and individuals, on claims to land in
cases arising under the treaty, between the United States and
Mexico, of Guadalupe Hidalgo, with the allowance of appeals to
the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.
It is therefore self-evident, that this special tribunal was not es-
tablished solely and exclusively "in puursuance of the adminis-
trative and fiduciary powers of Congress, as custodian and agent
of the lands and other property of the United States," as delegated
by the third section of the fourth article ; but that it may also,
and more properly, be traced to the powers given to Congress
by the eighth section of the first article, " to constitute tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court," and to the powers given by the
same section, " to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."
It has reference, also, to the second section of the second article
:
"But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such in-
ferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
courts of law, or in the heads of departments ;" for Congress
vested the appointment of the law agent in the President alone,
without the advice and consent of the Senate, and the appoint-
ments of the secretary and clerks in the court of commissioners.
It has just relation, also, to the powers of Congress to make
laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
It has, also, connexion with the judicial power of the United
States, which, by Art. Ill, § 2, "shall extend to all cases in law
or equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their
authority."
9It has likewise connexion with another paragraph of the same
section, which, after defining the original jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court, ordains that "in all other cases before mentioned,
the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to
law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations
as the Congress shall make."
Taking into view the various provisions of the act of 1851
to ascertain and settle private land claims in California, it
seems clear that the legislation by Congress, in instituting
the commision to hear and determine the validity of the private
land claims in California, does not depend solely and exclusively
upon that section of the Constitution which ordains that "the
Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States ;" but that the said legislative act
of Congress proceeded from the powers vested in the Government
of the United States, by articles one, two, three, five and six, of
the Constitution ; that the said board of commissioners is a judi-
cial tribunal, a court of record, instituted " by the Government of
the United States in its political and governmental capacity."
Again it is supposed
—
(printed Record, p. 101-108, sec. 9)
—
" this court cannot have appellate jurisdiction from a tribunal
constituted otherwise than according to sections one and two of
article third of the Constitution, unless by consent ; and such
consent is not given in this case."
The meaning of the objection is, that the Congress cannot au-
thorize an appeal to a court of the United States, unless it be
from another court of the United States, established under the
third article, of permanent duration, holden by a judge or judges
appointed by the President of the United States, during good be-
haviour," receiving a "compensation, which shall not be dimin-
ished during their continuance in office."
That is also a clear misinterpretation of the Constitution of the
United States. The judicial power of the United States " shall
extend to all cases in law or equity arising under this Constitu-
tion, the laws and treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority;" and if the case so arises, no matter if it be first
decided by a court of a State, or by a judge or justice of a State,
or by a judge or justice of the peace of the United States, or by
the accounting officers of the treasury who hold their officers
during pleasure, yet it is within the lawful authority of the Con-
gress of the United States to draw the case to the examination
of the courts of the United States, and to the final decision of the
Supreme Court, under such regulations as the Congress shall
make. So it must necessarily be in order to maintain the uni-
form construction and administration of the Constitution, laws,
and treaties of the United States and their supremacy.
Accordingly, by the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789,
(i Statutes at Large, by Little & B., p. 85, chap. 20,) a final
judgment or decree in the highest court of a State in which a de-
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cision can be had by the laws of the State, "may be re-examined
and reversed or affirmed," in the Supreme Court of the United
States, if such decision involves a question within the judicial
power of the United States, as particularly defined in that act.
Under that 26th section many decisions of the State tribunals
have been reviewed and reversed in the Supreme Court ; whereof,
it will suffice to cite: Martin vs. Hunter's lessee, i Wheat., 323;
Cohens vs. The State of Virginia; vi Wheaton, 375; Buel vs.
Van Ness, viii Wheat., 322; Weston vs. The City Council of
Charleston, ii Peters, 463 ; Buchanan vs. Alexander, iv Howard,
20. The case of Cohens was a writ of error to the judgment of
the hustings court for the borough of Norfolk, in the State of
Virginia, upon a presentment for vending lottery tickets in a
lottery authorized by a law of the United States, the sale of such
being supposed to have been prohibited by the law of the State
of Virginia, and the court in which the judgment was rendered
being the highest court which had jurisdiction of the case. In
Van Ness & Buel, it was determined that the value in contro-
versy was immaterial where the right under a law of the United
States was involved. In Weston vs. The City Council of Charles-
ton the decision re-examined and reversed was upon a writ of
prohibition. The case of Buchanan vs. Alexander arose out of
attachments issued by a justice of the peace against seamen,
and garnisheeing moneys in the hands of the purser due to the
sailors for wages ; the attachments were severally affirmed in
the superior court for Norfolk, in Virginia, being the ultimate
tribunal of the State which could take cognizance of the attach-
ments.
The 29th section of the judiciary act of 1789 provides for the
removal of cases, commenced in the courts of States, into the
federal courts, in certain cases coming within the judicial powers
delegated to the United States. And in the case of Gordon vs.
Longest, xvi Peters, 101, the State court having improperly re-
fused to remove the case to the circuit court of the United States
for that district, upon .the petition of Gordon, the judgment of the
State court was for that refusal reversed in the Supreme Court
of the United States.
The laws of the United States authorize appeals and writs of
error from the decisions of the supreme courts of the respective
territories of the United States, as will be seen in the act of 3d
March, 1805, (ii Stat, at Large, by Little & B., p. 338, chap. 38 ;)
and in other subsequent statutes organizing territorial govern-
ments.
By the act to establish a territorial government for Utah, for
example, approved 9th September, 1850, (ix Stat, at Large, by
L. & B., pages 455-456, chap. 51, sec. 9,) the judicial power is
vested in a supreme court, district courts, probate courts, and
justices of the peace, with writs of error and appeals from the
decisions of the supreme territorial court to the Supreme Court
of the United States, in cases where the value in controversy
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shall exceed one thousand dollars. It moreover allows writs of
error and appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States
"from the decisions of said supreme (territorial) court created by
this act,' or of any judge thereof, or of the district courts created
by this act, or of any judge thereof, upon any writ of habeas
corpus involving the question of personal freedom."
The decision of the accounting officers of the Treasury of the
United States, in disallowing credits claimed, may be reviewed
and reversed in the courts of justice, according to the fourth sec-
tion of the act of 3d March, 1797. (i, Stat, at Large, by L. & B.,
p. 515, chap. 20.)
By the act of 15 May, 1820—"providing for the better organi-
zation of the Treasury Department," (iii Stat, at Large, by L. &
B., p. 592, chap. 107,) warrants of distress issued under that act,
against debtors to the United States, by the comptroller of the
Treasury, are liable to be injoined by bill in equity presented to
the district judge, according to sections four, five and six of that
act. (See United States vs. Nourse, ix Peters, 8.)
The ministerial acts of the executive officers of the United
States are, to a certain extent, subject to be examined and re-
viewed by the courts of the United States ; as in ex parte Randolph,
ii Brockenborough's Rep. 470-77 ; same case, in note to United
States vs. Nourse, ix Peters', 12-17 ; Postmaster General U. S., vs.
Stokes, xii Peter', 254, 526, 614, 618; act of 1789—"to establish
the judicial courts of the United States,"—i Stat, at Large, by
L. & B., p. 81, chap. 20, sec. 13.
The scope of the judicial powers of the United States, under
the Constitution, would authorize Congress to confer upon the
judicial tribunals the like powers of issuing writs of mandamus,
as those exercised by the court of King's Bench in England, di-
rected to any officer of the Government of the United States, or
inferior court of the United States, requiring them to do that which
is just and lawful, and appertaining to their office and public duty,
in cases where there is no other adequate remedy. Congress
have not, as yet, thought it fit and expedient to vest in courts the
whole of the judicial powers which the Constitution permits : a
portion as yet remains dormant. (Postmaster General Kendal vs.
Stokes, relator, xii Peters', 518, 627, 641, 642.) But, in so far as
Congress have acted upon the subject, in the various cases before
mentioned, including the appeals to the district court from the
court of commissioners, as regulated by the acts of 1851-52, they
are well authorized by the powers delegated by the Constitution
of the United States.
IV. It is alleged in the printed Brief for appellant, (p. 5,) "that
the proceedings in the court below were in derogation of the
rights of Cervantes—of rights growing out of the act of 1851,
and his acceptance of its provisions. The act of 1851, was, it is
argued, a proposal of one land claimant to a counter claimant, to
settle the controversy in a manner and on the terms therein set
forth. Cervantes assented to those terms, by filing and prosecuting
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his claim before the commission, and thereby the act of 1851 be-
came a contract between the United States and Cervantes, which of
course neither party would alter without the consent of the other.
This objection was also made in similar terms and specifications,
to be seen in the printed Record, p. 100, objections 6th and 7th.
The sum of this argument for the appellant is, that Cervantes,
by having instituted his suit while the act of 1851 was in force,
thereby acquired such a private right and vested interest in the
provisions of the ninth, tenth, and twelfth sections of that statute,
as to the mode and form of prosecuting an appeal, and as to the
limitation of time within which an appeal should be prosecuted
when a final decision should be made, as that Congress could
not, constitutionally and rightfully, pass the twelfth sect, of the
act of 1852, to operate upon his case.
The reply to this argumentis obvious and complete. "What-
ever right to the land Cervantes may have acquired under
the government of Mexico, whether legal or equitable, that right
to the land, under the Governmentof the United States, is not in-
tended to be impaired, cannot be impaired, it is secured by the
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, by the law of nations, by the prin-
ciples of law of universal obligation, which even a conqueror dare
not disrespect, cannot infringe, but at the hazard of the contempt
of neighboring nations and of the revolt of his subjects or citizens.
Congress has especially secured the rights to lands by requiring
all the tribunals of original and of appellate jurisdiction "in
deciding on the validity of any claim brought before them under
the provisions of this act to be governed by the treaty of Guada-
lupe Hidalgo, the law of nations, the laws, usages, and customs
of the government from which the claim is derived, the principles
of equity, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, so far as they are applicable."
What greater security has any citizen of the United States for
his rights of private property?
The distinction between the right and the remedy exists in the
nature of things. Without impairing the right, the remedy may
certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct.
Statutes of limitation relate to the remedies which are furnished
in the courts. (Sturges vs. Crowningshield, iv Wheaton 200, and
207. Bank United States vs. Donally, viii Peters, 372. Huberus.
vol. 2, book I, title 3, § 7. Story's Confl. laws, § 557, 5676, chap.
14, page 931, 957.)
The 11th sect, of the act of 1851 relates to the right, ad litis
decisionem, and remains unchanged. Sect. 9, 10, 12, relate solely
to the remedy, ad litis ordinationem.
The administration of justice by a nation is a part of its public
right and duty.
The different modes of proceeding, the different kinds of rem-
edies, the different forums, and the times within which remedies
shall be pursued, are subjects belonging to the discretion of every
nation, with the right and the duty to adopt those best suited to
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the administration of justice, best adapted to enforce rights and
suppress wrongs. To modify, amend, or change the modes of
proceeding, the forums, and remedies, from time to time, as con-
venience, experience, and enlightened policy shall dictate, is like-
wise a public right and duty.
"The duration of law in general, as well as its first establish-
ment, depends on the free will and pleasure of the sovereign, who
can cannot reasonably tie up his own hands in this respect. * * *
"It would be absurd and pernicious to society, to pretend that
laws once created, ought to subsist forever, let what incon-
veniency soever arise. (Burlamaqui on Natural and Political
Law, book I, chap. 10, sect. 14, p. 76.)
To deny the right to modify remedies from time to time, as ex-
perience and exigencies shall require, is to deny the right to ira*
prove and perfect. It defeats the purpose of the social compact.
The remedy, the forms, and modes of proceeding in courts, the
manner of certifying an appeal from one forum to another for re-
view, and the times within which a review may be had, are sub-
jects of legislative discretion, matters of public policy.
Rights are determined by the laws of the country existing at
the time of each particular business transacted in that country,
The changes of the laws, the changes of forum, the changes of the
modes of proceeding in the forum, the changes of sovereignty, do
not change the rights of the parties in the particular transaction.
But it is an egregious error to say that each particular trans-
action, under which a right is claimed, carries along with it the
particular modes of proceeding, the particular forms of remedies,
the particular forms existing at the time of the transaction ; that
each particular transaction, or each particular suit instituted,
binds and ties up the hands of the legislature, so that they cannot
modify, from time to time, the forms and modes of proceedings, to
ascertain and enforce that right, or to guard against a wrong 5
that when antient transactions are brought on for judicial inves-
tigation, the antiquated, inconvenient, cumbrous, obsolete, and
abrogated forms and modes of proceeding are to be revived, ob-
served, and applied.
The principle asserted by the motion to dismiss this appeal
from the decision of the court of commissioners to the district
court, because it has been prosecuted according to the law of
1852, made before, and existing when the decree of the commis-
sioners was finally pronounced, and not according to the law of
1851, existing when the petition was presented to the commission-
ers, would, if admitted, in its effects and consequences, run into
the greatest inconveniences and absurdities. It is the shade of a
gross error, long since tried and condemned at the bar of reason,
experience, and wisdom, and buried in oblivion.
If that postulate had been suffered to prevail as true doctrine,
it would have been a stumbling block in the way of abolishing at
once those absurd trials by fire ordeal, by water ordeal, by battle,
and the various other superstitious modes of trial which once pre-
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vailed in England, and in other countries, and would have hin^
dered and encumbered the rise, progress, and improvement of
the laws of England, during the five periods mentioned by her
legal historians from the earliest times, down to the present age.
(iv Black. Comm., chap. 33, pp. 407, 418, 425, 441, &c.)
The postulate, upon which the dismissal of the appeal is de-
manded, would, in its effects and consequences, carry the trial of
the right to this land to such forum, such remedies, such modes
of proceeding as prevailed in Upper California, and the Supreme
Government of Mexico, where the claim of Cruz Cervantes origi*
nated, and prevent its consideration by any other.
The idea that because a plaintiff has begun his suit in a par-
ticular court, on a particular day, he thereby acquires such a
private vested right to the continuation of that particular court,
and to a continuation of all the public laws regulating that court,
and its modes of proceeding, and, also, in all the public laws re-
lating to the appeal from the decision of that court, with the
mode and formula of carrying the appeal from a decision, therein-
after to be made, to a superior court, so that the hands of the
legislature are bound up against abolishing that court, and trans-
ferring the cognizance of the case to another judicial tribunal,
and from altering the manner of taking an appeal when the de-
cision shall be given, unless the personal and individual consent
of the plaintiff be given, is a heresy, opposed by the practice
of all governments, legislators, judges, and executive officers,
and contrary to the very nature and foundation of the Govern-
ment. The statute bocks abound with the creation of new judi-
cial tribunals, and express transfers by law of suits and prosecu-
tions pending in the old to the new, there to be heard and deter-
mined.
Congress have found it necessary and proper to make new
judicial districts, and new courts, in the States of New York,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, and Louisiana ; to alter
the judicial system first established in Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee,
and in various other States, which, from being territories, and
under territorial governments, have been admitted into the Union
as States, wherein a district court, with powers of a circuit court,
was first established, and thereafter the circuit court system ex-
tended to them. In all which changes, provisions were made,
either for retaining suits pending in the old jurisdiction, or for
transferring them to the new, as deemed most convenient and
politic.
Every day, controversies, originated in the several States, under
the laws thereof, and in foreign countries, under foreign laws, are
litigated, heard, and determined in the federal courts, and the
remedies administered therein according to the forms and modes
of proceeding established by the laws of the United States. The
decisions of the rights involved are according to the laws of the
State, or nation, wherein the transaction was done ; the remedies
are administered according to the law of the forum. The judi-
15
oial power of the United States, as defined by the Constitution, is
founded upon the distinction between the right and the remedy,,
The counsel for Cruz Cervantes alleges that said Cervantes
"has not consented, and now protests against" the act of Congress
of 1852, " and does not consent to a variance of or departure from"
the act of 1851. (Printed Record, pages 100, 101.)
Is it not against all sense to assume, that the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives of the United States,
and the constituents of them, who voted in the negative, and re-
corded their names on the journals against the passage of a law,
or otherwise opposed it in opinion, were therefore not bound by
the law when duly enacted by the competent number, and ap-
proved by the President of the United States?
By the fundamental principles of government, by the theory of
the social compact, by the fact of forming or living under a con-
stitutional form of government, every member of the society
is considered as consenting, in advance, to be bound by and to
submit to all laws, and every one of them, which shall be made
in pursuance of the Constitution.
The Constitution of the United States provides for the making
of laws by the passage of bills by the House of Representatives
and the Senate and the assent of the President of the United
States, or if he disapprove, then by the passage by yeas and nays
entered on the journal of each House, respectively, by the votes
of two-thirds of each House. And thereafter ordains, " that this
Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land."
Every man in the United States is, in judgment of law, party
to the making of a law of the United States and bound thereby,
being present by his representatives, the members of the two
Houses of Congress, and the President of the United States, who
is himself elected by, and represents, all the people of the several
States.
What sort of government would that be, which should allow
each individual as to whom a law, enacted by the competent au-
thority, was about to be enforced, to protest against the law and
thereby require direct proof that he had given to it his personal
and individual assent?
V. It is objected by the appellant, (printed Brief, p. 7,) " that the
judgment of the court below is erroneous, apart from the merits
of the claim of Cervantes.
1st. because it is not rendered on the pleadings and evidence
in the case ; and the court had no authority to render a judgment,
except on the pleadings and evidence.
How far the decree of the district court conforms to or departs
from the pleadings and evidence, this appellate court will decides
that is not a question of jurisdiction.
"2. It was rendered at a special term, for the holding of which
it had no authority ; and a time when it had not authority to hold
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any term ; and when the appellee cannot be supposed to have
even constructive notice."
The third section of the act of 28th September, 1850, extend-
ing the laws and the judicial system of the United States to the
State of California, which constituted the northern and southern
districts, enacts, " that the judges of the districts of California
shall hold extra sessions at any time when the public interest may
in their opinion require the same."
As to the supposition that the appellee Cervantes, had not
" even constructive notice" of that extra term, this is openly con-
tradicted by the Record, which shows, p. 99, 101, and 102, that the
counsel for Cervantes made three several motions to dismiss the
appeal and argued their said motions, on the 17th day of October,
and again on the 21st October, 1858, at the said extra term.
3. It is objected that the decree of the court "was founded on
a transcript which was not lawfully before it, and of which it
could not take judicial notice."
This seems to be but a repetition of one of the objections spe-
cified under the second head, as to the authentication of the trans-
cript of the record by the secretary of the board of commission-
ers, and has been answered.
4. It is objected that the decree of the court does not recite
" the facts necessary to show its jurisdiction, and authorize it to
pronounce judgment."
The decree is founded on the record, which shows the facts ne-
cessary to sustain the jurisdiction of the court, including the no*
tice by the Attorney General of the intention to prosecute the
appeal, (printed Record, p. 98.)
The district court of the United States for the northern district
of California, although an inferior court of the United States, in
the language of the Constitution, (because it is inferior to the
Supreme Court of the United States,) "is not so in the language
of the common law, nor are its proceedings subject to the scrutiny
of those narrow rules which the caution or jealousy of the courts
at Westminster long applied to courts of that denomination, but
are entitled to as liberal intendments or presumptions, in favor
of their regularity, as those of the Supreme Court." * * * *
A district court of the United States, however, " is of limited ju-
risdiction, and has cognizance not of cases generally, but only of
a few specially circumstanced." # * " This renders it neces-
sary, inasmuch as the proceedings of no court can be deemed
valid further than its jurisdiction appears or can be presumed, to
set forth, upon the record of a district court or circuit court of the
United States, the facts or circumstances which give jurisdiction
either expressly or in such manner as to render them certain, by
legal intendment." (Turner, administrator of Stanley vs. The
Bank of North America, iv Dallas, 11.)
But if the rule was, that the facts and circumstances to sustain
the jurisdiction should appear in the judgment or decree of the
$ourt, as the appellant supposes, instead of upon the whole record,
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yet the decree itself, in this case of Cervantes, does recite the
facts necessary to show the jurisdiction of the court. The final
decree (printed Record, p. 100) is in these words and figures:
"This cause coming to be heard at the above stated term, on ap-
peal from the final decision of the commissioners to ascertain and
settle private land claims in the State of California, under the act
of Congress approved March 3, 1851, upon the transcript of the
proceedings and decision, and the papers and evidence on which
said decision was founded ; and it appearing to the court that said
transcript has been duly and regularly filed in pursuance of the
12th section of the act of Congress approved August 31, 1851
;
and the argument of counsel for the United States and for claim-
plainant being heard : It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed," &c.
The notice of the appeal by the Attorney General is in the Re-
cord at page 98.
VI. Under this head certain assumed general principles are
announced in behalf of Cervantes, (printed Brief, pp. 7, 8.)
As to these alleged general principles, the United States deny
them either as premises or in their application, or suggest modifi-
cation of the doctrine they assert or imply, as follows :
1. It is said for Cervantes that the United States, in respect of
proprietary rights, are to be considered in their private capacity,
and in that capacity can have no rights other than those of an
individual ; and
4. That the United States hold the public domain in their pri-
vate and not in any political or sovereign capacity.
This imputed private capacity is a metaphysical fiction or
metaphor, not a constitutional fact.
The United States hold the public domain as a government and
no otherwise, being in that respect the trustee of the States and
their people, as in the power to make laws, regulate commerce,
or perform any other act of sovereignty.
5. Printed Brief, p. 8.—It is said, for Cervantes, " that the only
advantage which the United States had over any individual who
might have purchased the residuary interest of Mexico in Cali-
fornia, was in their immunity from judicial process, and that they
relinquished that advantage in respect of the claim of Cervantes
by the act of 1851, and his acceptance of its provisions."
To this it is answered, 1st, that the United States, by their
treaty with Mexico, in which California was ceded to them, ac-
quired the sovereignty and jurisdiction, as well as the public do-
main ; whereas an individual, who might have purchased from
Mexico her residuary interest in the lands in California not
granted to others, would have acquired only the title to the lands,
without the political powers of government ; 2d. By the act of
1851 the United States did not relinquish their political sover-
eignty and jurisdiction, nor tie their hands against future legis-
lation ; did the institution of the suit by Cervantes, under that
act, pretended by Cervantes to be "his acceptance of its provi-
2
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sions," have the effect of taking away the legislative power of
the United States, as that argument supposes.
The Congress of the United States legislates in regard to this
subject, as in regard to all others, as the representation, quoad hoc,
of the sovereignty of the States united.
2. The second point under this head consists of a series of pro-
positions in substance as follows
:
1. "The same acts constitute a contract on the part of a State
as would constitute a contract on the part of an individual," and
"a State cannot violate its contract any more than an individual
can violate his."
Those two associated propositions, in the form and to the pre-
cise extent in which they appear, must be qualified, by considera-
tion of the eminent domain, and especially in their application to
the Federal Government, the powers of which are such, and such
only, as the Constitution confers.
Contracts, strictly so called, when made by the United States,
are undoubtedly subject, when they come before the courts, to the
same general rules of construction as contracts by individuals.
(See United States vs. Kirkpatrick, ix Wheat., 729 ; Farrar vs.
United States, v Peters, 573 ; Smith vs. United States, v Peters,
294; United States vs. Tingy, v Peters, 118; United States vs.
Buford, iii Peters, 12, 30.
As to the implied or constructive contracts involved in the
tenor of an act of legislation, the Constitution distinguishes, and
for good reason of course, between laws enacted by a State of the
Union and laws enacted by the Congress of the United States.
(Evans vs. Eaton, Peters C. C. R, 322, 337.)
But there is nothing in the present case which seems to call
for a discussion of the vext question of legislative contracts,
whether applied to the land laws of" the Mexican Republic, or to
those of the United States.
2. " A state cannot legislate itself into rights."
This proposition, to be admitted, must be qualified, and its ap-
plication to the case is denied.
3. A state, "when impleaded in a judicial controversy, can
only be considered in its private capacity, with the same rights
as the opposing party."
A judicial controversy, to which the state is a party, may be
subject to the same general rules of law as if both parties were
individual citizens ; but the ascription of a "private capacity" to
the state is not the less to be questioned.
3. The third point, under this head, also consists of a series of
propositions, in substance as follows
:
1. The judiciary, "though established by the political power, is
in its proceedings independent."
The judiciary department, in the United States, is the creature
of the Constitution, like the legislative and executive departments.
In some respects each is independent of the other, and in others
not. The political power, in the United States, decides for itself
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absolutely all those things which the Constitution empowers it so
to decide ; and so, only, does the judiciary power.
2. The judiciary "is not, in any sense, a part of the state, when
it comes to judge between the state and an individual."
This proposition cannot be admitted as true either in fact or
law.
3. " The state in fact,'r it is added, "not appearing before the
judiciary in its political, but in its private capacity."
The state appears in fact as what it is in fact, that is, as the
state.
Finally, as to all the arguments suggested or shadowed out
under this head, it may be observed that they imply that the case
of Cervantes cannot be maintained by "the provisions of the
treaty of Gaudalupe Hidalgo ; the law of nations ; the laws,
usages, and customs of the government from which the claim is
derived ; the principles of equity ; and the decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, so far as they are applicable."
The act of Congress for the adjudication of land claims in Cali-
fornia, expressly enacts " that the commissioners herein provided
for, and the District and Supreme Courts, in deciding on the va-
lidity of any claim brought before them under the provisions of
this act, shall be governed" by these rules. They give to Cer-
vantes, as to all the other claimants, unquestionably the security
of every doctrine of positive law recognised in the jurisprudence
of the United States. In seeking to go beyond this^and in placing
at the foundation of his case questionable abstract propositions
of government, he in effect raises doubts as to the merits of his
case, legal or equitable, upon the Record.
It remains to discuss the merits in the second part of this Brief.
C. CUSHING,
Attorney General,
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taken and read as a part of this petition. The same act was modified
and changed by an act of the same Legislature, passed A. D., which is
also asked to be taken and read as a part of this petition.
On the 7th of July, A. D., 1846, the then pueblo, now city of San
Francisco, was a town of the population of about one thousand inhabi-
tants, and on the 3d of March, A. D., 1851, the population thereof
'amounted to about thirty thousand persons, and that on the said 7th
of July, and on said third of March, the said pueblo or city, under and
by virtue of the grant aforesaid, and under and by virtue of the laws,
usages, and customs of the government of Mexico and California, all
and singular the premises aforesaid, except as aforesaid, were part and
parcel of the land and premises of said pueblo or city.
There are several adverse claims to the one herein set forth.
One Jose de Jesus who claims one square league, part of said pre-
mises, as particularly appears by his petition therefor now before your
Board, numbered thirty on the docket of claims. That Jacob Luis
Leese and Salvador Vallejo claim two hundred varas square, part of
said premises, which claim is particularly exhibited in the petition
therefor before your Board, numbered 74 on the docket of claims.
That James R. Bolton claims three square leagues (with exceptions)
part of said premises, which claim particularly appears in his petition
before your Board, and numbered 8 1 according to the docket of claims.
That Josefa de Haro and others, the " Potrero of San Francisco" being
one half square league, part of said premises, the particulars whereof
appear in third claim before your Board, number 101 on the docket of
claims.
That John F. Shultess, and others, claim thirty-seven vara lots, part
of said premises, particularly described in his petition, on file with
your Board, and numbered 171 according to docket of claims. That
the said John F. Shultess also claims forty-seven other fifty vara lots,
part of said premises, particularly described in his petition before your
Board, and numbered 172 of claims.
That Josefa de Haro and and others, claim premises known as the
" Laguna de la Merced," one league long and one half league wide,
and particularly described in their petition before your Board, num-
bered 102 of claims, and which is also part of premises herein first
described.
That one Thomas 0. Larkin claims a tract of land, parcel of said
premises, and including a portion of the incorporated limits of the city
of San Francisco to the west, and running thence westerly along the
waters of the bay to the Pacific Ocean, including the site of the Pre-
sidio, the quantity or particular description of his claim this claimant
is unable to state. That Charles V. Stuart and Isaac N. Thorne claim
a portion of said premises, known as Ridley's ranch, under a grant to
Jacob P. Leese oi one league and one half, situated contiguous to and
north of the Sanchez ranch, but a particular description thereof canno^,
be given by claimant.
The claimant represents to your honorable Board that all and singu.'
lar the foregoing adverse claims are insufficient and void. That all o:'
them were made subsequent to the establishment of the pueblo oyi
San Francisco, and that the grants thereof were in the derogation o:-
the lawful claim and right of the said pueblo. That some of them
were made after the authority of the government of Mexico in th^
Department of California had been superceded by the authority of the
government of the United States, that such is the fact particularly ir'
the case of the lands claimed by James R. Bolton as aforesaid, anc.
in the case of the lands claimed by Thomas 0. Larkin as aforesaid
'
also in the case of the lands claimed as aforesaid by John F. Shultesf.
and others, and by John F. Shultess. That all said claims are basec -
upon grants made without authority of law, and in direct violation o:
the laws and regulations of the government of Mexico in force ir
Califoraia.
The said city of San Francisco now insists that by the Treaty o:
Guadalupe Hidalgo, the laws of nations, and the laws, usages anc
customs of the government of Mexico, in force in California, as alsc
by force of the act of the Legislature of said State incorporating the.
said city, and the act of Congress of the United States, entitled "at
act to settle the private land claims in the State of California," ap'
proved March 3, 1851, the said city has good and lawful claim to al'
and singular the premises aforesaid, and said city relies upon the saic
laws, usages and customs, and proceedings in pursuance thereof, upor
the order made for the establishment of the pueblo of San Francisco
the record of other evidences of its existence, continuance and extenl
the grant to said pueblo as aforesaid, and upon such other evidence
as may be adduced, touching the premises, upon a full exhibition anc
consideration of all which premises it is prayed that such claim be ;
confirmed.
J. A. McDOUGALL,
For the city of San Francisco.
San Francisco, Feb. 11th, 1853.
On this day, before Commissioner Harry I. Thornton, came M. G
Vallejo, a witness in behalf of the claimant, city of San Francisco,
petition No. 280, and was duly sworn, his evidence being given ir
English.
QUESTIONS BY CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL.
Question 1.—What is your name and age, and place of residence.
I Answer.—My name is Mariano G. Vallejo, my age is 45, I reside
m Sonoma, and have lived in California all my life.
i Ques. 2.—What office did you hold in 1834, 1835, and 1836.
Ans>—I was at that time commandante of San Francisco, and of the
aorthern frontier of California.
Ques. 3.—Examine the document now here shown to you, filed
herewith, and marked Exhibit No. 1, and say whether you are acquain-
ted with the hand writing of Governor Figueroa signed thereto, and
f yea, whether his signature thereto is genuine or not, and state further
vhat you know in regard to that document
1 Ans.—I have examined the said Exhibit, and am well acquainted
with xhe hand writing of Figueroa signed thereto, having often seen
trim write, and have no doubt that his signature thereto is genuine.
This document was transmitted regularly to me, and recorded officially
with others for my instruction and guide in the discharge ofmy duties.
Ques. 4.—Examine the document marked Exhibit No. 2, and filed
lerewith, and say whether you are acquainted with the hand writing
)f Francisco de Haro, Francisco Sanchez, Joachim Castro and Juan
Mirando, whose names are attached to said document, and if yea, state
whether their signatures in and upon said document are their genuine
signatures.
Ans.—I have examined the said Exhibit No. 2, filed herewith; am
icquainted with the hand-writing of the persons named in the inter-
rogatory and whose signatures are made on said document having of-
ten seen them write, and say their signatures, where they occur
thereon are genuine.
Ques. 5.—Do you or not know whether the election of officers, as
stated in this last above named document took place ?
Ans.—The election of officers as stated in said document, did take
place.
Ques. 6.—Examine the document now shown to you, marked Ex-
hibit 3, and filed herewith, and say if you are acquainted with the
hand-writing of Francisco de Haro and Francisco Sanchez, signed to
said document, and if you can state whether their signatures thereto
are genuine ?
Ans.—I have examined the document marked Exhibit No. 3 here-
with filed, ?m acquainted with the hand-writing of the persons whose
names are signed thereto, having often seen them write, and their
signatures thereto are genuine.
Ques. 7.—State if you know whether or not the election of officers
referred to in this last named document took place as stated ?
Ans.—I know that said election did take place as stated.
Ques. 8.—State whether or not a municipal organization of the
pueblo of San Francisco was continued to the time of the occupation
of the country by the United States from the period of the elections
above named;
Ans.—There was a municipal organization of the said pueblo o_:
San Francisco during the whole period above indicated.
Ques. 9.—In the papers received by you from Governor FiguerosH
in 1834 was there any one designating the boundaries of the Puebic
of San Francisco.
Ans.—There was a paper received by me from the Governor for!'
that purpose.
J
Ques. 10—Examine the document now here shown to you marked'
Exhibit No. 4 to this deposition, and say whether to the best of your2
knowledge and belief it is a true copy of the original received by you;
;
as stated in your last answer written above.
Ans.—I have examined the said paper marked Exhibit No. 4 to this"
deposition and according to my best recollection it is a copy of the!
document received by me as above stated.
Ques. 11—State if you know where the original of the document
No. 4 above referred to now is ?
Ans.—I do not know where it now is if it be in existence ; I put it
among the Archives in the Pueblo, as I did other documents of that'
character.
Ques. 12.—Did you or not ever receive or have in your possession
a copy of the original referred to as Exhibit No. 4, certified by Augus-,
tus V. Zamarano, the Secretary of the Government under Governor
Figueroa ?
Ans.—I did have in my possession a copy of the said original docu-
ment referred to in my last answer certified by the said Secretary Za-
marano as Secretary of the Government under Figueroa.
Ques. 13.—Do you or not know what has become of that copy so
furnished to you ?
Ans.-—I think I have that copy among my private papers.
Ques. 14.—Have or not your private papers, among which this cer-
tified copy should be, been in the hands of Eaymond De Saldo at any
time within the last three months ?
Ans.—I believe they have been in his possession within that time.
Ques. 15.—Has or not the said De Saldo a portion of your private
papers now in his possession ?
Ans.—I think he has not. I think he returned all my papers.
Ques. 16.—Did you or not mark out the boundaries of the Pueblo
of San Francisco according to the boundaries described in document
Exhibit No. 4 to this deposition ?
Ans.—I did, before the time of receiving said document, proceed
to mark out the boundaries, and sent down to Monterey an Expedi-
ente thereof, and they were established by me within two weeks after
the date of the said dispatch Exhibit No. L
Ques. 17.—Do you remember any who were present with you at
the marking out and establishing these pueblo boundaries, and if, name
them? |j
I Ans.—There were present those I now remember : Francisco de
(Haro, Jose Sanchez, Francisco Cazeres and Juan Miranda. There are
imany others whose names I do not recollect, and those that I do re-
member are not all dead.
I Ques. 18.—Have you or not such a recollection of the boundaries
established by you, as that you could now describe them and point
fthem out.
t
Ans.—I have such recollection that I could point them out on the
ground and all the boundaries made, in fact, are on reflection, not nam-
;ed in the copy exhibit 4, to this deposition.
j
QUESTIONS BY UNITED STATES LAW AGENT.
! Ques. 1.—What extent of territory was comprehended in the per-
tido of San Francisco under the jurisdiction of the Ayuntiemento.
' Ans.—The partido comprehended the country on this side of the
j
bay as far as Los Pulgas, and on the other side of the bay the Rancho
of the Paraltas and Panoli ; the jurisdiction of the Ayuntamiento ex-
pended only to the limits of the pueblo. The partido was under the :
jurisdiction of civil Alcaldes.
1 Ques. 2.—Did the inhabitants of all this territory take part in the
election of the whole Ayuntamiento of San Francisco ?
Ans.—The greater part of the inhabitants of the partido lived in
San Francisco and voted there.
1 Ques. 3.—Did any of the persons who voted as electors for the
Ayuntamiento of San Francisco, live out of the limits of the pueblo ?
' Ans.—All lived in San Francisco except Joaquin Castro, and I don't
know whether he did or not.
Ques. 4.—Did the Ayuntamiento of San Francisco exercise juris-
diction over all the potrero ?
I Ans.—No sir I did not.
Ques. 5.—How long did the Ayuntamiento of San Francisco sub-
jsist?
' Ans.—I do not recollect.
M. G. VALLEJO.
U. S. Law Agent, present. Sworn to and subscribed before me this
11th of February, 1853. HARRY J. THORNTON, Commissioner.
i
Examination continued of the same witness by the claimant.
, Ques.—Examine the papers now shown to you and marked Nos. 5>
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and filed herewith as Exhib-
its and say if the signatures of Jose Figueroa, Jose Castro, Nicholas
Gutterrez, Francisco de Haro, Francisco Guerraro Palamares, Francisco
Sanchez, Antonio Maria Peralta, J. de L. Cruz, Manuel Jemino, Jesus
Noe, Juan N. Padilla, Juan Baulim and Robert T. Ridley are genuine
|or not?
i
Ans.—I have examined the papers which are marked as abotfe in
interrogatory and to be attached hereto ; I am acquainted with their a
band- writing, having seen them write, and say that their signatures j
respectively, where they appear in and upon said marked papers, are J
their genuine signatures.
Ques. 2.—Was there, or not, a town on the present site of the city ij
of San Francisco, on the 7th day of July, 1846, and on the 3d day of -J
March, 1851.
Ans.—There was a town on the present site of San Francisco, on
]
the 7th of July, 1846, and there was on the 3d of March, 1851, a town 1
on the site called San Francisco.
Ques.—Have you, or not, in your possession now, the paper referred I
to in your deposition, above taken mentioned in your answer to
J
question 12.
Ans.—I have the paper now in my possession, which was referred 1
to in my deposition as above mentioned, which is now here by me
produced to be attached to this deposition, and marked exhibit No. 18.
Ques.—Is, or not, the signature of Zamorano, if you know it, his
j
true and genuine signature to the said exhibit No. 18.
Ans.—I am acquainted with the handwriting of the said Zamorano,
]
having seen him write, and say that his signature in exhibit No. 18, is
his genuine signature.
Ques.—Has, or not, this document referred to, exhibit 18, been in
'
your possession ever since about the period of its date.
Ans.—I was in possession of it, except at the Bear Revolution, as it
is called, in 184G ; it, with my other papers, was taken from me, and
retained until after my own release ; I think my papers were not re-
turned to me until early in the year 1847, by Lieut. Revere of the U.
S. Navy.
Ques.—Is, or not, the paper now produced by you, and marked as
above, exhibit No. 18, to the best of your knowledge and belief, a true
copy of the original received by you from Gov. Figueroa, and delivered
over by you to the Alcalde of the pueblo De Haro.
Ans.—I have no hesitancy in saying that it is.
Ques.—Does or not this paper Exhibit No. 18, contain a true state-
.
ment of the boundaries of the Pueblo, as marked out by you ?
Ans.—It does contain the boundaries as they were established by
me.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY THE UNITED STATES LAW AGENT.
Ques.—When the Ayuntamiento was elected from the pueblo of
San Francisco, were any other Alcaldes elected for the portions of the
partido of San Francisco, out of the limits of the pueblo ?
Ans.—I do not recollect.
Signed M. G. VALLEJO.
U. S. Law Agent present.
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Sworn to and subscribed before me, this 15th dav of February, 1853.
Signed H. I. THORNTON, Commissioner.
Filed in office Feb'y 11th, 1853. GEORGE FISHER, Sec'y.
Exhibit No. 1, annexed to the Deposition of M. G. Vallejo.
Gov. Figueroa,by an official note bearing date Nov. 4, 1834, makes
known to Gen. Vallejo that the Territorial Deputation in use of the-
faculties conferred on them by the law of 23d June, 1813, had on the
day before resolved that the Partido of San Francisco might proceed
to elect a Constitutional Ayuntamiento which should reside in the
Presidio of that name, composed of one Alcalde, two Regidors, and
one Sindico Procurador, regulating itself in doing so by the Consti-
tution in force and by the law of 12th of June (it should be 12th of
July) 1830, and that report should be made of this resolution to the
Supreme Government. That the Ayuntamiento being installed should
exercise the political functions with which the Commandant had been
charged, and that the Alcalde should exercise the judicial functions in
defect of a Judge of Letters.
Exhibits No. 2 and 3 annexed to the Deposition of M. G. Vallejo.
That on the 7th December, 1834 and 13th December, 1835, prima-
ry elections were had for electors, who were to elect the municipal
officers ; the first being held in the Presidio of San Francisco, and
the second in the plaza of the " Pueblo of San Francisco de Asis,"'
but whether the election of Ayuntamiento took place, does not ap-
pear from any document on file.
Exhibit No. 5, annexed to the Deposition of M. G. Vallejo.
It appears that in the year 1835 the Constitutional Alcalde of " San
Francisco de Asis," appointed an Assistant Alcalde for Contra Costa,
which was approved by the Governor.
Exhibit No. 6, annexed, to the Deposition of M. G. Vallejo.
That the Territorial Deputation, by a resolution of 22d Sept., 1835,
authorized the Ayuntamiento of " San Francisco de Asis'' to grant lots
on which to build houses at the place called Yerba Buena,which lots were
not to exceed 100 varas square, and to be distant from the beach 200
varas, for which grants the canon, or tax, was to be paid to the Ayun-
tamento for the benefit of the municipal fund (propias) which might
be prescribed, (by the government of course,) and the Ayuntamiento
in the execution of this authorization were to have respect to regular-
l which is communicated by Jose Casto, Gefe Politico, to the " Al-
11
calde of San Francisco de Asis," in a note dated 26th Oct., 1835, in
order, as he says, that it may be made known to the residents of that I
Pueblo, so that they may not thereafter make their application to the t
government the granting thus authorized, being one of the favors I
which the Ayuntamiento can dispense.
]
Exhibit No. 7, annexed to the Deputation of 31. G. Yallejo. j
By an official note of 19th Jan. 1836, addressed by the Gefe Poli-
tico Gutieriz to the Alcalde of " San Francisco de Asis," this function-
j
ary is reminded of the necessity of a punctual compliance with the '
law of 22d July, 1833, requiring a monthly report of criminal causes.
Exhibit No. 8, annexed to the Deposition of M. G. Yallejo.
It appears that on the 3d December, 1837, in the "Pueblo of San \
Francisco de Asis" electors were chosen who, on the 8th Jan., 1838,
,
(Exhibit No. 9, annexed to the Deposition of M. G. Yallejo,) elected
an Alcalde, 2d Kegidor and Procurador Sindico for the year 1838.
Exhibit No. 10, annexed to the Deposition of M. G. Vallego.
By this it appears that Governor Alvarado in a Bando dated 17th .
Jan. 1839, premising that owing to circumstances, the elections under
the constitutional system (of 1837) had not yet taken place, and '
that he was desirous that the authorities which were authorized by
it should be established, ordained that the constitutional elections
should take place according to the law of 30 November, 1836,
beginning on the first Sunday of March then next following and
ending on the third Sunday of the same month ; that one elector
should be chosen for San Francisco, San Jose, Villa of Branciforte,
Monterey, Santa , Barbara, Los Angeles and San Diego; that for the
purpose of carrying these elections into effect certain places named
should be considered as cabezeras and among them the port of '
San Francisco was to be considered as the cabezeras of the whole fron-
tier north of it, that is the elections were to be held there. This
Bando appears to have been communicated by " Haro," to the Assist- :
ant Alcalde in Contra Costa.
Exhibit No. 11, annexed to the Deposition of M. G. Yallejo.
Don Manuel Micheltorrena by document dated Nov. 4, 1843, bearing
the signature of himself and Manuel Jimeno, recites that although
Justices of the Peace have been established in the pueblo of this de-
partment conformably to the law of March 20, 1837, the which confers
upon them the same powers and obligations as those belonging to the
Ayuntamientos yet it has been observed that in the capitals of dis-
tricts subjects of various classes are daily occurring which prevent
them from attendiug to the duties which devolve upon them in defect
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of an Ayuntamiento ; the Prefectures having also to cease for the
coming year and as a resolution on the subject has been taken by the
" Junta," in pursuance of the faculties conferred on them by the
Bases Organicas, His Excellency orders that the law respecting elec-
tions of 27 April 1837, be put in execution under the following regu-
lations :
1. That in Monterey and Los Angeles, being capitals of Districts
Ayuntamientos, shall be elected, composed of a first and second Alcalde,
four Regidores and one Sindico.
2. That in the " Pueblos of San Diego, Santa Barbara, San Juan
Villa of Branciforte," " Pueblo de San Jose, San Francisco and So-
noma," there shall be elected two Alcaldes, a first and second.
3. That on the second Sunday of the following December Gom-
promisarias shall be chosen, who, on the Friday preceding the third
Sunday of that month will elect the authorities specified in the pre-
ceding articles, observing, as far as necessary, the provisions of the law
of 19 June, 1843, in the part relating to " Elecciones, Secundarias,"
and other articles applicable.
4. That the first Alcaldes will discharge the functions of Judges of
first Instance, conformably to the decree of 15 July, 1839, and will
also be charged with the Prefectures of their respective Districts.
5. That on the 1st day of January, 1844, the newly elected officers
shall enter upon their duties and receive from those going out an
exact inventory of the Expedientes Boohs, and everything else per-
taining to said " Corporations," in order that it may be passed over
to the Departmental Assembly.
Exhibit No. 12 annexed to the Deposition of M. G. Vallejo.
A note dated 22d December, 1844, at "San Francisco," signed by
persons purporting to be President, Yice President and Secretaries of
elections, communicates to the Alcalde elect the notice of his election.
Exhibit No. 13, annexed to the Deposition of M. G. Vallejo.
Is an official note addressed by the Secretary of Government to the
Alcalde of "San Francisco," respecting auxiliary military force, (dated
July 7, 1844.)
Exhibit No 14, annexed to the Deposition of M. G. Vallejo.
Is a note of Micheltorrena to the "Alcalde of San Francisco," dated 11
March, 1844, acquainting him with an order that had been given to a
military officer, to present himself with 12 or 15 men to the Alcalde
of first instance of Yerba Buena, in order to suppress certain disorders
which had occured, and enforce due respect to the authority of said
Alcalde.
1o
a
Exhibit No. 15, annexed to the Deposition of M. G. Vallejo.
Is a note dated 20 January, 1844, by the Secretary of Governing
addressed to the " first Alcalde of the Port of San Francisco," 1
knowledging the receipt from him of the inventory of things pertal
ingto that Juggado. •
\
i
Exhibit No. 16, annexed to the Deposition of If. G. Vallejo. I
Is a note dated 5 March, 1845, of the Secretary of Government r
the first Alcalde of" San Francisco," communicating a decree of Go
eminent by which the note says : The Alcalde will be informed I
the desires of his Excellency, and that his object is to secure by sois
efficacious mode, the property of the inhabitants of the department m
doubting that he will have the due co-operation of the respect^
authorities. *
Exhibit No. 17 annexed to the Deposition of If. G. Vallejo.
Then comes the inventory " of 1845 of all that has been archived fro
the establishment of the Ayuntamiento in 1835 until the end of t;
year 1845, and of the furniture, &c, of which Jose de la Cruz Sanch<-
Alcalde going out makes delivery, to the citizen, Jesus Noe, 1st Ji
tice of the Peace coming into office and beginning with the year 184(^
It is dated at aYerba Buena," Jan. 15, 1846, and is perhaps the mc
pertinent and interesting of all the documents, and evidence in tl
case at it exhibits at a single view the whole patrimony of the "I
eblo." It consisted at that date of a desk in which the archives we
kept, a plain table, a new cloth carpet of ordinary quality, an inkstan
a brass candle stick, four chairs, a very good padlock, two chains, ai
a pair of fetters which just at that time, however, had been carried <
but were to be hunted up. There was also an old woolen carpet whi
the Alcalde thought to exclude as "used up," after due consideratiy'
the old carpet was finally excluded as useless and receipt given f.
the balance by the Justice of the Peace.
Exhibit No. 18 annexed to the Deposition of M. G. Vallejo.
Political Government of Alta California.
Head-quarters General of Alta California.
The Government, satisfied with the zeal and activity which charg
terizes you, as well as the patriotism which animates you, sees in yo
official note of the 24th October last, a new proof of your veheme
desire for the progress, and of your untiring efforts for the impro^
ment and aggrandisement of your country and of your fellow-ci
zens.
In consequence, it affords me pleasure to inform you, in accordant
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|th its request, that the E. D. T. has adopted in its totality, the plan
!.'dch you presented in your note aforesaid, with regard to the pueblo
i:
San Francisco, declaring the boundaries to be the same that you
;lineated in the said note. That is, commencing at the little cove at
; of the Fortaleza, following the line traced by you as far as the shore,
uving to the north the Casamata and the Fortaleza; thence following
'(3 border of the said shore to the Point of Lobos on its southern
jle ; thence following a straight line as far as the peak of the Devi-
lero, (Lookout,) continuing the said line towards the E. as far as the
•^int of the Rincon, embracing the Ganutales and the Gentil. Said
; .e shall terminate within the bay of the Mission Dolores, whose estu-
w shall serve for a natural boundary between the municipal juris-
ption of that Pueblo and the aforesaid Mission de Dolores.
The Government, in proof of the confidence which your services
i
spired, has arranged that you shall be he who will have the honor
\. installing the first Ayuntamiento in that Pueblo of San Francisco,
]? which you have already done so much.
• You will therefore proceed at the time and in the mode provided
I law to the election of the municipal authorities, in order that they
\ installed on the first of January of the coming year, 1835 ; setting
:
art for public buildings those edifices which to you may seem most
propriate.
God and Liberty.
,' Monterey, Nov. 4, 1834.
I
Signed, JOSE FIGUEROA.
I
Military Commander of San Francisco,
DON MARIANO G. VALLEJO.
It is a true copy,
ZAMORANO.
BEFORE COMMISSIOKER ALPHEUS FELCH.
" My name is Julius K. Rose ; my profession is that of attorney-at-
w ; my age, thirty years and upwards ; and I reside in the city of
in Francisco, in the State of California. I have resided in that city
ice August, in the year 1849 ; I did know a person of the name of
rancisco Gurrero ; I knew him from August, 1849, to the time of his
iath, which took place about one and a half or two years ago ; I was
?ry well acquainted with him ; he was a client of mine, and was
most every day in my office, and I was at his house almost every
mday. I have had conversations with him in reference to the
mndaries or limits of the pueblo, of which the present city of San
rancisco is claimed to be a part. I owned a piece of land at the
Mission, and as it was all the land I had in the world, I felt very
lxious to know what the title was. To ascertain this I had several
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conversations with Mr. Gurrero, in one of which I asked him if tl^i
land was not included in the limits of the pueblo, the existence i
which I then took for granted. He replied that it was not, and pi.l
duced a plan of what he called the pueblo ; he undertook to expla li-
the boundaries of the pueblo to me from that plan, but as I was veri'
little acquainted with the shape of the peninsula on which San Fra-
cisco stands, and knew but little of the Spanish language, he propose,
to go out some day and look at the lines of the pueblo, and seveiD
other ranches. A few days afterwards, we went out on horsebac
and he pointed out the lines to me of what he called the pueblo
'
San Francisco, as well as those of several adjacent ranches, to wit : tl
northern line of Buriburi, and the lines of Ranch o de la Merced, J^
Noe's rancho, which, I think, was called e San Miguel' ; Mr. Ridley
rancho, which, I think, is called ' Yisitacion," and a rancho belong^
to a Spanish woman, called, I think, ' The Widow Bernal,' and tl
rancho known as * The Potrero.' The limits, as pointed out to me 1
him from a very high hill, were as follows : he described the bounc^
ries as commencing just at the entrance of the bay at the Golden Gat
running from that point, to a hill about half a mile distant from th :
point ; to the hill on which we stood, and which is a very high, rout,
hill, from that place to the southern extremity of Rincon Point, whe'
it runs into Mission Bay, and from that point by the line of the b&
to the Golden Gate, at the place of beginning. The hill on which v
stood was a conical hill, very high and running to a small peak,
could be easily distinguished, because it was the highest land in th
vicinity, and one that a person would not forget, who had been on
once ; I have heard it called ' Devisadero,' but never heard it so calk
until lately ; I should think it was about one mile from the first h
which I mentioned in describing the boundaries ; it may be muc
further ; I never traveled the space between them. As near as I cs
judge, I should think it was about three miles from the Devisadero i
the place where the line would strike the southernmost extremities .
Bincon Point in Mission Bay ; the point which I call ' Rincon Pour,
in Mission Bay, is upwards of half a mile from the point known as Ri.
con Point, in the city of San Francisco ; I cannot tell exactly how fa
I considered Gurrero about forty years old when I knew him ; he hs
been Justice of the Peace and, I believe, Prefect, but am not certa:
of that ; he was a very intelligent man ; I think he had a good knov
ledge of business affairs, and an excellent memory; I have heard
remarked, that he was the only Californian capable of holding his o-w
after the Americans came here ; he claimed to be a joint owner wit
Mr. Fitch, of a rancho of about half a league, near the Presidio
; I b
lieve it was under a title derived from a Governor of California,
asked him if he thought his title was good, and he replied in a jocuh
way, ' that his title to the land was good, if that of the pueblo w; :
not good.'
"
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..Question.—Describe more particularly the point of starting in the
l
scription of boundaries above given.
: Answer.—The starting point is a promontory at the mouth of the
: rbor, near a pile of rocks which are always covered with sea-lions
;
Sm this point to the Devisadero, the line is not exactly straight, but
'Aviates a little to the small hill before described; the lines would
prm an angle at the small hill of about a hundred and fifty degrees
;
(.may be mistaken in my recollection of these lines ; the land between
.e Devisadero and the promontory at the starting point is sandy, and
11
some places covered with small bushes
;
I could go on to the land
( d point out all these landmarks; I never heard Guerrero say by
^honi these lines of the pueblo limits had been marked out; I think
^must have been about the year 1850, in the early part of that year,
hen Guerrero pointed out these limits to me ; when I examined the
5
ap with Mr. Guerrero, I thought it did not give a correct delineation
' the shape of the peninsula, but when We reached the top of the
_gh hill I was surprised to find the shape of the country what it is,
id I saw it corresponded with the general features as laid down on
e map, but whether the map corresponded with the particular land-
arss which he pointed out, I cannot say ; I have never, to my know-
Jdge, seen the map since. JULIUS K. ROSE.
j
before commissioner robert a. thompson.
My name is Henry L. Ford ; my age, thirty years ; and residence,
plusi Count}^, California , I have resided in California since the 14th
' September, 1842. In 1843, I knew nearly all the persons who re-
eled in San Francisco at that time. In March, 1844, I was riding
om San Francisco to the Mission Dolores, in company with Captain
inckle}^, at that time Alcalde of San Francisco, and in the course of
le conversation he stated to me that the pueblo line commenced at a
Dint of rocks on the coast, beyond the Presidio, and ran over in a di-
3ct line, crossing Mission Creek near its mouth, to a point of rocks or
Dulders, at a place known, at that time, as the " Potrero." Capt.
vinckley died in 1846 ; he was regarded as a very intelligent man ; I
apposed him to be about forty years of age. I had a conversation
-ith Francisco Guerrero, who died in June or July, 1851. A short
:
me before his death, he was showing me a piece of land on the north
»de of Mission Creek, which he stated had been granted him by the
» lcalde of the pueblo of San Francisco ; he was standing on the south
jde of the creek at the time, and he stated, that the land on that side
^longed to the ilission, and on the other to San Francisco ; he also
pinted out to me the way the line ran between the Mission and the
fueblo, and where it would strike the bay which was very near the
"oint formerly shown me by Hinckley ; the place pointed out to me
jy Capt. Hinckley, was just below the juncture of the main creek
dth another, coming in on the south side.
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Question.—Look on the map, marked A, and with the initials, R T.'
herewith filed, purporting to be a map of the northern portion of th
county of San Francisco, and state, if you can identify on said mar-
the point described in your last answer.
Answer.--It would cross near where the letter R occurs in the word'
u Mission Creek," which is identified by a small cross on said map ; thi
place was called "Yerba Buena," when I knew it, from 1842 to 184C
it was generally called "San Francisco," by the Americans and Eng
lish ; the people of the country generally called it " Yerba Buena;
the Mission was called the "Mission Dolores." I believe Francisc
Guerrero was Alcalde or Justice of the Peace of this jurisdiction be
lore I came here ; during the time that I knew him, he resided part o
the time at the Mission and part of the time at his ranch on the coast
the piece of land which Guerrero pointed out to me in 1851 as ha~\
ing been granted to him by an Alcalde of San Francisco, he stated t
me, was four hundred varas ; I think I could point the land out if
was at the Mission ; Mr. Hinckley lived in this place ; the precise spof
as near as I can recollect, would be between Clay and Sacrament
streets, and between Montgomery and Kearny; Jack Fuller lived be
tween Sacramento and California streets, and between Montgomer
and Kearny
; in 1845, a Frenchman built a house in what is now know:
as
u Happy Valley"; I do not know whether he owned the land ; I kno^
of no other this side of the Mission. HENRY L. FORD.
United States of America, | ^
State of California. J
San Francisco, April 13, 1854.
This day personally came before Peter Lott, a commissioner for tat
ing testimony to be used before the Board of IT. S. Land Commissior
ers in said State, John J. Vioget, a witness on behalf of the claiman
in case No. 280, on the docket of said board, in which the city of Sa:
Francisco is claimant, and the said witness being duly sworn, on oatl
deposed in the English language as follows, to wit
:
The U. S. Law Agent is present.
QUESTIONS BY COUNSEL FOR CLAIMANT.
Question 1.—What is your name, age and present residence ?
Answer.—My name is John J. Vioget ; my age 55 years ; I resid
now in San Francisco County, California.
Ques. 2.—In what year did you first arrive at San Francisco ?
Answer.—I arrived here in July 1837.
Ques. 8.—State whether or not you made a map of the town c
18
i
i^erba Buena, and if yea, in what year, and by whose direction was
;he map made ?
]
Answer.—In the winter of 1839 and 1840, I was requested by
Lhe Alcalde, Guerrero, to form a plan of a town, former grants having
(been made in irregular form ; I accordingly made a plan which
brought most of those lots in the squares of blocks, some few would
fall in the streets, one or two were so situated that the location of them
had to be changed.
i
Ques. 4.—State what portion of the present city of San Francisco
was embraced in plan you made out, and laid off into blocks and
streets.
(This question objected to by the Law Agent, as improper without
the map referred to, being presented.)
: Ans.—The west side of Montgomery street was made the base line,
md was intended for the city front ; then I drew Sacramento street,
Olay, Washington, Jackson and Pacific streets as they are now called,
then at right angles Kearny street, Dupont, and as Capt. Richardson's
aouse (Stood angling off from Dupont in that direction which went off
:owards North Beach ; I laid off no streets south of Sacramento street,
or west of Dupont street ; I laid off the lots on the outside or south
side of Sacramento street that had been previously granted ; I recol-
lect Fuller's lot on that side ; Fuller's was the only lot on that side
which I laid off, and Richardson's and Leese's west of Dupont.
Ques. 5.—State whether or not you received any instructions from
the Alcalde how to make the plan of the town, or of its limits, and
why did you lay off no other streets than those you have named ?
i
[This question objected to by the Law Agent.
J
,
Ans.—The only instruction I got from Guerrero was, to regulate
the grants already made, and so as to have a regular plan for future
grants, I mean by regulating the grants already made, that I should
make my plan to accommodate the lines of the streets and blocks as
far as practicable so as to embrace the lots already granted within that
plan. There was no limit stated to me, I made no more streets, be-
cause I saw no necessity for them, I dotted them off so that they could
L
,be made afterwards if they wanted them. In my original map I marked
the line from Rincon Point out to North Beach forming the blocks as
c
the nucleus of the town where I have stated, that was on the old map
,which I sent to the Governor at Monterey.
,
Ques. 6.—When you were instructed by Guerrero to make the map
,or plan, did he state to you anything, if so what, as to the authority
(Under which he was proceeding to have the map made ?
M (This question objected to by the Law Agent as hear-say testimony
t
and incompetent.
)
| Ans.-—He never gave it to me in writing, he told me the Governor
Alvarado had ordered it.
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Ques. 7.—Is Guerrero the Alcalde now living, if nay, where did h€
die ?
Ans.—Guerrero is dead, I think he died a year and a half or twc;
years ago.
Ques. 8.—State whether or not at the time you made the map oi
plan you have mentioned, you had knowledge of the existence of any;
prior map having been made of the town, before yours ?
Ans.—I never- saw, nor heard of any such.
Ques. 9.—Was or was not Capt. Wm. A. Richardson residing in the
town, at the time you made the said map, and do you know whethei
or not he was aware that you was engaged in making the map or plat
Ans.—Capt. Richardson's family was living in his house, but Capt
Richardson was sailing about the bay nearly all the time, occasionally
he came home. I do not know whether he knew I was engaged
I
though he must have known it very shortly after it was done. Capt.,
Richardson's house which I speak of, was up on Dupont street.
Ques. 10.—State whether or not the fact that you were engaged ir.
making the map and plat of the town, was at the time, when yon,,
were so engaged, a notorious, and well known fact ?
Ans.—The inhabitants saw me doing the work, and I suppose thej
must have known what I was doing it lor.
Ques 11.—When and from whom did you first hear of the map
said to have been made by Capt. Richardson of the town of Yerba
Buena ?
Ans.—I never knew of the existence of any such map till Jose Y
Limantour spoke to me of it last year.
CROSS-EXAMINED BY U. S. LAW AGENT.
Ques.—Where did you reside from 1839 to 1846?
Ans.—From 1839 to 1843 I lived in San Francisco on the cornei
of Clay and Kearny streets as it is now called, the southeast corner,
and from 1843 to 1846 I was occupied as commander of a vessel
mostly at sea, occasionally coming ashore.
Ques. 2. How were you occupied during the time from 1839 tc
1843 ?
Ans.—I was occupied in trade, I was constantly here about the place
during that period.
Ques. 3.—Do you know whether Francisco Guerrero, whom you
have mentioned held the office of Alcalde or of Justice of the Peace
at the time when he requested you to make the plan which you have
referred to ?
Ans.—We called him Alcalde, I certainly understood him to be
Alcalde at that time, I do not know positively.
Ques. 4.—Look at the paper now shown to you, marked " Exhibit
No. 1, A. F. annexed to the deposition of Victor Prudon, filed in No.
20
74," and state whether it is an exact copy of a plan to which you have
I Referred as having been made by you at said Guerrero's request ?
| Ans.—This map is a copy not made by me, but is a copy of the
i:map which I made and presented to Guerrero, with the exceptions of
,|the dotted lines at the ends of the streets,. It differs from my map
] Wso in the way in which the Plaza or Portsmouth Square is laid down.
iMy map made said Plaza to embrace all the block between Clay and
t Washington, Dupont and Kearney, except two fifty vara lots on the
(West side of said block. This map only makes the Plaza embrace one
fifty vara lot. This map also differs from mine in the east part.
i
'Montgomery street is not laid off here in the vicinity of the place
balled on this map "Laguna," as it was on my map. I laid off the
i
blocks on Montgomery regularly as far north as Pacific street, with
I
the exception of one fifty vara lot at the corner of Washing-
ton street. The vacant space on this map at the corner of Jack-
i3on and Montgomery, was laid out as forming a lot on my map.
Ques. 5. Where did Francisco Guerrero reside and keep his office
jat the time he gave the order to you to make the plat, and where did
lie live afterwards till he died ?
Ans.—He lived at the Mission Dolores at that time, and always
f
afterwards till he died, I believe. I never knew him to live any
;
where else.
• Ques. 6.—Is the Mission Dolores the same place which was known
and called by the name of San Francisco de Asis ?
t
' Ans.—It was more usually called Misson Dolores. I have heard it
called Mission of San Francisco de Asis. It is the same place.
I
I
JOHN J. VIOGET.
1 Subscribed and sworn to before me on this
13th day of April, A. D., 1854.
PETER LOTT,
,' Commissioner for taking testimony &c.
I
TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN HALLECK
: I
Question I.—How long have you been in California,, in what ca-
pacity did you come, and what offices have you held ?
if Answer.—I came in January 1847 ; came as an engineer officer to
examine the Pacific coast with respect to its military defences, under
ithe orders of the Secretary of War. A few months after my arrival,
i?l was made Secretary of State of California, which office I held till
;December 1849, and as such had charge of the archives of the former
ii'government of California, and retained charge of them until some
;<time in February 1850, at Monterey, when I delivered them over to
;<Major Canby, Assistant Adjutant General. After I turned them over
vihey were moved to Benicia by the Military Department, where they
^remained until delivered to the Surveyor General.
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Ques. 2.—State whether at the time you had charge of the archives,
it became your duty, under any orders or otherwise, to examine and
make repoits upon them, and what was your opportunity to examimif
and know their contents ?
Ans.—I was directed by Gov. Mason to examine the archives anc
report on certain points connected with the law titles, which I did
,
the examination was not very thorough in consequence of the^
archives being very voluminous. They were at that time in grea!
confusion, located at different places in the town. Parts of the docu-
ments were found in different places. With the assistance of Mr
Hartwell I arranged them in the best manner I could under the cir-
cumstances.
Ques. 3.—Have you any knowledge of the loss of any of them ?
Ans.—I saw a portion of the archives in the Custom House, which
was then used as a hospital for the soldiers and marines, They were
using them as waste paper. There were supposed to be Custom House
documents, until they were examined and of no value. Some weeks
after I picked from the floor a mutilated paper, and on examination'
found it to be part of an expediente of land title. Called Gen. Kear-
ney's attention to the fact, and he sent Mr. Hartwell to examine them.
He reported they were part of the archives, mixed up with the Custom
House papers, when they were removed to a place of security. An-
other portion of what now constitutes the archives in the office of the'
Surveyor General, were brought by Col. Fremont from Los Angeles,
in May, 1847. They were packed on mules and considerably torn
from running under trees. They were in a very [ ] state. These
constitute the papers of the archives at that time. Subsequently in-
dividuals brought in others, and when stated to be part of the archives,
were filed, and the time of their filing endorsed on them.
Ques. 4.—State whether in the examination of any of these docu-
ments, you discovered any relating to the public lands of San Francisco
or Yerba Buena, if so, what were they, and when did you last see
them ?
Ans.—I do not recollect to have seen any title or document defining
the title of San Francisco or Yerba Buena. I recollect to have seen
documents and correspondence between the Governors. Military Com-
mandants and Alcaldes of the Presidio and Pueblo of Yerba Buena
and San Francisco. These names were used indifferently. In these
papers the municipal lands and common lands of the Pueblo were
frequently mentioned proprios and egidos.
Ques. 5.—Can you particularize any of these papers ?
Ans.—I cannot recollect the documents particularly ; in the expe-
diente of the Potrero Nuevo, the boundaries of the pueblo is alluded
to, but not defined ; showed the document to Jimeno, former Secre-
!
tary of M. Torena ; he said that at that time the exact boundaries
of the pueblo were not known to him or M., and for that reason a :
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.
blause was put in making it subject to that line
;
this was the expe-
miente of the young De Haro ; that he believed the line at or near
Mission creek.
Ques. 6.— State whether you have examined the Archives in the
'pffice of the Surveyor General, with a view to the title of the pueblo
;
'pud if so, whether or not, there is now to be found there all the papers
im relation to it, which you saw at Monterey ?
'i Ans.—I have examined within the last year very thoroughly for
ijthe correspondence of Gov. Figueroa, Gen. Vallejo and the Alcalde of
fpan Francisco, and find the greater portion of that of 1834 and 1835
'missing
; the early part of the year 1834 is very complete.
| Ques. 7.—Have you seen any documents in the office of the Alcalde
|
.of San Francisco, relating to her pueblo rights of land, and if so, state
'when and what ?
...
Ans.—In February or March, 1850, 1 was employed by J. W. Geary,
1 first Alcalde, to examine the archives in his office, and select out such
,;papers as had reference to the title of the pueblo lands here for the
juse of the City Attorney, in a suit between it and Justice Colton ; the
.^examination of the archives was commenced but not finished, Colton
•having absconded ; there was a large mass of Spanish documents ; I
•should think a cart load ; I recollect that we found documents in the
.form of letters of the Governors and authorities here, which were
[deemed sufficient to prove the establishment of a pueblo, and the con-
trol of the authorities over the municipal lands of the pueblo ; among
the papers, I then saw, were the papers now filed in this case, No. 1,
1 6, 9, 10, 11, 15, deposition (of) M. G. Vallejo, having read and marked
ithem ; I remember there were a great many other papers relating to
,it, letters, decrees, &c. ; I recollect one paper which is not among these,
.being a letter from Governor Figueroa to the Alcalde, subsequent in
I
date to document No. 1 above, with reference to the boundaries of the
i
pueblo, which were to be fixed by the military authority; considered
1
this fas an important document leading to the discovery of others,
I
among the military papers in relation to the boundaries of the pueblo •
I
they prove the earliest foundation of the pueblo being filed; these
jj
papers were all left in the custody of the Alcalde, and the one men-
jtioned was in date next in order to No. 1 as I recollect; the number
ed papers were handed me in 1853, by Major Brenham ; the letter of
Figueroa recognized the pueblo, and said its boundaries would be
,
marked out ''by the military authorities; my recollection of the con-
tents of the letter is, that the boundaries of the pueblo would be
, marked out by the military authorities ; I have since my examination
,
in 1850, made a thorough examination for, and have been enabled to
I
find the letter of Figueroa before spoken of; I do not know that it
i
was all, but there was a large mass of military correspondence and
documents in the Alcalde's office in 1850, No. 1 was found among the
.
military and not the civil papers.
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Ques. 8.—Do you know what became of the papers in the Alcalde'^
office, when it was abolished ? Have you recently, within the lasj.
year, made search for them ? And if so, what efforts have ycu madl]
and with what success ? i
Ans.—The book of records were transferred to the County Records
er's office. The record of cases in litigation before the Alcalde, wer^j!
transferred to the district and other state courts. But I never coulc
find the great mass of the documents, and know of no law
making any disposition of them. Within the last year I have made
search when I thought it likely they would be found, but without suc-
cess. I have seen a paper in the hands of private individuals, which
from their character, I believe was part of them ; but these papers oi,i
little importance, not relating to the Pueblo title.
John W. Geary was the last Alcalde, he now resides in Pennsylva-
nia ; he left here in 1851.
Ques. 9.—State whether or not several fires have occurred in thej
city which destroyed, &c.
Ans.—Since I saw these records in the early part of 1850, several
fires swept over the parts of the city in which the public offices were
situated, destroying them ; and I know that portions of the records ol
the courts were destroyed, among them the Mayor's officej &c.
Ques. 10.—State whether you had a conversation with William A.,
Richardson, whose deposition has been taken in this case in relation
to a grant of lots to him near the Presidio ; if so, state the whole
conversation, and when it occurred.
Ans.—I arrived on the 13th of February, 1847, and on the same
day in company with Captain Warner, under Gen. Kearney's orders,
examined the fort at the point and the Presidio, with the intention to
have them occupied with troops. Within a few days Thomas 0.
Larkin, or Leidesdorff, his agent, objected on the ground that it be-l
longed to him under a grant to Benito Diaz. I was directed to make^
inquiries of some of the old inhabitants: I went to Mr. Richardson,
who was then Collector of the Port, he said the grant to Benito Diaz
could not be good, because the land on which the Presidio was situa-
ted belonged to the pueblo of San Francisco : That it was the centre
of the pueblo, that he had two lots near the Presidio, and. others. He
pointed out his at the time in front of the Presidio, we being in a boat
at the time ; on account of this information and some other obtained
by Gen. Kearney it was determined to take and keep possession which
was done, notwithstanding the claim of title.
(Objected to, because he had not been put on his guard by asking
in relation to the conversation.)
Ques. 11.—What was the character of the documents you saw at
Monterey, in relation to the pueblo of San Francisco ?
Ans.—The correspondence was literally in this shape : The comma- .
nication of the Alcalde was srenerallv folded and endorsed, and in the
;
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pside the answer or reply was enclosed in it. Sometimes the reply
was endorsed on the Alcalde's communication. This correspondence
Related to affairs in the place. Its general character was to communi-
cate everything as it occurred here. The correspondence of the
Alcalde ran through from 1835 until the taking possession by the
.TJnitecl States. My recollection of the correspondence is that it dated
indifferently pueblo of" Yerba Buena," and pueblo of " San Francisco,"
\ Ques. 12.—Who were the Alcalde's communications signed by ?
I Ans.—De Haro, Hinckley, and others. There was a long corres-
pondence contesting Hinckley's eligibility as not being a citizen.
\
Ques. 13.—How many communications did you see there which you
.lean now identify ?
* Ans.—I think I must have seen a hundred, but of them I can only
.particularize by reference to their subject matter. There must have
[been five or six in relation to the Hinckley contest. There were three
•or four in relation to the troops at the Presidio taking charge of the
I civil prisoners. I remember a number from the Alcalde, say half a
dozen, with reference to the holding the sessions at the Mission, in-
stead of at the Presidio. The Governor at first refused, but after-
'wards consented, and probably fifteen or twenty communications in
respect to elections. I do recollect reports of ;he receipts and ex-
penditures of the municipal funds of the town.
Ques. 14.—Was the Presidio ever called the "Presidio of Yerba
Buena ? "
Ans.—I never heard it called the Presidio of " Yerba Buena" but
of " San Francisco." The term "Yerba Buena" was generally applied
to the place or landing, taking the name from a kind of mint growing
there.
Ques. 15.—What is the distance from the Presidio to the landing of
Yerba Buena ?
Ans.—Two, or two and a half miles.
Ques. 16.—Do you recollect seeing any particular paper among the
archives when the lines of a pueblo were spoken of?
Ans.—I recollect only one which was the Potrero Grant to Fran-
cesco and Ramon de Haro.
The within minutes of the deposition of Capt. Halleck is admitted
to be read in evidence with the same effect as the original, the original
having been mislaid or lost, it being understood that the claimant shall
furnish a copy of the paper spoken of in relation to the Potrero.
May 13th, 1854. J. H. McKUNE, Law Agent.
DEPOSITION OF WM. A. RICHARDSON.
My name is Wm. A. Richardson ; I was born in England, and now
reside at Saucelito, Marin County, California ; my age is 58 years ; I
have resided 31 years in California; during the first seven years, I
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lived at the Presidio of San Francisco. I resided from the latter par,
of the year 1829, to the early part of 1835, at San Gabriel; from Jul}
1835 to June 1841, I resided at Yerba Buena, and from that time untj
this date, I have resided at Saucelito, my present residence. I hel<
under the Mexican government the office of Captain of the Port o,
San Francisco ; I was first appointed to that office by General Figue
roa in 1835, but did not receive my commission until January 1837
I held the office until the latter part of the year 1844 ; November o
December, I think. When I came to reside at Yerba Buena ther*
were no inhabitants there ; there had been no lands or lots grante<
to any individuals at that time, to my knowledge. In the early par
of the month of October 1835, I received a one hundred vara lot i:
Yerba Buena, situated in what is now Dupont street, on the south-wes
side of that street, on the north side of the Adelphi Theatre. Ther
is a street called Pike street at the back end of the lot. I received i
by order of the Territorial Deputation to the Alcalde of the Mission c
San Francisco de Asis.
The paper purporting to be a letter addressed by Jose Castro to mc
bearing date, October 20, 1835, marked exhibit No. 1, with the initk
'A. F.' was not received by me from Castro in person, but I receive
it from Don Francisco de Haro, the Alcalde.
I have often seen Jose Castro sign his name ; this is his signature
The plan mentioned in the said letter, which I had formed for begir
ning the settlement at Yerba Buena, is one that I made by order c
De Haro, the said Alcalde. The paper purporting to be a maj
marked exhibit No. 2, with the initials ' A. F.,' is the original plan
;
copy of it was sent to the Political Government, by order of the sam
Alcalde De Haro. I recommended the situation of the limits of th
settlement or town of Yerba Buena to General Figueroa, while at th
Mission of San Gabriel in May 1835 ; I recommended the cleare
place for it. There was a plan of Yerba Buena made in 1839, but nc
by the government or the authorities. It was made by order of th
people of the town, and under a survey made by Capt. Vioget. Ther
.was no other plan adopted by the authorities but the one here presen1
ed and marked exhibit No. 2.
There was no pueblo or town of San Francisco before July, 184(
When I came here in 1835, the Ayuntamiento of San Francisco hel
their meetings at the Mission of San Francisco Asis, and continued t
hold them at that place until the war of 1846. When I first cam
here, the Ayuntamiento was chosen by a vote of the people. It coi
sisted of an Alcalde, one Regidor, one Sindico Procurator, and on
Juez de Campo, or Justice of the plains. I do not recollect how Ion
these officers continued to be elected by votes. There were seven
changes and they were sometimes appointed by the Governor. I hav
looked at the document marked Doc. H. J. T., No. 18. I have neve
seen it before ; I don't know the writing ; it is a strange hand-writin
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,to me. I am well acquainted with the hand-writing of Zamorano
;
jbave been in the office with him, and have often seen him write and
"dgn his name, and have had documents from him ever since 1828,
juntil his death. The signature at the bottom of the last mentioned
jpaper is not the signature of Zamorano. The words il Es copia con-
forme," immediately preceding the signature are not in his hand-
writing. I never heard of a town called San Francisco, being laid off
lis represented in this document, nor of a grant to a town of that name.
|[ have heard of a grant of land to a town or pueblo called Yerba
'Buena. In 1835, in the month of October, the Alcalde of the Mission
of San Francisco de Asis, Don Francisco de Haro, received orders from
pe Political Government to lay off a small town at the Yerba Buena
for the convenience of locating public offices at the port of San Fran-
cisco, for the convenience of the shipping, as the place called Yerba
Buena was the general anchorage for shipping at that time. The
same orders directed me to assist De Haro in doing it, and the orders
ilso directed De Haro to give me a one hundred vara lot, and to re-
serve two hundred varas all along the beach for government buildings,
md to make a plan of the place selected and measured off for the
'iown. It was laid off as represented by the plan or map marked
Exhibit No. 2, with the initials A. F., and the notes thereon. A copy
iff this plan was delivered to the magistrate De Haro ; he requested
ne to keep the original in my possession. We had no compass at the
ime of the survey. The notes on the map have reference to the
limits of the town as established by the magistrate. The limits estab-
ished by the magistrate were as follows : They first measured off the
wo hundred varas from the beach, for the Government Reserve, in a
outh-west direction; then they measured off a certain distance to a
)lace intended for a street, which they called " Calle de la Funda-
;ion." I think this was two hundred varas Irom the Reserve. From
'his street they then measured off three hundred varas more in the
'lame direction to the south-west ; then from the south-east they com-
menced on the first sand-hill and measured in a north-west direction
'Jong the said " Calle de la Fundacion," four hundred varas, and
there located my lot ; it was the fifth one hundred vara lot. They
"hen continued on the same line to the beach of the bay. The first
and-hill laid in a north-east and south-west direction ; the north-east
\>art terminating in the bay to the southward of a small lake which was
In the beach ; it run to the south-west and terminated three hundred
;
'aras from the parallel of the street above named. These boundaries
1
»f the pueblo of Yerba Buena were approved by the Territorial Gov-
ernment. I learned this by the letter which was read to me by the
Magistrate of San Francisco de Asis, when he delivered me the letter
before mentioned and marked Exhibit No. 1. In the paper marked
•')oc. No. 2, purporting to be a certificate of the election of certain
Persons named therein as Electors for the Ayuntamiento of San Fran-
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cisco, dated Dec. 7, 1834, I recognize three of the signatures thereon
affixed, namely, Francisco de Haro, Francisco Sanchez and Joaquin1
Castro ; the other I do not recognize. Ignacio Peralta, at the time of
his election, lived at Eancho San Antonio in Contra Costa; Joaquin
Castro and Antonio Castro lived at rancho San Pablo in Contra Costa,
and Francisco Soto lived on his farm in Contra Costa near the Mission1
of San Jose. These persons were all connected by marriage with per-
sons living at the Presidio of San Francisco and the Mission of Sari
Francisco de Asis, and were frequently at these places—sometimes
months together ; but their permanent locations were as above stated.
The father of Ignacio Peralta was living at the time, and resided at
the Pueblo San Jose. I don't know whether the rancho on which Ig-
nacio Peralta lived belonged to the father in person, or the father and
family. I have known ranchos in California belonging to a father and'
his family ; my rancho in Saucelito and several others ; Saucelito was'
granted so by the Mexican Government. I have seen Ignacio Peralta
in the Presidio of San Francisco, and in the Mission of San Francisco
de 4sis. He was a soldier when I came here in 1822, and for several
years after. He did not reside here in 1835 or 1836. There were
about twenty-five or thirty persons in the presidio in 1835 or 1836,
but I do not believe there were over ten or twelve men. About the
same number resided at that time at the mission of San Francisco de
Asis, according to my best recollection. The distance from the Pre-
sidio to the Mission is little over three miles. I never knew of an
Ayuntamiento sitting at the Presidio; when I came here in 1835 they
were sitting at the Mission; they always sat at the Mission; some-
times they held no meetings for months together. I don't know if
there was an Ayuntamiento in existence when the Americans took
possession of this country in 1846. At that time I resided on my farm
at Saucelito. Don Francisco de Haro was Alcalde of the Ayunta-
miento in 1835, Joaquin Estudillo in 1836, Ignacio Martinez in 1837,
De Haro, I think, in 1838
;
I don't recollect who in 1839. The names'
of the Alcaldes, between 1839 and 1846, are De Haro, Guerrero, Pa-
dillo, William Hinckley, Francisco Sanchez, Jose Jesus Noe, Jose de la
Cruz Sanchez. I do not recollect any others.
The Ayuntamientos between 1835 and 1846 were composed of four
persons, an Alcalde, a Regidor, a Sindico, and Juez de Campo. De
Haro resided in the Mission most of the time, but a part of the time
on his farm. Guerrero resided m the Mission ; he had a rancho five
or six leagues south from the Mission, but was very seldom on it. Pe-
dillo resided in Yerba Buena ; he had a rancho at Petal uma, and also,
I believe, on Tomales Bay. Hinckley resided at Yerba Buena. Fran-
cisco Sanchez resided most of the time on his farm at San Pedro, about
four and a half or five leagues south of the Mission, I never knew of
his having a house at the Mission ; he stayed with his relations when
he was there. Most of those persons lived in the old buildings of the
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Mission when they were at that place. Noe lived a part of the time
'jLt Yerba Buena, but he had a house at the Mission. Guerrero fitted
jip one of the old houses of the Mission and lived in it.
I don't know how the Ayuntamiento was formed in 1 834, not being
iere. In 1835 it was formed by an election of the people. I don't
now how it was conducted, not having assisted in it. I never assisted
n any election of an Ayuntamiento before 1846. I never saw any
i/oting for members of an Ayuntamiento here before 1846. I never
Jaw any such voting at the Mission or at the Presidio before 1846. I
,'iever voted for a member of an Ayuntamiento. I have heard that
i.mch elections were held every year in the latter part of October or in
November ; sometimes as late as the latter part of December. The
(polls were open at the Mission ; I have never heard of any other place
put the Mission ; I don't know who voted at those elections ; I believe
;
;
phey were private people and soldiers, who came along mixed together.
1 have heard of cases of naturalized Indians voting. I don't know
ivhether the right to vote depended upon the residence of the voters
ir not.
1 I have not the letter or copy of the letter directing De Haro to make
iihe map here presented and marked "exhibit No. 2." I made that
;jnap in the early part of October, 1835. The copy I sent to the Gov-
ernor, I made the same day. The paper on which the map is made, I
(got from the French ship Hero in the year 1828, or from a schooner
galled the Krymakoo which was here about the same time. I have
^oine of the same kind of paper yet left, I think ; I gave some of it to
|0apt. Vioget. The copy which was sent to the Governor, was on the
isame kind of paper ; I have also made other copies on the same kind of
;
paper and sent to the Governor ; I never saw or heard of any copy
.being in the Governor's archives except on the receipt of the letter
linarked ' exhibit. No. 1,' with the initials ' A. F.' The map marked
i exhibit No. 3,' with the initials i A. F.' has been in my possession since
lit was made in 1835. Several persons have seen it ; I think Mr.
jLeese saw it soon after he came here in 1836. I do not recollect any
rothers, but it was public, with my other papers and charts about my
,
( uouse. I had, I suppose, twenty or thirty different charts. The map
jhas been inquired for frequently since 1846, particularly in the case of
•Mr. Bates, who took my testimony about three months ago.
a Since the year 1846, 1 have resided at Saucelito ; I have been some
„away from home ; I have been up and down the coast several times,
, and once as far as the city of Mexico. I was at the city of Mexico in
,/June 1852, and remained there about eleven days. 1 have been ac-
quainted with the map of the village of Yerba Buena ever since it was
.,'laicl off by me. I assisted in measuring and defining the line as laid
[i'down on the map. I could at any time since the map was made, de-
scribe from memory, those limits, and point out the natural objects
-included in those limits. I have pointed them out to persons since the
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year 1 846. I was very particular in pointing them out to Mr. Vioget
when he was altering the plan and making a survey of the place it
1839.
In 1843, when I sent a copy of this map to the Government, |
pointed them out to several persons. I recollect that I pointed then.
out to a man called Jack the Soldier, Messrs. Rose and Reynolds, sbij
carpenters, Gregorio Escalante, a Manilla man, who, I think, lives at th
Mission ; there were several others whom I do no-fc recollect. Messrs
Rose and Reynolds live in Napa. At the time of the war in 1846 o
1847, when Commodore Biddle was lying at Saucelito, in the Columbus
I spoke publicly, clown in front of William Davis' house, which is nov
Montgomery street. I explained the limits of the town, where it earn
down to on the beach, and the whole limits round ; as they were giving
lots outside those limits, I opposed it, as I had applied for lots outsich
the limits of the town and never could obtain them, and it was con
trary to Mexican law. A simple magistrate had no authority to do it
I applied for lots toFigueroa in his time, that is in the year 1834. Ii
1828, likewise, I applied to General Echandea, who was then Com
mandante General and Governor. I also applied to Alvarado, th]
Governor of California. This was about the year 1840 or 1841. Th
last time I applied was with the knowledge of John B. Cooper, o
Monterey, who was to have part of it. My application in each cas
was rejected on account of the lands being occupied by the military
post of the Presidio, for the convenience of their horses. The lano
located about half way between what is now called Clark's Point am
Rincon Point, along the beach. I applied every time for the sam
piece of property. I also recollect making application to Don Lui
Arguello, Governor of California in 1825, for the ground afterward
occupied for the site of Yerba Bueua. The grant for the one hundrei
vara lot was made me by Don Francisco de Haro, the Alcalde of th
Mission de San Francisco de Asis, by order of the political govern
ment. The document of that grant was lost, and I obtained anothe''
document for it in 1836, from Don Joaquin Estudillo, Alcalde of th
same place. There were several grants made of lots in Yerba Bueng
before 1846. Some were made by the magistrates residing at the Mu
sion of San Francisco de Asis, and others by the different Governor
of California.
By magistrates I mean the Alcaldes and Justices of the Peace. Th
Alcaldes were members of the Ayuntamientos. I never saw any c
the Justices of the Peace acting with the Ayuntamientos. The A
caldes who made these grants resided at different places ; at the Mii
sion of San Francisco de Asis, at Contra Conta, and at the settlemen
of Yerba Buena. I saw a hundred vara lot in Yerba Buena measure<
off by Ignacio Martinez, who resided at Contra Costa at that time, bu
was Alcalde of the Mission of San Francisco de Asis. This was ii,
1837. I don't know whether Contra Costa was a part of the land be
30
•bnging to that Mission, but understood that it was under the jurisdic-
tion of the civil authorities of the Mission of San Francisco de Asis.
|t was not in that jurisdiction continually, but was sometimes under
l'ie jurisdiction of the pueblo of San Jose.
I I heard of people having lots at the Mission of San Francisco de
Isis, but never saw any documents relating to them. I never heard
horn whom these grants were obtained. I did hear about Padre San-
illan having sold lands, or given lots, but do not recollect at what
time. The lots they were granting at the time I was complaining,
i,fere situated at the South East of the settlement of Yerba Buena,
jpwards Rincon, at a place now called Happy Valley. I never had a
j^mversation with any one when I was in the city of Mexico, about
me limits of what is now claimed to be the pueblo of San Francisco.
I had no conversation with any one about the limits of Yerba Buena.
I
saw Mr. Limantour in Mexico. He never asked me anything re-
jecting the limits of San Francisco nor Yerba Buena. I went to
jtexicp on my own private business, respecting my lands. I have no
property in San Francisco now ; I have a piece of property north of
'ie Presidio on a little plain, between the Presidio and the bay. It is
ijue hundred and fifty varas square. I claim that property by a grant
ij'om Governor Arguello. I have no interest, direct or indirect to any
|nds or claims to lands in or near the present city of San Francisco,
(xcepting my farm at Saucelito, where I reside. From November,
i;834, to May, 1835, 1 resided at the Mission San Gabriel. In Novem-
ber and December, 1834, 1 was on the road from San Gabriel to Mar-
ilnez' farm and at the Mission of San Francisco de Asis. I returned
(pick to San Gabriel and arrived about the 21st or 22d of December.
ijleft San Gabriel in the early part of May, 1835, with my family,
X company with General Figueroa to remove to the Yerba Buena. I
Itent to see my father-in-law, and arrived here with my family in the
j'.tter part of June, and pitched my tent here to await the orders of
general Figueroa. Jacob P. Leese was the first settler who came here
iFter me ; he came and built his house on the 3d of July, 1836. His
it was adjoining the lot I had possession of to the south-east.
il Gen. Figueroa told me he had seen a communication of mine to
jlen. Echandea respecting the anchorage at Yerba Buena. He asked
je if there was any spot sufficient to lay off a small village or town,
'told him there was one abreast of the anchorage where the vessels
(,iy, a small place. He asked me the extent, and wished me to give
;.m a small sketch of it, which I did, stating the dimensions to the
Vast of my knowledge of the clear spot. The sketch I made exhibited
/ie land, and stated the extent to be about four hundred varas from
je beach opposite the anchorage in a south-west direction ; and the
direction of the valley run about north-west and south-east about
,jvelve hundred yards. I told him there were very few springs and it
-.:as very scarce of water. The land above described, as exhibited by
j
]
ie sketch was clear of bushes. The anchorage used by vessels enter-
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ing the bay when I first came to the country was at the eastern sid<
of the old fort, opposite the Presidio, and at the entrance of the bay
It continued there until December 1824, or the spring of 1825. Fron
that time they came to anchor at the place called Terba Buena
There had never been a captain of the Port here before. I was ap'
pointed in 1835. The Comandante of the Presidio acted as every
thing ; there was no Captain of the Port. I do not recollect who wai :
the Comandante in 1834 and 1835 ; it was sometimes a soldier.
J
was here in 1834, but did not see M. G. Vallejo here ; I did not go tc
the Presidio. I was at the Presidio in 1833, and he was then residing
there with his family, and was Comandante in 1834. I did not se<
him, but understood he was on his farm at Petaluma, and left a soldie:
or corporal in charge at the Presidio. This is the only time I waf 1
here in 1834. There might have been sixty or seventy inhabitant; 1
altogether in this city in July 1846. I do not know what time Gene
ral Vallejo ceased in the command. It was customary for Coman
dantes to go away and leave others in charge for a time.
WM. J. RICHARDSON.
*-
Political Government, ad interim, of Upper California :
This Government, conforming with the good desire of my prede
cessor, Senor General Don Jose Figueroa, regarding the foundation o\
a settlement in the place called "La Yerba Buena," and attending, like
wise, to the statement made by you, in the name of the residents o:
the port of San Francisco, the welfare of which I sincerely desire, has
approved the plan which you have formed for the commencement oj
said settlement ; which, (while other matters are arranged, togethei
with the system of civil authorities) will be borne in mind, in thecases
of granting lots to the individuals who may solicit them.
All which I state to you for your satisfaction, thanking you for the:
services which gratuitously, you propose to do in favor of those
residents.
God and Liberty,
Monterey, Oct. 20, 1835.
(Signed) JOSE CASTRO.
To Senor Don Guillermo Richardson,
Captain of the Port of San Francisco.
United States of America, I c q
State of California. J
San Francisco, March 25, 1854.
This day personally came before Peter Lott, a commissioner for tak-
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iing testimony to be used before the Board of U. S. Land Commission-
Jers in said State, William A. Richardson, a witness on behalf of the
'United States, in case No. 280, on the docket of said Board, in which
J.the city of San Francisco is claimant, and the said Win. A. Richardson
Jbeing duly sworn on oath, deposed in the English language as follows,
/to wit
:
9 QUESTIONS BY U. S. LAW AGENT.
1 Question i.—What is your name, age and present place of residence ?
I Answer.—My name is William A. Richardson ; my age 58 years
;
|)my residence Marin county, California.
t Ques. 2.—Where was reputed to be the boundary on the side to-
i
wards the port of can Francisco of the Old Mission, and the so called
Pueblo of San Francisco de Asis ?
I Ans.—Mission Creek was reputed to be the boundary.
I Ques. 3.—Was the place called Yerba Buena or the plat formed in
lit for the concession of Solares, ever considered as embraced in the
actual limits of said Mission or Pueblo of San Francisco de Asis?
I Ans.—No it was not.
j (This last question and and answer objected to by attorneys for
'claimants on substantial grounds, and not merely to the form.)
CROSS EXAMINATION BY ATTORNEYS FOR CLAIMANT.
Question 1.—What were the old limits of the Mission of San Fran-
cisco de Asis ?
Ans.—I do not know what the southern and eastern limits were,
but it never passed the creek towards the port.
Ques. 2.—Do you know what the western boundary of the Mission
: was ?
Ans.—The coast of the Pacific.
\
Ques. 3.—What was the reputed extent of the Mission lands in
| leagues or square miles ?
i Ans.—It is hard to tell, to the best of my judgment I should say it
I
would run about six leagues one way and about three the other ; the
three leagues would be ^in a direction from the Pacific coast to the
bay, and the length would run about north-west and south-east.
Ques. 4.—Do the Mission buildings stand on the north or south side
: of Mission Creek? and how far from it.
Ans.—On the south side, a little over a half mile from the creek.
i Ques. 5.—What was the north boundary of the mission lands west
'' of the Mission buildings ?
I Ans.—It followed up the ravine of Mission Creek to a round hill
', called the Devisidero, there are two hills which were called by this
\ name, the other is nearer the old fort, where the new Telegraph sta-
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tion now is, the boundary continued from the round hill first mention-
ed to the Pacific coast.
Ques. 6.—State your means of knowing that Mission Creek formed
the northern boundary of the mission lands ?
Ans.—I know that the lands this side of the creek, on the north,
were used by the horses and cattle of the Presidio, and there were fre-
quent disputes about the boundary; I recollect when I first came, that
there were Indian huts on the north side of this ravine, on a line from;
the Mission towards the north, about 400 or 500 yards distance ; I think
at that time the stream ran by those huts, but in the freshet of 1825
the sand hill was washed away, and that brought the stream nearer to
the Mission buildings, where it now is ; there formerly was a lake
about 7 or 800 yards from those huts in a direction to the Pacific coast,
where the spring use to head.
Ques. 7.—Was the place where those Indian huts stood known by
any particular name, if so, what was it ?
Ans.—I know of no particular name, except the " Rancheria."
Ques. 8.—Do you know a place called " Canutales ?" and if so, is il
to the north or south of the north line of the Mission lands, as you
have now described that line, and how far distant from it ?
Ans.—I do know all the little valleys north of that line go by thai
name, they are covered by a peculiar growth of a little weed some-
thing like a reed, with black rings around it.
Ques. 9.—Do you know the Spanish term by which Indians were
known and designated at that time ?
Ans.—Yes ! Neophytes, they were the Christian Indians, the others
were called Gentiles.
WM. A. RICHARDSON.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, on this 25th day of March
A. D., 1654.
PETER LOTT,
Commissioner for taking Testimony, &c.
Filed in office, March 25, 1854,
George Fishee, Secretary.
DEPOSITION OF JUAN B. ALVARADO.
My name is Juan B. Alvarado ; age 44 years, and my place of resi
dence is in the county of Contra Costa, in the State of California,
have resided in California ever since my birth, I will name in order
the offices I have held under the Mexican Government. I was first ai
officer in the Treasury, then Secretary of the Territorial Deputation
then Inspector in the Maritime Custom House at Monterey, then De
:
puty in the Territorial Deputation, then Governor ad interim of Cali.
5
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lifornia; also Colonel of the Militia of the Territory, Constitutional
governor of the Department of the two Californias, and Deputy from
^California to the General Congress of Mexico. I was a member of the
itTerritorial Deputation all the year 1834, and some months of the year
^835. I recollect that at that time there were two Secretaries of the
[^Political Chief, but I don't know when they changed \ one was Augustin
iV. Zamorano, the other was Francisco Castillo Negrete. I am acquain-
ted with the signatures of Jose Figueroa, Political Chief of the Terri-
(tory at that time ; I have seen him sign frequently ; I have seen the
I paper marked "Doc. No. 1," purporting to be a dispatch from Jose
\ Figueroa to the military commandant of San Francisco, and do not
helieve it to be the genuine signature of Figueroa in its totality, be-
cause I find a little difference in it, which might have been caused by
the haste in which he might have signed many other dispatches at the
teame time.
i: I have seen the document marked " Doc. H. I. T. No. 18," purport-
ing to be a copy of a dispatch from Jose Figueroa to Don Mariano G.
'Vailejo, Military Commandant of San Francisco ; consider the words
f Es copia conforme," and the signature Zamorano, and cannot justify
;fche words nor the signature, because I do not find it exactly as he
lused to write it I am riot acquainted with the hand-writing of the
.body of the letter. I have seen the book marked on the outside cover
"Libro Borrador, de Actas de la Exma Deputacion 1834 and 1835;
,sesions publicas ;" and at the head of the first page, the words, " Ses-
sion de 8 de Julio," and concluding on the last pag3 with the signa-
ture of Manuel Jimeno. I consider this book as the genuine book
that was kept by the Territorial Deputation as the Journal of their
proceedings from July 8th, 1834, to October 16th, 1835. It appears
"that it commenced with July 8th, 1834, and concluded with the 16th
•of October, 1835. I recollect the circumstances connected with the
•establishment of the Ayuntamiento of San Francisco. It appears to
(
jme the Ayuntamiento was established by the authority of Figueroa.
Question.—Look at the paper now presented to you, marked i; Doc.
;|No. I, H. I. T" annexed to the deposition of M. G. Vallejo, filed in
,|this case, and say whether you remember anything respecting the de-
\ cree of the Territorial Deputation cited therein.
• Answer.—I recollect that the Political Chief, Figueroa, with the
Territorial Deputation, determined to establish an Ayuntamiento in
:'San Francisco, and by virtue of this decree it was established.
Quek-—Do you know, or have you had reason to believe that any
.(tract of land was ever assigned to a pueblo or town of San Francisco,
''by the Territorial Deputation, or the Departmental Junta, or Depart-
'i; mental Assembly, or any other competent authority in California ?
Ans.—I do not recollect that there was any action in relation to the
n
matter. I do not know whether any land was ever assigned as u pro-
; pries' or "egidos" to the pueblo of San Francisco. I did not know
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any pueblo in California called the pueblo of San Francisco, before
July, 1846. I knew this place, where the city of San Francisco, now
stands, before July, 1846, by the name of the pueblo da la Yerba
Buena.
Ques.—Were any lands ever assigned to the pueblo of Yerba Buena
as " propios," or V egidos," or " tierras comunes," or were any limits
ever assigned to said pueblo prior to July, 1846 ?
Ans.—At one time some portion of land was designated to this
town by the Political Chief; as regards the limits, I do not recollect
of their having been fixed as a town. I recollect that the Ayunta-
miento of San Francisco held their sessions sometimes in the Presidio
of San Francisco, and sometimes at the Mission Dolores. There was:
a movement in the Ayuntamiento, and its place of meeting was not
permanent ; this I have heard stated but have not seen it. The Pre- 1
sidio may be one league, more or less, from the place where we now
are ; I cannot state positively. At the Presidio, in L834, or about
that time, there might have been forty persons, more or less, not in-
cluding the soldiers. I think there was an Alcalde for the first time 1
in 1834. I do not recollect the day or the month when the Ayunta-
miento began to hold their sessions here but I believe it was in 1834
I cannot state when they ceased to hold their meetings there. There
was no place known as the public plaza or square at the Presidio ex-
cept the military plaza ; it was situated in the Presidio itself; it was
three hundred Spanish varas, more or less, on each side.
Ques.—By what authority, after the Mexican Independence, were
municipal lands or egidos assigned to towns ?
Ans.—I recollect a law given by the Cortez of Spain in 1813, whicl
regulates the political economical government of the provinces beyonc
the seas. This law provides the manner in which the municipal lands
shall be assigned to towns already established, or which may hereafte]
be established. I do not recollect any decree of the Congress or Pres
iclent of Mexico recognizing those laws as in force in California, but ]
am certain the said Spanish law was ordered by the Mexican Govern
ment to be observed by all the Governors within the territories of the
Mexican Republic, and it was acted upon. I cannot tell when th(
sessions of the Ayuntamiento were held at the Mission. I stated be
fore, that the Ayuntamiento was changing its place of holding its ses
sions from the Presidio to the Mission, and was sometimes held at the
one place and sometimes at the other, but I cannot tell at what parti
cular time it was held at each. I visited Yerba Buena and the Pre
sidio for the first time in the year 1822
;
I lived in San Francisco in
1822 and 1823 ; I lived at the Presidio of San Francisco. I canno
tell exactly the date when the first inhabitants first settled on the site
of the present city of San Francisco ; it was subsequent to the yea]
1822. So far as I understood there were very few settlers at Yerb*
Buena in the year 1834 or 1835 ; from what I heard stated about tha' :
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[time, there were not more than ten or twelve. I do not recollect
jwhether I was at Yerba Buena at that time; I was there twice between
(the years 1835 and 1846, but I recollect only the time of the last visit,
which was in 1846; there might have been from twenty to thirty
'Wises at Yerba Buena previous to 1846.
I Ques.—Look on the book here presented to you and marked on the
stover " 1840, Sesions Publicas," and closing with the signature of
jManuel Jimeno Prenato and Jose Q. Fernandez Srio, and state what
phe book is, and what is the first communication contained in it.
!
' Ans.—I know the book
;
it is the book of the Sessions of the Depart-
mental Assembly ; I have examined the first communication in it, and
At contains the acts of the Assembly as therein stated. The recom-
mendations contained in the first communication, came from me ; I
'Was then Governor of California. I do not recollect any law or au-
thority in California for giving or measuring municipal lands to towns
pr pueblos, except the Spanish law, and authority existing previous to
;;he declaration of Mexican Independence in 1821. The present town
jof San Francisco is within the ten coast leagues.
!
: Ques.—Look at the paper here presented to you, being one enclosed
jimong others in a paper cover, marked on the outside, ct Comunica-
;^iones al E. S. Gobernador," and state what the same is.
| Ans.—I have seen and examined the paper, and state that it con-
tains a petition to the Supreme Government upon subjects which at
lihat time were thought necessary for the country.
i Ques.—Look at the paper now presented to you, marked " No. 3,"
illated " Monterey, 8th April, 1840," and signed by Manuel Jimeno, and
initiate whether it is part of the same proceedings, and whether you re-
jiognize the signature thereto as genuine.
i Ans.—I recognize the document as containing a portion of the sub-
stance of the contents of the paper shown me before, and I recognize
i'ke signatures (names) of Manuel Jimeno and Jose C. Fernandez
j'thereto, as the genuine signatures of those individuals.
l!
Ques.—Did the Supreme Government of Mexico ever, to your
iivnowledge, take any action on the subject of that petition in relation
,
(|;o the grants of Mission lands, or in relation to the grants of land
JlVithin the ten littoral leagues, or as to the granting lands within the
,j,en littoral leagues? If so, state what action.
s.
1
Ans.—I do not know whether the Supreme Government of Mexico
jkver received the said petition, or whether it answered it ; but I do
| jiow recollect of having seen a communication from the Minister of the
./"nterior, of Mexico, addressed to General Micheltorena, and received
(
'()y General Castro during the voyage of General Micheltorena to Mex-
ico, in which mention is made of a grant made to Mr. Smith of Bode-
ga, by Micheltorena, by which communication the Government ap-
proved the said grant made to Smith, but with orders not to make
Vmy such grants to any foreigner, and stating that if he did so, Govern-
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ment would make him responsible for it. The above is the substanc*
of said communication, although perhaps not in the same words,
believe this was in 1846 ; I am not very certain, but think it was ii
the latter part of 1845, or in the year 1846. My connection with th<
Government of California in an official capacity commenced in 183'i.
and closed in 1842. I was elected Deputy to the General Congress o
Mexico in .1845 or 1846, I do not recollect which. The Governor
of California from the year 1827 to 1846 were, first, General Jos|
Echandia ; he was Governor from the year 1827 to 1830. Genera
Manuel Victoria, from 1831. In 1832 there was no Governor. From
1833 to 1834, General Jose Figueroa was Governor. General Jost
Castro in 1835; and during part of 1835 and 1836, and part of 1831
Mariano Chico and Nicholas Gautierez were Governors. I was Govi
ernor from 1837 to 1842 ; Micheltorena in 1843 and 1844. Pio Pice,,
was the last Governor. Five or six claimed to be Governor ii
1832, but nobody acted in that capacity. They all wanted to b(;
Governor, including myself. I do not recollect the exact period when
the Governors mentioned in my last answer succeeded each other
There were many changes and none of them served out the Consiitu 1
tional terms. The pueblo of Yerba Buena was known by the people
of the country by the name of Yerba Buena, but by persons who came
by sea, it was called the port of San Francisco.
JUAN B. ALYARADO."
;
aFo:
United States of America, \ ^
State of California, j
Ban Francisco, March 23, 1854.
This day personally appeared before Peter Lott, a commissioner for 1
taking testimony to be used before the Board of U. S. Land Commis- :
sioners in said State, Juan B. Alvarado, a witness on behalf of the'
United States, in case No. 280, on the docket of said Board, in which
the city of San Francisco is claimant, the said Juan B. Alvarado being
duly sworn, deposed in Spanish, which was interpreted then and there
by the interpreter for said Board, into English, as follows, to wit
:
U. S. Law Agent present.
QUESTIONS BY J. H. McKITNE.
Question 1.—What is your name, age and present place of resi-'
dence ?
Answer.—My name is Juan Bautista Alvarado ; my age forty-five 1
years, and my place of abode is the county of Contra Costa, Cali-:
fornia.
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'.;!( Ques. 2.—In your deposition given before Commissioner Felch, on
l-fiie 12th clay of August, 1853, in answer to question 20, therein, you .
:%y, " At one time some portion of land was assigned to the pueblo of
:|i erba Buena, as propios egidos or Tierras comunes, by the Political
iPhief." Please explain fully what you mean by that portion of that
jfnswer ; what do you mean by there being a grant of land, and the
,i
;
acts referred to constituting what you call that assignment of lands
m Yerba Buena ; state fully the facts, within y'our knowledge, respect-
ing the existence of the municipal organization called San Francisco
J[le Asis, called the pueblo of that name, and the situation during the
frame time, of the place called Yerba Buena, and the relation which it
Occupied with respect to said Mission or pueblo, stating also the limits,
P any existed, of the said Mission or pueblo, on the side towards the
':l)ort of San E rancisco, and what localities were embraced in the place
hailed Yerba Buena ?
i
Ans.—In the year 1835, General Castro exercised the functions of
.^Political Chief of the Territory, and senior member of the Territorial
•Deputation in consequence of the death of General Figueroa; he was
ipommanding General and Political Chief at the time of his death. I
Recollect that the Political Chief, Castro, in consideration of a solicita-
tion of varions citizens of the Presidio of San Francisco, consented by
giving an order that there should be given to them lots according to
'their petition ; he gave an order declaring his consent that there might
jibe granted lots. The Political Chief, Castro, declared his consent to
ijthe solicitation of several of the residents of the Presidio of San Fran-
cisco, to the effect that there might be granted by the Alcalde or Civil
Judge of the residents of the Presidio and contiguous ranches, some
lots in Yerba Buena, having present a diagram that embraced a cer-
tain portion of the land of the said Yerba Buena, remitted to said
^Political Chief by some person resident at this place, and according to
my recollection of what the diagram represented, it would not be in
extent more than a piece of land three hundred varas on each side, a
little more or less, tbat is, calculating what the diagram or map might
^embrace. This is the same grant referred to by me in my former de-
position, spoken of. I know of no other grant in this connection. I
recollect that in the year 1835, there was established at the Presidio
or Mission of San Francisco, some civil authority, but I cannot recol-
lect whether there was an Ayuntamiento, San Francisco de Asis was
the very anciently established mission as all the others of California.
I recollect that in 1839 the said Mission of San Francisco de Asis was
secularized, giving it the name of pueblo, the same as had been given
to other Missions secularized prior to this, during the time of the gov-
ernment of General Figueroa. I cannot at this time recollect whether
any boundaries were determined to this pueblo of San Francisco, but it
was the residence of the municipal authority, as in the division of the de •
partment into districts and partidos, this place of San Franciseo de Asis
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or Dolores, was called the capital of the partido, for the residence of i
Sub-Prefect or Justice of the Peace. Respecting the locality of Yerb;
Buena, 1 have already said that there were no other limits assignee 1
to it than those to which I referred in the varas of land (las varas d<
Terreno), a little more or less of the said diagram, with the exceptior
of two hundred varas from the beach to the land, which the Govern
ment reserved for purposes that might be convenient. This is what I
can at this time recollect in relation to the matter.
(This question and answer last written is objected to on the grounc
of its relating to matters that ought to be proved by documentary o:
record evidence.)
Ques. 3.—What part of the present city of San Francisco is situatec
on the former site of the port of Yerba Buena.
Ans.—There has never been recognized amongst us any port o'
Yerba Buena ; there was a bay or anchorage called Yerba Buena
The portion of the bay lying in front of the present plaza, betweei
Clay and "Washington streets, was called the anchorage of Yerb/
Buena.
Ques. 4.—What was the northern limit of the pueblo of San Fran
Cisco de Asis ?
Ans.—I do not recollect that any limits were assigned to the Missior
before it was made a pueblo nor since. The Mission was large
though I do not know what boundaries were given to the pueblo.
Ques. 5,—Did any municipal organization ever exist during th(
time of the Mexican Government at the place called Yerba Buena ?
Ans.—There was here, as in all other parts of the department, loca;
authorities established at that time. Since 1839, when the departmem
was divided into districts and partidos, the denominated Pueblo d(
San Francisco de Asis (or Dolores) was the residence of the loca
authorities, and previously when it was a Mission and not a pueblo, r
was also the residence of the Alcaldes, or Ayuntamientos being de'
nominated these authorities also of the Yerba Buena. I recollect nc
other municipal organization here at that time.
I
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PEACHY AS ATTORNEY FOR THE CITY OF SAN
FRANCISCO.
Ques. 1—Please state if you know of any lots of land having beer-
granted by any authoiity, during the existence of the Mexican Gov-
ernment in California, within the limits of the present city of 3ar
Francisco, if yea, by whom, and by what authority ?
Ans.—I, according to my recollection, while Governor, made some
grants within the limits here mentioned, since 1839. I may have
made some before. The Alcaldes, Ayuntamientos, the Prefects and
Sub-Prefects, each, according to the authorities they had from the
Government, may have made grants of lots (solares). I know posi.
40
Jl
yively that the Alcaldes, Ayuntamientos, and Justices of the Peace,
Spade some grants within those limits during that time ; this might
Slave been done before 1839 ; it is possible ; they made such grants by
;?!he authority of the Governor of the Department or Territory.
k Qups. 2.—From what source did the Governor derive his authority
t!o delegate to Ayuntamientos, Alcaldes, and Justices of the Peace the
^ower of granting lands ?
| Ans.—From the Colonization Laws themselves, which did not pro-
hibit him from delegating this power when giving to the Governor
:fhat of making grants to families or particular individuals.
1 Ques. 3.—What Colonization Laws to you refer to ?
:; Ans.—The law of August 1824, and the law of 1828; there may
;>e another law referring to this subject, though I do not recollect cer-
tainly.
J:
Ques. 4.—Was the power of the municipal authorities of all pueblos
jfcp California, to grant town lots, derived from the Governor of Cali-
fornia ?
'
'
Ans.—It was, but sometimes from the Prefect, who exercised all his
{functions subordinate to the Governor. Generally the local authori-
ties made grants of lots (solares) in each pueblo, obtaining the power
prom the Governor, or some of his inferior authorities, as the case
might be.
j
Ques. 5.—What was the size of the lots of land usually granted in
the different pueblos to an individual ?
If Ans.—They were granted of different sizes to different individuals,
!n San Francisco of different sizes ; I do not recollect the smallest size.
There may have been in Yerba Buena concessions of lots of 200 varas;
il do not recollect the shape and cannot say whether it was square
varas or varas square, it was not customary to grant 50 vara lots, but
.'at one time an order was given by the Governor to the Alcalde here,
to grant no lots of larger size than 50 varas for a time.
JUAN B. ALVARADO.
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 24th day of March, A. D.,
1854.
PETER LOTT,
Commissioner for taking testimony.
BEFORE COMMISSIONER HILAND HALL.
IMy name is W. E. P. Hartnell ; my age is fifty-four years ; and
reside in Monterey.
Question.—Examine the paper, marked H. T. S., No. 18, attached to
the deposition of M. G. Yallejo, heretofore taken in this case, and say,
if yon recognize the hand-writing in which the body of the paper is
written ?
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Answer.—I do not. I think the signature of Zamorana, affixed tc
the paper, a very suspicious one at best, and I do not believe it to b(
his hand-writing. W. E. P. HARTNELL.
United States of America, 1 nn
State of California, j
San Francisco, May 10, 1854.
This day, personally came before Peter Lott, a commissioner fo;
taking testimony to be used before the Board of U. S. Land Commie
siouers in said State, Francisco Panchez, a witness in behalf of th<
United States, in case No. 280, on the docket of said board, whereii
the city of San Francisco is claimant, and the said witness being dub 1
sworn, on oath deposed in the Spanish language, which interpretet
into English by the interpreter to said board as follows, to wit
:
The attorneys for the claimant are present.
QUESTIONS BY U. S. LAW AGENT.
Question 1.—What is your name, age and place of residence ?
Answer.—My name is Francisco Sanchez, my age forty-eight years
my residence San Francisco county, California.
Ques. 2.—How long have you resided there, and what offices hav
you held under the Mexican Government ?
Ans.—I have lived in what is now called San Francisco county
since I was a small boy ; I was born at the Mission of San Jose ; I wa
first municipal elector for choosing members to the Departmental As
sembly at Monterey, that was in 1836. In 1835 and 1836 I was Sec
retary to the Ayuntamiento of San Francisco. From 1837 to 184,
I was military commandant of San Francisco at the Presidio. In 184
and 1843 I was Justice of the Peace of San Francisco ; that is all th,
offices I have held.
Ques. 3.—Look at the marked "Doc. No. 3," H. J. T., annexed t<
the deposition of M. GJ-. Yallejo, heretofore taken in this case, and stat
if you know the location of the place therein called the Pueblo c
San Francisco de Asis, and the plaza of said pueblo therein mei
tioned ?
Ans.—The election spoken of in the document, was held at th
presidio, and the place here called the pueblo was at the presidi(
afterwards it was at the Mission Dolores. The plaza in this documer
referred to is the plaza at the presidio. There was no pueblo there a
that time, though they called it so in the document.
Ques. 4.—Look at document marked " Doc. No. 2, H. J. T,, annexe
6
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po the deposition of M. G. Vallejo, taken before Commissioner Harry
<J. Thornton," and say whether there was ever more than one election
at the presidio ; if any, state whether this document relates to that
election ?
|t Ans.—This paper relates to the first election held at the presidio, it
was held at the house of the commandant of the presidio, at the time
when the Ayuntamiento was established. The other paper (Doc. No.
3) relates to a second election held at the same place, to elect the new
officers of "the Ayuntamiento.
1 Ques. 5.—Where did Bartolo Boyerguez reside at the time of the
first election of which you speak ?
t Ans.—He lived with his family at the presidio of San Francisco
;
.
le lived there a long time before that and afterwards ; he was there
la 1837.
! Ques. 6.—Explain why the presidio was discribed in Doc. No. 3, as
i pueblo, when it was not a pueblo, as you have stated in your answer
|D third question; and state where the pueblo was afterwards located.
:j Ans.—As it was an election held by the people (pueblo) assembled
,|.o elect their representatives, the name of pueblo was given to it by
(i'he president of the municipal meeting or assembly of the people
^pueblo) to elect their representatives. In 1837 the pueblo was moved
(o the Mission Dolores, in consequence of the Mission Dolores having
;been made the capital (cabezcra) of this district, by Governor Alva-
ijado.
t Ques. 7.—Look at documents No.'s 5, 7, 8, 13, 14, and 16, annexed
|?o said deposition of M. G. Vallejo, and say if you know where is the
;
;ocality of the place referred to in the address, or otherwise in said
'[documents called San Francisco de Asis and San Francisco.
I'l (Objected to by attorney for claimants, on the ground that it called
fibr the construction of written documents, and not for facts, P. L.)
.',: Ans.—In the address in Doc. No. 5, San Francisco de Asis refers to
ithe Mission Dolores. In Doc. No. 7, San Francisco de Asis refers to
|he Mission Dolores. In Doc. No. 8, Pueblo de San Francisco de Asis
.refers to the locality of the Mission Dolores, the document was written
ilhere. In Doc. No. 13, San Francisco refers to the same place. In
|1)oc. No. 14, San Francisco refers to the locality of Mission Dolores.
•j,n Doc. No. 16, San Francisco refers to the same locality of the Mission
)olores. At the time of the last document No. 16, the court was
,}.eld here where San Francisco now is, because Hinckley had changed
n Ques. 8.—What office did Hinckley hold, and during what period,
,'( nd how did he get such office ?
j Ans.—He was Justice of the Peace from January, 1844, to Jan-
uary, 1845; he was appointed by the Governor of the Department.
,;,
Ques. 0.—What was the territorial extent of his jurisdiction ?
'} Ans.—From the arroyo of San Francisquito to the port of San
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Francisco. The place called Pulgas ranch was embraced in what was
the jurisdiction of said Justice of the Peace.
Ques. 10.—Where did Jose de la Cruz Sanchez, Felipe Briones, G-a
briel Castro, Manuel Sanchez, Francisco Sanchez, Ygnacio Peralto
Joaquin Estudillo, and Candellario Valencia, reside at the time the elec-i.
tions were held at the Presidio of San Francisco.
Ans.—At that time Jose de la Cruz Sanchez lived at the Presidio
:
Gabriel Castro, Manuel Sanchez, Francisco Sanchez, and Joaquin Es!
tudilio at the same place ; Felipe Briones lived at the rancho de Pi:
none, in Contra Costa; Ygnacio Peralta lived at the rancho of Sar
Antcnio, in Contra Costa ; Candellario Valencia lived at the Presidic,
also.
Ques. 1 1.—How long did they respectively live at those places afteii
that time ?
Ana—After the Ayuntamiento was established at the Mission; some
of them moved there and some to ranches, but I do not know wher
each one moved.
,
Ques. 12 —State about how many voters attended each of the elec
tions at the Presidio, and from what parts of the country did they
come there to vote ?
Ans.—I do not know how many roters attended those elections.
They came from Contra Costa, Sonoma, San Rafael, and other placet,
embraced in the jurisdiction. The voters were anxious to come to the,
election, and spared no exertion to do so, as they were anxious to gei
rid of the military authority.
Ques. 13.—Did you know Francisco Guerrero in his life time ; if yea
what office did he hold ; where did he and his family reside, and where
did he keep his records and office ?
Ans.—I knew him from 1833 till he died. From 1839 till 1841 he
was Justice of the Peace at the Mission Dolores, and lived with hii
family, and had his office and records there. I think in 1845 he wa^
Sub-Prefect, and had his office at the Mission. His records and ar
chives were there at that time.
Ques. 14.—While you were military commandant in 1845, was the
petition of Benito Diaz for a tract of land known by the name of Poin
Lobos, bounded on the north by the sea, which runs into the port o:
San Francisco, on the south by the ridge of hills at the rear of the
Mission of San Fr ncisco, known as the hills of the Deep Lake (L;
guna Hinda), on the east by the high ground, and on the west bj
Point Lobos, leferred to you for report ; if yea, state whether at tha.
time you reported the same to be public lands of the nation, ane
whether in fact it was public land at the time ?
Ans.—Yes; in 1845 while I was military commandant such a peti
tion was referred to me, by the Governor, to report whether the lane
was vacant (valdio). I made report that it was embraced within the
lands belonging to the military post, as the Governor had asked fo.
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:hat information in referring the petition to me. It was not in fact va^
)ant (valdio) as it was occupied lay the military works and used for
"hat purpose. It belonged to the Government.
Ques. 15.—In what direction and how far from the Presidio was that
and ?
Ans.—The Presidio is on the land which was petitioned for in that
petition.
[ Ques. 16.—State, if you know, whether the municipal or other au-
thorities, or the citizens of said Mission, or so called pueblo, or any
father pueblo or town, previous to the American occupation of the
Country, ever exercised any acts of ownership over, or laid claim to
pny lands whatever, in the present county of San Francisco, as lands
>f the property of the town
;
and if the said town, or any other town
Vithin the Territory embraced by the present county of San Francisco
Vas ever reputed to be the owner of, or have any right to, any lands
yhatever ; and if yea, explain what lands, and by what right they
j,Vere held or claimed.
Ans.—The pueblo at the Mission Dolores pretended to own the lands
mmediately about the Mission which did not belong to any individual,
uch were recognized as the lands of the pueblo. So far as relates to acts
if ownership, I never saw any acts of measurement. The pueblo never
:^aade any ; I never saw lrnds measured by surveyors till the Americans
'ame here, nor were any enclosures made by the pueblo as such. I
;[iever knew a pueblo in California to enclose its lands. I do not know
j'y what right they claimed the lands, but the pueblo solicited the
xovernor to establish its settlement (poblaciori) at the Mission Do-
ores, in the pueblo of San Francisco de Asis, and the Governor estab-
lished as cabezera (capital) of the district of the pueblo of San Fran-
isco de Asis at the establishment of Dolores ; that is all I know about
,'ne right by which they claimed. The court of the Justice of the
.^eace was there, and the Justice of the Peace gave various lots to in-
dividuals to build houses and live on.
Ques. 17.—Did the Justice of the Peace give such lots by order of
lie Government ?
Ans.—He did ; of fifty Vara lots.
\ Ques. 18.—Did the Governor himself make grants of lots in the
' uieblo ?
Ans.—He granted lots which were more than fifty varas, as the Jus-
1
ice of the Peace only had authority to give fifty vara lots ; when they
1
'fere larger than fifty varas, the application had to be made to the
i
Jovernor, who by a marginal order on the petition directed the Jus-
lice to give the applicant the lots so petitioned for. The Governor
i!i;ave orders that the Justice should not grant lots of more than fifty
1
aras each, without application was made to the Governor aud re-
ceived his sanction. I made grants myself as Justice of the Peace
;iere in Yerba Buena, while I was acting in that office at Dolores.
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The Justices had the authority to grant lots both here in Yerba Buen;
and at the Mission, it was all within their jurisdiction.
CROSS-EXAMINED BY ATTORNEYS FOR CLAIMANT.
Ques. 1.—Look at the Document No 2, H. I. T., annexed to Depo1
sition of M. G. Vallejo, taken in this case, and say if the name Fran
cisco Sanchez, therein written is your name, and you are the samt
person therein referred to as one of the Junta primaria de los electorei
and an election of an Ayuntamiento was made by the said Junta / i
yea, when and where was the said Ayuntamiento installed ?
Ans.—I am the same individual referred to in document as Francis'
co Sanchez ; that is my name. I was member of the Junta Piimaru
referred to, and acted as secretary of the same. That Junta, on th
first Sunday in December, 1834, elected electors of whom I was one'
for the purpose of choosing the Ayuntamiento. The Ayuntamient
was chosen on the third Sunday of the same month. The Ayunte
miento was installed Jan. 1, 1835. These meetings, elections and ir
1
stallations all took place at the Presidio. The oath of office was ac
ministered by the Alcalde, Francisco de Haro, by M. G. Vallejo, wh
was the military comandante, and the said Alcalde administered th
oath to the others.
Ques. 2.—Answer the same questions respecting documents. No. c;
annexed to deposition of JVL G. Vallejo, taken in this case.
Ans.—In December 1853', the primary Junta chose electors, and the;
chose an Ayuntamiento as before at the Presidio of San Francisco, an
I am the same person also named in this document as secretary, an
this is a genuine document. The second Ayuntamiento went int
office Jan. 1st, 1836.
Ques. 3.—Where did the next or third election for an Ayuntamient
take place ?
Ans.—At the same place at the Presidio, and the election of th'
Primaria Junta of that year, 1836, for the choice of electors for th
Ayuntamiento of 1837 also took place at the Presidio.
Ques. 4.—Where did the Ayuntamiento of 1837 hold its sittings?
Ans.—Chiefly through that year they sat at the Presidio, but tc
wards the close of that year they moved to the Mission Dolores.
Ques. 5.—Why was the Ayuntamiento moved to the Mission ?
Ans.—As the Governor established the capital (cabezera) of the pa
tido or district of San Francisco at the Mission of Dolores, the A]
untamiento was moved to that place, and because the Presidio bein
a military post the pueblo could not be established there.
Ques. 6.—In what year did the Governor make the Mission the Cc
bezera of the partido or district of San Francisco ?
Ans.—I do not recollect. The Governor Alvarado is here an
knows.
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[:] Ques. 7.—How did you know that the Mission was made the capital
pf the district?
i'] Ans.—I saw the order ; it was published and was in the archives.
| Ques. 8.—How long after that order was issued did the removal of
pie Ayuntamiento take place ?
( Ans.—I do not recollect.
I Ques. 9.—Do you recollect whether, in the order of Gov. Alvarado
establishing the Mission as the capital of the district of San Francisco,
jpmi saw any order, establishing the capital of any other district or
loarticlo ?
I Ans.—There was, in the same order, an order establishing San Juan
jj$autista as a cabezera of that district. I do not recollect of any other
in that order.
i Ques. 10.—Look at Document No. 6, annexed to M. G. Yallejo's
Reposition in this case, and say what locality is reierred to in the
yddress on said documents ?
\g Ans.—At the time of the date of this document the Alcalde was at
]
he Presidio, and Don Jose Castro will know what place the address
'refers to.
|t Ques. 11.—Who was the constitutional Alcalde of San Francisco de
ijiisis, in 1835 ?
[q Ans.—Don Francisco de Haro was.
||:j Ques. 12.—Was said Francisco de Haro a member of the Ayunta-
jltaiento which had its. sessions at the Presidio in 1835 ?
f Ans.—He was the Alcalde and presided over that Ayuntamiento.
j* Ques. 13.—Was there any Ayuntamiento at the Mission of San
•prancisco, in the years 1834, 1835 and 1836 ?
:
,i: Ans.—In 1834 there was no Ayuntamiento any where about here,
ind in 1835 and 1836 it was not at the Mission, but at the Presidio
;
Inhere was none at the Mission in those years.
? Ques. 14.—How many, and what years was there an Ayuntamiento
held at the Mission Dolores ?
Ans.—In 1838 it held its sessions there, and in 1839 there ceased
lb be an Ayuntamiento, as the Governor established a Justice of the
| "eace. There was no Ayuntamiento at the Mission in any other
I ears.
ii Ques. 15.— Give the names of the Justices of the Peace who suc-
' eeded the Ayuntamiento, after it was superseded by the Governor.
';it Ans.—Don Francisco Guerrero, in May, 1839, 1 think, entered upon
' vhe duties of Justice of the Peace. It seems to me there was a (Su-
1
Uente,) or 2d Justice, Vicente Maramontes, though I am not certain.
|( Ques. 16.—Do you remember the names of the Justices of the
Peace in 1840 ?
If Ans.—The same Francisco Guerrero continued till 1841. I was
'eustice of the Peace in 1842 and 1843, and Jesus Noe was my (Se-
;i.tundo,) or second Justice.
47
Ques. IT.—Who were the Justices of the Peace, after 1843 ?
Ans.—William Hinckley was, Justice in 1844. I do not recollec
his (Segunclo) ; in 1845, Juan Nepomoceno Padilla, his second wa
Jose de la Cruz Sanchez ; said Padilla was a Justice of the Peace
there were no Alcaides at that time, and he was not Alcalde.. Padill^
was appointed by the Governor, as were all the others. In 1846, Jesu
Noe was Justice, till July 9th. I do not recollect his segundo, thougl
I think it was Ridley. FRANCISCO SANCHEZ.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, on this 11th day of May, A. D.
1854. PETER LOTT,
Commissioner for taking Testimony, &c. :
BEFORE COMMISSIONER LOTT.
Jose Castro deposed that he is 45 years of age, and reside in Moq
terey. In 1835, I was Political Chief of California, as senior membe
Territorial Deputation from the year 1838 to 1846. In the last men
tioned year, 1846, I was Commandant General of California. Before
1835, in the year 1834, in October and November, I was senior mem
ber (Primer Vocal) of the Territorial Deputation ; I was well acquair
ted with Zamarano, former Secretary of Governor. Figueroa, and verj
familar with his hand-writing. I was in the same office with him on
year, and wrote at the same table. I have often seen him write, hav-
received many letters from him, and know his hand-writing well. 01
being asked to look at Doc. marked H. I. T. No. 18, annexed to ibJ
deposition of M. G. Vallejo, heretofore taken and filed in this case, an<
say whether the name "Zamarano" thereon written is his genuin
signature, he says, no it is not his signature, the rubrica is in or
imperfect than the name is; according to my judgment it is not his
The words " es copia conforme," written on this same paper above hi
name, is not his hand writing; I do not know the hand-writing of th
body of said document ; I can say that Gov. Figueroa never had a clerl
in his office, according to the best of my judgment, who wrote a hand
writing such as this. I recollect the session of the Territorial Deputatioj
of California during the months of October and November, 1834
;
was first Vocal (President) of the Deputation. On being requestec
to examine the said document No. 18, and say whether the subjec
matter mentioned therein was brought before the Territorial Deputa
tion, or acted upon by that body between the 24th of Octobrr, 1834
and the 4th of November of the same year, he says no such plan a
this was ever presented to the Deputation ; I have examimed the Docn
ments carefully and understand its contents fully.
The subject matter itself was never presented to, nor acted upon b}
the said Deputation. On looking at Document No. 3, annexed to th]
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jpeposition of M. G. Vallejo, he says, according to my understanding
of this paper, the place therein called " San Francisco de Asis," is the
pame as the Mission of Dolores. And the plaza mentioned was in
pie Mission to the west of the church, and also in front of it. There
Iwas no other place in the vicinity of the Mission of Dolores, or of the
present site of the city of San Francisco, called " San Francisco
lie Asis." or any other place called the plaza, at the time this paper
Spears date. On examining Documents Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 16, he
pays, according to my understanding, the name " San Francisco de
[t^sis," and " San Francisco," whenever they occur therein, refers to the
place known as the Mission of Dolores.
Examination Continued, April 4, 1854.
i On looking at Exhibit No. 1, annexed to Deposition of William A.
jiuichardson, he says his name hereto signed, is his genuine signature.
i:I wrote it with my own hand : I was then acting in the capacity of
(Political Chief (Gefe Politico).
{} CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. PEACHY FOR CLAIMANT.
I He says, I do not recollect how often the Territorial Deputation met
between the years 1830 and 1840; they met at Monterey; I do not
Recollect whether there was a meeting of the deputation in 1833 ; I
ij'lo not recollect whether there was one in 1835 ; I recollect that there
'twas a meeting of the deputation in the latter part of the year 1834.
I On being requested to name the years between 1830 and 1840, when
Ike knows that the Territorial Deputation assembled, he says : I can-
jliot recollect ; it might be twenty times, and I will not pretend to say
fes I cannot remember ; between 1830 and 1840 I lived at various points
fin different parts of the country; I was at Los Angeles, Santa Barbara,
'San Juan Bautista and Monterey and out of this country in Mexico
Kind in all parts of the country in different commissions from the Gov-
ernment of the country ; I was about four months, below this on the
iioay trapping beaver; I was at Vallejo's head quarters; that was
l;obout a league and a half in a westerly direction from this place a lit-
l
: ;le below the old castle near the sea; there was a square out there
fealled the comandancia, where there was a house called the Presidio
:
'when 1 was there I think it was in 1830, I am not certain; that was
i
;
:he only time that I was at that particular place ; I was during that
i'iime (between 1830 and 1840) here and at the Mission of Dolores;
. :hese are the times that I recollect (of being here and at the Mission
(Dolores :) there might have been others ; I do not recollect how long;
iii time I spent here ; it was a few days ; I do not recollect the nura-
Oer ; I do not recollect how long Vallejo commanded at the Presidio,
faor when he took command, nor the year when he left the command,
i'lor who succeeded him, nor whether any one succeeded him. The
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Presidio was called the Presidio of our Father San Francisco. (I
Presidio de Nuestro Padre San Francisco.) All the Priests called
so. I know it from them. I was once a member of the Territorh
Deputation for 4 years. I think it was 1832, 1834 and 1835. I d
not recollect how many sessions were held while I was a member, pei
haps there were two sessions of several months ; there might hav
been more. I do not recollect when those sessions were held. The
were held in the latter months of 1834 and the early month of 183'
I recollect the session in the year before, but I do not recollect th
sittings. I do not remember the number of members of the Territc
rial Deputation, Juan B. Alvarado, Carlos Carrillo, Jose Antonio Corre
and Pio Pico, and Joaquin Ortega.
On being asked if he was present every day of every session whei
the Territorial Deputation sat, he says I was always present ; I wa
young and healthy at that time ; I was always in attendance at th
acts (acuerdos) of the Deputation. There might have been a da;
when I was not there. I, as Vocal, received the Reports of the Com
mittees and the Communications from the Governor. I think I wa
first Vocal two years, 1834 and 1835. On being asked if he can rec
ollect any of the business transacted by the Deputation while he wa
first Vocal, he says I cannot recollect ; it would require more time fo
me to state exactly what I might recollect ; if I could have a day o
two I could write what was done. I cannot now recollect any of th<
proceedings. The Doc. marked Ex. No. 1 was written by Alvarado
(he did not say it was ivritten by Alvarado, but it is in the hand-writing
of Alvarado.)
On being requested by U. S. Law Agent to look at Doc. A, B, C
and D, P, L filed in this case, and say whether he recollects any o
the proceedings mentioned in Doc. H B," P, L, and is enabled to refresl
his memory of the proceedings about that time, and the first five page;
of the Doc. marked B, being read to him at his request, because hi,
sight was defective, he then answered, I recollect all the proceeding
as read to me ; I was a member of the Deputation during all that ses
sion, when these proceedings were had, and minutes were kept in i
book of all the proceedings of the Deputation, and that ought to be ir
the archives.
JOSE CASTRO.
United States of America, |
State of California, j
San Francisco, May 10, 1854.
This day, personally came before Peter Lott, a Commissioner foi
taking testimony to be used before the Board of U. S. Land Commie-
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if:
Ibners in said State, Charles Brov/n, a witness on behalf of the United
liJbates, in case No. 280, on the docket of said Board, wherein the city
m Irian Francisco is claimant' and the said witness being duly sworn,
jlp. oath deposed in the English language, as follows, " to wit
:"
H The Attorneys for the City, Mr. Peachy and others, are present.
;h QUESTIONS BY THE U. S. IAW AGENT.
I
. .
.
\k Question 1.—What is your name, age and present residence ?
I Answer.—My name is Charles Brown ; my age is 39 years ; my resi-
dence Mission Dolores, San Francisco County, California.
|l Ques. 2.—Where have you resided during the last 20 years ?
I Ans.—In the County of San Francisco, California ; I lived about 14
fears on my farm in the red woods, where Col. Jack Hayes now claims,
jnd the balance of the time at the Mission.
'jjj Ques. 3—Look at the paper marked Doc. No. 3, H. I, T, annexed
:o the deposition of M. G. Vallejo, heretofore taken in this case, and
;,'itate if you know the location of the place therein, called the Pueblo
W San Francisco de Asis, and the plaza of said pueblo therein men-
•fiioned.
1 Ans.—I have looked at the papers, and I do know the location of
ike place called the Pueblo of San Francisco de Asis, it was what is
jjfiow called the Mission of Dolores and the plaza therein was just in
j/ront of the old adobe buildings, and the church about where the cor-
ner of Dolores and Centre street is.
i Ques. 4.—Was there any other place in the vicinity of the said Mis-
sion of San Francisco, or of the present site of the city of San Fran-
cisco, called San Francisco de Asis, at any time before the American
occupation of the country, or any other place which, at the date of
jyhis document, was called the plaza of said pueblo ?
I Ans.—The document is dated Nov. 10th, 1835, and at that time
ohere was no other place called the plaza of said pueblo ; nor was there
^ever, within my knowledge, any other place in the vicinity called San
Francisco de Asis.
(Objected to by counsel for city, Gen. Williams, on the g«ound that
iit calls for the construction of written instruments, not facts. P. L.)
" Ques. 5.—Look at Documents No. 5, 7, 8, 13, 14 and 16, annexed
'to said deposition of M. G. Vallejo, and say if you know where is the
Jlucality of the place referred to therein, the address or otherwise in
said documents called San Francisco de Asis and San Francisco ?
i
Ans.—It is Dolores as it is now called, and there was no other place
'called by those names.
Ques. 6.—State if you know what were reputed to be the bounda-
ries on the side towards the port of San Francisco of the said Mission
and so called pueblo of San Francisco ?
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Ans.—I always understood the boundary on that side of the Mi
sion to be the Mission creek, and running thence straight across t
Point Lobos.
Ques. 7.—State if your residence was within the jurisdiction of tb
authorities of said Mission and so called pueblo, and if you were o
were not a voter, and if you were, at what place you voted.
Ans.— 1 did live within the jurisdiction of the said authorities
;
was a voter and voted at Dolores and at no other place ; I knew c
no elections held anywhere else within said jurisdiction.
Ques. 8.—State by what name the place ihis side said line of th
Mission referred to by you in answer to the sixth interrogatory an
lying on the port of San Francisco was known and called previou
to the American occupation of the country.
Ans.— It was known as Yeiba Buena.
Ques. 9.—State if you know whether the municipal or other ai
thorities, or the citizens of said Mission or so called pueblo, or an
other pueblo or town previous to the date referred to in the last que-
tion, ever exercised any acts of ownership over, or laid claim to an
lands whatever, in the present county of San Francisco, as lauds (
the property of the town, or if the said town or any other town with
in the territory embraced by the present county of San Francisco wa
ever reputed to be the owner of or have any right to any lands whai
ever, and if yea, explain what lands and by what right they were hel
or claimed.
Ans.—I know of- no authority ever exercised over any lands or an;
claims being made to any land in the county by said pueblo, or an
other as owner of such lands, nor by citizens as claiming to hold uncle;
such ownership ; all I know about it is that the place now calle<
Dolores, was called San Francisco de Asis, and I never heard of thei
owning any lands, or claiming to own any as a pueblo. I have live«
for the last twenty years within what is now the county of San Frar
cisco, and within what was the jurisdiction of the Mission Dolores, o
San Francisco de Asis.
CROSS-EXAMINED BY ATTORNEYS FOR CLAIMANTS.
Question 1.—Were you a naturalized citizen of Mexico ; if yea, whe:
did you become such ?
Answer.—I was, and I think I became so naturalized about 1838.
Ques. 2.—Did you ever hold any public office in California ?
Ans.—No.
Ques. 3.—Did you ever live at the presidio ?
Ans.—No I never did.
Ques. 4.—Did you ever live at the Mission Dolores?
Ans.—Yes, I live there now and have lived there this last time fou
years.
J
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I Ques. 5.
—
"What was your occupation during the twenty years of
fjyour residence in California?
W Ans.—I sawed lumber and made shingles in the red woods, and have
Veen ranching and had stock.
| Ques. 6.—Where did you live in 1833, 1834, 1835, and 1836 ?
J
1 Ans.—In 1833 and part of 1834, I lived between this place and the
presidio, at a spring called " Ojita Figueroa; " from that to 1835 I was
li Sonoma and Napa Valley ; I was after that a few months at pueblo
.
f San Jose, and from that time to the present in this county ; when I
}4
3turned to this county from San Jose, I do not recollect exactly where
I first lived ; I was part of the time at the Mission, and here and at my
!, lace in the red woods.
I Ques. 7.—Did you ever attend an election of members to the Ayun-
j,imiento?
I Ans.—I do not recollect that I ever did ; I might have done so.
I Ques. 8.—Do you or not own any land in the county of San Fran-
cisco ?
1 Ans.—I claim to own some.
.j Ques. 9.—Where is it ?
I Ans.—I own some on the Sanchez rancho, called Buriburi ; that is
fl I own. My wife has some at the Lake House, part of the De Haro
| state, of the Kancho La Laguna de Merced and some lots at the Mis-
.
gpil Dolores. I do not know by whom the lots were granted. They
/ere granted to San Francisco de Haro.
li
f RE-EXAMINED BY U. S. LAW AGENT.
I Ques. 1.—Did you know Francisco Guerrero in his life time ; if yes,
.j'Vhat was his business and his character, and where did he reside ?
I Ans.—I knew him well ; he lived at the Mission Dolores. He was
'lways in office, either Alcalde or Sub-prefect or sometoing of that
|Ort. I knew him from about 1835 till he died, all of which time he
!ved at the Mission Dolores. He went sometimes to his farm on the
oast, but always had his home at the Mission.
I Ques. 2.—Did he ever keep his office during that time at any other
dace than the Mission ?
Ans.—He never did at any other place.
1 Ques. 3.—Are you acquainted with Francisco Sanchez, ? how long
ave you known him ? what office has he held ? where has he resided
•nd where did he keep his office ?
I Ans.—I know him; he was a long time Alcalde at the Mission Do-
(
bres, and also at one time Alcalde's clerk; he was Captain of the
!
^ort of Yerba Buena. I have known him some twenty years or up-
Yards. He kept his Alcalde's office and his Secretary's office at the
/Mission Dolores.
Ques. 4—Answer the same questions as to Jose de la Cruz Sanchez ?
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Arts.—I have known him about the same time that I have knowi
his brother Francisco last named ; he was once Alcalde of the Missior
and lived and had his office at Dolores ; he afterwards moved to his
farm in this county. I do not think that he ever lived at Yerb*
Buena.
Ques. 5.—Answer the same questions respecting Don Jesus Noe.
Ans.—I have known him since about 1835. He was .Alcalde at the
Mission Dolores ; he lived and had his office in what is now San Fran
cisco, back of Dupont street, back of where the Monumental Engine
house now is ; I do not recollect the year he was Alcalde ; he was the
last Alcalde before the war ; I think he was elected. I was at thai
time at my farm and do not remember.
Ques. 6.—Answer the same questions respecting Francisco de Haro.
Ans.—I knew him ; he was my father-in-law ; I first knew hirr
about 1832 or 1833, and till about 1847 ; he was Alcalde and alsc
Alcalde's Secretary at the Mission Dolores ; he lived and kept his of
fice at Mission Dolores.
Ques. 7.—Did the several officers you have named exercise jurisdic-
tion over the country here, irrespective of any pueblo, extending that
jurisdiction as far as Contra Costa and the Palgas Rancho ?
Ans.—I know that they exercised jurisdiction heie; but I do not
know the territorial limit of that jurisdiction ; I do not know whether
it was limited by any pueblo or town, or not.
CKOSS-EXAMINED AGAIN BY ATTORNEYS FOR CLAIMANT.
Ques. 1.—During the time of which you have been speaking, didj
you take any particular interest in the administration of public affairs
at this place, or know much about them ?
Ans.—I took but little interest in such matters : I knew only what
was publicly known who the officers were, and the like, but took no
particular interest or part in such things.
CHARLES BROWN.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 10th day of May, A. D.,
1854.
PETER LOTT,
Commissioner for taking testimony, &c.
United States of America,
State of California.
ss.
San Francisco, May 11th, 1845.
This day personally came before Peter Lott, a Commissioner for ta-
king testimony to be used before the Board of U. S. Land Commis-
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lioners, in said State, Jacob P. Leese, a witness on behalf of the United
States in case No. 280 on the docket of said Board, wherein the city
pf San Francisco is claimant, and the said witness being duly sworn
t3.»n oath deposed in the English language as follows, to wit
:
I
!' The attorneys for claimant are present.
jt QUESTIONS BY U. S. LAW AGENT.
H Ques. 1.—What is your name, age, and residence ?
ik Ans,—My name is Jacob P. Leese, my age 45 years, my residence
.{donterey, California.
I Ques. 2.—How long have you lived in California?
I Ans.—I have lived here since the year 1833. From 1836 to 1841,
p lived at Yerba Buena, from that time till 1848, in Sonoma, since that
in Monterey. I was frequently visiting Yerba Bucna while I lived at
llonoma.
|i Ques. 3.—Who built and inhabited the first house in Yerba Buena,
;
!md when ?
I Ans.—I believe I built the first house here and lived in it ; that
Eras in 1836.
I (Objected to by counsel for claimant on the ground that it calls for
Construction of written documents and not for facts. P. L.)
I Ques. 4.—Look at Document No. 3, annexed to M. G. Vallejo's de-
position in this case, and state if you know the location of the place
pnerein called the Pueblo of San Francisco de Asis, and the Plaza of
:
;he Pueblo therein mentioned.
:';. Ans.—The locality known as pueblo of San Francisco de Asis, was
the Mission of Dolores, and wdrich sometimes was called Dolores. The
a'
. .
'Plaza referred to m this paper means the Plaza in front of the church
fat the said Mission.
I Ques. 5.—Was there any other place in the vicinity of said Mission,
tar of the present site of the City of San Francisco, called San Fran-
cisco de Asis at any time before the American occupation of the
icountry, or any other place, which at the date of this document was
j called the Plaza of said Pueblo ?
Ans.—There was no other place except the Mission in this vicinity
known as San Francisco de Asis, nor any other Plaza known as the Plaza
of the said Pueblo before the American occupation of the country.
•:
; Ques. 6.—Look at Docnments 5, 7, 8, 13, 14 and 16, annexed to
}M. G. Vallejo's deposition in this case, and state where is the locality
of the place referred to in them, in the address or otherwise in said
^document, called San Francisco de Asis and San Francisco.
) Ans.—San Francisco de Asis was the name given to the locality of
'the Mission Dolores, and, as I understand it, the name in these docu-
ments refers to that locality, as also the name San Francisco. The
Alcades lived at the Mission.
55
Ques. 7.—State, if you know, whether the municipal or other au
thorities, or the citizens of said Mission, or so called Pueblo or town
previous to the American occupation of the country, ever exercised
any acts of ownership over, or laid claims to any lands whatever it,
the present county of San Francisco, as land of the property of th<
town, and if the said town, or any other town within the territory em
braced by the present county of San Francisco, was ever reputed tc
be the owner of, or have any right to any land whatever, and if yea.
explain what lands, and by what right they were held or claimed.
Ans.—Until the year 1839, I never knew the Pueblo to claim anj
lands, or exercise acts of ownership over them ; after that, the PuebU
of San Francisco de Asis claimed lands in a portion of this place (th<
present city of San Francisco.) In the year 1839 there was a survey
made of this place, (city of San Francisco,) in November, 1839, whicl
included the streets now known as Montgomery on the east, Pacifi*
on the north, Dupont on the west, and California street on the south
all the land embraced in that survey, the authorities in San Francisco
de Asis exercised ownership over, for municipal purposes, for granting
town lots. That is the only land I know of over which the authori
ties aforesaid- exercised jurisdiction, in this place,then known as Yerb;
Buena. Those lands were claimed by an order which came from tin
Prefect, directing grants to be made to settlers in this place.
Ques. 8.—Did the claim you speak of in your last answer consis
merely in the exercise of the power to grant lots to individuals, com
municated by the Departmental Government, within the boundarie.
which you have mentioned ?
Ans.—That was the substance and intention of the claim—that wa
all.
CROSS-EXAMINED BY ATTORNEYS FOR CLAIMANT.
Ques. 1.—Who made the survey of which you have spoken ?
Answer.—Captain Vioget made it.
Ques. 2.—Do you know of any grants of lands having been mad<
by the municipal authorities of San Francisco, previous to 1839 ; i
(
so, what grants were they ? and by whom or to whom ?
Ans.—I know of no grants being made by said authorities before
1839. The authorities of San Francisco, before 1839, granted in thi
place (Yerba Buena,) to myself, one 100 vara lot, about where thj
Saint Francis Hotel stands, on the south-west corner of Clay and Du
pont streets, and they granted also, before 1839, to William A. Eicb
ardson, a lot of the same dimensions, adjoining the grant to me, oi
the northern side. I do not recollect of any other grants being madt
by said authorities before that date. These grants which I speak o
were made in pursuance of an order from the Governor (Chico,
which I brought myself from him, in June, 1836.
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Ques. 3.
—
"Was any price charged for lots which were granted after
irioget's survey in 1839
; if yea, what price?
I Ans.—Yes, after the survey by Vioget, I myself had a title perfected
|o a lot, for which the authorities charged me twenty-five dollars ; it
Jvas a one hundred vara lot ; it was a lot now on Montgomery street,
between Clay and Sacramento, and was marked No. 1, on the map;
pi paid that amount to the municipality for the lot ; Francisco Guer-
rero made me a deed for the lot, by order of the Governor, to whom
I had applied for such a grant.
I Ques. 4.—Was there, at that time, any regular price fixed for these
,'ots ; if yea, what was the price, and was it exacted of every one who
)btained a lot in the survey ?
I
Ans.—Yes, there was a price fixed, for a fifty vara lot; $6 25 was
r;he price, and every vara over fifty, in front, was 25 cents per vara
;
|io the best of my knowledge, this price was exacted of all who ob-
tained lots.
j|i Ques. 5.—By what authority was that price established ?
| Ans.—I am not able to say ; I believe it was the custom of the
pountry, in all pueblos ; it was the custom in Monterey.
1 Ques. 6.—Who directed the survey to be made by Vioget, in i
(11839?
r
^ Ans.—I do not recollect ; I think it was either Alvarado or Castro.
§
f'-
RE-EXAMINED BY U. S. LAW AGENT.
'" Question 1.—Was the sum which you have referred to as the price
..bf lots, which were granted, called derechos.
I (Objected to by counsel for claimant as leading the witness. P. L.)
| The question withdrawn by the Law Agent after the objection was
;
nterposed, and before the question was entirely written, but after it
bad been spoken in hearing of the witness. P. L.
I Ques. 2.—Was the sum which you have referred to as the price of
'lots, designated by some particular name in Spanish, if yea, what was
I?
I Ans.—Yes it was so designated ; it was called the funds of the mu-
'aicipaliclad ; municipal fund is the translation.
I
Ques. 3.—Please mention the Spanish word by which the sum paid
':or the grant of lots was designated ?
: Ans.—The term was Los derechos de la Municipalidad.
\]
CROSS-EXAMINED AGAIN BY CLAIMANTS COUNSEL.
I Question 1.—Do you not claim lands within the limits claimed by
! the city of San Francisco in this case, and for which you have peti-
tioned this Board for confirmation, if yea, state what lands and under
what title you hold them?
[j Ans.—I claim land in this place, which was a grant to me and Sal-
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vador VaT^jo, in the Spring of 1839, before the survey by Vioget, o:
wh'ch I liavy spoken, which is now known as Clarke's Point. .
Signed, J. P. LEESE. ll
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 11th day of May, A. D.;
1854.
''
(Signed,) PETER LOTT,
Commissioner for taking Testimony, &c. >
BEFORE COMMISSIONER LOTT—MAY 15, 1854.
Charles E. Pi ket depos.s that he is a resident of San Francisco'
County, thirty-five years of aire, and has resided in California since 1
[July 184(5. I lived*' in Yeiba Buej.a from July 184H Till March ldW.
jFr.im ttiy inquiries ;in I examinations about July 7, 18 i(), which were.
very particular, there was no regularly constituted municipal corpora--
ti >n on the present site of the City of San Francisco at that dale. X
had a conversation -with FraV. :cisco Guerrero, and I think I had with.
M. G. Vallej<>, though 1 am not positive. - 1 think so from the fact that
I conversed with most of the' ancient Californians upon the subject,
[and there seemed t » be but one opinion. On my return, after an ab-,
sence of a few weeks, 1 found that Capt. Montgomery, at the fort, had
appointed his second Lieutenant, Mr. Baitlett, Alcalde. Soon alter my
anival in town, Mr. LeidesdorrF and other citizens, I do not know (IJ
stopped at Leidesdorff House) said they had been trying to get CaptJ
Montgomery to authorize the. new Alcalde to grant lots as the old
ones had done under the Mexican Government, but that he had hesi-
tated, believing that he had no authority to do so. They then request-i
ed me to see Capt. Montgomery, and gave me some reasons why he'
ought to give the authority. I saw Capt. Montgomery on the subject,
and represented the wishes of the citizens to him. He then stated to
me that he could get no positive information as to the authority he or
the Alcade had for granting land, and requested me to get all the in-
formation 1 could on the subject and report to him. Mr. Leidesdorfl
was my interpreter conversing with Jesus Noe, Ex-Alcalde, and with
Francisco Guerrero, and also Francisco Sanchez and Jose de la Cruz
Sanchez. They all concurred in the opinion that there was no Pueblo
in existence here They also stated the usage and custom which had
been adopted by the Alcalde here, in granting lands. This all took
place here (San Francisco) in September, 1846.
8
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$ GENERAL VALLEJO's LETTER.
Sonoma, Nov. 7th, 1843.
i' Senor Don Guillermo Richardson :—Esteemed Sponsor, (compadre;)
linor Don Manuel Castanares writes to rae requesting to inform him
pout the vacant lands existing in the " Yerba Buena," and particularly
l the sea-beach ; as Senor Don Manuel seems to be a little jealous of
,..e extensive grants which Senor Don Manuel Micheltorena has made
V other individuals, as you know Senor Castanares wishes to enjoy
§30 the same rights that the foreigners do. You know that he has
|ld several offices, and that to-day he is the Collector of the Maritime
jstom House, and he wishes also to get something, as all the rest.
—
e solicits to obtain a tract of a thousand "varas" long, by two hun-
|'ed " varas" wide, and besides fifty " varas" in the sea, the whole
V^th: to make, a wharf. rj
{\\
.^
It. seems to me, sponsor, that this Senoi works to have the Custom
P,puse brought to San .Francisco—let us see. You know that always
was my project, that the. Custom House should be removed to San
i
!
;ancisco, and I believe that my friend Castanares knows something,
:f he came from jMexico lull of the projects of Bandini, Hisar, Par-
ses, and Aranjo, who, had they not fallen,- into disfavor, would have
: nsummated said removal. However,we shall see how the tiling goes.
'for my part, don't think that the, Custom House may remain in Mon-
!Vey. | Whether tlie lands be given to foreigners or natives, matters
!.; little, after the object being obtained. But it would be far. better
at he should have such land in, preference to other strangers as I
ime to understand.
,
r
ij'll send you also the letter of Don Francisco Sanchez, about the sub-
ijfet, to whom I have written already as Alcade of the place, to state
'inch are the vacant lands of such dimensions as you will see. he indi-
ces to me the boundaries of a devil of a tract. I think that you
r
Jiow better of the grants made, so I hope you will have the goodness
i ,;.)[
give me your opinion, that I may write to Senor Don Manuel Casr
Spares, about his solicitation to water privileges, which he is going
I
11 ask the Governor, following the example of Leese, .Salvador, and
i, e Russians, &c. ; also that you may give me an idea about the land,
•th a delineation of the sea-beach, although I think it be a foolishness
i
ask for since it is worth but little, it is deep bottom, there ?re so
i
j-j"g.e rocks, that Capt. Steel on one or two occasions, got his vessel
,; ;uck, while I was on board, and besides you know that at the very
i,;ace there lay the wreck of the Spanish Brig of YYar, ", San Carlos,"
'ilnich was cast away, I think, in 1812.
i'i |I believe that your statement about the subject will be of much
,1'^ight in favor of Senor Castanares, and will be considered the best
.;; port as may be given, since by your practical knowledge as a resi-
I &
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dent of the place, you have been Captain of the Port many years, ai
this is of much consideration to the subject in question.
Also, I understand that our friend, the well-known Limantour, wl
you will recollect wrecked on "Punta de Reyes," and whom we help<
to save a part of his goods, with thousand troubles, has furnished lar<
sums to General Micheltorena, and that if he does not intrigue, at lea
he endeavors to obtain some grants in that and other places, taHi
advantage of the poverty and scarcity of the revenue of theTreasm
of the Department.
Finally, we should endeavor as a first point in view, to get and brir
the Custom House to San Francisco—since from that, it will not on
result a good to the country, but to ourselves particularly. I ha^
sent the exposition made to the Government, printed here omCiall}
and this, it seems to me, has opened the eyes of Senor Castanares, wl
has no property in Monterey. Besides, you know, that I have man
friends in Mexico, and particularly the friendship of the President '<
the Republic, to whom, both privately and officially, I have writte,
extensively ; and according to my political and financial barometer
;
the Capitol, Senor Virmond, the thing takes a very favorable aspec'
Senor Castanares has told me in private conversation, that lie thou.']
of establishing a rancho here, and I offered to give him cattle, hbrs>
and Indians, in this way calculating. upon his friendship, as we shti
predispose him in our favor. The General: himself is well disposed
|
foster the advancement of the country. I can operate, as you kn«n
so efficaciously that almost I am able to assure you that the thing w;
be done.
This companion and friend wishes you prosperity.
(Signed) M. G. VALLEJO.
I, George Fisher, Secretary cf the Board of the United States Con
missioners, to ascertain and settle private land claims in the State <
California, certify the foregoing to be a translation of a Spanish doci
ment on file in this office, in case No. 548, Jose Y. Limantour, an
under my charge and custody, as such Secretary.
Witness my hand this 22nd day of September, 1853.
(Signed) GEORGE FISHER, Secretary.
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j
Wose Figueroa, Brigadier General of the Mexican Republic, Comman-
\ dant General, Inspector, and, Gefe Superior Politico of the Territory
\ of Upper California.
i The most Excellent Territorial Deputation desirous of supplying to
J
.he pueblos the funds necessary for works of common utility, has been
^leased to accord the following
:
o
I Plan of propios and arbitrios for municipal funds of the Ayunta-
! nientos of the territory of Upper California.
Art 1.—The Ayuntamientos will apply by the ordinary channels,
'.soliciting that to each pueblo lands be assigned for ejidos and for pro-
v
'nos.
ij Art 2.—The lands of propios which may be assigned to each pueblo
^ihall be divided into middling sized and small portions, and may be
f
1
! rented, or given out on quit rent (censo enfiteutic<>) at public auction.
' The present possessors of lands ofpropios shall pay the annual rent,
j censo,) which according to the discretion of the Ayuntamientos, with
jjhe previous informe of three intelligent men, may be imposed.
r Art 3.—For the concession of a lot to form habitations, the parties
interested shall pay six dollars and two rials for each lot of one hun-
l jrod varas square, and thus progressively or diminutively, shall pay at
t
f ihe rate of two rials per vara front.
?' Following are 15 articles more, relating to matters not material in
j, ibis case. The last article, which is the 19th, provides that the sub
pet shall be reported to the Supreme Government, which appears t
[fjiave been done by the following communication, which is annexed :
$ E. S.
;r IT. (EXCELLENT SIR.)
\i I have the honor to transmit to you, accompanying this, three copit
'jiif the bando, which contains the plan of propios and arbitrios for thes»
'i
;inunieipalitie?, accorded by the Excellent Deputation of this territory,
''til the 30th of July last, in compliance with article 19, and in ordej
'uhat you may be pleased to bring it (elevate it) to the cognizance <
he most Excellent President for his supreme resolution, as he may
j
eem just.
ff God and Liberty, Aug. 6, 1834.
|j Excellent Senor,
j.f Minister of Relations,
fii
'
.,..
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This Document is a copy certified by the U. S. Surveyor Generr1
for California, from the Journal of the Territorial Deputation, froi
the 31st day of October, 1834, to the 3d day of November fo
lowing inclusive, when the Deputation adjourned sine die. In th
proceedinds of the 3d Nov., is contained the resolution, duly adoptee
which is referred to in Doc. No. 1, annexed to the deposition of M. G
Wllejo that " the Gefe Politico shall take the necessary steps to th
end that the Parfido (district) of San Francisco proceed to the elec
tion of a Constituti -nal Ayuntamie to, which must reside in the Pre
sidio of that name, composed of one alcade, two regidores, nnd on.
Sitidico Procurador, being regulated throughout in carrying it int<
effect by the Constitution, and the law of 18th July, 1830 (should bi
12th July.)
1
'
In none of the proceedings is any reference had to the subject re
ferred to in Doc. No. 4 and i 8, annexed to the deposition of M. G
Valh jo. The remainder of the procee lings of the Deputation referreq
to in Doc. B. have no material connection with this case.
C
This document is an Expedience certified by the Surveyor General
from the oid archives of California remaining in his custody.
It contains
:
1.—A petition to the Gefe Politico, dated Ranchos of the North,
San Antonio, San Pablo and those adjoining, May 30, 1835. The
petitioners represent themselves as the residents of said ranchos ol
the north, "belonging to the jurisdiction of the port of San Fian-
cisco," and represent that they are subjected to great inconveniences,
by being subject to thit jurisdiction, among which are the perils oi
the sea and the danger of shipwreck, in their voyage to said port,
which, they say, will be at least forty leagues, going arid returning.
They say, that in the said " Port" there are no lodgings for the
accommodation of an Ayuntamiento, with their families, for a whole
year, after having brought with them the supplies necessary, during
the time of their official employment, and that to serve in offices which
they may be called to fill, they will have to abandon their families
and private affairs for a whole year, for which reasons, and others not
material, they pray to be annexed to the jurisdiction of the authori-
ties of San Jose, deputing for them a person charged with the admin-
istration ofjustice, who will be subject to the Judge of San Jose, aa
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th e cabezera (capital) as, in those ranchos, the greater part of the
citizens reside with their families. It is signed by
>r Antonio Ma. Peralta, Juan Jose Castro,
I Joaquin Isidro Castro, Gabriel Castro,
Bias Narva is, Cand ela ri< > Balen cia,
\ Santiago Olbera, Jose Peralta,
•J
Fernando Felis, Joaquin Moraga,
Antonio Armijo, Bamon Torivio,
Juan Bernal, Jose Duarto,
I; Bisente Peralta, Francisco Pacheco,
Ant nio Igera, Mariano Castro,
Bartolo Pacheco, Filipe Briones,
£ Ignacio Peralta, Domingo Peralta,
Bruno Balencia, Julian yil,
1
Bafael Felis, Francisco Soto,
Francisco Armijo.
On the 5th Sept. 1835, the subject having been passed to the Ter-
; ritorial Deputation, pursuant to an order of the Gefe Politico, Jose
' Castro, endorsed in the margin of the petition, they report that they
find the application to be "founded in justice, reason and public con-
venience; but as the subject ought to be treated of with the neces-
isary previous informes," they consider that these ought to be given
by the Ayuntamientos of the pueblos of San Jose and San Francisco.
They accordingly so resolve, and that the Expediente shall afterwards
1 be returned to them with the informes.
Sept. 28th, the Gefe Politico orders the Expediente to be passed to
those Ayuntamientos accordingly, and when returned with the in-
'formes, to be accompanied with a list (padron) of the citizens of the
pueblo of San Francisco.
Nov. 4th, 183 % the Ayuntamiento of San Jose report in favor of the
'•
application, observing that the petitioners had previously pertained to
> that jurisdiction.
1 Dec. 20, 1835, in a report dated at the "Port of San Francisco,"
'"the Ayuntamiento of San Francisco, says that the reasons set foith
1 by the petitioners why they ought not to belong to this jurisdiction
are frivolous in. their conception," and after many observations irrele-
1 vant to this case, advert to the fact that the petitioners have repre-
sented " that in the Presidio there are no lodgings where they can
live for a year when they may be called to discharge some office in
1
the Ayuntamiento, the which is not true (allowing us so to speak) and
I they deviate from the truth therein, and frankness which they ought
to observe before the authority which they are addressing (as they
;
likewise do in putting names, as ^su^sqtibecj^wtiigh
a
re^lj
s^4il 1lQ>k?^^>
and which 'migllt""
l
bc* menWneo!) for it *is evident and an established
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fact that the military Commandant of the Presidio furnished h^u^es to
th ) functionaries of the present Ayuntamiento as soon as it was in-
stalled." i
" In conclusion," they say, "the land or coast which embraces the;
petitioners, lias formerly pertained to the jurisdiction of the Presid ; o;
for besides forming with that of the Port itself the bay of San Fian-
cisco, the Rancho of Castros which is in front of the Presidio (a little*
more noitherly) is scarcely two leagues distant by sea, and that of the
Peraltas, two leagues, and a little more to the west ; which circumstances
were without doubt the data upon which the most Excellent Deputa-
tion proc eded, when in the latter part of the year 18'4 (counting
upon those citizens) resolved that the formation of the Ayuntamiento
should be proceeded to (making report to the Supreme Government)
and the Commandant General and Gefe Politico at that time D. Jose
Figueroa (may he rest in peace !) acting from the same reasons as the
corporation (the Deputation) proceeded to carry their resolution into
effect, thus giving orders to the Military Commandant of San Fran-
cisco ; and over and above the circumstances aforesaid, likewise con-
curs, that when said deceased Figueroa delineated (al demarcar)
(although provisionally) the limits of the jurisdiction of San Francisco
as appears irom his official note remaining in these archives, he like-
wise included that part of the land and property (terreno y bienes.")
This is signed by Francisco De Haro and Francisco Sanchez Secretary,
and with that the Expediente ends.
D.
A message from the Governor delivered to the Departmental Junta
on the 16th day of February 184 J, in which the condition of the
country is treated of elaborately. The following extracts contaiu all
that is in any way material in this case.
" Ejidos—No one of the said towns (of the department) with the
exception of Monterey, have marked out to them the Ejidos and lands
of propios which ought to be fixed for each one of the municipalities,
in order that they may know their /undo legal, for which reason the
Government on making grants immediately about the town*, has done
it provisionally, in anticipation of the regulation of this rmitter. The
iproper informes have been repeatedly required. Your Excellency
i(the Junta) in view of all and in use of the powers which are conced-
'ed to you in the first part of article 45, of the said law, (of 20 March,
1 11837,) and with the concurrence of the Government, will regulate as
a'may be convenient."
Agricitlttre.—Under this head the message states that during the
ifew-years-past-a-coasiderable' quantity, of-land has' been-grauted both
.
I; . .„. ............... , ...
-
.
•
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R natives and foreigner^, hut that Hi. is to he noted in respect to the
eater part of the sai 1 grants, th t they possess the character of
| legal concessions, if it be considered that they exist within the ten
I ttoral leagues which the law regulating the subject of 18 Aug., 1824,
'xpresseV It states in coniinu tiou that th. 1 diff rent Gefts Politlcos
nd provin id deputations consideiin •; the narrowness of the country
f,i.u£ altogether upon the co ist, and that to oblige the farmers to es-
iblish themselves in the interior, woud be to expose their lives and
roperty to the savage tribes, were obliged to accele to such coir e-;-
')ns. '• But it is to be observed likewise that upon th's subject no ap- ;
'lication has b en directed to the Supreme Government, which has
pr its object the legalizing of them, nor am I aware that this subject
las been brought to its cognizance Y>ur 1 xcellet cy (ihe .Juura) to
yhose attention I commend this business for the bme!it < f agriculture.
w'\\\ take the appropriate 'initiative, directing to the Supeiue Govern-
ment the due representati <n by which the lands of sa d propri tors
4ay be secured in a legitimate and permanent mock."
i
e
'] Is a copy certified by the County recorder of a certain book in the
>pani>h language, which appears by the certificate of Washington A.
Sartlett, the first American Alcalde, dated Aug., 1846, to have been
,ianded over to him by Don Jose de Jesus Noe, the last Mexican Justice
of the Peace, and Bartlett's immediate predecessor, " as containing the
ialy record of the grants o'* lots in said town of Yerba-buena."
I
This book purports to contain a record of all the grants made in the
pueblo or Mission of San Francisco and the place (paraje) called Yerba-
puena at any time prior to the time of its delivery to Mr. Bartlett. -
The dates commence in I8>9, and end June 6, 1846.
II Jt has three headings as follows :
,') 1. " Book in which are evidenced the possessions of solares in th
,')oint (jpmito) of Yerba-buena in virtue of the orders (lo despU'Sto)
ihe Departmental Government."
2. "Are evidenced those granted in the establishment of Dolores in
.Pursuance of the authority applied for (lo pedido) by the Prefecture
)f the D slrict of the government of the Department, of which (fact)
| have cognizance, as appears from the cfficial note which is found on
>age two."
' 3. Gives a '-'formu'a showing the mode in which possessions of
\\olares to form habitations have been given to the cit'zens {yecinos)
If the jurisdiction of San Franu isco de Asis."
• The official note referred to, which appears to have been written by
^° F. Castro, acting ad interim, and dated 1*HI> states
re
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that he had received from the Secretary of Government an offici
communication, dated 16th April, 1841, reciting that when the Pr
feet, Don Jose Castro made a visit to the north, he bore with him i
structions from the government on various subjects, and among othei
it was ordered that solares might be granted to individuals in the e.
tablishment of Dolores, but they must not exceed fifty vara-5 , whic
disposition of the government was now renewed in consequence of tl
official communication of the Prefecture, dated the 6th of the san
month, which his Excellency, (the Governor,) had seen.
The grants entered in the book of a date anterior to this commun
cation, are geneially of 100 vavas, but those of a subsequent date, bot
at the Mission, and atYerba Buena, are of fifty varas only, ex crpt thos
made by the Governor.
In this book are recorded fifty-five grants, in all, at both points. (
these, ten appear to have been made either directly by the Governo
or in pursuance of his special order. Five were made in compliant
with a special decree of the Prefect made in each individual cas
The grants by the Governor and the Prefect are indiscriminately
\
one hundred vara, and fifty vara lots. Two of the Governor's 'g ant
at Yerba Buena, appear to have b«-en made April 22, 1846. The r»
maini'-g giants appear to have been made in virtue of the authority give
by the Departmental Government, referred 1o in the heading of tr
book, and to whieh illusion is sometimes made in the subsequent el
tries, and sometimes nut. One of the grants made by the Governc
at Yerba Buena, is in the form of a license to erect some sort of m;
chinery, and the decree of the Governor contains the^-e woids:— •<•
being understood that as soon as the said sola shall he disoecupied I
the machine referred to, it shall remain to the benefit of the nation fc
the uses convenient." The word town or pueblo is nowhere used i
the book, but a plan is sever d times referred to. The place in whic
the grants this side of Mission Creek are made, is designated as tb
jparaje (locality), qy punto (point) of Yerba Buena.
d& 'JJfj .
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I STATEMENT- :
Lands sold on judgments according to the evidence introduced in
't.;fj rs THIS CASE BEFORE THE U. S. BOARD OF LAND, COMMISSIONERS,
| : : : -
FY
'
!
- '
'
'
'
'"
i'The property 5 within and adjoining this city which has been sold at
...'ariff's sales on executions against the city, isas follows:
i'ijyjfl the 8th of July, 1851, 2 fifty vara lots (and 5 wharves, all the
J
arves of the city then built, or nearly, except Commercial or Long
jOn the lljth of September following, 40 one hundred (or 160 fifty,)
yl 55 fifty vara, lots, mating in all 215 fifty vara lots, were sold, all
'which were held either under Al.cade grants, or by the Commission-
;': of the Funded Debt of the city.
jljJn the 14th of J.uue, A. D. 1851, the Sheriff sold 30 entire blocks
\\ 7 one hundred vara lots, besides 102 water lots.
,
On the 26th November, 1851, the Sheriff sold 24 entire blocks,
Uprising about 3t0 fifty vara lots, and the entire number brought
,!,y $1275, asappears on the official books of the Sheriff.
';5n the ,30th January, A, D, 1852,,, the Sheriff sold 16 fifty vara lots,
"hundred vara lots, and 15 entire blocks, and a piece of land hear
'•'uiston. street and Mission Creek, containing 5 blocks making in all'.
['Wt 400 fifty vara lots, and also at the same sale, three large tracts
i.j^A extending in a belt two miles wide, entirely around the sur-
'!/ed limits of the city except oh the water, which leaving out so
,i ch of it as is covered with water, may be described as follows : Be-
aming at the intersection of Larkin street with the bay, and running
fence along the natural high water mark of the bay, to the distance
:,( two miles in a straight line, thence south on a line parallel to the
\e of Larkin street, about four and a half miles, thence east to the
id water mark to the south of the city, thence along said water mark
'•"a point two miles south of Clay street, thence to the junction of
JJsom and Corbett streets, thence along Corbett to the line of Larkin
[feet, and along Larkin street to the place of beginning. Only a
filing portion of the water property around the city which has been
Id under the same executions and judgments is included in the
I'pve description.
i|ote.—It is believed that the whole amount for winch, the foregoing property was sold, will be con-
'ratty 1*» tfatt $10,000. ''''..';.; '...
POINTS ON BEHALF OT THE UNITED STAT
'
.
'
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1. There is no evidence of t\e establishment of a Municipal ;
poration at any time within the present limits of the City of San I
cisco. The Ayuntamiento elected in 1834-5, was for the Partia
San Francisco, which embraced all Coutra Costa, Sonoma, San ~Ri
and on this side of the Bay, the whole of the present County of
Fram isco. It was a change of the former Military Government, w
the Commandant of the Presidio had exercised, into a civil Go"*
ment for the same district.
2. The head-quarters of the civil authorities elected to super
the Military Commandant, though first established at the Presidi 1
want of some other suitable place at that time, were afterwkrc
1
moved to the Mission of San Francisco, commonly called Dol
which thus became the Gabezera (Capital) of the Partido, and co
ued to be so till the time of the American occupation of the cou
There the Ayuntamiento held their sessions so long as that be ^
tinued. There the elections were held, and there all the muni
officers lesided, kept their public offices, and the archives of the
government of the Partido with the exception of Capt. Hinc Aey
Jesus Noe.
3. The place called indiscriminately, the Pueblo of San Fram
and San Francisco de Asis is the secularized Mission of San Fran
de Asis or Dolores, and no other place was ever known by that i
previous to the American occupation. No part of the country
side of Mission Creek was ever considered as included in it. 0:
last two paints, all the depositions, documents and evidence cc
without any exception.
4. No limits were ever assigned to the so called pueblo of
Francisco or any other pueblo in the present county of San Fran
by any competent authority, nor by any authority whatever.
~"""5: The dociTment"N6rl§"anne'X'e"d'-"to^th6 tieposition of M. G.
"lejot, though incompetent as evidence; tifiuffideiftlfc' prove TO
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|:,vxiv*u , to De establi hed by it, and wholly irrelevant to the matter
controversy if it did prove it, is abundantly shown to be a forgery,
the deposition of Alvarado, Hartnel!, Richardson and Castro. Be-
.yes this, in point of law, the Gefe Politico and deputation had no
' wer to fix limits to any pveh-o.
'M. There is not only no evidence of the establishment of a munici-
jl corporation anywhere in the piescnt county of San Francisco, but
:>3 fact is that no authority existed in California competent to create
/p.
:7. But if the existence of the municipal corporation had been
'Wly made out with its limits defined, and established by competent
thority, that is, admitting all that the claimant has even attempted
i
:
;
prove, it would not fcgnd to support the claim in this case; it would
'4y show the competewy of the corporation to acquire and to hold
tjoperty. The claimant has not attempted to prove any grant or pre-
sided that any was ever made in point of fact.
!f8. By the laws of Mexico, towns of every class, though capable of
'quiring property, have none by virtue of their establishment as such,
1 il or personal, none but what they acquire in the same mode and
,j:h the same legal requisites as individuals with this one superadded
'those necessary in the case of individuals, that towns to receive or
Ejjtd landed property must have the special license of government.
;':J'|, By the laws of Spain and Mexico all municipal corporations
Aoy just such rights, privileges and exemptions, as may be specially
'Anted to them in their charters or other special legi-lative acts, and
I;to property, they, enjoy such as they can get from the lawful owner
ijithe usual legal mode, with the license of government superadded.
AilO. The demarkation of limits to towns, Partidos or provinces,
;M nothing to do with property, but all property (by the laws of
tjxico) which may be embraced within such limits when established,
jvl and personal, remains unaffected in the possession of its several
prietors, whether the proprietor be an individual, a corporation, or
sovereign.
ILL Although municipal corporations are competent to acquire pro-
!;ty with the license of Government, no power ever exist d in Cali-
l;
pia competent to grant the smallest portion of the public domain,
"the property of such corporations, for any purpose whatever.
;'.2. The laws of the Mexican Republic, which must be the only
.'3 in the territories, and the departments which previously existed
'y as territories, make no provision for granting or reserving public
1 \A~h to municipal corporations, but the whole system of town lands
preservations was abolished, and therefore no power but the general
'j-
1
!' igress was ever competent to make such grants in Calilornia, since
,
1* independence of Mexicc was established.
•.'
'.3. Under the laws then, as they existed in California, prior »to. July
;! >v46, ho city or pueblo could hold land without express grant,, and. if ..
f
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the property in the Foil had not in fact at" that time passed from th
sovereign to some person or corporation to whose rights the presen
claimant has succeded, no confirmation can be had in this case,, unles
the i4th section of the act of 1851 is construed to operate as a tram
fer to the present city of San Francisco.
14. That se tion instead.of g> anting, directs how city lots heh
under grants to individuals from corporations to which lands may hav>
been granted, shall be presented to the Board, thus showing that thi
Board is confined to questions connected with actual grants.
15. In this case, as no grant has b 'en prove 1, the claimant mus
rely on the presumption raised by said section 14.
16. To make that presumption available, the claimant must brins.
itself, by the proofs, within the provisions of the act.. In the first plac»
it must be shown that the corporation has granted lots to individuals an(
.the claim to those lots may then be presented by the corporation, anc
the clause making the existence of a city on the 7th of July, 1846
l>rima facie evidence of a grant to such corporation, only applies tc
cases where the co poration has presented those individual claims, anc
for the benefit of those claimants. The city has failed to present an)
grants on behalf of private individuals, and is not therefore entitled tc
the benefit of any presumptions raised by the statute. On the other
hand she claims adversely the whole land within certain limits, show-
ing numerous adverse claimants, when the evident intetion of the
statute was to enable a city (or individual) where the claims must
otherwise be numerous, to present each sub claim in one petition, and
thus obviate the necessity of making proofs in a large number of cases,
of one original grant.
17. But if a grant is to be presumed under the statute, can you
presume more than the bare existence? Would you not be compelled
to prove the loss and the contents, as in other cases. The statute only
provides for a presumption of the existence of a grant. How then
.will the terms be fixed ? who is presumed the grantor and who the
grantee ? What is the presumed date of the g: ant ? What are the
limits to he assigued under the direction of presumptions ? Will you
establish a point and make the limit equidistant from it in all its parts
thus forming a circle a or will you form a square or ether figure and
fix the lines arbitrarily?
The necessity of having these questions answered in the proofs,
show that the contents of the grant must be proved ; otherwise, any at-
tempt to carry the doctrine of presumption, so far as to fix the terms,
would be, in fact, an arbitrary exercise of power wholly at variance
with all rules of proceeding in courts.
18. Again, who shall have the benefit of the presumption, the city
or those private parties who hold adverse ? The 14th section applies
to individuals a? well as to corporations, and those claimants who are
named in the. petition* together with- Liuiantour, -'are* entitled' to" the;
'To
same presumption, with this circumstance in their favor. You would
not be compelled to presume the terms of their claims, because they
are filed in each case and proved. Besides this, the presumption thus
allowed to operate equally in favor of various conflicting claims, con-
tradicts and destroys itself.
If we are correct in the foregoing propositions, the claimant must
be held to strict proof of every essential fact, the most essential of
which are not in evidence, and therefore the claim must fail.
19. But if there were rights in a former pueblo to all the lands
now claimed, in what corporation did it exist? This is essential, so
that we can ascertain whether the present claimant has succeeded to
the same rights.
Was the Presidio of San Francisco the owner? That was a military
establishment owned by the government, and the government could
grant, or not, in its discretion. Was it the pueblo of San Francisco
de Asis? No part of that wasinduded within the limits of the city
of San Francisco, as first established. Was it the port of Yerha
Buena? That was never a separate municipal organization from the
Mission Dolores; most of theofficers who exercised jurisdiction over
Yerba Buena were residents of Mission Dolores ; and all the elections
were held entirely outside of the first established limits of the city of
San Francisco. If then no city was the owner, the claimant could not!
succeed to any proprietary rights as successor of a Mexican pueblo.
The city of San Francisco dates its legal existence, April 15th, 1S50.
The act creating the city and defining its limits, did not purport to*
adopt any part of a former organization, and no succession to any
rights or privileges of a pre-existing pueblo is claimed therein, taking
a name and location peculiarly its own. There is not in any of the
evidence proof of succession to any former rights of property, and no
proof of the existence of the city of San Francisco on the 7th of July,*
184(i, and consequently, the cl.tim must be rejected.
The authorities to prove the foregoing proposition, will be produced
orally to the Board, and submitted during the argument.
J. H. McKUNE,
Law Agent
HORACE HA WES,'
Of Counsel.
EKKATA.
n page 8, in answer to interrogatory 17 for are " not all dead " (5th line) read
ow all dead.
ame page, in 4th interrogatory by U. S. Law Agent, for " Potrero" read
iido, and in the answer thereto, for " J did not," read, it did not.
n same page, at the continuation of the examination, insert the date (Feb 15.)
Exhibit No. 4, referred to in the deposition of M. G. Vallejo, is not inserted, it
ejig merely a copy ef Exhibit No. 18-
£he testimony of H. W. Ilalleck is taken from the minutes of the claimant's coun-
j the official record of it having been mislaid.
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BRIEF OF ARGUMENT.
Although it will be perceived from a subsequent part of my argument, that
all the facts attempted to be established by the claimant, are wholly immaterial
and irrelevant to the subject in controversy, inasmuch as no proof Las been
offered of any grant of lands to the town of which the present city of San Fran-
cisco is alleged to be the successor and heir
;
yet I propose to refer briefly to
such as have been regarded as important, and
1. Was an Ayuntarniento elected for the Partido of San Francisco pursuant
to the resolution of the Territorial deputation passed Nov. 3, 1834, and commu-
nicated to Gen Vallejo by Governor Figueroa in the letter dated Nov. 4, (Ex-
hibit No. 1 to Vallejo's Dep.)
The election of members for such Ayuntarniento undoubtedly took place, and
if that is material, I will add that it was held at the Presidio, although we have
no documentary evidence of the fact, the documents marked Exhibits 2 and 3,
referring only to the choice of electors by whom the members were to be chosen.
This Ayuntarniento was installed by the Military Commandant of the Presidio,
who had to that time exercised the civil functions with which the newly consti-
tuted body was to be charged, because there was no other authority existing
that could install them.
2. > What was the territorial jurisdiction of this Ayuntarniento?
It will at once be seen that it must be co-extensive with the Partido for the
only authority for the creation of an Ayuntarniento is found in the resolution
of the Depution referred to in the said Exhibit No. 1, which provides that the
Partido of San Francisco, comprehending by the concurrent testimony of all
the witnesses on both sides, a large extent of country on the other side of the
Bay of San Francisco, and on this side the whole of the Peninsula as far as San
Francisquito Creek, shall proceed to elect a Constitutional Ayuntarniento. And
when the election was held, pursuant to this order, says Francisco Sanchez, (p.
42 and 43) the whole Pueblo (people,) of San Francisco that is of the Partido
of that name, came from their several abodes in Contra Costa, Sonoma, San
Kafael and other places, '''sparing no exertion to do so, as they were anxious to
get rid of the military authority." And so, from this time on, the civil author-
ity of the Partido was joyfully taken in hand by the Pueblo (people) of San
Francisco who were to exercise it through the constitutional functionaries, e^cted
by them. Not only did the voters for the Ayuntarniento come from Contra
Costa and other places, distant from the Presidio and Port, but a majority of
the individuals chosen for electors and of those selected to fill the various offices
at different periods, resided either on the other side of the bay or in the Mission
of San Francisco, or in some of the ranchos distant from the Presidio and Port,
as may be seen from the depositions of Brown, Sanchez, Richardson and others
as well as by reference to document C, in which are set forth the names of 27
persons residing in Contra Costa, who in 1835 wanted to be exempted from the
Partido of San Francisco, on account of the inconveniences that would result
to them from being obliged to serve on the Ayuntarniento which at that date
was required to hold its sessions at the Presidio.
3. How long did this Ayuntamiento continue to hold its sessions at the Pre-
sidio ? There can toe no question that it was removed to the Mission and never
sat at the Presidio after the year 1837. So says Sanchez (p. 42) who was Sec-
retary of that body, and in this he is supported toy all the testimony in the case.
After the year 1838 until 1846, only two persons, Piiia and Soto, who were
soldiers with families, continued to reside at the Presidio. The Mission from
that period to the war was the residence of the local authorities, and the place
where all elections were held.
4. Where is the locality called the Pueblo of San Francisco and San Francis-
co de Asis ? That it is the Mission of Dolores, is a fact fully established by the
testimony of Richardson, (p. 27). Alvarado, (p. 39), Francisco Sanchez, (p. 42),
Jose Castro, (p. 48), Charles Brown, (p. 50)), Jacob P. Leese, (p. 54), and there
is no witness or document that says the contrary.
5. Were any limits for a town ever established by competent authority, or to
be more definite, was the line generally denominated the Vallejo line so estab-
lished, and for that purpose ? I waive the question whether Gen. Vallejo did
mark out either on the ground, or on paper, or mentally, the line referred to,
as no one will pretend that he alone had the power to establish it. I waive
also, for the present, the question whether the Territorial Deputation had power
to establish it, or to approve the establishment of it. I inquire only if they did
so. Neither Gen. Vallejo nor any other witness testifies that they did, nor would
parol proof of that fact be admissible, without first laying some foundation for
it. But even if it could be proved by parol, no such proof has been offered.
Neither has the record of the proceedings of this Deputation been offered, which
is the'cnly competent evidence, unless such record has been lost. But we know
that the record is not lost, for the Government has produced it, and it contains
no act such as the claimant pretends was adopted by the Deputation. If the
resolution was adopted and not recorded, it could have no legal effect whatever,
because a deliberative body, such as the Territorial Deputation, can not act by
parol. Their acts have no legal existence till recorded at least. But even if the
act of the Deputation could subsist in parol, that is, could be valid without ever
having been i ecorded, we have the highest evidence possible in such a case, that
the act was not adopted, nor even considered, namely the deposition of the pre-
siding member, (p. 47.) who, as first Vocal received all communications from
the Governor, and distributed to the various committees the business on which
they were to report respectively. If the claimant's counsel had entertained any
doubt of the truth or accuracy of Jose Castro, why did they not call one of the
six other members whose names appear in the journals of that session, some of
whom are yet living in the State, and one of whom, at least, has been in this
very room, repeatedly, since Castro's deposition was taken ? It must be taken
as true then, beyond all controversy, that the Deputation never did act upon
the subject at all. The record of their proceedings says so, and the presiding
member confirms it by his oath. Was there some other record or journal in
which this act might have beeu entered? That is not pretended. The Zamarano
document (No. 18,) which has so clearly been proved to be a forgery, was got up
by unskillful hands. It does not purport to certify an act of the Deputation. It
certifies only that a certain paper is a copy of a certain other paper, which other
paper certifies that the Territorial Deputation had passed a certain act,;which
act must necessarily be matter of record. I am at a loss to perceive under what
rule of evidence such a document can be admitted, or have any legal weight
though its genuineness were unquestioned.
If the original letter of Figueroa, of which this forged document purports to
be a copy, were now produced and its genuineness admitted, it could not cer-
tainly be admitted as the best evidence to prove the act of the Deputation, for
the record (or a certified copy of it,) of the proceedings and acts of that body
would be better, and the proper officer, under the former government, to certify
such record, was the person having the custody of the archives of the govern-
ment—the Secretary—and if such certificate or certified copy had been issued
and afterwards lost, it would not be competent to offer a copy of such certificate
or certified copy, but recourse must be had to the record again, or else its exist-
ence and loss must be proved. The act referred to in Document No. 18, pur-
ports to be an act of the Government, conjointly with the Territorial Deputation.
and even if the original document, of which it is alleged to be a copy, namely,
the original letter of Figneroa, were competent evidence of such act, as being a
certificate of what was done, and recorded as all acts of government and the
Deputation must have been to have any validity ; still, the loss of the letter
must be supplied, not by a copy or proof of its contents, but by having recourse
again to the original record, or proving its existence and loss.
But if it were admissible to give evidence of a copy or of the contents of the
letter of Figueroa, no sufficient evidence has been given. The only witness who
speaks on that point is Gen. Vallejo, and he does not say that either exhibit No.
4, nor exhibit No. 18, was copied by him from the original, nor that he ever
compared either of them with the original. It cannot, therefore, be considered
as a copy, or admissible as a copy, under the rules of evidence applicable to the
case. No evidence has been offered of the contents of the letter of Figueroa,
nor does Gen. Vallejo testify that he has any recollection of such contents, dis-
tinct from the said exhibits. The said exhibits are offered as copies, and as, up
to this time, they are not proved to be such, by any competent evidence, they
must be rejected, and not considered as part of the evidence in the case. V/hat
evidence is there, then, of the establishment of the Vallejo line? There is none
whatever. Counsel for claimant have argued as if Gen. Vallejo had testified to
the fact that the government with the Deputation had established or approved
that line as the limit on one side of some pueblo. He has testified to no such
thing, nor would parol proof of that fact be admissible. Again, there is no evi-
dence whatever that auy genuine document or record of any kind, relating to
the alleged act of government, ever existed in the archives of government. No
witness says so. No genuine document says so. The existence must be proved
clearly before the loss can be proved, and both must be clearly established before
any inferior evidence can be admitted. More than this, it is proved beyond all
doubt that the document referred to by Gen. Vallejo was not one referring to
the demarcation of any Pueblo. Gen. Vallejo says he put that document, what-
ever it was, in the archives of the pueblo. The keeper of the archives, as may
be seen by reference to the second and third depositions of Francisco Sanchez,
and the law on the subject, was the Secretary of the Ayuntamieuto. Every com-
munication and every document, after being seen by the Alcalde, was passed into
his hands to be archived. Sanchez was Secretary from the organization of the
Ayuntamiento till that body ceased to exist. He swears that he saw no docu-
ment containing or referring to the demarcation of limits to any Pueblo. The
only limits ever designated, as he says, were those of the Partido which he
describes. He was also the Justice of the Peace in 1842 and 1843, and as such
had still the custody of the archives. He was also commandant of the Presidio
from 1837 to 1840 and from 1845 to the American occupation. Surely, no one
could know better than he whether such a document ever existed. In addition to
this, it is in proof that every person who has had the custody of the said archives
from the time the Ayuntamiento was first organized in 1835 to the American
occupation in 1846, except Hinckley and Guerrero, is now living, and all of
them have been almost daily in attendance at this Commission. Why has not
some one of them been called to prove the existence and the loss of the alleged
document. Gen. Vallejo says he put it in the archives of the Pueblo. Is it not
most clear that if he did put it there, he has forgotten its contents, as he very
well may have done after the lapse of twenty years ; for that no document ex-
pressing the limits to any Pueblo ever existed in those archives, seems to me to
be beyond all doubt. The deposition of Capt. Halleck as to what he saw in the
Alcalde's office, in 1849, is of no legal weight, as he does not describe any docu-
ment, and, if he had done so, being entirely unacquainted with the hand-writing
of Figueroa, never having even seen the man, he could give no legal evidence as
to the genuineness of any document purporting to be from him. All that he
says respecting the archives of the Departmental Government is equally irrele-
vant to the question, whether any record had existed on the subject of bounda-
ries : for neither he, nor any other man, living or dead, pretends to have ever
seen or heard of the existence of any such record in any place.
Gen. Williams, on Saturday last, paid a merited compliment to the character
of my friend, Gen. Vallejo, as I am informed. I thank him for it, and I am
sorry my health did not permit me to be present to hear it. It is the only senti-
merit in Ms whole argument, I believe, which was ever expressed before, at least
by any gentleman of his abilities.
It seems to me, therefore, that the conclusion is inevitable without impeach-
ing anybody's veracity, founded upon all the facts and documents, that no lim-
its were ever ever fixed by any act of the Territorial Government as limits of a
town in this present county, unless it should be those marked out by Captain
Richardson in 1S35, and described on the map annexed to his deposition in this
case including the land at Yerba Buena from California or Pine street to North
Beach, and extending west about as far as Stockton street. That this survey
was made, the map formed and remitted to the Governor, and the plan approved
by him rrovisionally in his official note, dated Oct. 20, 1835, (p. 31), is proved
by Richardson's deposition, and the original document on file in this case, the
genuineness of which are acknowledged by Governor Castro in his deposition
(p. 48), and is not brought in doubt by any evidence in the case.
Having thus adverted as briefly as possible to some of the leading facts, I will
proceed to consider the points of law, observing in the outset that the claim ap-
pears to me to be not only invalid, but destitute of any foundation. In this
respect, it differs from all the adjudicated cases. It is, perhaps, the first time in
the history of judicial proceedings, in which a tribunal has been gravely asked
to pronounce in favor of a claimant who offers no proof of any right or title to
the thing claimed. Truly the parties interested in the confirmation of this claim
must " live by faith alone."
§ 1. The first point to be considered in the argument of this case is, by what
law is the claim to be determined ? It will at once be admitted that it must be
governed by the Mexican laws, under the sanction of which the rights of the
claimant, such as they may be, must have had their origin.
§ 2. The Independence of Mexico, so far as respects the effect of Spanish legis-
lation, is reckoned from the 23d day of Sept., 1821, when she was denied a rep-
resentation in the Cortes. Spanish laws of a date subsequent to this, are not
recognized as having any operation in the Republic, but all those of a prior date
which were not repugnant to the new political system continued to have the
same force after, which they had up to the time of the Independence. It may
may seem superfluous to refer to authorities in support of a doctrine familiar to
those having the slightest knowledge of Mexican jurisprudence. To elucidate
it, however, I will adopt the language used in the introduction to the " Collec-
tion de decretos y Ordenes de las Cortes de Espana que se reputan vigentes en
la Republica delos Estados Unidos Mejicanos.''
§ 3. " The Independence of Mexico having been happily realized by the occu-
pation of its Capital on the 27th Sept. 1821, and the overthrow of the Vice-
royal Government, although the bonds of dependency on Spain remained for-
ever broken, the laws which regulated the rights and duties of this new society
could not nor ought to remain without vigor, since it not being possible to re-
place them but in the transcourse of time, and by the authorities competent, the
sudden abolition of them all would have been the establishment of a state of
anarchy at a time when order was most needed.
" Thus it is that with the exception of those laws which conflicted directly
with the the plan of Iguala, and the new order ot things which it created, all
the rest which had emanated from the kings of Spain, and the sovereign author-
ity which to that time had been recognised, were acknowledged and respected.
Suits were decided by them
;
justice waa administered in conformity therewith,
and by ther tenor the Mexicans regulated their social life. Hence, the Spanish
Codes, to which others entirely national have not yet been substituted, are
sought after with eagerness by judges, professors, and even private citizens, as
in these they encounter the standard of their actions, the guaranty of their re-
spective rights, and the rule of their judicial proceedings."
" Notwithstanding that Mexico is independent of Spain," says the author of
the Febrero Mejicano, " she is yet governed by the codes of her ancient metrop-
olis, because (as say the History of the Law, new ed. of D. Juan Sala), circum-
stances which it is not necessary to mention, have prevented the substitution of
others entirely national, to those which in many parts are repugnant to the char-
acter of a free and independent nation, and much more to the system of Govern-
ment which has been adopted.
* They subsist, however, in all other parts, and are now the rules of the ac-
tions among the Mexicans, who find iu them the sum of their rights when not
determined by national laws. For this reason is indispensable the study of the
Spanish Codes, from which are are deduced nearly all the doctrines of this
work." (1 Feb., Mej. 28.)
The same doctrine is authoritatively declared in a " Consulta" of the Council
of State, addressed to the Supreme Government of Mexico, Sept. 20, 1838, on
the question referred to them whether the laws of the old States, now Depart-
ments, ought to be considered as remaining in force after the establishment of
the consolidated Central Government.
§ 5. " To resolve this question," says the Council, " we will make some ob-
servations which perhaps may conduct us to a correct conclusion. It ought
principally to be noted that all those laws are in force, which not being
directly repugnant to the system which rules, are not expressly abrogated by
some posterior disposition, this rule having its application even with respect to
those laws which were dictated in very remote epochs, and under the different
forms of government which the nation has had. Thus it is that the tribunals
and other authorities, daily resolve the different subjects of their cognizance
according to the decrees of the Spanish Cortes, the laws of the Partidas and
the Recopilacion provided that these dispositions do not partake more or less of
the form of government under which they were dictated," and concludes with
the opinion that the laws of the old States ought to be regarded as remaining in
force, which was adopted by the Executive and communicated to the Governors
of the Departments, in order that it should be observed as a general rule, ( Col-
eccion de leyes y Decretos importantes, etc., 1838-9. p. 130.) The foregoing
proposition and the authorities cited, refer only to those rules and dispositions
established by the Supreme Power, the Legislator, and intended to have the
force and effect of laws.
The orders and dispositions of other departments and functionaries not inves-
ted with the legislative authority, cease with the Government that issued them,
§ 6. It is a fixed rule of interpretation in Mexican Jurisprudence that, the
former law must not be deemed changed by the posterior any farther than it is
so expressly declared. The reason is because the correction of the laws being
odious, it is avoided whenever possible by construction, always endeavoring to
reconcile them and not admitting the change without necessity. (1 Feb.
mej. p. 17.)
§ 7. In determining any question in Mexican Jurisprudence, the codes are to
be consulted in the following order after the constitution and laws of the Repub-
lic and of the particular State in which the question may arise.
1. The latest dispositions of the Spanish Government made applicable to New
Spain and communicated in the usual form though not inserted in the recapila-
tion of the laws of the Indies, and having respect to those of latest date in all
cases of conflict.
2. The laws of the Recapilacion of the Indies, and if they should be found
conflicting, giving effect to those of latest date.
3. The JVueva Recapilacion including the autos acordados of the Supreme
Council, and observing always the dates in order to resolve any doubt arising
from real or apparent conflict. (1 Feb. Mej. 49. Refers 1 1 and 2, T. 1. Lib.
2, R. I.)
4. The Laws of the Fuero Real and the Fuero Juzgo.
5. The Statutes and Ordinances of each city, provided they have been con-
firmed by the Royal Council, (or the Legislative authority), and be not opposed
to the principles of religion or any written law.
6. The Laws of the Siete Partidas.
7. If after consulting all the Codes, Constitutions and Statutes mentioned, an
express law cannot be found applicable to the particular case which has occurred,
it must be decided by some other law for similar cases which can be accommo-
dated to it by parity of reason. (Alvarez Derecho Real y de Indies, v. 1, p.
58-60.)
§ 8. The JVovisima Recapilacion not having been at any time ordered to be
observed in New Spain, nor communicated in the usual mode, nor having been
adopted by the Legislative authority since the establishment of the Republic, is
snot regarded as an authoritative code in Mexico, and consequently to determine
the force and effect which any law found in it ought to have, it must be referred
to its origin. (1 Feb. Mej. 39.)
§ 9. The distinction which exists between an executive regulation and a law
must also be constantly borne in mind, for the executive can only provide for
the execution of the law, and consequently a regulation or decree of the Gov-
ernment conflicting with any existing law, whether an act of the Mexican Con-
gress, or a law found in any of the codes referred to, is void ; and as observes
Lares in his Derecho Administrated, p. 19 : " neither the judical nor adminis-
trative tribunals are under any obligation to obey illegal reglamentos," and
the council of Government in the consulta already referred to, expressly say,
that regarding the laws of the old States as Vigentes (remaining in force) in all
things not directly repugnant to the ruling system, it is of no consequence that
the Supreme Government may have dictated otherwise for its dispositions must
never be placed above the laws.
§ 10. The proposition which I now propose to make clear by reference to
various laws and authorities that will be cited in the proper place, is : That
towns in Mexico as in all Spanish countries, (and I might add in all countries in
the world) enjoy the rights, privileges and franchises which have been specially
conceded by the sovereign authority, and although by virtue of some general
laws, the mere fact of their corporate existence would entitle them to some^?o-
litical rights, such as to have a local Government, constituted in the manner
which these laws prescribe, yet in respect to property, real or personal, they
can claim only such as has been expressly granted to them, or which they have
acquired by purchase, or by some other legitimate title, in the same manner and
subject to the same laws as individuals ; that is to say, that the formation of
Ayuntamientos, the election of Alcaldes, or other officers, establishment of lim-
its to towns, Partidos, districts, or provinces, has nothing to do with property,
but all property, real as well as personal, which may be included within such
limits, when established, belongs to the same proprietor that it did before—some
to individuals, some to various corporations perhaps, as churches, hospitals,
monasteries, and some to the sovereign.
And when the law guarantees to the towns their privileges, offices, uses, cus-
toms and franchises, (as in L. 1, 2, 3,4 and 5, T. 2, Lib. 7 It. and L 3, T. 5, Lib.
3, R.), rights, revenues and propios, (as in L. 1, 2, T. 5, Lib. 7, R.), Aldeas.
fortresses &c, (as in L. 6, T. 5, Lib. 7, R.), it speaks of those things which have
been expressly granted to them, or acquired by some legitimate title, and is only
in affirmance of the principles of natural justice, equally applicable to the rights
of individuals and corporations
;
and when it gives a solemn pledge to preserve
to the towns and cities in Spain, their terminos comunes or valdios Ejidos,
montes and pastos, (as in L. 1 and 2, T. 7, Lib. 7. R.). and that the sovereign
will not sell any part of the terminos publicos or valdios, (as in L. 8 and 10, T.
5, Lib. 7, and in L. 11), which refers to the solemn contract between the King
and people known as the " Condicion de Milliones" it has exclusive reference
to the vacant lands in Spain, of which the citizens of the towns had enjoyed the
use in common for many centuries, and proposes the perpetuation of a system of
policy in reference to the public lands which was completely abandoned in
1813.
In order to understand this subject properly, we must have reference to the
dates of the laws cited, and the actual state of the country and its legislation at
the time. The laws of the Recopilation already referred to, were promulgated,
as we have seen by their dates, at various periods, from the year 1325 to 1609.
The towns and cities were not by any means equal in respect to their political
rights and franchises, nor in respect to the lands and property which they en-
joyed, nor were they all subject to the King as their immediate Lord.
To show the position in which they stood in these respects, and how they ac-
quired their respective privileges and franchises, I will translate some passages
from a work entitled " Leyes Fundamentales de la Monarquia Epanola," by
-R. P. Fr. Maguin Ferrer. " As a result of the invasion of the Moors, the do-
minions of the King of Spain had been reduced to the mountains of Asturias.
It was proposed to reconquer the country, and the chiefs of the people who had
united with D. Pelayo, continued in the meantime acquiring lands, and the king
9gave them the government and the property in the lands of certain of the Pueblos,
while he himself remained owner of the lands of other districts (Comarcas.)
" By degrees, as this system created by circumstance, acquired consistence, so
that no one perceived that it had acquired the character of a system, the princi-
ple became firmly established, that the king was to be considered in two charac-
ters, the one as particular Lord of the Pueblos and lands conquered, which con-
tinued as his own private patrimony ; and in this respect he was on a footing of
equality with the other lords in regard to their respective estates. The other
as universal lord ( Sehor) of the kingdom, or that which is the same thing, as
the Sovereign, and in this character he commanded the subordinate lords and
governed the kingdom" (p. 146, vol. I.). ' ; The right of property is founded in
natural law. and absolute sovereignty being itself subordinate and subject to
this right, it follows that it cannot dispose of the right of property.
Let us take the idea of property as it was understood in those times in relation
to the subject of which we are treating. When the king gave lands to the lords
( Senores), it was considered that he gave them not only the dominion and
property in the fields (campos), the vineyards, the woods, the houses, &c, but
that he gave them likewise the right of Government and Jurisdiction over the
persons who inhabited the lands, so that the particular lords were the proprie-
tary governors and judges of their respective dominions, administering them con-
formably to the general laws of the Kingdom (ib. 147).
§ 12. Thus passed three centuries, the king governing the monarchy as uni-
versal lord, and customarily administering the affairs of the Pueblos of his own
patrimony as their particular lord. But in the year 1050 or 1012 perhaps,
Alonzo V.. desiring to give more regularity and solemnity to the politcal and
judicial administration, called together the Council or Cortes, and promulgated
the special laws called the fuero (law or franchise) of Leon, among others of a
general nature promulgated for the whole kingdom. This is the most ancient
fuero (franchise) which can properly be so called, and in it are comprehended
some thirty laws reputed as municipal, in as much as their observance was re-
stricted to the city of Leon and its Termino or Alfoz (the district over which
the municipal government extended its jurisdiction."
From that time the municipal system took its origin, without its being then
perceived, however, nor its effects being foreseen, and which in time came to
represent one of the three estates of the Realm.
Whether it was because the kings understood the beneficial results that would
follow from giving to each one of the cities and villas a written fuero (code) by
which it should be governed ; whether it was necessity that compelled them to
concede these fueros in order to attract people to come and settle the cities that
remained deserted, or the desire to distinguish the pueblos that belonged to their
particular dominion from those which pertained to other lords; it is certain
that thenceforward, date the fueros granted successively to Najera by B.
Sancho the elder of JVavarra, to Sepiilvedda, Logrono and Sahagun by D.
Alonzo VI, to Jaca by B, Sancho Ramirez, to Toledo by B. Alonzo VII, and
other cities and villas by the said kings or their successors, who either granted
them new fueros (franchises) or gave them some one of the primitive, as, for
example, B. Alonzo VI, who rebuilt the city of Oviedo, giving it the fuero of
Sahagun. Following the example of the kings, various of the particular lords
likewise gave fueros to their respective Pueblos, although it was with the ex-
press consent or by the command of the Sovereign, for the lords of the Pueblos
had no legislative authority. Thus it was that the Bishop of Palencia, D. Ra-
mon II, gave fueros to that city and its council with the consent, will and con-
cession of our Lord Alonzo, Kiug of Castile. The master of Santiago Pedro
Fernandez to the citizens of Caslrotoraf, by the good pleasure of the King
Ferdinand, and by his command ; and to those of Ucles, by the will and order
of the King Alonzo and his wife Eleonor, and when it happened that any lord
gave fueros without the license and consent of the king having preceded, he
confirmed them afterwards, if he thought proper, as he did in the case of the
fuero of Madrigal granted to the Bishop of Burgos, D. Pedro, saying that he
gives and grants to the citizens of Madrigal the fueros (franchises) which were
given them by D. Pedro, Bishop of Burgos*
* No corporation of any class can be formed without express royal license and authority.
—
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§ 13. The franchises (fueros) given by the King to the cities and villas
produced without at first perceiving it, the innovation that each city and each
villa came to be a particular Sehor which governed its citizens and adminis-
tered the affairs of its Termino or JLlfoz (district,) in the same manner that the
Lords ( Sehores) governed their respective lands, with the only difference, be-
sides the accidental ones which existed in their charters (cartas forales), that
the dominions and authority of the Lords was vested in an individual, while that
of the cities and villas was vested in a corporation (cuerpo) called a consejo,
the members of which, as I have already said, and shall have occasion to repeat
a thousand times, were heads of the principal proprietary families. And I will
observe here that for the same reason that the king ceased not to be the absolute
Sovereign in the estates of the particular Lords, because the rights, the domin-
ion, and the jurisdiction of these was a legitimate property which belonged to
them, so, neither did he cease to be so of the cities and villas, because the do-
minion and the jurisdiction of the latter over their respective citizens was a
property which the king had given them in their charters (cartas Pueblas o for-
ales.) With this explanation, which is the extract of all the histories, and all
the authentic documents of the first four centuries of the restoration, will be
discovered the capital error of some statesmen, who, giving an aspect and sense
contrary to facts and writings, have pictured Spain sometimes under the odious
point of view, as being governed by the Feudal system, and sometimes under
the enchanting view of a system almost Republican.
The system, or rather the fundamental law was always the same, that is to
say, that the lords governed their particular estates with perpetual right, domin-
ion and jurisdiction, but subject to the dependence and pre-eminent dominion
of the Monarch. Only there was a period in which all the estates which formed
the patrimony of the King, were governed by the latter as particular lord, with
appeal to himself as sovereign ; and there was another period in which the
King as sovereign made donations by means of charters (Cartas Pueblas y
forales) to the cities and villas of all or a part of the rights and properties
which he held as particular lord, in the same manner that in the first ages of the
restoration he made these donations to private persons, who for this cause were
denominated Sehores. That is to say that in the second epoch in like manner
ns the estates of the particular lords were under the immediate dependence of a
single individual who transmitted his rights to his successors; so the lands that
were of the royal Seigniory, were under the immediate dependence of many in-
dividuals who formed the Council (Consejo), and who as a body corporate
(cuerpo), tvas the perpetual possessor, the individuals changing conformable
to the laws.
§ 14. I have already said that when the King gave fueros (franchises) to
Leon, he sowed, without its having occurred to any body, the seed which in time
was to vary fundamentally the entire administration of the affairs of the king-
dom. The Monarch had obligated himself in the charters (Cartas Pueblas y
forales) not to impose any tributes but such as were therein expressed. The ex-
penses of the war becomes every day more exhorbitant, and were in inverse
proportion to the royal revenues, for the sovereign had to sustain this war, not
only for the purpose of adding new territory to what had already been conquer-
ed, but to avoid the loss of what he yet possessed ; and the day arrived in which,
being totally destitute of the necessary resources to continue it, and seeing the
flourishing state of his cities, especially those which were removed from the
frontiers of the Moors, and being unable to exact new tributes according to the
franchises (fueros) which he had granted and confirmed with an oath, he saw
himself reduced to the necessity to petition them to grant him the resources re-
quired. To this end he called together in the Cortes the Procuradores of the
different cities
;
he unfolded to them the necessities of the kingdom to which
his revenues were inadequate, and treated with them respecting the means
which they could contribute in order to escape from the exigency equally pre-
judicial to the sovereign and the Pueblos.
It was natural that the citiesshould accede not only for the benefit that would
result to themselves, but because of the new honors -which the Sovereign did
them in giving them a voice and a vote in the Cortes.
(Don, InstitMciones del Dereclw Publico General de Espana. V. 1, p. 273.) In addition to the
charters referred to, see extracts given by Hen no, of the charters of Bermeo, Silboa and other
towns in Spam—(Avertguaciones, <&c, pps. 189, 90, 204, 24T.)
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§ 15. Besides the rights of the particular lords, and of the cities and villas
which pertained to the king (that is, which were of the seignory royal) there
were the behetrias, which were the Pueblos formed by foreign emigrants whom
the Sovereign had invited to settle desert districts ( Comarcas) , giving them the
right to elect their respective Lord, who was to continue for life."
§ 16. There was also a fourth species of seigniory recognized in Spain during
the period referred to by the author just cited, called abodengo, which was a
portion of the seigniory and jurisdiction royal in certain Pueblos which the kings
ceded to churches, monasteries and prelates. (See for a more complete explan-
ation of this subject, note 2 to tit. 8 lib. 1, Fiiero Viejo de Castillo, by Asso Sf
Manuel, and the " Adiciones " to the preliminary discourse to this code by
Pedro Jose Pidal.)
§ 17. But the rights, privileges, exemptions and property of all the Pueblos,
whether seignorial, Realengos, behetrias or abadengos, depended in each case,
upon the express concessions made by the Sovereign, or by his command, or
with his subsequent approval and confirmation, in their respective town charters
or cartas Pueblas, and which privileges and exemptions were not uniformly the
same in all the towns, but varied according to the terms of their charters as
before stated by the author cited.
Neither were all the Pueblos or towns—of which there were many classes and
grades—bodies corporate ; but mauy, indeed the greater number of them at
the date of the laws of the Recopilacion before referred to, were destitute of
any jurisdiction or independent rights, privileges, exemptions or property, being
subject to the jurisdiction, control and government of the corporate villa or
city within whose terrnino, alfoz or demarcacion they were situated.
D. Vicente Vizcaino Perez, advocate of the Royal Council, in the celebrated
work entitled " Compendio del drecho Publico y Comun de Espaha,v speaking
of the formation of towns in general, after observing that in Spain they cannot
be formed without royal license, says, " These unions of inhabitants have differ-
ent names ; some are called Aldeas, Lugares, Arrabales, Pagos, Villas, Ciu-
dades ; and all these Poblaciones take their title conformably to the Privilegios
de Poblacion, which the Sovereign concedes to each one
;
(v. 1, p. 331 ;) and the
same author, speaking of the Villa, which, per se, possesses jurisdiction, honor,
district and right of patronage, lays it down as an incontestible principle, that
" The King or Sovereign Prince, alone has authority to grant privileges, (priv-
ilegios) or titles of villas or to constitute any Lugar such, and no other can do
it, though he be owner (dueho) of the Territory."
§ 18. These charters, privileges, exemptions and royal concessions of every
name and nature, after being first signed with the royal hand of the Sovereign
himself, were to be next recorded word for word, and then sealed by the Chan-
cellor, for which purpose the Notary of the Kingdoms of Castile and Leon, who
held the keys of the arc or chest in which the great seal was kept, were to pre-
sent it to that high functionary (L. 1, 9, t. 15, Lib. 2, R.), and by the laws of
Spain and the Indies this registry was essential ; the act or concession not only
being incomplete, but expressly declared to be null and void without it. (L. 4
and 7, T. 4, Lib. 2. R. I.; L. 2, T. 5, Lib. 8, N. R.)
§ 19. We accordingly find specified in detail, in L. 3, T. 8- Lib. 2, 0. R.. which
is L. 10, T. 15, Lib. 2, R. the fees to be paid to the Chancilleria for sealing each
of the various charters, privileges, grants, &c.
"Firstly, when we command to give our charter (carta) with new franchises
(defuero nuevo) to any villa there shall be paid for the seal 600 maravedis."
"For the charter (carta) in which we command to make new proof and give
them hereditaments of terrnino poblado (a settled district) there shall be paid
for the seal, 300 maravedis, and if the terrnino be not poblado (settled) there
shall be paid 120 maravedis. 1 '
"If we give to any city or villa a great terrnino poblado, it shall pay for the
seal 600 maravedis, and if it be terrnino yermo, (a desert district) there shall
be paid for the seal, 300 maravedis.^
" And if the terrnino which we may give to any city or villa, be as large and
valuable as some others that may be poblado, they shall pay for the seal to the
charter, (carta) 600 maravedis, and if it be aldea, 300 maravedis."
" If we exempt any city or villa from tax or toll, there shall be paid for the
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seal to the carta for each of these, 600 maravedis, and if it be aldea, 300 mara-
vedis."
"But if we grant such exemptions to a villa and district (tierra) one fee shall
be paid for the villa and another for the district. If the aldea exercises juris-
diction per se, it shall pay for the said carta 300 maravedis."
" If we shall exempt any lugar from the jurisdiction of another city, or villa
or Merindad and give jurisdiction per se there shall be paid for said charter 600
maravedis."
" If we shall grant to any city, villa or lugar jeria (fair or right to hold
one) it shall pay therefor, 200 maravedis, aud if it be feria or Jerias, francos,
(in which goods are allowed to be sold free of duty) there shall be paid for the
seal for one fair in the year, 1000 maravedis, and for two fairs in the year, 2000
maravedis?''
" If we shall grant to any city, villa or lugar mercado (the right to hold a
public market,) there shall be paid for the seal to the carta 200 maravedis, and
for a free market, 2000 maravedis^
The fees to be paid for confirmations and for grants made to individuals of
cities, villas, aldeas, lugares, castles, fortresses, offices, titles, and other things
belonging to the crown or perogative royal and which could only be granted by
the Sovereign Power are also minutely specified.
§ 20. We see therefore, that the laws of the Recopilation of Castile (§ 10) so
frequently cited in our courts, recognizing certain rights, privileges, exemptions
and property in towns, refer to such as had been couferred by special and formal
acts of the Legislative Power, and prove this, and this only, that the sacred
right of property, founded in the law of nature itself, was respected by the
Sovereign, whether vested in individuals or corporations. But to cite these
laws for the purpose of establishing the fact that a town is the owner of any
specified or defined tract of land, store, apothecary's shop, rural estate, or other
property, would be no less absurd, than to cite in support of some private indi-
vidual land claims, L 7, T 13, Lib. 4, and L 6 and 10, T 10, Lib. 5, of the same
Eecopolation, to establish the fact thit the claimant had acquired a valid title
to the property described in his petition, because these laws contain guaranties
equally ample in favor of the private property of individuals.
§ 21. The following language of D. Francisco Antonio De Elizondo one of
the most eminent of Spanish Jurists in his " Practice, Universal Forense "(v.
5, p. 226,) is but a repetition, in more direct, concise and unequivocal terms of
the proposition, with which I have set out in my argument, and therefore, if
that celebrated author, who was a member of the royal council, in which, sub-
jects affecting the rights and property of towns were daily discussed, may be
supposed to have understood them, at least, as well as any of us, it will not be
necessary to add any thing further on this point.
"No hay cosa alguna diputacla por dereclio para pertenencia de los pueblos mas
que aquella, que 6 por privilegio de los principes, Costumbre, o disposicion de los
hombres entre si les estd concedido." *
There is nothing designated by law as belonging to towns, other than that which
by royal privilege, custom or contract between man and man, may have been granted
to them.
§ 22. It will be observed that I am not now speaking of " terminos conuines."
or of solares valdios destined for reparlimiento, distribution to actual settlers in
towns. To avoid repetition, I shall reserve my observations and authorities
with reference to this class of public lands, until I come to refer to the laws of
the Indies and Mexico, regulating the colonization and settlement, the distribu-
tion of lands, and the formation of towns.
But I am speaking of the vested corporate rights, the property of towns which
the laws guaranty to them, and protects in the same manner as the rights and
property of individuals, and which they acquire by the same modes, and sub-
ject to the same legal rules, requisites and restrictions, with this only difference,
that towns being reputed as minors, and under the perpetual tutilage of govern-
ment, can neither purchase nor alienate without its special license, (Derecho
Ad7ninistrativo, p. 121, 194-95, Teatro de Legislation, V. 5, p. 136.)
§ 23 Let us refer now again to L 2, T 5, Lib. V, B, which has been as often
misunderstood and perverted as it has been cited in our courts.
* To the same effect is Greg, Lopez on L. 9, T. 28, P. 3, see post § 51.
" Our "will and pleasure is to preserve to our cities, villas and lugares, their
rights, revenues, and propios and not to make any grant of anything thereof:
Wherefore "we command that the grant or grants, which of them or any part
thereof, we may make to any person whatever, he not valid,." (A. D. 1325.)
"Whether the term Derechos in this connection, signifies rights, as I have trans-
lated, or certain imposts, which, hy virtue of an express concession of the Sove-
reign some towns were permitted to levy on articles of consumption, is immate-
rial ; for all the rights which they could claim must appear in the documents by
which they were acquired, or in the general guaranties of the Common Law
extending alike to individuals and corporations.
What were their revenues, {rentas, ) and propios (property)? For these also,
they must show the documents,—the express grant (see ante § 21) or title. But
in what did these revenues and propios consist? What particular things belonged
or appertained to the rentas and propios of the towns ? Not the Solares, Val-
dios, for in towns of Spain, which were more populous and more flourishing in
the age of the Roman Emperors, than at the present day a settler or squatter
would have looked in vain for vacant solares in the fourteenth century ; Some of
them had even then been so long established, that the time and circumstances of
their foundation were lost in the obscurity of remote and fabulous ages.
§ 24. But the solares in newly founded towns in the depopulated parts of
Spain, as well as in the New World, were intended for alienation, for repartimi-
ento or distribution among actual settlers.
"Let the solares be distributed by lot to the pobloAores, continuing from those
which correspond to the plaza mayor, and let the rest remain for tts to make
grant (merced) thereof to those who shall afterwards come to settle, or whatever
our pleasure may be. (L 11, T. 7, Lib. 4. R. I. ; see also T. 17, Lib. 7, N. R.
Be los despoblados y su repoblacion.) But "our Avill and pleasure is to preserve
to our cities, villas and Lugares, their revenues and propios, and not to make any
grant of anything thereof," &c. Neither could the towns themselves, nor the
municipal authorities at any period of time, either in Spain, or the Indies, or in
the Mexican Republic, grant or alienate any property belonging to their propios
or rentas without precedent license from the Government, such license not being
presumed by any lapse of time short of one hundred years. (Ante § 22, Elizon
do practica Forense Universal, v. 5, p. 233. 1 Feb. mej. 305, Law of March 20,
1837, Art. 9.*) Neither can the said towns or their authorities encumber them
in any manner (ib.) nor are they subject to embargo, seizure or sale by any judi-
cial process. (JDelos' Jurisprudence Generate, v. 3, p. 133. Dictionnaire de Droit
Normand, title municipatite.) The Solares valdios, or town lots which remained
vacant after the distribution made to the first settlers, were not things belonging
to the rentas or propios of the towns, but were intended to be alienated in full
property in favor of those who should afterwards come to settle.
§ 25. But " the propios " says Febrero, " is that species of property, which by
some title pertains to the commonalty of each Pueblo, and the revenues whereof
are dedicated to the preservation of the civil State, and municipal establishment
of the councils, comprehending likewise under this name all those things declar-
ed to be such in virtue of any legal dispositions ; arbitrios are certain duties, or
taxes imposed by the supreme authority upon articles of consumption and com-
mercial effects in those pueblos which have no piropnos, or in which they are so in-
considerable, that they are insufficient to meet the necessities of the municipality."
These are the revenues {rentas) of the towns. L. 1, T. 5, Lib. 5, Nueva.
Becopilacion, which is L. 2, T. 16, Lib. 7, of the Novisima, provides: "Forasmuch
as it is our will and pleasure that the cities, villas and lugares be relievedin
(respect to) their propios, we ordain and command that the tiendas (shops) and
boticas, (apothecary stores) alhondigas (public granaries) and lonjas (exchanges)
and suelos (sites for stalls or shops) which are in their plazas and markets, and
which yield rent, or might be rented, and which were approprkcted to the propios
of the said cities, villas and lugares, and likewise the offices which they have,
* " In cases of necessity or for motives of public convenience, they," (the Governors) " may,
with the previous consent of the Departmental Junta, grant license to the Ayuntamientos or
authorities charged with the administration of the funds (bi-enes) of propios and arbitrios to
alienate some part of said property, and any cession, donation or contract whatsoever made with-
out this requisite, shall be null and void."
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which are to be provided for and filled in the said cities, villas and lugares, and
which yield them revenues thereby, (that is, by the sale of them being vendible,)
which have been occupied or intruded upon by some persons unjustly, or with
power which they hold in the, said cities, villas and lugares, and pay no tribute
or rent for the said suelos ; that they be immediately restored to the said cities,
villas and lugares, and likewise the said offices, and if any cartas (royal order) and
grants of the things aforesaid shall have been given by kings, our progenitors, or
by us, let them go for naught, and be obeyed and not fulfilled ; and our judici-
ary, for not fulfilling them, shall incur no penalty, although they may contain
any derogatory clauses whatever (1433.)
(To obey and not fulfill is the observance of certain formalities in token of
obedience and submission to superior authority, without actually carrying into
effect what is commanded.)
§ 26. The revenues and propios in different cities and towns in Spain and
Spanish America, consist in a great variety of productive property acquired at
different periods and in different modes.—Lots leased out on ground rent,—rural
estates, stands and tables (or rather sites for them) rented out on the Plazas,
markets,—revenues arising from the supply of water for irrigations and family
use by means of aqueducts, places and stalls, in the portales around the plazas
or public squares and in certain streets ; offices rented out to Notaries and others
in the Cabildo (City Hall or Town House,) dues collected for anchorage in some
sea-ports, and many other things differing in each place, and depending always
upon some title or express coneessison. An account rendered of the propios of
the city of Havana and of the city of Sontiago de Cuba for the year 1830 and
183*7, which will be found in a work entitled Biblioteca de Legislacion Ultrama-
rina (v. 5, p. 215) will illustrate this remark.
In the regulation on the subject of propios and arbitrios formed for the city
of Mexico in 1*771, by Jose De Galvez, Visitor General of New Spain in pursu-
ance of the King's command, it is declared in article 8, " among other revenues
ought to be placed first in order that which is denominated of propios, and it
consists of the shops and stalls of commerce, houses and appurtenances situate in
the streets and lanes of Monterilla and S. Bernardo, in various annuities perpet-
ual and redeemable, the pension paid by the contractors for the supply of meat,
rent of tables in the slaughter house, the office of sealer of weights and mea-
sures of this capital, (which was vendible) and the towns of the areh-bishoprick,
and the income from the posts, and tables of the plaza mayor, the product where-
of are destined to the payment of salaries, public works, charges, festivals, and
generally the expenses of the Ayuntamiento." (Manuel de providencias, econoini-
cas,—Politicas, para uso de los habitantes del Distrito Federal, by Rodriguez, p. 173)
The revenue arising from the stands rented out on the plaza mayor is declared
to belong to the propios by virtue of an express royol concession (Art. 12) and
so that arising from duties levied on wine, brandy, vinegar and other liquors, (ib.
Art. 21) as well as all the rest. By a Royal Cedula of 30th Dee. 1694 the
Ayuatamiento was authorized to grant out lots on enfiteutic rent and apply the
revenues thence arising to their propios.
§ 27. Some cities, villas and lugares of the Indies, had concessions from the
crown for a limited time of the fines payable to the Royal Exchequer, which
might be incurred within their jurisdiction to be applied to their propios, as may
be seen by reference to L. 9, T. 13, lib. 4, R. I.* By L. 1 of the same title and
book, (of 1523,) it is also provided that, "The Viceroys and Governors, who may
be thereunto empowered (que ttivieren facidtad) shall assign to each villa and
lugar which may be newly founded and settled, the land and lots (solares) which
may be necessary and can be given to it without prejudice to third persons for
propios, and make report to us of what has been assigned and given to each, in
order that we order the same to be confirmed," (A. D. 1525). The Viceroys and
Governors, not all—or any of them indifferently, but such as may have authority
from the king, the Legislative Power shall assign to each new town, not those
already founded, but those which shall be newly settled, for the propios of the
place, and consequently to be reserved from sale or distribution, the land and lots
* By the law of 20 March, 1S3T, Art's 5, 65, 112, 113, 172, the fines imposed by the Governors,
Prefects, Sub-Prefects and Alcaldes are to be applied to the propios of the place where the fined
person resides.
15
which may be necessary for that purpose, and make report thereof to us, not
grant them, but advise us, so that we may grant them, or which is the same thing,
order the designation made to be confirmed, by which act, the title would pass,
qualified and limited, however, as in all such cases.
§ 28. In the division of the tract of land or termino y territorio which by ordi-
nanza 88 and 89 de poblaciones, or L. 6, T. 5, lib. 4, R. I., was to be given to the
empresario who should undertake to found a villa by contract, a quantity of land
is to be reserved for propios equal to that embraced by the solares ejido and dehesa.
"Let there be taken out first what may be necessary for the solares of the pueblo,
and a competent extent for ejido and dehesa sufficient to pasture abundantly the
cattle, which by ordinance the citizens are to have, and as much more for the
propios of the place." [Ordinanza 90, L. 7, T. 7, lib. 4, R. I.) All this was regu-
lated by express contract eutered into with the Viceroy, audiencia, or some per-
son duly authorized by the king, drawn tip with great formality in numerous
chapters and articles, and which contract was the law that governed the particn
lar ease. {Ordinanza 87, L. 25, T. 3, lib. 4, R. I.) The lands to be reserved for
propios were distinct from the solares, ejido and dehesa which were to be taken
out of the tract before the lands for propios were assigned, and the later were to
be equal in quantity to all three of the former together. It is also provided by
ordinanza 130 de poblaciones which is L. 14, T. 7, lib. 4, R. I., as follows:
"Having designated a sufficient quantity of land for ejido of the town (pobla-
cion), and its growth in conformity with what is provided (in the preceding ordi-
nances,) let those who have authority to make the discovery and new settlement
designate dehesa, which must bound with the ejidos, in which to pasture the work-
ing oxen and horses, and cattle for the slaughter, and the ordinary number of
other cattle which the settlers are required by ordinance to have, and a good
deal more which shall be propios of the Council," (the proper lands, or property
of the Council,) &c. In art. 4, T. 14, of the royal instruction for settlements in
Upper California of 24th October, 1781, it is provided that, "the solares, which
may be granted to new settlers are to be designated by the government in the
localities (sitios,) and of an extent corresponding to that of the land where the
new pueblos may be established, in such mode that there shall remain formed
plazas and streets conformable to what is provided by the laws of the kingdom,
and in conformity therewith there shall be designated ejidos sufficient for the
pueblo and dehesa, with tillable lands suitable for propios," <fee.
§ 28-J. We see, therefore, that the propios and revenues of towns consist of a
great variety of things acquired by express grant, and that the lands belonging
to the propios are entirely distinct from the lots laid out for settlement and pri-
vate occupancy, as well as from every other class of lands, which may be within
the limits and jurisdiction of towns. They are the lands granted, designated,
described and located for that specific purpose, without which location, bounda-
ries or description, there can of course be no valid grant.
§ 29. We have already seen that by the laws of Spain, not only is it the exclu-
sive prerogative of the king (or since 1812 of the Cortes) to grant the title of
villa to any place, and to designate the termino or demarcation of its jurisdiction,
but that all the rights, privileges, property and exemptions which it can claim,
must be derived from the same source. The same principle is declared in the law
of 1627, which is L. 6, T. 8, lib. 4, R. I.
" We ordain that any viceroys, audie?icias, governors, or other ministers of the
Indies, however superior in authoritv, do not for any cause, or reason whatso-
ever, confer titles of cities, or villas upon any pueblo or lugar either of Spaniards
or Indians, nor exempt them from the jurisdiction of their principal cabeceras,
with admonition that it will be matter for accusation in the account to be taken
of their official conduct, for this merced (favor) and faculty must be petitioned for
in our Council of the Indies, and we declare void those titles, which in contraven-
tion of this law shall be conferred upon any pueblo or lugar whatsoever ; and
in respect to the new toivns and settlements (nuevas poblaciones y fundaciones) let
the dispositions (of the law) be observed."
This law is sixty-four years later in date than L. 2, T. 7, lib. 4, R. I., and must
be considered as modifying it, if anj' real conflict exists between them.
§ 30. We accordingly find that when it was proposed by the inhabitants of
the pueblo of Manzanillo in Cuba, to establish local authorities at that place,
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erecting themselves into a separate municipality, the expediente formed for that
purpose had to be passed to the Concil of the Indies in order to obtain the royal
sanction
; and as the title which was granted will illustrate several matters which
Ave have to consider. I beg your indulgence while 1 read it in English
:
" Don Ferdinando VII, by the grace of God, king, <fcc. In a letter of the 14-th
May of the year 1830, my Governor, Captain General of the Island of Cuba, re-
ported to me the expediente formed at the instance D. Sebastian Romagoza, D.
Pedro Olive and D. Joaquin Clavelle, citizens of the new town called Port Royal
of the Manzanillo in the said Island, with the intent that there should be granted
to it the title of city and villa, independent of that of Bayamo, (founded in 1515,)
with the right to have a local government sub-delegate of the royal Hacienda,
Ayuntamiento and Public Xotary, manifesting with that view its state of civili-
zation, numerous inhabitants, commercial advantages, the inconvenience and dis-
advantage to which the citizens were subject, from haA'ing to go for the adminis-
tration of justice by impassable roads, a distance of fourteen leagues to the villa
of Bayamo, as likewise the well known advantage arising from the advancement
of the settlement of that part of the Island contiguous to foreign parts.
" In order to proceed with the exactness which was requisite in affairs of this
nature, it was ordered on the 21st of October of the aforesaid year 1830, that
my Governor, Captain General should appoint a person, in his confidence, to pro-
ceed to the apeo (judicial survey,) and demarcation of the lands of said pueblo of
Manzanillo, designating those necessary for propios, ejidos, dehem de labor, (pas-
ture land for working oxen and horses) and pasturage of cattle ; that he should
mark out with all possible exactitude the jurisdictional limits (terreno jurisdic-
cional) which were to be assigned to it and the partidos which it should embrace
;
that in defect ofpropios, he should propose the arbitrios, which he might deem
proper to cover the municipal expenses, for which purpose he was to form an
expediente with citations of the ownei'S of coterminous lands, or of those who
might for any cause be presumed to have a right to be heard ; that- he should
take proof of the exact mmiber of souls in Manzanillo and of the neighboring par-
tidos, which it might be proper to include in its jurisdiction ; that he should select
the edifice which ought to be set apart for the Council House (casa de Ayunta-
miento) and prisons, or if there should be none suitable for the purpose, then of
the land most suitable, whereon to build them, forming plans, estimating the cost
of the works, and proposing, at the same time, the means and arbitrios which he
might think least burdensome to defray the expenses, without detriment to my
royal Hacienda; that he should form the municipal ordinances which should
govern ad interim, for which, and all else that he might deem necessary he should
give audience to the inhabitants in a Junta composed of four or five of the best
informed
;
proceeding in all things with the greatest dispatch, without any vexation
or oppression of the inhabitants, and that he should report all with his informe.
In pursuance whereof, my Governor Captain General committed the execution of
the aforesaid proceedings to the Lieutenant Colonel D. Fulgencio De Salas, who,
as the result of his first investigation, manifested that the discharge of his com-
mission was the work of a long time, and would occasion a delay much to be re-
gretted in the indispensable separation of Manzanillo from the jurisdiction of
Bayamo, which, without suspending the other measures, might be effected imme-
diately, designating for the division line of the trrmino and jurisdiction of Manza-
nillo that marked by the Estero and Cienega del Buey, liver Gicotea, river Tar-
quino as natural limits, closing the distance between the sources of the two rivers
by two right lines, one extending from the Gicotea to the Buey, and the other
from the Tarquino, hj Avhich demarcation, there remained in the new jurisdic-
tion the partidos of Yara, Gua and Vieana, leaving still in the jurisdiction of
Bayamo, a territory much more extensive. Upon this exposition of the Commis-
sioner Salas, my said Governor, (Captain General,) consulted with the superin-
dent sub-delegate of my royal Hacienda, and both chiefs concurring in respect to
the convenience and utility of the emancipation of Manzanillo, Avith the aforesaid
demarcation, the former made report of all for the corresponding determination
(of the king). The subject having been examined with all that mature delibera-
tion which its importance exacted in my Council of the Indies, they acquainted
me with their opinion in a consulta of the 5th June last, and conformably there-
with, I have determined to concede the title of villa to the pueblo of Port Royal
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of Manzanillo, in the said Island of Cuba, "with the said jurisdictional territory
designated by the Commissioner D. Fulgeneio de Salas, and the establishment of
an Ayuntamiento, composed of two ordinary Alcaldes, which my Governor Cap-
tain General "will appoint for the first time, and six regidores, declaring these last
offices vendible and renunciable, with respect to "which the Intendente will form
an expediente and proceed conformably to the laws. Likewise, I have deemed
meet to charge my said Governor, very particularly, that he take the necessary
measures, to the end, that as soon as the Ayuntamiento be formed, it occupy it-
self in expediting, as much as possible, the proceedings commanded in the order
of 21st October, 1830,- at least, those which may take place most conveniently,
and with the least expense, difficulty or delay, reserving to myself the preroga-
tive to take measures for the appointment of sub-delegate of the four causes,
(Justice, Police, War and Hacienda) in Manzanillo, whenever I may determine
upon the consulta of my said Council of the Indies, with respect to the establish-
ment in the Island of Cuba, of Alcaldes, Mayores Letrados similar to what was
done in Porto Rico, and considering that the advantages resulting from this con-
cession are greater, with respect to the State than the citizens of Manzanillo. I
have determined to declare it exempt from the services designated to those of
this class in article 16 of the Royal Cedula of 3d Aug., 1801.
"In consequence, it is my will, that the said pueblo be perpetually styled and
called villa of Port Royal, of Manzanillo, and as such use the jurisdiction corre-
sponding to it with the possession of the pre-eminences which it may and ought
to enjoy. Given in the Palace, 19th of August, 1833.
"I, the King."
§ 31. From this document several important conclusions are deducible in har-
mony with the laws and authorities before cited.
1. That no power short of the Sovereign, could ereoS a municipal corporation
at Port Royal, give to the inhabitants a separate jurisdiction and local govern-
ment, and segregate them from that of Bayamo, in whose termino they had been
comprehended, though fourteen leagues (nearly 40 miles) distant from it. The
Captain General of Cuba, though possessed of the omnimodas facultades, the ple-
nary powers of the Viceroys could not even take the initiatory steps, so as to
create the slenderest inceptive rights or franchises, but forwarded the expediente
directly to the king, by whom the initiatory orders were given. This is a prac-
tical expositions of L. 6, T. 8, lib. 4, R. I., as late as 1830-3.
2. That a municipal corporation may be fully established with its termino, or
jurisdictional limits marked out and defined, and its Ayuntamiento and other
authorities fully installed, without giving that corporation any shadow of right
to lands within its limits, or to anv other property whatsoever. For at
the time when the king signed the charter for Port Royal, not only had no
grant of lands been made to the town, but the lands had not been marked out
under the orders which the Commssioner Salas had received for that purpose,
but to execute that part of the royal mandate, he had reported would be the
work of a long time. There must be an apeo, a technical expression well under-
stood in law, meaning a judicial survey, with many indispensible formalities. An
expediente must be formed—there must be indispensibly a citation of colindantes,
and "of all who, for any cause might be presumed to have a right to be heard."
Of course on a subject so immediately affecting the inhabitants, as the demarka-
tion of lands for their propios, ejidos, dehesa de labor, and pastos he must give them
audience. All this, however, to be executed with that exactitude which is re-
quired in affairs of this nature would require a long time, and was left undone,'
and consequently when Port Royal got its charter, it got no grant of land with
it, and although it was probable that at some subsequent day, some of the lands
within the extensive territory which its jurisdiction embraced, would be surveyed
off, assigned and granted to it
;
yet, nothing is clearer, than that at the time of its
incorporation, it had no lawful claim to any particular tract of land within the
three partidos which it embraced. Manzanillo had been a pueblo for a long time
with a numerous population and a considerable commerce, when it was erected
into a corporate town or villa, but the question of pueblo or no pueblo was not
agitated, it seems, as affecting the question of lands or property, and although L.
6, T. 5, Lib. 4, R. I. was in force in Cuba, nothing appears to have been suggested
3
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about thatfour leagues square, either by the inhabitants, the Commissioner Salas,
or the Captain General, nor by the learned Council of the Indies. The Commis-
sioner -was also required by the Royal Order of 21 Oct., 1830, to select the edi-
fices for Council House and prison, or if there should be none suitable for the
purpose, then the lands whereon to build them. These lands would of course be
in the heart of the town and would be selected from some of the vacant or un-
granted lots, the property of the king, and which, when selected, and reported
to the king, he intended to grant to the town for the purposes indicated in the
order. Had these lands been vested in the town from and by virtue of its estab-
lishment or incorporation, the Royal Commissioner would have nothing to do, but
the town would select for itself and make use of its own lands for any municipal
purposes not forbidden by the laws.
§ 32. I had proposed to defer my remarks on the subject of Terminos Comunes
about which there has been so much legislation in Spain, until I should have oc-
casion to refer the laws of the Indies, relating to the establishment and settle-
ment of towns, and particidarly the orders and regulations, which are made
especially applicable to California. But the laws of the Indies were framed in
Madrid by Spanish jurists who employed terms and expressions, the sense of
which has to be ascertained from the then existing state of legislation in Spain ; I
shall, therefore, refer first to those laws of the recopiliation of Castile, in addition
to that already cited, which are supposed to be applicable, and some of which
are really applicable to towns in America, but which are too often considered as
conferring rights of property, when it is scarcely necessary to sajr
,
they are in-
tended only to protect such as have been legitimately acquired.
§ 33. L. 6, T. 5, Lib. 7, R., which is L. 1, T. 21, Lib. 7, K R., commands, "that
the councils, cities, villas and lugares which may have purchased, or gained
by time, any aldeas, fortresses, or terminos, being in possessions, be not despoiled
thereof without being cited and heard, and the right of each one being deter-
mined by law ; and if in fact they be despoiled, that restitution be made without
delay." ' (A. D. 1325 and 1432.)
There had been at the date of this law as we have already seen, granted to
cities and villas, as well as to individuals, aldeas, (small villages,) foi'tresses, ter-
minos poblados and terminos yermos (settled districts.and desert districts) by royal
patent, and sometimes they had been possessed and held from time immemorial
by which they were enabled to sustain their right thereto by the law of prescrip-
tion. At one time it was doubted whether individuals in possessions of, and
claiming the Seigniory of cities, villas and lugares, and exercising the civil and
criminal jurisdiction without being able to show a royal patent therefor, could
prescribe for the same as against the Crown, and it was resolved by L 1, T 15,
Lib. 5, R. which is L. 4, T. 8, Lib. 11, K R. introduced into these codes from the
Ordenamiento of Alcala," that immemorial possession proved according to, and
with all the qualities required by the law of Toro, which is L. 1,T. 17, lib. 10R., shall
be sufficient to acquire against the king any cities, villas and lugares, and jurisdic-
tions, civil and criminal, and anything or part thereof,with all that to the seigniory
and jurisdiction, are annexed and appurtenant." The aldeas, fortresses and termi-
nos which might be in the possession of cities and villas might be gained by time,
which Avould be regulated by the law last referred to, provided the possession
was attended with all the requisites prescribed by the law of Toro. As to the
extent and nature of the interest which the towns had in the terminos valdios,
some authorities will be referred to in another place.
It is also ordained by L. 1, T. 7, lib. 7, R. or L. 2, T. 21, lib. 7, K R., "That
all the ejidos, monies, terminos and hereditaments of the councils of our cities,
villas and lugares of of our kingdoms and Seigneuries, which are taken and occu-
pied by any persons whomsoever, on their own authority, or by virtue of any
letters of ours, be at once restored and returned to the said councils whose they were
and are. But we declare that the said councils cannot work (labrar,) sell nor alienate
them, but that they remain (sean) for the common advantage [pro comunal) of
the said cities (villas) and lugares, where they are situated, and if any persons
have worked or occupied anything of the same, let it be immediately disoccupied.
And we command the same with respect to the ejidos which the Pueblos have and
possess, that they be not cultivated for the production of grain, and if any one
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shall have our authority so to do, let him send it to us, so that in view thereof,
we may dispose according as our pleasure may be, (A. D. 1329.)
§ 34. "The privilege of the University," says Perez (Conip'o del derecho Publico
y Commun de Espana, V. 1, P. 332) " or town (poblacion) are firstly, to have defined
terminos, the designation whereof is in Spain, the exclusive prerogative of the
Sovereign, and it being found to have been done by the King or admitted by im-
memorial custom, the said terminos, (that is the whole extent of territory em-
braced within its jurisdictional limits) or that which they comprehend, are properly
called the endowment (dote) of the University, and the author refers in a note to
the law of the Ordenamiento Real, which I have before cited (ante § 19,) and L. 1,
T. 12, lib. 4, R. I. which ordains the dirtribution of lands among settlers, and de-
fines the various measures therein referred to.
"The division of lands was made by authority of the King of Castile. They
never pertained by right to those who occupy them until the king donated them
and their jurisdictions, lugares, villas and cities," (ib, 331.)
The lermino is the territory, district, or jurisdictional domain assigned by letters
patent to any town or particular Lord, and the town or rather its inhabitants had
at the date ofthe laws first referred to, and indeed all times prior and subsequent
thereto, the right of enjoyment in common to the wood, water and pasturage, and
natural products of the whole termino assigned to it, Elizondo Prac. Forense V.
5, p. 230.)
But the right of common use was not vested in the Council or Corporation
which stood in place of the individual Lord as we have seen from the authorities
cited (see ante §13) for "quis dominium jurisdictions appidi, alicujus habeat, non
est dominus comunium pascuorum illius oppidi quce in hoc Lusitance regno, Boldios
vocant, sed inliger populus ct communitas eorum liabet dominium'' (Molina de jus-
titia et dejure, Tract 2, Disput 59;) and therefore the same author treating on the
monies (Tract 2, Disput 38) and the unlawful or excessive use and destruction of
wood and timber by one of the citizens or commoners, although he states that he
is obliged to make restitution to the community, limits the liability in these terms:
"Neque tunc id totum restituere tenetur: eo quod oppidanus sit;.et partem quaru-
dam eorum sine onere restituendi potuit scindere sibique asciscere, solum ergo
incrementum damni supra id quod sine restitutionis onere scindere potuit, tenetur
restituere."
(Coveruvias Prac. Quaest. Cap. 3*7,) is to the same effect.
§ 35. But the right of common in cases dependent solely on the general laws
of Spain and the Indies, and not originating in special privilege, grant or contract,
that is the common use and enjoyment which the vecinos have in the terminos
publicos and consejiles of the cities, villas and lugares, Avas only a precarious servi-
tude existing by sufferance in the royal lands remaining undisposed of, notwith-
standing the numerous laws and authorities, which, when not well understood are
calculated to induce an inference to the contrary, which did not restrict the Sov-
reignHs full and absolute property in those lands, nor impede the free disposition
thereof, a right which was fully exercised by the decree of the Cortes, of January
the 4th, 1813.
To elucidate this observation let us refer briefly to the history of the subject,
and then to the laws and the authorities.
"The Gothic laws or those of the Fuero Juzgo, which ever since the year 409
have superseded those of the Romans in Spain, were general in the kingdom and
maintained for many centuries an equivalent system" (in regard to the respective
rights of individuals, and of the University) distinguishing in the rules applicable,
the cultivated lands from the monies and uncultivated lands.
"By right of conquest the Goths occupied two thirds of the improved and cul-
tivated lands as soon as they had subdued the country aud established their
Monarchy therein, leaving the remaining third in each pueblo to the ancient res-
idents who were denominated Romans in the Gothic laws.
"This division on which is founded the private property and dominion of lands
and estates in Spain, is that referred to in L. 9, T. 1, Lib. 10, of the Fuero Juzgo in
which that distribution is required to be respected not only in favor of those who
first acquired the improved and other lands included in the general division made
at the time of the conquest, and the irruption of the Goths in the peninsula, but
likewise in favor of their children and descendants, with the salutarv view that
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the conquerors and the conquered should form one nation, and that their families
should continue firmly rooted and devoted to husbandry.
"The enjoyment (apro vechamiento) of the montes and uncultivated lands which
were not included in the general distribution, remained common and promiscuous
between the Goths and the Komans as the general patrimony of the people, as
may be seen L. 10, T. 1, Lib. 10 of the Fuero Juzgo.
" This system, which endured for the three centuries of the Gothic Monarchy,
defined the private dominion of individuals and the general dominion of each
pueblo, the dispositions ©f those laws inclining to favor the distribution of the
montes with equality among the citizens, (vecindario,) in order that all should
apply themselves to the cultivation and improving of them, since, as observes
Alfonso de Villadiego, " the indivision causes the improvement (majora) thereof to
be neglected, which can only be secured by means of just rules which give to
each citizen a definite participation in the enjoyment of the montes, their pasturage,
acorns, wood, and other productions."
" Although the invasion of the Arabs diminished the splendor of the Gothic
Monarchy, its laws maintained all their vigor in the country, since in the time of
S. Fernando, who flourished in the thirteenth century, the laws of the Fuero
Juzgo were yet preserved in vigor, and that glorious king extended them to his
new conquest of Jaen, Cordoba, Sevilla and Murcia, regarding them as the funda-
mental laws of the kingdom.
" The government of the Goths having endured from the beginning of the 5th
till the 13th century, the distinction Avas inviolably observed in that Avhole series
of eight centuries, between the private dominion and the municipal of the terrenos
publicos o' consejiles, the latter being governed by the judiciary (justicias) and
Ayuntamientos. As soon as the land was recovered from the Moors, the Montes,
were assigned (Aplicados) to each town, (poblacion) in the general distribution and
demarcation of (terminos) preserving substantially the system of the Gothic laws
with all the enjoyment alto y bajo (in the mountains and vallies) with the exception
of those lands which fell to individuals by distribution, gift, or other legitimate
title."
" In some towns and localities the trees produced on lands of private owner-
ship, were reserved to the common use, which practice still exists in various
districts of the kingdom, so that the individual is owner of the soil, and the
Pueblo or comun, (community,) of the wood and natural products," (Escolano
Practca del Consejo Real, v. 1, p. 231.)
§ 37. The terminos publicos or comunes and consejiles, or the commons of
towns, embraced all the public and vacant lands in Spain, the which were
assigned to each town respectively at the time of the general demarcation of limits.
The uniform policy was opposed to their alienation by the Crown, to whom the
property therein appertained (L. 8, 9, 10, T. 21, L. 1, 2, 3. T. 23, & T. 24 & 5
Lib. 7, A. R.,) and tins policy was affirmed in the most solemn form, in the
contract between king and people, known as condicion de millones, in which the
representatives of the pueblos in the cortes granted to the Crown the sum of
seventeen millions in aid of its necessities, (L. 2, T. 23, Lib. 7, N. R..) and the
Sovereign promised for himself and successors not to sell vacant lands (tierras
valdias) nor trees, nor the fruit thereof, and that the same should remain as
theretofore, to the common use and enjoyment.
§ 38. In America, shortly after its discovery and first settlement, the use and
enjoyment of all the vacant public lands were declared to belong to the citizens
in common, (L. 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9, T. 17, Lib. 4, R. I,) which is understood to be
restricted in the same manner as in Spain, to the citizens of the respective towns
within whose termino or demarcation the said public and vacant lands may exist,
unless some special provisions have been made to the contrary, as in L. 3, T. 8,
lib. 4, R. I., which ordains "that the Judiciary of the city of Mexico have juris-
diction, civil and criminal, within the fifteen leagues of the termino which has
been assigned to it, provided that all the said termino (of fifteen leagues extended
each way) be of pasto comun (common pasturage,) for all the citizens, dwellers,
and settlers in New Spain, during such time as the same may be unoccupied with
crops, as is provided in our laws and ordinances," which are those referred to
above, namely
:
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"L 6." The lands and hereditaments whereof we shall make gift and sale in
the Indies, the sown crop being removed, must remain for common pasture,
(pasto comun,) except the dehesasboyales y cousejiles (A. D. 1536) L. 1, "the monies,
pastos and aguas of the places and the monies embraced in the mercedes which
shall be made, or which we shall make of seignueries in the Indies must be
common for all the Spaniards and Indians, and we command the viceroys and
andiencias that they cause this to be observed and fulfilled (A. D. 1533,) L. 8.
" Our will is to make, and by these presents we do make the monies of rustic
fruit common, and every one may gather it and take away the plantas, (trees
planted,) to set in his own lands, (A. D. 1533,) L. 5. " We have ordained that the
pastos, aguas and monies remain common in the Indies, and some persons without
our authority have occupied a great part of territory and lands in which they do
not allow any one to put corral, nor bring hither their flocks. "We command
that the use of all the pastos, montes and aguas of the provinces of the Indies
be common to all those who now are or hereafter shall be vecinos thereof, <fcc,
(A. D. 1559.)
§ 38. But this common use and servitude created by these general laws, and
sustained during so many ages, did not restrict the Sovereign's full and absolute
property in those common lands of the consejos or pueblos, which, in the demar-
cation of limits, might be comprehended in their terminos, nor impair his right
freely to dispose thereof; "for," says Elizondo, " the kings, fountains of jurisdic-
tions are the owners, (duenos of all the terminos situated in their kingdoms, and
as such can donate them divide or restrict them, the same being true of their
pastos, although the pueblos enjoy them, it being presumed that they are conceded
only so far as respects their use and administration, the property remaining in the
Sovereigns themselves, so that they may limit them afterwards, enlarge or
restrict them, or give any new form to the enjoyment (goce) thereof, and hence
it is, that the pueblos cannot alienate their terminos and pastos without precedent
royal license and authority." (Praclica Universal Forense, v. 3, p. 10*7. See
also 108-112.)
§ 40. The same author in part 2, chap 11, (v. 5, p. 226,) entitled, "Eecursos
extraordinarios para la enagenacion y venta de los bienes publicos consejales," treats
more largely of the subject, and considering many misconceptions into which
American Lawyers, and the com'ts, too, have fallen in relation to it, I beg your
permission to copy his remarks at length.
" There is nothing whatever designated by law as belonging to towns, other
than that which by royal privilege, custom, or contract between man and man,
(disposicion de los hombres entre si,) is granted to them, so that, although there be
assigned to the towns, (poblaciones) at the time of their constitution a territorio
and pertenencias, which may be common to all the residents without each one
having the right to use them separately, it is a prerogative reserved to the princes
to divide the terminos of the provinces, and the villas, assigning to these the use
and enjoyment, but the dominion remaining in the Sovereigns themselves.
§ 41. " The property (bienes) of the community of each pueblo, we find desig-
nated, by Don Alonzo, the Wise, and restricted to the fountains, plazas, arenales,
(aluvions) in the banks or the margins of the rivers, ejidos, places where horses
run, (i. e. race courses), montes, dehesas, fields, vineyards, and all other similar
places, (sitios) which may be used by every resident, poor or rich, but not by
those of another town (poblacion) contrary to the will of the vecinos.
" Upon these principles of power and prerogative rests the law established by
the Catholic Sovereigns in Cordoba, on the 3d of Nov. 1490, prescribing that any
person, whomsoever, to whom the king may have made, or shall make grants of
any Cortijos, (a location in the country for gathering fruits and crops, and keeping
small stock,) hereditaments and lands in the terminos of the cities, villas and lu-
gares of the kingdom of Grenada, cannot, without royal and special license, fence
up (dehesar) and keep to himself (defender) the herbage and other products which
the land bears spontaneously, the same remaining open (libre) so that all the
vecinos can consume it with their cattle, beasts and working oxen, the same not
being, (at the time,) planted or sown, under the penally that he who contravenes
(this law) shall lose whatever right he may have and the lands to remain for
common.
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§ 42. " Upon the same principle of sovereignty, the princes, may alter, restrict
or enlarge the terminos once assigned to any town (pob(acion) giving them new
form, or revoking the ancient, without any pueblo whatever being able to acquire
exclusive right to their pastos against the king, otherwise than by his privilege,
(special grant), or immemorial prescription.
" And from these antecedents, arises the justice of the incontrovertible practice
in the recovery of lands called of realcngo, (royal lands), so that in cases of doubt
they are to be adjudged such, the princes having in possessory and petitiory suits,
their demand so far established ( fundada su intencion) that the possessor must be
required to exhibit his title, and not doing so, that the lands may be applied to
the royal patrimony.
§ 43. "We may reduce the pastos of the pueblos to four principle classes; one
of valdios or comunes, another of arbitrados, (or those royal lands which to supply
some special necessity, the pueblos may have been authorized by special license of
the king, to inclose and rent out for a limited time in aid of the municipal funds),
and another ofpropios, and another of individuals, which it is convenient not to
misunderstand by reason of the different rules which apply in this matter. The first
are of the vecinos or commoners, (i. e. for their use), exclusively, and in the second,
the former (vecinos) have the legal preference, which is recently so declared and
not altered by the resolutions of the Councils. The same tanteo (preference in
purchase, if he gives as much as another offers) belongs to the commoners in this
class ofpastos acotados (inclosed for private use) to their prejudice when the ob-
ject of the arbitrio (means of raising funds) is verified, they paying the price with-
out necessity t ^.distributing all the lights of the community.
" The dominion in the pastos propios, (of the lands belonging to their propios)
can not be disputed with the vecinos ever since the establishment of the legisla-
tion of the Partidas, in which, speaking of them, Don Alonzo, the "Wise, thus
expresses himself : ' although they belong in common to all the residents of the
city or villa, whose they were, <fcc., the utility or benefit of their products belong-
ing to the University.'
§ 44. " The application (pertenencia) of the dehesas or pastos acotados of indivi-
duals which exist within the terminos of the pueblos, is the last of the four classes
into which we have divided their lands, the acotamiento (inclosure for private
use) being the effect of privilege, or of that possession which supposes it, the
lords of vassals in their j urisdiction having no power to donate any thing of the
bienes comunes without royal authoritv, or to permit lands to be converted into
(private) pasture to the prejudice of those to whom the use of them belongs,
which power (facultad) is among the prerogatives reserved to princes and of
which they make use for just cause, looking to the common good of the vecinos, it
being important to the public welfare that thepastos be preserved, and that they
reduce not their lands to cultivation contrary to (en ofensa de) their original in-
stitutions, (sus primeros establecimientos). So that we find prohibited the muta-
tion of the pastos, even with the consent of the pueblos, without royal authority
thereunto empowering them.
" Immemorial possession is another title, which, sufficiently proved (Men pro-
bada) (the which we may calculate is very difficult) has the force of title, conces-
sion and privilege for the cerramiento and acotamiento (conversion to private use
exclusively) of lands in which the presumption of law is in favor of the vecinos,
without the necessity of proving the dominion or right to their use, which is for
him to prove (the contrary) who denies it, every individual of the pueblo being
entitled to prosecute the popular action in order to resist the limitation or injury
which the owners of vassals themselves may attempt against their pastos, and
commons (aprovechamientos.
)
" Hence it is that before the privilege, it must be presumed that the pastos
acotados were common to the vecinos in whose territory they might be, because
the pueblo and its inhabitants have already proved by law, their claim to com-
mons (aprovechamientos) and pastos of the whole termino which was assigned
them.
"To this presumption and legal assistance is added one other, which is, that
as it requisite when the privilege be conceded for the acotamiento (conver-
sions to private use) that it appear that the necessary pasto is left for the citi-
zens; if this circumstance ceases or varies, it is necessary likewise to moderate
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the privilege, as it had its origins and was issued with a cause or condition
which has prospective variation (tracto sucesivo) and is subject to the accidents of
time ; so that the most delicate modifications which the privilege can receive,
and the least prejudicial to the holder [privilegiado) is to restrict him somewhat
in the liberty to rent out his pastos acotados, requiring that he have respect to,
and prefer the vecinos, without prejudice to their value in that which may be
regulated as necessary or convenient."
§ 45. The lords of vassals can do nothing in the pastos publicos which may pre-
judice the other vecinos admitting strangers to participate in the benefit, or renting,
or selling them, they being reputed, in respect to these points, as two vecinos only,
and with the qualities of real co-partners {compiaheros with each other, without
any other especial distinction, except that of being regarded as having a double
personality with respect to the enjoyment.
§ 46. "Let us return to the consideration of the right which the pueblos have
to the pastos publicos and funds (ramos) of the university, restricted purely to the
use and administration of them. Wlience it proceeds that they cannot in any man-
ner sell or alienate them without royal authority therefor, for the extreme incon-
veniences which were represented by the kingdom assembled in the Cortes of
Valladolid, in the }"ear 1540 to the Sefiores D. Carlos and Dofia Juana, his mother,
which sovereigns came thus to ordain.
" From this antecedent, we deduce that the royal authorization ought to precede
every alienation of public property, (bienes,) and rights of property, (derechos,) the
former not being presumed by any lapse of time, as would be any other extrinsic
solemnity of an act, except where the alienation has transpired for a period over
one hundred years, by which antiquity the presumption that royal permission
was obtained begins to operate.
"For the same reasons the pueblos can not incumber with censos the public
property {bienes) without royal authority, although the capitals may have been
converted to their common benefit, and those who impose the incumbrance (los
imponedores) prove it conclusively, (plenamente,) who must remain solely respon-
sible for the satisfaction thereof, and not the propios, or any other public reve-
nues (caudales publicos.)
§ 47. "In the legislation of the Indies, after designating the place in which the
towns (jwblaciones) are to be founded, and the circumstances which are to pre-
cede their establishment, it is ordained that there shall be assigned to them dehe-
sas which shall confine with the ejidos, in which to pasture the working oxen and
horses, and cattle for the slaughter [corniceria], and for the ordinary number of
others which the settlers are required by ordinance to have, with a good deal
more, which shall he, propios of the Council, [consejo,] the rest being used for till-
able lands of which suertcs shall be made, as many of them as there may be so-
lares in the town, \_poblacion], L. 14, T. 7, lib 4,] prescribing that if any individuals
shall have occupied any lands of the public and municipal places, [lugares publi-
cos y consejiles], the same must be restored according to the law of Tolido, [which
is L. 5, T. 21, lib. 7, K R. or L. 3, T. 7, lib. 7, R.] and those which prescribe the
manner in which restitution is to be made, and define the right of prescription
when interposed as a defense by individuals, [L. 1, 2 and 3, T. 7, lib. 7, R.] with-
out the Viceroys and Presidents granting commissions for composition of lands,
unless in cases of 'vident necessity, and with precedent notice to the king of the
cause which nur induce them to do so, in what places [lugares] the lands are, to
what persons they appertain, how long they have possessed them, and the kind
of timber plantations, and lands without trees. [This law dates 1618, nine years
after L. 2, T. 23, Lib. 7, N. R. knowh as condition de millones]. The propios
[bienes de propios] being wholly governed, as respects the alienation of them by
the laws of Castile, to which the special laws of the Indies are conformable. [See
Laws of T. 13, L. b. 4, R. I.]
§ 48. " The necessity which the Pueblos have to obtain royal authority for the
alienation of public property [los bienes publicos'] being granted, it is indispen-
sible that we now consider whether the councils [consejos] can per se [on their
sole authority] dispose, so far as regards the administration, and good govern-
ment, giving license to build in the places [lugares] of the University for the
ornament, decencv and convenience of the towns [poblaciones] or to construct
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mill a, fulling mills, and other improvements from which advantage will ensue to
the community [comun] without the need of royal authority therefor, except in
the Kingdom of Granada, where the mill seats [sitios] belong to his majesty,
and they can only be used by way of renting for the benefit of the royal treas-
urv for the time, price, and with the conditions that mav appear convenient.
§ 49. " Seiior Don Alonzo, the Wise, speaking of the public places, [sitios
publicos,] and under what circumstances one may build in them, expresses himself
in this wise : ' If any man commence building in the plaza or in the street, or
common ejido of some Lugar, without authorization from the King, or of the
Council, [Consejo] in whose land, [swefo] he may be doing it, then every one of
that JPveblo can forbid so that he proceed not with the work, <fec, which language,
clear and explicit, shows at once that the license of the Ayurdamiento alone is
sufficient in order to build in public sites and places, [sitios y lugares publicos.]
" In the same legislation of the Partidas treating of where, and in what man-
ner a mill may be constructed near to another, it is prescribed [L. 18, T. 32, p. 3]
that any citizen may build it in his estate, [heredad] or in land, [st<e/o] which
may be of the termino of the King with authorization of his majesty, or of those
of the community of the Council [Consejo] whose is the place [lugar] where it
is desired to do it, in such manner that the course of the water do not impede
the operation of the former, but leave it free to perform its functions in the same
manner as before ; all which obtains though there be opposition from the owner
of the first, and he should allege that by reason of the new one, his mill will
produce less revenue ; and the same is to be observed in respect to the ovens
which may be newly constructed.
" This legislative disposition rests upon the principle that the construction of
mills, fulling mills and ovens or other buildings, is not an act of jurisdiction, but
of pure dominion, conformably with which, and the natural liberty which men
have to use their patrimony, they, may execute those works in private rivers,
and even public and navigable ones, without royal authorization, not in any
manner impeding the natural course of the waters."
§ 50. We have heretofore seen by the references which have been made to
express laws, to several eminent writers on the fundamental laws of Spain and
from numerous references to historical facts, showing when and how some of the
princijiial towns in Spain and America first became invested with their corporate
rights, revenues and property, that in all Spanish countries corporate towns can
only be erected by royal charter, cartas Pueblas or privilegios de poblacion, with-
in the terms of which all their rights are restricted, and that this incontroverti-
ble principle prevailed at the date, and must be applied in the interpretation of
all the laws which have been cited here or elsewhere from any of the Spanish
codes, and moreover that the same principle has been recognised and uniformly
applied in practice, at all times, even from the foundation of the Spanish mon-
archy.
§ 51. By a review of the foregoing observations of Elizondo, we find that
they embrace the following propositions:
1. That towns have inherently no property, neither is any conferred upon
them bv general laws, but their claims to property are subject to the same laws,
as those of individuals [see ante §§ 21. 40.] ; and it must be remembered that he
is speaking in view of all the legislation both of Spain and the Indies, and of the
practice of the Supreme Council of the Indies as well as that of Castile of which
he was a member. His work is upon the " Practica Universal Forense de los
Tribunales de Espana y de las Lidias," and these Supreme Councils were the trib-
tmals which had exclusive cognizance in most cases, of the subjects treated of in
the observations cited.
Keeping this pi'inciple in view, we are enabled the better to understand that
celebrated iaw of the Partidas [L. 9, T. 28, p. 3] cited by the Court in the case of
Kew Orleans vs. The United States [10 Peters, 728.]
"Apartadamente son del comun de cada una cibdad o villa, las fuentes e las
placas o fazeu las ferias e los mercados e los lugares o se ayuntan a eonsejo e los
arenales que son en las riberas de los rios, e los otros exidos e las carreras o corren
los cauallos e los montes, e las dehesas, e todos los otros lugares semej antes destos
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que son estoMecidos e otorgados para pro comunal de cada cibdad o villa o Castillo o
otro Lugar."
Son del comun. Sed an quoad dominii usum tantum?" very pertinently in-
quires Gregorio Lopez. They are if the comun—of the eomonalty of each city,
<fcc, but by what tenure, what is the nature and extent of their interest? The
celebrated author referred to, answers this query substantially in his observations
upon tne clause ''son establecedos." " Preterea quod hie dicitur [que son estableci-
dos] non intilligitur quod a jure sunt statuti pro eivibus : quia civitati vel castro de
jure nihil coporale est deputatum quod sit de ejus pertinentia; nisi quatenus a
lege, aut consuetudine aut hominura dispositione reperiatur concessum," and after
citing several authorities in confirmation of this maxim [for such is its character
in Spanish jurisprudence] concludes, "et ita potest intelligi ista lex cum dicit [que
fuessen estoMecidos] scilicet, ab hominibus vel statute: et sic quod verbum [que]
ponatur restrictive": that is the word que restricts what is before said in this law,
to those things which son establec idos [which are granted or acquired by some
legitimate title] and the proposition is not, that the things referred to are estable-
cidos but that those which are establecidos, not a jure, but by contract, or special
act of the Sovereign power, are of the comun of each city <fcc, in which case the
documents will show by what tenure they are held; because as the author observes,
nothing corporeal is designated or specified by law as pertinentia of a town
[civitati] except so far as the same may have been granted by lege, aut consuetudine,
aut hominum dispositione; and it must not look for any rights of property deduced a
corpore juris or from the cuerpo del derccho, nor understand this law as conferring
or recognizing any such; but as referring to and protecting such as may have
been legitimately acquired. And the words son establecidos must not be understood
that a jure sunt statuti pro eivibus ; for the law grants nothing to municipal corpo-
rations or communities any more than to other corporations, or to individuals.
There are many laws [though they are now abrogated] expressive of the sove-
reign will that lands shall be assigned and granted to towns, and there are just
as many expressive of the sovereign will and pleasure that lands and lots shall be
assigned and granted to individuals who may go to settle new places, but neither
the one nor the other can found a claim of title upon those general laws, nor make
out from them the slenderest equity conceivable.
§ 52. That after the limits of towns have been legally established, which can only
have been done by act of the supreme authority [see ante § 17, 34,] the sove-
reign remains the absolute owner [see ante § 40,] of all the lands within those
limits to which a legitimate title cannot be shown by individuals or corporations
[ante § 42] ; that as such he may freely donate or distribute them [ante § 39,]
that he may alter, restrict or enlarge the limits once assigned to any town, or
revoke them at pleasure, and that no town can acquire any right even to the use
of the lands embraced in them as against the Sovereign, unless by special grant or
immemorial prescription [ante § 42], that is, in the same manner as any indi-
vidual or other corporation; and the right of common, which the citizens enjoy,
though exclusive of those of other towns, is not in exclusion of the Sovereign's
right of property and possession, and consequently the only acts which the muni-
cipal authorities can do, affecting these lands, are such as are purely administra-
tive and belong to the local jurisdiction, conferred by the charters. The council
and judiciary [justicki] of towns exercise the local authority of the government.
In the charters or Privilegios de Poblacion, is generally granted the power to
administer justice in first instance to the citizens, as well as to exercise the local
government Politico-econimo over all the inhabitants of the Termino or demarca-
tion assigned to the city or villa. They cannot, however, inclose for their own
or any private use, any portion of these lands without direct authorization from
the sovereign proprietor. But " when a Pueblo finds itself in circumstances of
necessity, and destitute of funds, it has been the custom to grant to it authority
for a limited time, to break up [romper] sell or incumber some portion of these
tierras comunes and inclose them for private use ; and as this is an expedient
[arbitrio] which is resorted to in order to relieve the urgency, they are distin-
guished with the name of propios arbitrados."—
[
€'•ompendio del Derecho Publico
y comun de Expana, V. 1, p. 336 refers L. 5, T. 27, Cap. 28. Lib. 7, E". R.]
§ 53. Continuing now our references in support of the proposition contained in sec-
4
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tion 35, and the deductions which I have just expressed ^e shall find the whole
course of Spanish legislation in harmony therewith. Respecting L. 1 and 2, already
cited at length [ante § 33], and all the following of Tit. 21, lib. 7, ~N. R, a few
general observations will suffice, in addition to what has been said already in the
quotations from Elizondo, and the deductions drawn therefrom. The first law
referred to speaks expressly of those things which have been purchased or
gained by time-immemorial prescription, and which, to the extent of the interest
that may have been thus acquired would constitute a legitimate property.
The remaining laws of this title and those of title 22, 23, 24 and 25, Lib. 7, KV
R., show that the general policy of the Spanish government was opposed to the
alienation of public lands, or their conversion to any other use than that of com-
mon pasturage, but they do not show or contain any evidence whatever that the
towns or citizens thereof, individually or in common, owned anything, much less
any lands except such as had been conveyed to them by the Sovereign or other
proprietor—L. 2, T. 23, lib. 7, N. R., refers to the contract entered into by the
King with the Procuradores of the towns of the kingdom, known as the Condicion
de Millones, it being put as a condition to the grant of seventeen millions and a
half, made by the towns or their representatives in the Cortes, to supply the
necessities of the Royal Exchequer, and contains the promise confirmed with an
oath of Philip Third ror himself and successors, that there shall not thenceforth
be sold any Tierras valdias, nor trees, nor the fruit thereof, but that the same
shall remain, for the use and enjoyment of his subjects, as they had theretofore, [A
D. 1609].
The preceding law in this Recopilacion which is from 1. 8 and 10, T. 5, lib.
7 of the Nueva, and was promulgated in the year 1586, provides that judges shall
not be appointed and sent out to sell or re-survey Tierras Publicas y baldias and
that in cases where, for any cause, a re-survey of lands sold shall take place, the
Sobrante—the overplus not included in the title issued, shall not be sold but shall
remain for Publicas and consejiles.
These laws do not tend to prove that the sovereign was not the owner of the
lands mentioned, but the contrary, except so far as the first part of the said L. 1,
T. 23, Lib. 7, K". R., may be supposed to refer to the propios apropiados, or lands
specially granted to municipal corporations, [Derecho Publico y Comicn de Espana
v. 1, p. 334—5], and which having been thus appropriated to private use, could
no longer be denominated baldios or free lands [ib. 336.]
§ 54. The same remark may be applied to all the laws relating to the termi-
nos of the cities, villas and lugares, " Terminos comunes d baldios. [L. 4, T. 21,
Lib. 7, ST. R. L. 7, 8 and 10, same T. and Lib.] ''Terminos realengos y consejiles"
of the cities, <fec. [L. 2, T. 22, same Lib.] " Terminos Publicos," &o. The general
policy of Spain was opposed to the alienation of the royal lands. It was
thought more advantagous that they should remain common and free [valdios] for
the poor and the rich alike, in the several towns within whose demarkation they
were, and that the citizens of those towns should be required to bestow their
care and labor so far as necessary in the preservation and reproduction of the
timber, wood, and shrubbery upon them, and, as is said in Art. 14 of the Royal
Ordinance of 1749 [L. 14, T. 24, Lib. 8, X. R.] "it cannot be regarded as a burden
upon the towns or the citizens thereof that they are required to bestow labor in
the preservation of the timber already grown, or to plant anew the woods, and
free lands [mojvtes y tierras baldias] although they be the property of his majesty,
[ciunque seean propnos de S. 31.], because besides being obligated so to do, they
enjoy the fruit thereof with pasture and shelter for their cattle;" by the increase
of which and the more abundant supply of wood, coal, meat and provisions,
their propios or private revenues would be augmented, [see also L. 22, T. 24,
lib. 7, K". R. Art. 26]. The King, however, frequently did make grants of lands
within the Terminos of the cities, villas and lugares, as may be seen in the law
2, T. 25, lib. 7, TS. R., referred to in the remarks I have translated from Elizondo
[ante. § 41.] and many others, but the owners were not allowed to exclude the
citizens from the right of common except during the time that the land should
be occupied with sown crops—the natural productions remaining free to all, un-
les3 such owner were empowered by royal privilege specially conceded for that
purpose, to enclose and enjoy the lands exclusively.
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The law of 15th June, 1788, however, which is L. 19, T. 24, lib. 7. N. R., and
the decree of the Cortes of 8th June. 1813, abolish the right of common so far
as respects lauds of private ownership which the citizens of the respective towns
had enjoyed from the earliest period of the Monarchy. The latter declares that
all dehesas, hereditaments, and other lands of every class whatsoever pertaining
to private dominion, be they free or entailed, are, to be thenceforth deemed as
perpetually "C'errados y acotados" [inclosed for private use exclusively] and the
owners and possessors thereof may inclose them without prejudice to the Canadas
[paths] abrevaderos [watering-places] roads, crossings and servitudes [to which
they may have been legally subjected, of course], enjoy them freely and exclu-
sively, or rent them, as to them may seem most advantageous and dedicate them
to cultivation, or pasturage, or planting of trees [plantias] or to the use which may
best suit them."
§ 55. The decree of the Cortes of 4th Jan. 1813, put an end to that system
which has occupied so much of our attention, which had preserved for many cen-
turies, the public lands for the common use of the citizens of the towns within
whose demarcation or termino they were situated, and provided for their sale,
distribution and reduction to private dominion. The utility of the measure had
been well understood, and recommended by the most intelligent Spanish states-
men at different periods, but it was natural that the towns whose citizens enjoyed
the free use of the lands and that most honored and privileged corporation, the
" consejo de la maesta" representing all the herdsmen of the kingdom, as Well as
many of the churches and convents which enjoyed equal privileges within the
terminos of their establishments, and the nobilit}- and rich men, whose cattle
"upon a thousand hills" were supported at the expense of the State, should
resist it; and there was no period of time, till that which occurred from 1808 to
1813, when the old establishments were completely broken up, and Spanish soci-
ety was reduced to its elements, that tins law fraught with such advantage to the
country could have obtained any general support. *
* Extract from the Infokme of D. Gaspar Jovellanos on the expedient© upon the agrarian
law presented to the Spanish Government on behalf of the " Sociedad Patriotiea " of Madrid to
which the Expedient* had been referred for its pictamex.
"If individual interest is the chief cause of the prosperity of agriculture, without doubt no laws
can be more opposed to the principles of the Society (the Patriotic Society of Madrid) than those
which in place of multiplying, have diminished this interest, diminishing the quantity of indi-
vidual property, and the number of private proprietors. Such are those which by a species of
political indolence have left without owners, and tenants a valuable portion of the tillable lands of
Spain, and withdrawing them from private cultivation, have defrauded the state of all the product
which private interest might have derived from them. Such are the baldios.
"The Society characterizes this abandonment with the name of political indolence, because
they can apply no other more decorous to the prejudice which has respected them (the baldios).
Its origin ascends even to the times of the Visigoths, who occupying and distributing among them-
selves two-thirds of the conquered lands, and leaving only one-third to the conquered, had to
abandon and leave without owners all those which the population greatly diminished by the war,
was insufficient to occupy. To these lands was given the name of carnpos vacantes, and these
are for the most part, our baldios.
"The war which had first caused the population to decline, opposed itself afterwards to its natu-
ral augmentation, which found other still greater impediments in the aversion of the conquerors to
agriculture and every species of industry. These barbarians knowing only how to fight and to
sleep, and being incapable of the toils and application which agriculture exacts, preferred the rear-
ing of cattle to the gathering of crops, and pasturage to the cultivation of the soil. The conse-
quence was that the campos eacardes would be respected as reserved for common pasturage, and
the increase of the herds, and of this rude policy we find repeated evidences in our Fuero Juzgo.
" This legislation restored by the kincs of Asturias from the time of Alonso the Chaste, adopted
on the part of the Crown of Leon by Alfonso V., transferred afterwards to Castile and observed
until the time of San Fernando, the same rural system was diffused through all parts, respected
the more in the middle ages, as the character of those times had deviated less from that of the
Goths, and the enemy being in the very heart of the empire, and almost always in sight, it be-
came necessary to look to the flocks principally for subsistence, and increase the public wealth by
means of an euterprize least exposed to the fate of arms. Even after the conquest of Toledo, the
frontier territories which extended along Extremadura, Mancha, and New Castile, were more
pastoral than agricultural, and their herds fed more upon common and open lands, than in private
pastures, and meadows, which could no more be protected than the cultivated fields.
" The Moors having been expelled from our continent, the baldios ought to have been reduced
immediately to cultivation. Public policy and charity cried out, the one to the other, for the in-
crease of means of subsistence, which the augmentation of population made more and more neces-
sary, hut between them both, they took a direction altogether contrary to each other. Policy,
finding deep-rooted the direful system of pastoral legislation favored it so exorbitantly that it made
the baldios an exclusive property of the herds : and charity looking upon them as the patrimony
of the poor exerted itself in preserving them for their use ; neither the one nor the other having re-
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§ 56. This law provides for the reduction to private dominion of all the baldios
[free lands] and other terrenos commies [common lands] called also terrenos real-
engos [royal lands, for such they were] as well as those pertaining to the propios
and arbitrios of the towns, not only in the Peninsula [of Spain] but in the pro-
vinces beyond sea except the ejidos necessary to the towns, [art. 1]. The lands
of propios and arbitrios, or rather the use of them, were recognised as the legiti-
mate property of the towns, that is of course, where the town could show a title
for them, [see ante, § 40-51], and consequently although the dominion remained
in the sovereign, while the usufruct was vested in the towns, [see ante, § 46],
the revenues which they had been accustomed to derive from them were to be
compensated and supplied by some means to be proposed by the provincial depu-
tations and approved by the Cortes, [art. 1], or in case the suerte to be given to
a resident citizen should, for want of sufficient lands among the baldios, be as-
signed out of the propios, then a redeemable quit rent was to be imposed, equal
to what the same suerte of land would yield annually during the five years end-
with the year 1817, [art. 15]. The towns are not regarded as having any direct
interest whatever in any otherlands, nor is any compensation provided. They are
all to be alienated, the one half on account of the national debt, [art. 6], a por-
tion of the other half as a reward to, and provision for, the support of the officers
and soldiers of the army, [art. 9 and 10], and the remainder by way of reparti-
miento [distribution] among the citizens of the respective towns, who ma}' be
destitute of landed property, and shall petition therefor, [art. 15].
§ 57. The law is certainly treating of the lands in towns, which is the situation
of all lands in tipain, because it is provided in art. 3d, that in the alienation of
said lands, a preference shall be given to the citizens and commoners "of the
pueblos en cuyo termino existan. [in whose limits or jurisdictional domain they
exist], and in art. 6th, that in the hypothecation of the half of the baldios and
realengos of the monarchy excepting the ejidos [for they are realengos—royal
lands also], a preference shall be given to those claims which may be held against
the nation by the citizens of those pueblos a que correspjondan los terrenos [to
which the lands appertain], and in art. 7th, that in the alienation on account of
the public debt of this half of the baldios y realengos, or the part which it may be
fleeted, that making the enjoyment of the baldios common, it was but natural that the rich rather
than the poor would reap the benefits, and that it would be wiser policy and greater charity to
found upon them a treasure of subsistence by which to save from misery a great number of poor
families, than by furnishing, in their common enjoyment, food for the cupidity of the wealthy
graziers, and a useless resort for the indigent.
" Those who have aimed to secure the multiplication of stock by means of the baldios have
greatly deceived themselves. Reduced to private property, cerados (shut up against the right
of common) tilled, and seasonably improved, would they not produce more abundant pasturage,
and maintain a considerably greater number of cattle.
" It will be said, that then, all would engage in agriculture, and in the same proportion, the number
of cattle would be diminished. This proposition is not certain, for it can be demonstrated that the
baldios reduced to private property and converted to the uses of pasturage and tillage, would ad-
mit of cultivation to a great extent, and maintain at the same time a number of cattle equal to. if
not greater than at present. But suppose for a moment that it should be so; can it be denied that
the nation which abounds in men and productions, is richer than that which merely abounds in
cattle ?
'• If it should be feared that the price of meat, an article of primary necessity, would, take
an extraordinary rise, let it be reflected, that when meat is dear, private interest will naturally be
directed to the subject, and in that case, will not the rearing of cattle be preferred to cultivation
from this very circumstance, without any other stimulus? So certain is it that the equilibrium
which is to be desired in this matter is established better without laws than with them.
"These reflections will be sufficient to demonstrate to your Highness the necessity of decreeing
the alienation of all the baldios of the kingdom. What a fountain of wealth would not this single
measure lay open, when these extensive and fertile lands being reduced to private property, and
the activity of individual interest being employed upon them, they shall be settled, cultivated,
stocked with cattle, and produce in pasturage and husbandry to the utmost of their capacity '"
After discussing various details as to the mode to be adopted in the alienation of the common
lands, the quantity to be assigned to a single individual, and the conditions of the alienation in
particular cases, all of which would depend upon the peculiar circumstances of each Province,
and the abundance or limited extent of these lands therein, the report proceeds:
"In fine, sir, the Society believes, that in the execution of this measure, no general rule will
be suitable : that the execution of it ought to be preceded by the investigations necessary to ac-
commodate it not only to each province but likewise to each territory (tract of country): that the
execuiion being encharged to the Provincial Juntas and the Ayuntamietitos under the direction
of your Highness, would be carried into effect with prudence and impartiality, and finally that
the most urgent is to decree the alienation immediately, in order to proceed to the rest. Let
your Highness, then decree this beginning, and the good will have been accomplished." (See also
Escricbe Diccionario de Legislacion, title Baldiob.)
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deemed necessary to hypothecate, a preference shall be given in the purchase, to
the citizens of the respective pueblos and the commoners [who had to that time
been] in the enjoj-rnent of the said lands, and that in payment for the same, will
be received at the par value, the claims which they may hold properly liqui-
dated, for supplies to the national armies or loans made for the war since the first
[which of May, 1808 ; and in art. 10 that the suertes que en cadet pueblo seconcedan
in each pueblo may be granted] to officers or soldiers shall be equal in value, in
proportion, cfec. ; and by art. 11th, that the senalamiento [designation] of these
suertes [to officers and soldiers] shall be made by the Constitutional Ayuntamien-
tos of the pueblos a que correspondan las tierros [to which the lands correspond
or appertain] wirhout exacting from the parties interested any costos [expense]
or derechos [fees] whatsoever, and that the expediente thereupon to be formed,
shall be remitted in continuation, to the Provincial Deputation to be approved or
modified; and in art. 15 that of the same remaining portion of baldiosy realengos
there shall be assigned gratuitously and for once only, by lot \sorteo from which
comes suerte~\ a suerte [allotment] to each citizen of the respective pueblos, who
may petition therefor; and by art. 17, that the dilligencias [initiatory steps and
proceedings] for these concessions shall likewise be taken by the Ayuntamientos
[that is of the respective towns in which the lands are] without any expense
whatever, and shall be approved by the Provincial Deputations.
§ 58. It is scarcely necessary to observe that the intervention which the Con-
stitutional Ayuntamientos are to have in the designation of the lands, or the
pointing them out, and locating them, for all the various classes of pretendants,
as officers, soldiers, settlers, vendees, and public creditors wishing to receive
lands in satisfaction of their claims, is only that which is delegated by the gov-
ernment to the subordinate political authority most competent from their local
knowledge and position, to discharge the duties assigned them ; an intervention
which was given by L. 5, G and 8, T. 12, Lib. 4, K. I., in all cases of the reparti-
miento [free distribution] of lands, and which I conceive is still requisite under
the colonization law of 1824, and regulation of 1828, in places where such local
authority exists, whatever irregular practice may have existed to the contrary.
§ 59. One observation in regard to the Egidos, which are excepted from the
sale, hypothecation and distribution to be made under this law of 1813, not be-
cause they were not baldios and realengos, because in Art. 6, they are, construct-
ively, at least, included in that denomination, but excepted out of the half to be
reserved to be hypothecated on account of the national debt, as they are likewise
excepted from the general provisions of the first article. "Without prejudice to
what is provided," [in the preceeding articles] " there is reserved the half of the
baldios y realengos of the monarchy excepting the ejidos" &e, by which it may
fairly be inferred that the ejidos were considered as included in that denom-
ination.
The first article provides generally, for the reduction to the class of private
property, of " all the terrenos baldios o realengos and of propios and arbitrios,
wooded and not wooded, as well in the Peninsula and islands adjacent, as in the
provinces beyond sea
—
except the ejidos necessary to the. pueblos. The ejidos are
certainly not exi-.i-. led from the denomination of propios and arbitrios from the
very character and description of this class of property, [see ante § 23 to 28]
and they nliist consequently be included in the denomination of royal lands
which remained baldios [free to all]. The lands of propios and arbitrios were
acotados and cerrados—inclosed for private use, and by means of cultivation, pas-
turage or other private use, for which they were rented out, yielded revenue to
defray the the municipal expenses. The propios in short consist of " that prop-
erty which by some title belongs to the comwn of each pueblo and the reve-
nues whereof are destined to the preservation of the civil State, and municipal
establisments," [1 Feb. 304—5 and ante § 25]. But the ejido yields no revenue.
"It is the campo [open country] which is at the salida [exit] of the cities, pueblos
and lugares, and which is not planted or cultivated. Its extension according
to the law [L. 13, T. 7, Lib. 4, R. I.] ought to be as great as may be necessary,
so that in case the town [poblacion] grows, there will always remain space enough
for the people to recreate themselves, and let out their cattle without doing
damage. From which it is clear that no fixed rule can be given, but that it must
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be altogether arbitrary, according to the circumstances of the magnitude of the
cities, number of inhabitants, <fec." [1 Feb. Mej. 812-13.] The author just cited
divides the bienes de universidad into two classes in the first of which he ranks
the propios and arbitrios, " which cannot be used by all, and which are only
administered by the ayuntamicnto or council of the city, and the fruits whereof
are dedicated to the public utility," [ib. 304] and in the second class the ejidos,
[ib. 312] which are for the common use of all the dwellers of that place, as well
of the poor as the rich-, but which cannot be used by those of any other tierra
[place or town] contrary to their will or prohibition ;" .[ib. 304, 312, vid. L. 9,
T. 28, P. 3.] and that exclusive right is founded, in the absence of any special
grant, other than a mere political designation, upon the division of territory for
political purposes, as may be inferred from the following words of Gregorio
Lopez in note 10, referring that part of the law of the Partidas which is above
cited in the words of Febrero : " et recte nam divisio territorio hoe inducit" and
the construction of it given by Febrero; " cuyataxitiva dice Erpcz, la induce la
division del territorio" [which restriction, says Lopez, is founded on the division
of the territory]. If the observations of Gregorio Lopez on the words " son
establecidos," used in this law of the Partidas, which I have already transcribed,
[ante §51] be considered as repeated here, I shall have no more to say about
ejidos at present ; observing generall}T
,
that after the decree of the Spanish Cortes
of 4th Jan. 1813, there remained no town commons distinct from ejidos in any
Spanish country, where, as in Mexico, this law remained in force. In Spain
itself, the radical reform which it proposed was not at once carried out, but the
project was several times suspended, and again ordered to be carried into exe-
cution. While this law remained in force, however, in consequence of the royal
decree of 15th April, 1820, Mexico became independent, and although, upon
the restoration of the absolute government in Spain, in 1823, its execution was
again suspended there for a time, this did not affect its operation in the Mexican
Republic, where it has always been considered as remaining in full vigor.
§ 60. The town commons in Spanish countries were all the lands public and
private, embraced within the termino or demarcation of the municipality, except
those which by special authority from the Sovereign, were acotados and cerrados.
The decrees of 4th January and 8th June 1813, destroyed the whole system. The
former authorized the sale and distribution of the royal lands in the towns, and
the latter, allowed individual owners to inclose and use their own lands to the
exclusion of all others. There remained after this, no commons to towns, which
might not at any time be disposed of by the sovereign proprietor. The laws
which permitted the citizens to use the public lands in common, remained in
force, but the ancient system which proposed the reservation of them for this
purpose, was abolished, and the lauds were, in accordance with the new and
wiser policy, to be reduced to private dominion as quickly as possible : (see
report of committee on agriculture in the Spanish Cortes on this subject, 12
Diario de Cortes p. 99, see post § 109.)
§ 61. In continuation of my reasons for the several propositions hitherto
maintained, and which for the sake of brevitj'- 1 refrain from repeating, reference
will now be had more particularly to the legislation of the Indies and of the
Mexican Republic, which has, or has been supposed to have some material bear-
ing upon this subject. Most of my efforts thus far have been employed in clear-
ing away rubbish—in correcting and refuting what I conceive to be errors, so
that the truth, which in this case, is veiy simple, may not be obscured by them.
This part of my task is not yet finished, but in the farther prosecution of it, I bag
the attention of the Board in the first place, to some laws, regulations and orders
supposed to be applicable, but which in truth are not so. Such are ordinanzas
88 and 89, 100 and 101 de poblaciones, first promulgated in the royal statute
under that title by Philip II. in the year 1563, and which articles were afterwards
inserted in the Recopilation of the Indies published in the year 1680, and consti-
tute laws 6, 1 and 10, Tit. 5, Lib. 4, which I will translate.
§ 62. L. 6. " If the situation of the country [tierra] renders it suitable for the
settlement of a villa of Spaniards with a council of ordinary Alcaldes aud regi-
dores and there be some person who will take asiento [contract] to settle it [pob-
larla] let the capitulacion be made with these conditions [calidades ;] that within
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the time that to him may be assigned, it shall have at least thirty vecinos, and
each one of them a house, ten breeding cows, four oxen, or two oxen and two
steers, [or young unbroken oxen, Avhether steers or bulls,] one breeding mare,
one breeding sow, twenty breeding castilian ewes, and six hens and a cock ; he
shall likewise appoint a clergyman to administer the holy sacraments, who shall
be for the first time of his election, and afterwards according to our royal patron-
age, and he shall provide the church with ornaments and things necessary for
divine worship, and give security that he will fulfill within the aforesaid time;
and if he do not fulfil, let him lose that which he may have built [edificado]
wrought [labrado] and gained [grangeado] which we do appropriate to our royal
patrimony, and moreover let him incur the forfeiture of a thousand pounds of
gold for our exchequer [carnara] ; and if he do fulfill his obligation, let there be
given him [se le den] termino y territorio, four leagues square, [cuatro leguas de
termino y territorio en cuadro] or prolonged according to the situation of the
country in such form that if it be measured, there shall be [in quantity] the four
leagues square [sean las cuatro leguas en' cuadro] with the condition that the
limits of the said territorio be distant at least five leagues from any city, villa or
Lugar of Spandiards which may have been previously settled, and no prejudice
be occasioned to any Indian Pueblo, or private persons."
. § 63. L. 7. "There being one who will obligate himself to build up a new
town [hacer nueva poblaeion] in' the form prescribed, with more or less than thirty
vecinos, provided they be be not less than ten, let there be granted granted him
the termino y territorio in proportion [al respecto~\ and with the same conditions."
§ 64. L. 10. "Whenever any private persons agree among themselves [se con-
cordaren] in the purpose of building up a new town [en hacer nueva poblaeion]
and there shall be a number of married men for that purpose, let license be given
them, [se les de licencia] provided they be not less than ton married, and let
there be given them [deseles terminio y territorio in proportion as aforesaid \_al
respecto de lo que estd dicho] and we grant them authority to elect from among
themselves ordinary Alcaldes and officers of the annual council." [See also "reg-
ulation and instruction for the Presidios which are to be established on the fron-
tier line of New Spain—established by the King 10th Sept. 1712," Tit. 12. It is
found in Arrillaga Recop. for 1834, p. 139—also order and instruction from the
comandante dated 22d March 1791, Rockwell 451.—also Viceroy's instruction of
17th Aug. 1773, 1 Rockwell 444, all of which are equally inapplicable and irrel-
evant to this case.]
§ 65. These laws are of no assistance eitner for or against the claimant,
because,
—
1. They did not remain in force in Mexico after its independence.
2. They are wholly inapplicabe to the subject.
3. They do not establish, nor tend to establish the rights contended for.
4. They do not militate against any one of the propositions which I have
advanced.
The meaning of a law is to be determined according to the intention of the
Legislator, which is to be ascertained not arbitrarily, but by the application of
certain fixed rules of interpretation, among which is one very evident and rea-
sonable, that reference must be had to the context and the cotemporaneous facts,
[1 Feb. Mej. 17.]
§ 66. The code entitled " Recopilacion de leyes Indias," is not a new statute,
or collection of new statutes thus first promulgated. If it were so, we should have
only to read it consecutively from beginning to end, in order to comprehend the
just interpretation that ought to be given to any one of the distinct provisions in-
serted in it, and which for convenient reference is set down distinctly in the appro-
priate book and title. But this code is just what it purports to be, a Recopila-
tion, a compilation, made up of many old laws, statutes and ordinances, for the
government of the kingdoms of the Indies, made and promulgated at various
distinct periods, during the transcourse of about one hundred and eighty years.
The compilation was made by various learned advocates and published by author-
ity of the King, who in a decree of 18th May 1680 declares what authority it is
to have. But the laws inserted in it are for the most part, old laws, which had
already been in force, for a long period, and these laws collected together
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and inserted, are not changed or modified any further than it is so declared by
some posterior disposition, nor is the just construction which ought to be, and
"was put upon them, and which is deduced from their eviden intention and import
in any manner altered by their insertion in this code.
The laws, Avhich I have just translated, are parts [arts. 88, 89, 100 and 101] of
one entire statute, consisting of several hundred articles, enacted and promul-
gated in the year 1563, by Phillip II, under the title of " Ordinanzas de Pobla-
ciones," and consequently, had already been in operation one hundred and seven-
teen years, when the Recopilaeion was promulgated as a code.
At that early period, nearly the entire continent of the two Americas was yet
undiscovered and unsettled, nearly all of which, with the adjacent Islands, and
the Philipines, were claimed as comprehended in the dominions of the King of
Spain. It Avas about forty years after the brilliant conquest made by Cortez in
that portion of the country which has erected into a distinct kingdom with the
name of JSTew Spain. It was two hundred aud six years before the epoch in
which the first white inhabitants, under the guidance of Father Junipero, and the
military escort of the Governor and Comandante D. Gaspar de Portala, with D.
Fernando Rivera y Moncada, second in command, and Lieutenant D. Pedro Fages,
with a considerable force by sea and land set foot upon the soil of Upper Cali-
fornia. The whole continent with the exception of a few scattered white estab-
lishments, supported by force of arms, in which the several subordinate govern-
ments then existing, resided, was in the possession of numerous and powerful
tribes and nations of Indians. These vast regions wero to be explored and set-
tled. It was out of the question to expect that individual settlers, for the sake
of finding land to to cultivate, would venture, unprotected, out of the reach of
the guns of the Spanish Forts. Neither could any discoveries be undertaken at
the expense of the Royal Treasury, nor any sums be expended for that purpose
by any of the Viceroys or other functionaries in the Indies, without special au-
thority from the king, even though they might be authorized to make discove-
ries, a prohibition Avhich was incorporated in the ordinance of 1563, [art. 25,)
which is to engage our attention, and of which the laws just cited constitute a
part.
It was principally for the pm-pose of engaging individual enterprise, and pri-
vate capital in the exploration and peopling of this vast continent, and the devel-
opment of its mineral wealth, then known to be inexhaustible, that the " Ordi-
nanzas de Poblaciones." were framed.
§ 67. It is provided in the first article [L. 4, T. 1, lib. 4, R. I.] that no person
of whatsoever quality or condition, shall make any new discovery on his own
authority, either by sea or land, nor establish any new poblacion (town, or settle-
ment) in the parts discovered or to be discovered without license from the king,
or some one who is empowered by the king to grant it; and the Viceroys, Gov-
ernors, and other officers are forbidden to grant such license, unless especially
authorized, but they are allowed to give license for founding poblaciones in those
parts within their jurisdictions, which have been explored and reduced, making
report to the king immediately.
§ 68. In Art 2 it is provided that the superior functionaries, spiritual and
temporal in the Indies, shall diligently ascertain whether in their districts or the
countries and provinces coterminous therewith, not being under the government
of others, there be any parts to discover and pacify, what number of people and
nations inhabit the same and of the character of the land without sending war-
like people or others who by their reprehensible conduct towards the natives,
may scandalize the christian faith ; and having informed themselves on these
points by the best means in their power, and also of the most suitable persons to
prosecute the exploration, they are permitted to enter into a contract, observing
in framing it the laws respecting discoveries, and offering to such persons the
honors and advantages which justly and without injury to the natives they may,
and of all they may have ascertained and contracted, without putting it into exe-
cution, they are to"make report to the vice-roy and through him to the Council
of the Indies, in order that being seen and considered therein, the royal license
may be given, if the discovery be deemed proper. (L. 1, T. 3, Lib. 4.)
The succeeding eighteen articles contain minute regulations respecting the kind
and number of ships to be employed in each expedition, the manner in which
they are to be equipped, manned, apparelled and provisioned, goods and trinkets
which are to be taken on board for the purpose of trafiic with the Indians, the
minute account that is to be kept of all that is discovered and observed on sea
and land, the conduct to be observed toward the natives and the time when the
ships must return.
§ 69. Articles 21 and 23 provide that those who shall have gone forth on
voyages of discovery by sea or land by capitulation (contract) made in the Indies,
must return to make report (daf cuenta) to the government or audiencia with,
which they may have contracted (capitulado) which government or audiencia is
to send an extended and complete relation of the discoveries and the results to
the Council of the Indies ; and that if the discubridor (the person contracting for
making the discovery) possesses the necessary requisites, he may be encharged
with the enterprise of settling the country discovered, or he shall receive the re-
ward which he may merit for his labor and expenditures, having fulfilled his con-
tract (asiento,) (L. 14, T. 1, Lib. 4.)
§ 70. In every expedition a journal is to be kept and read daily, before the
whole company, and finally presented to the Council of the Indies, or in the
audiencia where the report is to be made (Art. 22.) Indians are not to be taken
from the parts discovered, except for interpreters and going voluntarily (Art. 24.)
No discovery to be undertaken at the Bang's expense, (Art. 25.) The persons
charged with making discoveries, are to be those of approved Christianity, good
conscience and zealous for the honor of God and the Bang's service ; lovers oi
peace, and desirous for the conversion of the Indians, so as to satisfy the obliga-
tion which the King acknowledges himself under to see that the thing is done
with all christian prudence, love and moderation (Art. 27.) Foreigners and other
persons prohibited to pass to the Indies cannot be employed in discoveries, nor go
out with the expeditions (Art. 28.) The word conquest is to be dispensed with in
all capitulaeiones, and in its place the words pacification and poblacion are to be
used, so as to afford no pretence for committing outrages against the Indians,
(Art. 29.) The discoverers must observe the laws and the special instructions
given them which are to be reasonable, and adapted to the character of the coun-
try they go to discover and the nations which inhabit it, (Art. 80.)
§ 71. No discoverer, nor PoUidor (contractor for the settlement) can enter
into the district encharged to others, or which may be already discovered, in order
to make settlements (poblar) or discoveries there, (Art. 81.) Articles 34, 35, 36
and 37 (L. 1 and 2, T. 5, Lib. 4,) speak of the circumstances which are to be ob-
served by the pobladores in selecting locations for new settlements in eases where
it should be resolved to settle any province or district among those already re-
duced, or which should thereafter be discovered.
§ 72. Article 39 and 40, (L. 1, T. 7, Lib. 4,) "Having made the discovery by
sea or land, according to the laws and orders which treat thereof, and having se-
lected the province and district (comarca) which is to be settled and the site
(sitio) of the places (lugares) in which the new poblaciones are to be founded and
contract therefor being made (tomando asiento sobre ello) those who are going to
fulfil the same shall observe the form following, <fec. " The site is to be elevated
and healthy, and selected with a view to the shelter, capacity and defence of the
Port—and from places which are vacant and can be occupied without injury to
the natives or with their free consent. When the plan of the place is made, it is
to be divided into streets and squares, and solarcs, commencing with the Plaza
Mayor and extending the streets to the gates and principal roads, and leaving so
much open space (campo abi.erto) that should the poblacion go on greatly increas-
ing, it can always extend in the same form—care is to be taken to have water near
by which can be conducted to the Pueblo and the lands. Places very high or
very low are to be avoided, and those of medium elevation selected for settle-
ment, which may enjoy the North and South winds. Mountain ridges and hills
if they exist, should fall on the East and west, and care is to be taken to avoid
places subject to fogs. Sites for Pueblos are not to be selected in uncovered,
maritime places, for the danger of Corsairs—and because they are not generally
healthy, and for the additional reason that there the people will not dedicate
thamselves to tillage and agriculture ; nor will their morals be so well formed,
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uunless it be when there are some good and principal ports, and of these only may
be settled (se pueblan) those which may be necessary for the ingress to (entrada),
commerce, and defence of the country. " (Art. 41, L. 4, T. 7, Lib. 4.)
§ *73. Art. 43 (L. 2, T. 7, Lib. 4,) is as follows:—"The country (tierra) pro-
vince and place being selected in which is to be erected the new poblacion, and
the circumstances and advantages thereof being ascertained, the Governor in
whose district it may be, or on which it may confine, will declare the pueblo
which is to be settled (que se ha de poblar) and conformably to what he may de-
clare shall he formed, the council, republic and offices thereof; so that if it be a
metropolitan city it may have a judge with title of adelantado, alcalde mayor, or
corregidor) or ordinary alcalde, who shall exercise the jurisdiction insolidum (en-
tirely) and jointly with the (regimiento) council, have the administration of the
Republic; two or three officers of the Eoyal Hacienda; twelve regidores ; two
Heles ejecutores ; two jurados of each parish ; one procurador general : one mayor-
domo ; one escribano of the Council two escribanos publicos, one of mines, and
one of registries
; one chief crier (pregonero mayor ;) one exchange broker ; two
porteros (summoners ;) and if it be diocesan or sufrigan city, eight regidores, and
the other permanent officers
; for the villas and lugares, an ordinary alcalde, four
regidores, one alguacil, one escribano of the council, one escribano publico, and one
mayordomo." It must be observed, that this article empowers the superior au-
thority of the proper district or province to declare what is to be the class and
character of the pueblo which is to be founded and built by the Poblador referred
to in the previous articles 39 and 40, whether it shall be a metropolitan or
diocesan city, a villa or lugar, in order that the municipal government may be
organized in conformity therewith
;
but it does not empower him to confer the
title, much less to grant any privileges, exemptions or property. That could only
be done by the king himself, to whom immediate account was to be given, as
prescribed in Art. 1. (ante § 67.) At least if it may be construed to embrace the
authority to confer such title, it is so far abrogated by the subsequent law of 1627
which is L. 6, T. 8, Lib. 4, R. I., before cited (ante § 29) by which that power is
expressly denied to any viceroys, audiencias, governors or other ministers of the
Indies, however superior in authority. The form of the contract and the condi-
tions of it under which this pueblo must be founded and built, are specified
restrictively in other articles of the ordinance. The succeeding articles, 46, 47,
48 and 50 (L. 18 and 19„ T. 7, and L. 3 and 4, T. 5, Lib. 4) relate to the descrip-
tion of persons that are to be admitted to the company, or list of colonists which
are to be taken out as settlers for the new towns to be founded, the appointment
of municipal officers, payment of their salaries, registry of the names of the
settlers, and the capital which each is to employ in the adventure. -
§74. The articles which follow from the 50th to the 87th, exclusive, relate to
discoveries, pacifications and settlements of countries and districts, not included
in nor immediately bordering upon the district of any viceroy or royal audiencia
by whom it might be conveniently governed, to be undertaken by some great
capitalist at his own expense, by treaty made directly with the king with the
title of adelantado cabo principal or capitan. The adelantado was invested with
the superior government and jurisdiction in the provinces which he undertook to
people, and was subordinate and subject to no authority but the king and su-
preme council of the Indies. If he discharged his undertaking in such a manner
as to merit the royal approbation, he was to have the plaudit of " well done,
good and faithful servant;" and thenceforth take rank anions; the first nobility
of the old kingdom, (Art. 52, 86, 68, 69, 84, L. 2, 14, 15, 23, T 3, Lib. 4) ; all of
which, however, was to be regulated by contract. Among other articles (capit-
idos) to be inserted, one was that within a certain time to be specified, he should
have erected, founded, built and settled, at least three cities and one province of
Pueblos Sufriganeos. If he should contract to construct fortresses—he was to
have the tenancy of them for the time, limited or perpetual, which might be con-
ceded to him, his son, heir or successor, with competent salary from the royal
treasury, or products of the country. (Art. 53, 54, 55 and 60, L. 8 and 9, T. 3,
Lib..4,)
He might establish weights and measures for the precious metals in the Pueblos
of Spaniards, settled or to be settled, (L. 12, T. 3, Lib. 4, Art. 63.) In defect of
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officers of the royal Hacienda, he might appoint them ad interim (Art. 64, L. 11,
T. 3, Lib. 4). He might draw upon the royal treasury for any sums that might
be necessary to repress any rebellion (Art. 65, L. 18, T. 3, Lib. 4). He might
make ordinances for the government of the country and working of the mines,
provided they were not contrary to law, and were confirmed by the Council of
the Indies (Art. 66, L. 1*7. T. 3, Lib. 4). He might divide his province into dis-
tricts, and appoint judges and other officers, assigning them competent salaries
from the products of the country (Art. 67, L. 16, T. 3). He was himself to exer-
cise the j urisdiction, civil and criminal, in grade of appeal from the Lieutenant-
Governors, and the ordinary Alcaldes of the cities and villas which he founded,
and this jurisdiction was transmissible to his son or heir, or successor in the gov-
ernment (Art. 68, L. 14, T. 3, Lib. 4). As the said ddelantttdo or cabo principal
was next subordinate to the Council of the Indies, no one of the viceroys nor co-
terminous audiencias were permitted in any manner to intermeddle with the affairs
of his province (Art. 69, L. 15, T. 3, Lib. 4). If he found any judges already ap-
pointed in the province embraced in his Capitidacion on his arrival there, they
were to cease acting immediately, and depart the country, unless they wished to
stay as simple settlers (Art. 70, L. 13, T. 3, Lib. 4). He might appoint regidores
and other officers of ihe Pueblos, which should be newly settled, provided the
king had not appointed them, and those appointed by him must be confirmed
within four years by the king (Art. 72, L. 10, T. 3, Lib. 4). If he contracted in
Spain, and proceeded thence, royal cedillas Were dispatched in his favor, allowing
him to raise men and provisions, without any hindrance or interference on the
part of any of the public authorities, and without giving them any account of
the persons going out in his company, all of whom when once enlisted were to
follow, adhere to, and obey him, without separating themselves from the adven-
ture and going on any other voyage, on pain of death, (Art. 73, 74, 75, 76 and
77, L. 3, 4 and 6, T. 3, Lib. 4.) He was exempt from the payment of all duties
on slaves, provisions, and supplies carried out for the subsistence of himself and
the settlers under his orders for the period often years, and from the payment of
alcabalas for the period of twenty years (Art. 78, 79, 81, 82, L. 7, 5, 20, 21, T. 3,
Lib. 4). An account was to be taken of his official conduct {residencies) as in case
of all other principal public functionaries, and if he had fulfilled, as he ought, his
asiento (contract) he was to be commended as a faithful servant, and receive a
grant of vassals in perpetuity and the title of Marquis or some other wherewith
to honor his person and house (Art. 83 and 84, L. 22 and 23, T. 3, Lib. 4).
§ 75. It is next provided (Art. S7) that whenever discovery, pacification, ovpob-
lacian (settlement) is to be made of a province bordering on, or included in those
of any viceroy or audiencia by capitidacion with a viceroy or audiencia or person
in the Indies empowered to make it (the contract), it shall be conceded with the
title of Alcaldia Mayor (superior Alcaldeship) or corregimento (corregidorship) by
way of colony of some city of the Indies or of these kingdoms, or by way of
asiento (contract) with title of Alcaldia Mayor or carregemiento : and to the Cabo
who may contract shall be conceded the same as to the adelantado, except in all
things touching the government, he is to be subordinate to the viceroy or audien-
cia, in whose district his may be included, or on Avhich it may border, &c.
§ 76. The next two articles constitute the law which 1 have already cited,
(ante § 62) and relates to the settlement not of " any town," as White's transla-
tion has it, (2 White, Recop. 44,) but of a particular class or corporate town—
a
villa which per se, and not as a dependency of some other place
—
possesses
jurisdiction, honor, district, &c, (1 Comp. del Derecho Publico de Espaiia 340,)
and the title and privileges of which, " the King or Sovereign Prince alone,
has power to concede" (ib. 339.) It speaks of a concession to be made to the
contractor for building up and settling the place which is to constitute the future
villa, of a terminoy territorio, not " four square leagues," as White has it, but four
leagues square, (cuatro leguas en cuadro,) and not of the location of the land in
such form that " when it be located and surveyed the four leagues shall be in a
quadrangle," as White also has it, but in such form, according to the shape and
circumstances of the country, that if it be measured, there shall be in quantity,
the four leagues square comprehended in the boundaries assigned, (sean las cuatro
leguas en cuadro.) This, however, depended upon the capitidacion, and a strict
36
performance on the part of the contractor
; for if he failed to fulfill as he ought,
he not only got no grant, but lost all the labor and capital which he had expended,
unless an extension of time "was obtained as provided in 93, art. L. 25, T. 7, lib. 4.)
§ 77. Neither was the terrnino y territorio, when granted, to constitute his
private property, but was to be distributed as follows : [art. 90, L. 7, T. 7, lib.
4 :] first, was to be taken out whatever might be necessary for [not the indefinite
thing called "site of the town," as "White translates, but] the solares of the
pueblo, a competent extent for egldo and dehesa which must lie adjoining it, [art.
130, L. 14, T. 7, lib. 4,] sufficient to pasture abundantly the stock which the
citizens admitted as first settlers, were required by the preceding articles 88 and
89 to start with, and as much more for propios of the place. The remainder
was to be divided into four parts, one of which the contractor was to select for
himself. The other three parts were to be divided into equal suertes, equal in
number to the solares [art. 130], which solares and suertes, after assigning to each
of the first settlers those which they were to have for their respective private
use and property [vid. art. 103, L. 9, T. 5, Lib. 4,] were to remain the property
of the King, to be by him granted to such as might afterwards come to settle
[arts. 127 and 130, L. 11 and 14 T. 7, Lib. 4.] The contractor might entail that
part of terrnino y territorio which fell to his share, as well as the mines, <fec. on it,
[arts. 96 and 97, L. 24, T. 3, Lib. 4,] which power to entail property could only
be exercised by special royal privilege, [19 Teatro de Legislacion, p. 433, L. 2, T.
17, Lib. 10, N. R.] and was to have, if so agreed, the jurisdiction, civil and crim-
inal, in first instance, for the period of his own and the life of one child, or heir,
with power to appoint ordinary alcaldes, rcgidores, and other officers of the
council of the same pueblo [art, 95, L. 11, T. 5, Lib. 4.] If he took his colony
from Spain, he and those accompanying him as settlers for the new town, were to
be exempt from all duties and royal imposts on the things which they took for
their houses and subsistence in their first voyage to the Indies, [art. 98, L. 2, T.
6, Lib. 4 ;] and finally says art. 99, which is L. 6, T. 6, Lib. 4. " In order to honor
the persons and legitimate children and desecendants of those who may obligate
themselves to build up a town [los que se obligaren a hacer poblacion,'] and shall
have concluded and fulfilled their asciento, we make them Hijosdalgo de solar
conocido, so that in that poblacion and all other parts of the Indies, they may be
Hijosdalgo, and persons of noble lineage, and solar conocido, and for such be
deemed and held ; and we grant them all the honors and pre-eminences which
may of right be had and enjoyed by all Hijosdalgo and Caballeros of these king-
doms of Castile, according to the laws, usages and customs of Spain."
§ 78. Capitulacioncs were to be admitted on these conditions, and with the offer of
all these advantages and pre-eminences, with such others not inconsistent with this
ordinance, or the laws of tlie kingdom, as might be agreed on, with any one possess-
ing the requisite qualities and capital, and able to give approved security for his
compliance, who could furnish at least twelve settlers for citizens of the new
place to start with, and the terrnino y territorio to be assigned was to be in pro-
portion, whether the number should be greater or less than thirty.
§ 79. If a number of married men, not less than ten [ante § 64, Ord. 101, L.
10, T. 5, Lib. 4,] should agree among themselves to go to the new country and
build up a town [hacer nueva poblacion'] the proposal was to be admitted by the
government, and besides the conditions stipulated in other eases, they were to
have the right to elect from among themselves ordinary alcaldes and officers of
the council. But this was also regulated by express contract, as all treaties for
new settlements were to be, which are contemplated in the articles hitherto cited
from the ordinance of 1563, (see arts. 39 and 40, 45, 46, L. 18 and 19, T. 7, Lib.
4,) which contract or capitulacion, as it was called, because it was drawn up with
great formality, consisting of many capitulos (chapters or articles) constituted the
law which determined the rights of all concerned. The next article following
this (102) which is L. 20, T. 7, Lib. 4, referring to, and evidently intended to
comprehend all the different modes and agencies for establishing and settling new
towns which had been provided for in any of the preceding articles of the ordi-
nance, ordains as follows :
—
" Asiento for a new poblacion having been taken by way of colony adelantami-
ento, alcaldia mayor, corregimicnto, villa, or lugar, let not the council, or those who
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may have contracted (que hubieren ajustado)in the Indies, not content themselves
with having taken and made the asiento, but go on controlling it, and ordain that
it be carried into execution and take account of what is being done."
§ 80. It is evident from the examinations which have been made that 1. 6, 7
and 10, T. 5, lib. 4, R. I. (see ante §62 and 63-4) relate to the settlement of provinces
or districts wholly desert and remote from those "which had been already peopled,
in which settlements could only be effected at that early period by enlisting pri-
vate enterprise and private capital in these adventures, with the offer of advan-
tages and rewards corresponding to the danger, expense and privations attending
them. It is equally evident that these laws like many others relating to new
settlements prescribe merely the bases which were to be incorporated in the
contracts to be entered into with the government, and they can have no operation
independently of the capitulation asiento or express contract. If the last propo-
sition be true, another as a consequence seems to me to result, namely, that these
rules prescribing the matter and formalities of contracts to be made or declined
by the government at its option, ceased to have any operation in Mexico when
the authority of the government which prescribed them terminated; for they are
not properly speaking laws which operated per se or which had taken effect
except where they had entered into contracts already made. They were rules of
action for the Government only, authorising it to make contracts which should
comprehend them. It may be doubted whether after the Federal Government
was established in Mexico, it could alienate the smallest portion of the national
territory or other national property either in favor of individuals or corporations,
except by virtue of the colonization law of 1824, or some other act of Congress.
The prohibition is cei'tainly contained in the Constitution of 1836 (4th Const. Law,
Art. 18,) and in that of 1843, (Art. 89,) [see also note to 1. 8, T. 21, lib. 7, !ST . R. in
los Codigos Espaholes V. 8. p. 502.] I shall not pursue this point however, as it
is not necessary to my purpose. On some future occasion I may ask the permis-
sion of the Board to present some authorities upon it, which seem to me to be
decisive. In the absence of an express contract duly concluded in public form, these
laivs have no application, and when there is such a contract, the terms of it govern
every thing. Who is the Contractor ? "Who were the Casados that agreed among
themselves to build up the new town [hacer la nueva poblacion•/] In what city ?
before what Escribano Publico? and with what functionary duly empowered, was
the contract executed ? How many Casados, or how many vecinos were first stip-
ulated for, and how many actually went to work on the new town ? for the ter-
mino y territorio was to be in proportion to the number, in the proportion of four
square leagues to thirty. Was it to be a city, villa or Ivgar? Within what time
was the thing to be done, and was it completed according to contract? If it was
peformed where is the report to the Government, and where is the express grant
specifying the quantity or extent, shape, location and boundaries of the termino
y territerio that was to be given ? It could only be located either by the descrip-
tive tei'ms of the contract, or of the grant following its fulfilment, for the quantity
was indefinite, depending upon the number of settlers, and the form of the tract,
and its locality would depend on the topographical circumstances of the country.
These questions being answered, we may ask again, where are the lands of the
town, the propios, or property of the C'onsejo ? Where are the solares, the Ejido,
and the dehesa, confining with the Ejido ? Where the Suertes of land equal in
number to the solares? And where is the tract to be reserved as the exclusive
property of the contractor or contractors? (vid. 1. 6, 7, 9, 10, T. 5 and L. 7, 11, 13
and 14, T. 7, lib. 4. R. I.) The town had nothing but the propios which must be
segregated from the rest by metes and bounds. The solares, and suertes not
given to the first settlers, remained valdios for the king, the sovereign, to dispose
of to new comers or otherwise according to his pleasure [L. 11 and 14, T. 7, lib.
4.] The Ejido remained the property of the Sovereign also, being nothing else
but vacant space left, provisionally outside of the surveyed plat, which might sub-
sequently be sub-divided in the same form as the original plat, by extending the
streets, and laying out of new solares, if the increase of population should require
it [1. 1, 13, 14, T. 7, lib. 4, R. I.] Again where are the private lands of the first
setters, the solares, the tillable and pasture lands, the suertes or peonias and cabal-
lerias that were to be given them, with their locality and boundaries ? So far as
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the laics operate, they establish the claim to these as far as they do the claim of
the town to any particular tract under the name oiprupios, or any other denom-
ination, [L. 9, T. 5, and L. 7, 11 and 14, T. 7, lib. 4. J If the settlers themselves
should present themselves before the Board proving themselves to have been first
settlers and nothing more
—
producing no express grant, would you find enough
in these laws to establish a grant to each one for the portions of land claimed
by him, and to determine the locality and boundaries of each portion ? Would
you have no occasion to refer to contracts, written titles, documents, public
records or surveys? *
§ 81. While the learned counsel for the claimant are preparing to surmount
these formidable difficulties, we will propose another for their consideration.
Sea Ports are expressly excepted out of the operation of the laws which we are dis-
cussing. In article 92 of the ordinance, placed in juxta position with them, which
is 1. 6, T. 7, lib. 4, R. I., it is declared " Territorio y Termino for a new town,
[poblacion,~] can neither be granted nor taken by asiento in Sea Ports, nor in any
parts which at any time can result to the prej udice of our royal crown, or that of
the state [republica] for our will is that they remain reserved for us." Territorio
y Termino—It is the identical expression used in each and all of the three laws
which have so erroneously been supposed to give some support to the pretensions
of the present claimant [1. 6, 7, and 10, T. 5, lib. 4]. "Let there be given him four
leagues of termino y territorio " [1. 6] ; " let there be granted him the termino y ter-
ritorio in proportion" [1. 7] ; "let there be given them [the casados] termino y terri-
torio in proportion" [1. 10.] But in Sea Ports Territorio y termino can neither be
granted, nor taken by asiento, for these places must remain reserved for us.
On the 17th of September, 1776, solemn possession Avas taken of the Presidio
newly founded at the entrance of this Port, and on the 9th of October following,
the mission was founded with the usual ceremonies, on the site which it yet oc-
cupies under the patronage of San Francisco [Junipero 210, 214).f The port was
* The lands within the ternino y territorio of four leagues which was to be assigned as limits
were to be distributed in the manner specified in the laws already referred to and were not by any
means to be given to the town, but was to be divided out and granted in distinct portions to the
contractor, the settlers, the town, &c„ and the lots and suertes not distributed to the first settlers
were to be considered as the King's property, "for him to grant to those who should afterwards
come to settle, or whatsoever his pleasure should be, (L. 11, T. 7, Lib. 4, B. I. Art. 4 and 5, royal
regulation for California of 24 Oct. 1781. See also the Pitic Document dated Nov. 14, 1789, on file
especially Art. IS, in which it will be seen that all the grants of lands and lots within the termino
of four leagues to be assigned to that new town were to be made by the Eoyal Commissioner in
his Majesty's name, and that no authority was to be given to the Ayuntamiento over any lands
within the same termino, except the eight suerter, which by Art. 14 and 15 of the same document
are to be assigned, marked out and designated with monuments for propios, or property of the
town. The citizens were to enjoy in common the pasturage, wood, water, &c. on the vacant por-
tions of the termino, as prescribed in L. 5, T. 17, Lib. 4, B. I. (rid ante §38) which is referred to in
Art. 5 of this Doc. as the only foundation of, and defining the extent of the interest which the citi-
zens would have in the natural productions of this termino of 4 leagues. See also the communi-
cation of the Cornandante D. Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, dated 21 June, 17S6, on file, which in giving
the reason why the estancias for cattle, ought not to be located within the 4 leagues which may
have been assigned and marked out to a town, refers to the same L. 5, and those following of Tit.
17, Lib. 4, E. I. and the royal regulation of 1781, without intimating that the town would have any
property in the lands embraced in said termino, but only that the citizens would enjoy the com-
mon pasturage, fuel, water, &c, as provided in the general laws of the Kingdom referred to.)
t This is the Mission founded for the Patron of the Order in Upper California. It was not in-
cluded in the number of those originally projected, and the circumstances under which it was
established were somewhat curious, as may be seen from the following account of Palore in his
Historical Relation of the Life and Apostolic labors of the Venerable Father Fray Junipero
Serra :
" The 24 day of January, 1770, returned to San Diego the land expedition which had started out
on the 14 July of the year before, having spent six momhs and ten days and suffered many hard-
ships (as my beloved Father and fellow disciple Fr. Juan Crespi relates in his diary), bringing the
unwelcome intelligence of their failure to find the Port of Monterey, in which had been anchored
the Maritime Expedition of Admiral Sebastian Vizcaino, in the year 1603, in the time that the
Count of Monterey was Vice-roy of New Spain, and that they had arrived at the Port of our
Father San Francisco, forty leagues further to the North.
" Father Fr. Juan Crespi who went with the Expedition wrote me this information, adding
that they suspected that the Port bad been stopped up as they found some large banks or ridges
of sand. As soon as I read this, I attributed it to the Divine interposition, that the Expedition
not finding the Port of Monterey in the place indicated on the old charts, should proceed onward
till arriving at the Port of our Father San Francisco, for the reason which I am now going to state.
"When the Venerable Father Fr, Junipero treated with the Most Excellent Seilor Visitor Gen-
eral (Galvez) respecting the three first Missions which the latter had given him in charge to found
in this New California, seeing the names and Patrons assigned to them, he said, 'and is there to
be no Mission, sir, for our Father San Francisco ?' to which it was replied, ' If San Francisco
39
at that time more thoroughly explored than it had been previously ; but for a
long time previous to this, it had been known to the Spanish Government as one
the most magnificent seaports in the world, and was doubtless looked upon as
probably destined to become the grand emporium of that new commerce, which
the sublime genius of Alveroni aimed to establish with the Asiatic nations, in
which project he was defeated by the conspiracy of France and England at the
court of his master.
§ 82. Seaports might be settled, towns might be built up in them, so far as
might be convenient for the accommodation of the interior and exterior com-
merce, for which purpose it was only required that the sovereign proprietor of
the land, or some one by him authorized, should grant building lots to those wish-
ing to settle and establish themselves there. But the three laws which have
already occupied too much of our attention, speak of the termino y territorio to be
granted to the original founders, subject to distribution in the manner specified.
This could not be granted in seaports. They are exceptedfrom the operation of
those laws. They are reserved to the Sovereign. I may suggest here the doubt
whether under the laws of Mexico, any lands whatever can be given to towns or
individuals, within ten leagues of the seacoast, without the previous approval of
the supreme government of the Mexican Republic. I say to towns or individ-
uals, for so far as California is concerned, no power but Congress itself could give
lands to towns or other corporations, on which point I propose to speak more par-
ticularly in another place.
The Governor of California in his message to the Departmental Junta of 1 6th
of Feb. 1840 (Doc. "D." filed in this case) expressly says that all the grants of
land within ten leagues of the seacoast are illegal
—
illegal, that is the expression,
and that no application had been made to the supreme government to legalize
them. So says Capt. Halleck in his report which will be found 1 Eockwell p.
436. In Sinaloa, there was an act of the Legislature passed while it was a Sov-
ereign State, authorizing the designation of ejidos to towns, which law remained
in force after the establishment of the Central Government in 1836 (see ante § 5).
The Governor of that Department, by a decree of July 8th, 1842 (2 Observador
Judicial 265), established a regulation for the execution of that law, and in Art.
14 thereof it is declared,
"In the ten literal leagues which the General Government reserved to itself by
articles 4 and 5 of the law of Aug. 18, 1824, lauds cannot be given in property
to any Pueblo, corporation, nor private person."
§ 83. I shall not occupy the time of the Board with a detailed examination of
Tit. 11, of the regulation for Presidios of Sept. 10, 1772(Recopilaeion of Arrillaga
for 1834, p. 159), the document published by Rockwell (p. 451), purporting to be
instructions from the Commandante-General of the interior pi'ovinces, of March
22, 1*791 ; instructions from the viceroy, of Aug. 17, 1773 (Rockwell 444), nor
the laws of Sept. 13, 1813, Aug. 17, and Nov. 26, 1833, and April 16, 1834, re-
specting the secularization of missions; nor the document on file, dated Chihua-
hua, Nov. 14, 1789, purporting to be "Instruction approved by His Majesty,
wishes to have a Mission, let him show you his Port, and it shall he founded for him.' The Ex-
pedition ascended. It arrived at the Port of Monterey: it tarried and planted a cross there with-
out any one recognizing it among all that went, knowing only what they had read of it in history
;
they proceed forty leagues further up ; they fall in with"the Port of San Francisco, and all reeog-
nize it immediately, by the application of all the descriptions which they had of it. In view of
this what could we say, hut that our Sainted Father wished to have a Mission at his Port ?
"Thus judged the Most Excellent Visitor General, for as soon as he received the information,
(His Excellency "being still in Mexico,) he obtained orders from the Vice-roy that the Mission
should be founded at said Port," (Chap. 18.) This was done in the year 1776, of which the author
gives an account in Chap 45
:
" Having concluded the survey, the launch returned to the Port, and both Commandants com-
municated with each other the information obtained, and what they had seen and observed in
order to report to his Excellency (the Vice-roy,) and considering that it was now time for the
Paquet boat to return to San Bias, seeing that the order of the Commandant Eivera for the es-
tablishment of the Mission of our Father San Francisco came not, they resolved to proceed to
take possession and make a beginning for it, as was actually done on the 9th day of October.
" After having blessed the site (sitio) and reared the holy cross, and made a procession with the
image of our Father San Francisco, which was afterwards placed upon an altar, I sang the first
mass, and preached of our Sainted Father as Patron of the Mission ; at which foundation the
people (gente) of the Presidio, the Barque, and the Mission assisted, firing their salutes during the
progress of all the ceremonies." (See also Forbes' California, p. 93, 127-5.)
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which was formed for the establishment of the new villa of Pitic in the province
of Sonora, ordered (it is said in the title, but not shown any where in the docu-
ment) to be adapted to the other new poblaciones projected and which ma)' be
established in the district of this Cornandancia" nor the document dated '21st
June, 1786 purporting to be opinion of the asesor of the Cornandancia of the
Interior Provinces (among which California was never included, but to the supe-
rior government of which it was subject from 17*76 to 1788 only ; see "Republics
Mexicans in 1846," by Rodriguez, p. 7 and 8 ; 4 Legislation Ultramarina 283-4,
Junipero p. 229) on various subjects respecting the granting of lands to individuals,
and the designation of the tennino or limits of four leagues to new settlements so
that within it the citizens may enjoy in common the pasturage, wood, waters and
other natural productions as provided in L. 5, and those following it, Tit. 17, Lib.
4, R. I. (See ante § 38) to which he refers, as well as to the 8 and 9 arts., Tit. 14,
of the regulation of 24th Oct. 1781."
JSTo general regulation for Presidios settlements <fec., for the interior provinces
had any application to California after its own peculiar regulation of 24th Oct.,
1781 was approved by the King. But this matters nothing; any argument,
claim or right, that could be founded on these and similar Documents is fully
answered in my remarks upon the laws to which they refer. The Pitic Docu-
ment, the opinion of the Asesor, the order 1791 do not purport to be laws, nor
could they possibly have the force of such if they did, but executive orders the
operation of which so far as they had not actually been executed, ceased with the
authority which had issued them. But if they had not ceased, if they had not
only been applicable, but continued in force to this day, thay afford no assistance
to the claimant because so far as San Francisco is concerned, they were never
acted on. There was no town founded here. There was no measurmeut and
designation by permanent monuments of the tennino [limits] of four leagues
therein spoken of—no asignment, measurement and designation in the same man-
ner of the eight suertes of land which were to be granted to the town for its
propios. But supposing that they had all been specially applicable to Califor-
nia and had continued to preserve all the force they ever had till this day, and
could now be executed as fully and effectually as ever. This does not help the
claimant, for so far as they relate to the tennino of four leagues, they are wholly
based upon and refer to the laws of the Indies [L. 6, 7, and 10, T. 7, Lib. 4,]
which I have before discussed, and from the operation of which laws, as we have
before seen, sea ports are expressly excluded by one of the articles immediately
following in the very same statute. But allowing all I have here said to be of
no weight, and that each and all the said orders, opinions, &c, had referred to
this identical locality and been carried into full effect it would not help the pre-
sent claimant except so far as respects the suertes of lands which were to be as-
signed to the town for propios, [See Pitic Doc. art. 14 and 15, Reg. of 1781, Tit.
14, art. 4 and 5, and the laws of the Indies cited ante § 38.]
The instruction for Pitic expressly directs that all the lands and lots with-
in the tennino of four leagues, distributed to settlers shall be given them by
the RojTal Commissioner in the King's name, (see the Doc, especially article 18,)
in size and number according to his discretion, and gives to the Ayuntamiento
and municipal functionaries no control whatever over any lands but the propios,
and does not propose to give the town or its citizens any interest whatever in any
other lands embraced within the said tennino, or limits, of four leagues, nor does
it propose to give the citizens any interest in the natural productions, but what
is given by the general laws of the kingdom to which express reference is made
as the only authority for the action proposed to be taken. This, with what is
said by Elizondo, and by Viscaino Perez respecting the tennino which may be
assigned to towns (ante ^ 40, 52,) and the preceding part of my remarks and ref-
erences, will be sufficient to dispose of this, and other similar documents. These
observations will be found entirely applicable to the " opinion of the asesor," be-
fore referred to. It is an opinion founded upon various laws and royal regula-
tions, which it particularly refers to, and which, when the paper is carefully read,
will be fmmd to have been already fully explained in my argument. As to what
functionaries had authority to distribute royal lands and lots to private persons
at different periods—whether the Commandants of the Presidios had it, and if so,
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how they received the authority, and within what territorial limits they were
restricted in its exercise, and for what reasons, and whether because they might
have granted lp.nds and lots, any individual could sustain a claim for lands or lots
which in fact were not granted to him, are questions not necessary to consider
here.
§ 84. Have towns then no propei-ty by virtue of their establishment, in Mex-
ico and other Spanish countries—none' but what they acquire by the same modes
as natural persons ? I answer, none whatever. It was contemplated by the
colonization laws of Spain, and let it be admitted that it is contemplated
_
by the
colonization laws of Mexico, that lands for certain purposes shall be given tr
towns, and it is clearly likewise contemplated by the said laws that lf^s shall
be given to individuals. But in many, perhar)-- l!ie majority of *£&% D0th the one
and the other are found dsScre&ii'e, because they did not get the grant from gov-
ernment, or because fuey had not means to buy them, or, perhaps because they did
not want them. How then do towns grow up in Spanish countries? I answer in
tho same manner as in the United States, by the union and the concentration of
the population at some particular point, the establishment and natural increase of
trade, commerce, manufactures. The citizens who want dwelling-houses, stores,
or shops, build them or buy them from the lawful owner. Those who want lots
to build on, purchase or receive them by gift from the proprietor, whether he be
the sovereign or some private person, and the property is not chtmged in any
manner by the formation of the town, or its erection into a corporation. There
is no Spanish or Mexican law or authority that ever has been, or ever can be adduced
in refutation of this proposition.
§ 85. By law 4, T. 12, Lib. 4, R. I. of 1568, (five years after the promulga-
tion of the Ordinanzas de Poblaciones be it noted) to supply a defect it would
seem in the ordinance of 1563, which relates exclusively to the establishment of
towns by contract, it is provided that
—
" If in the parts of the Indies already discovered, there be some sites (sitios)
and districts (comarcas) so good that it may be expedient to found towns {pobla-
ciones) and any persons should apply to establish themselves, and take up their
residence therein, in order that they may do it the more willingly, and with
greater advantage let the viceroys and Presidents give them in our name, lands
solares and waters, according to the situation of the land, provided it be not in
prejudice of third persons, and be during our pleasure."
Compare this now with L. 5, 6, 7 and 8, of the same title, and L. 11 and 14,
T. 7, and article 4 and 5 of title 14 of the regulation of 24th Oct. 1781 (Arrellaga
Rccop. 1828, p. 162) and no doubt whatever can remain that the king was deem-
ed the absolute owner of all lands, and lots in towns which had not been ex-
pressly granted.
The said law, 5 Tit. 12 of 1532 provides that when distribution is to be made
of lands, waters, watering places, and pasturage among those who go to settle
(poblar) the vice-roys or Governors who have authority from us, shall make the
distribution (repartimiento) with the parecer (opinion or advice) of the Cabildos
(council or Ayuntamieuto) of the cities or villas, (i. e. within whose termino the
lands are) taking care that the Regidores be preferred, if they have not equiva-
lent lands and solares ; L. 6 (1534) that at the distribution {repartimiento) of the
vecindades [lands given to residents] Caballerias and peonias of lands which may
be given to the vecinos, the Procurador of the city or villa in which this is to be
done be present ; L. 7 [1588] that the distribution [repartimiento] of lands as
well in new towns [poblaciones] as in places and terminos which may be already
poblados [where towns may be already established] be made with impartiality
and without respect to persons.
L. 8, [1563] provides "That if there be presented a petition soliciting solares
or lands in a city or villa, where our audiencia resides, the same shall be first
presented in the cabildo, and being there conferred upon, two regidores shall be
deputed who shall make known to the viceroy or president, the opinion of the
cabildo \lo que al cabildo pareciere] and being considered by the vice-roy or presi-
dent, and deputies, let the despacho be given signed by all, in the presence of the
Escribano of the Cabildo, in order that he may record it in the book of the Cabildo ;
and if the petition shall be for the distribution [repatiniento'] of waters and land*
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for machinery or mills [ingenios,~] let it be presented before the Viceroy or Pres-
ident, and let him remit it to the Cabildo, -who likewise having conferred upon it,
shall send by a regidor to declare their opinion [parecer] in order that being con-
sidered (visto) by the Viceroy or President he may decree (provea) as may be proper
{lo que convenga.)
§ 86. It ought to be constantly borne in mind that in all Spanish countries,
the local authority is the Municipal whose informe should be taken on all aifrirs
of the Government relating to its demarkation, and especially in the distribution
of lands tocitizens, which is to be done with impartiality, and with a knowledge
of the particular claims, and merits of each one as well as of the actual condition
otw lands solicited, all which information the local authority alone can commu-
nicate.
But in all cases tne grants are to u? made by tho- Viceroys, Presidents or Gov-
ernors who may have royal authority tilcTCfor, after taki.ig the opinion or in-
forme of the respective municipal authorities in the same mannC. as by the regu-
lation of 21 ISov., 1828, [Art. 3,] the Governor may, and in many cases ought
indispensibly to take the informe ov parecer of the respective municipal authority..
§ 87. The said royal regulation of 24 Oct., 1781, made especially for California
[articles 4 and 5,] provides that [Art. 4] "the solares which may be granted to
new pobladores must be assigned by the Government in the sites [sitios~\ and
with the- extension corresponding to that of the land where the new Pueblos may
be established, in such mode that there may remain formed streets and a Plaza,
conformably with what is provided by the laws of the Kingdom [this was only
a regulation and instruction] and regulated thereby [con m arreglo] there shall
be assigned ejido sufficient for the Pueblo and dehesa with the tillable lands suita-
ble for propios."
Art. 5. " Each suerte of land as well irrigable as de temporal, must be two
hundred varas long and two hundred wide, this being the extent which is usually
occupied by one fanega of Indian corn in sowing. The distribution which of the
said suertes, as well as of the solares, must be made in the name of the King our
Lord, shall be executed by the government, with equality and in proportion to
the extent of land which has the advantage of irrigation, in such manner that
having previously made the proper demarkation, and reserving valdias, the fourth
part of the number which results, compared with the number of the Pobladores
if there should be so many [that is, as take three-fourths] two suertes of irrigable,
and tw.o of dry land, will be assigned to each, and of the king's suertes [realengas\
will be set apart, such as may appear suitable for propios of the Pueblo, and of
the rest [of the suertes] [las restantes\ grants shall be made by the Governor in the
name of his Majesty, to those who newly [de nuevo~\ come to settle, as likewise of
the respective solares, and especially to soldiers who having completed the time of
their enlistment, or their advanced age, may retire from the service, as well as
to the families of those who may have deceased."
§ 88. Here is a commentary upon the laws of the Indies and the Sovereign's
proprietary right to the lands in towns, so clear and explicit in itself that I am
saved the necessity of any explanation. But I have two others not less clear and
explicit, the one by D. Pedro Pages, Governor of the Califomias, and the Commis-
sioner Jose Moraga, Lieutenant Comandante of the Presidio of tSan Francisco, and
the other of less recent date by the King and royal council of the Indies ; which
as they prove themselves, so far as concerns my present purpose, I have adopted
as part of my argument.
The following statement from one who was an eye-witness to what he relates,
will serve as an appropriate introduction to the first
:
" In order to give sustenance and stability to this spiritual conquest, the most
Excellent Sefior Viceroy, gave in charge to the new Governor B. Felipe New,
that he. should procure to settle [poblar\ the country with some Pueblos of Span-
ish people, who should occupy themselves in the cultivation of the lands, and the
rearing of cattle and beasts, [horses and mules,] which might serve for the
maintenance of these acquisitions. And the said Sefior keeping in mind this
superior order, having observed when he came in sight of the royal Presidio of
this Port, [of San Francisco] the extensive plains hi which the Mission of Santa
Clara is situated, the great extent of land which might be irrigated with the
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abundant waters of the river named our Lady of Guadalupe, he assembled the
pobladores who had come with the expedition from Sonora and adding to them
others, he assigned to them a site [sitio] and distributed lands for the formation of
a Pueblo entitled of Sa?i Joseph da Guadalupe, designating for the location \abica-
cion] thereof the place above the Mission of Santa Clara, on the other side of the
river named Guadalupe towards its rise, three quarters of a league distant from
the houses of the Mission, "In the said site [siVio] the colonists [colonos] formed
their Pueblo giving a beginning thereto iu the first days of November 1177, to
the which, other vecinos have been added, and all governed by an Alcalde of the
same veeinos, subordinate to the Governor of the Province, with a guard of three
soldiers, and one Corporal; all resorting to the Mission to hear Mass. They main-
tain themselves with the crops which they gather of wheat, beans and Indian-
corn, and with the surplus which they sell to the troops they clothe themselves,
for the same purpose rearing large and small cattle and mares, in order to supply
the troops with horses."" \_Palo\C Life and Apostolic labors of Father Junipero,
p. 225.]
§ 89. Here you have a Pueblo fairly established by the Govei'nor, in person,
acting under orders of the Viceroy, who had to the same effect received his instruc-
tions from the king [vid same author, p. 63.] All that remained now to be done
so far as regarded the establishment of the Pueblo, was to make immediate report
to the king according to L. 4, T. 1, Lib. 4, R. I. Yet tins Pueblo thus fairly estab-
lished with its Municipal Government installed, had no lands, nor anything it could
call its own, but the immortal honor of being the Pioneer town in the most mag-
nificent country in the Universe. Five years afterwards the initiatory steps
were taken in conformity with L. 1, T. 13, and L. 1, 13 and 14, T. 7, Lib. 4, R. I.,
and the royal instruction of 1781 in the designation of lands for propios and Ejido,
as well as for giving to the settlers formal titles for their respective allotments. It
was done in this form
:
" Don Pedro Fages, Lieutenant Colonel of the royal army, and Governor of
Old and New California, &c.
" Inasmuch as in Title 14 of the royal regulation which governs in this Penin-
sula, is provided the mode of distributing solares and suertes of land with all else
relating to cultivation, and rearing of cattle, aud the establishment and ad-
vancement (fomento) of Pueblos of civilized people, (Gente de razon,) which may
be located in the territories adjacent to the Presidios of these new establishments,
and it being convenient to practice the formalities requisite in giving possession
to the citizens of San Jos« de Guadalupe, in order that they may subsist in peace
and quietude :—
" Therefore I commission D. Jose Moraga, Lieutenant Comandante of the Pre-
sidio of San Francisco to proceed to the said Pueblo, and conformably with the
instructions contained in the aforesaid royal regulation, give possession in the
name of his Majesty, (whom God preserve) to each one of the settlers of the suertes
and solares, which are destined for them, proceeding by formal acts (autos) and in
continuation of this mandate, forming for each one of the parties interested, a
despacho with insertion of a copy of this Expediente, and of the proceedings rela-
ting to each, he will remit the same for confirmation, in order that this govern-
ment in view thereof, determine as may seem convenient; enjoining that it must
appear (in said Expediente) that the citizens are made aware of what is realengo,
and what is of the common (comun) as are the Ejidos, watering places, fuel, <tc.
;
that it must be expressed in each dispatch and proceeding giving possession, that
it is received and admitted subject to the conditions and penalties, which the
said instruction imposes, as well as the privileges, favors and exceptions with
which the sovereign makes the grant, aud all must sign or some other by their
request with the commissioner himself and witnesses ; and lastly that in the prin-
cipal book of records an entry shall be made of their possessions as well as of
the branding irons, [for marking their cattle] which are to be given to them of
all which a certified transcript [testimonio] is to be obtained and archived in the
said Presidio of San Francisco.
Monterey, Oct. 24th, 1782.
PEDRO FACES.
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" In the Pueblo of San Jose Guadalupe, on the thirteenth day of the month of
Mav, of the rear one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, I, D. Jose Moraga,
Lieutenant Comandante of the royal Presidio of San Francisco, in pursuance of
the mandate -which precedes, must proceed to its punctual fulfillment, and as the
said instruction in articles 4 and 5 declares," &c. [here is inserted verbatim the
4th and 5th articles, Tit, 14 of the regulation of 24th Oct., 1781] ; "being fully
aware of all which, it is my duty to command and I do hereby command, that
when the proceedings shall be concluded with the execution of whatever may be
justly required, the originals be remitted to the Governor for his approbation, or
the purposes which to him inay seem meet, and that a copy remain in the archi-
ves under my charge. Thus I have ordained decreed and signed, which I
authenticate.
JOSE MOEAGA.
" In the same Pueblo, day, month and year above expressed, I, the said Lieu-
tenant Commissioner for the possession and repartimiento of solares and suertes of
land to the settlers of the Pueblo of San Jose de Guadalupe, in view of the act
which precedes, it being indispensible in order to execute it, to appoint assisting
witnesses during the progress of the proceedings, do name for that purpose the
soldiers Felipe Tapia, and Juan Jose Peralta, whom I made aware of the contents
of this appointment, in order that in view of the circumstances corresponding,
they might obligate themselves to give their assistance in the respective acts.
Thus I have decreed, ordered and signed, which I authenticate.
JOSE MORAGA.
In the said Pueblo, day, month and year aforesaid, I, the said Lieutenant Com-
missioner, by virtue of the preceding appointment having in my presence Felipe
Tapia and Juan Jose Peralta, soldiers of the company of the royal Presidio of
San Francisco, made known to them the preceding decree, the which having
heard, they said that they accepted the said appointment, and promised their as-
sistance in these proceedings, with the punctuality which I exact of them, and to
which they are obliged, and they signed with me which I authenticate.
JOSE MORAGA,
FELIPE TAPIA,
JUAN JOSE PERALTA.
In the said Pueblo on the 14th day of May, in the year one thousand seven
hundred and eighty-three, I, the said Lieutenant Commissioner, in continuation
of these proceedings in duty ought to, and do command to appear before me, and
the witnesses of my assistance, the nine Pobladores [settlers] of the said Pueblo,
and having all present, in the name of his Majesty, [whom God preserve], I gave
possession of the respective solar thirty varas square for a dwelling house, to the
Alcalde and settler Ignacio Archuleta, who was made acquainted therewith, and
he said that he was aware of the privileges, favors and exceptions with which
the sovereign made him this concession under the penalties imposed on the dis-
obedient; and being interrogated if he admitted the possession given, replied that
he did, and offered to fulfil the obligations centracted in his establishment [here
follows the discription of the lot] ; not knowing how to sign, Tiburcio Basquez
did it at his request ; I did the same with the assisting witnesses.
JOSE MORAGA,
FELIPE TAPIA
JUAN JOSE PERALTA,
TIBURCIO BASQUEZ.
And immediately in the said Pueblo, day, month and year, I proceeded with
those in my assistance, and the settlers to the arrable lands, and the measurement
having been first made, two hundred varas in length and two hundred in breadth,
of each suerte, I gave possession to the said Alcalde Ignacio Archuleta of the
four suertes of land to which he is entitled, all irrigabie, there not being sufficient
of the description provided for in the said instructions for Pueblos of civilized
people, [gente de razon], [here is the description which is omitted] ; the posses-
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sion being given with, the same formalities and requisites expressed in the forego-
ing proceeding relating to the solar of the said Ignaeio Archuleta, "who not know-
ing how to sign, Jose Tiburcio Basquez did it at his request, and I did the same
with those of my assistance. JOSE MORAGA,
JOSE TIBURCIO BASQUEZ,
FELIPE TAPIA,
JUAN JOSE PERALTA.
(The next act is that of delivering the branding irons for marking cattle. The
formalities practiced in giving possession to the other settlers, are precisely the
same, after which follows the designation of Ejido, and seting apart suertes of
land for propios of the Pueblo.)
In the Pueblo of San Jose de Guadalupe on the 19th day of May, of the year
one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, L D. Jose Moraga, Lieutenant
Comandante and Commissioner for the execution of these proceedings, in duty
ought to, and do order, the acts of giving possession of the solares and suertes of
land to which each settler of the said Pueblo is entitled, being concluded, that I
do proceed with them to the lands of the part to the of this Pueblo, and it3
river, and the measurement having been made from the and river below,
unto the boundary which divides the lands of the said Pueblo from those of the
Mission of Santa Clara, from such measurement there result 1958 varas to the
said boundary. Of this quantity the half is designated for propios of the Pueblo,
and the remainder is to be considered royal land \realengo\ with all the rest of the
land which is not comprehended in the portions of which possession has been given
to the settlers, and for Ejidos of the said Pueblo, there is designated all the
fifteen hundred varas in length and seven hundred in breadth, with all of which
I made them fully acquainted, and they unanimously said that they undei'stood
as well what belonged to their respective possessions, as what was propios of the
Pueblo, and what royal land, (realengo) with all else which has been made known
to them, and not knowing how to sign, Jose Tiburcio Basquez did it at the re-
quest of all ; I did the same with the present witnesses, which I authenticate.
JOSE MORAGA,
JOSE TIBURCIO BASQUEZ,
FELIPE TAPIA,
JUAN JOSE PERALTA.
Monterey, Dec. 31st, 17 8 3.
I approve all that has been done in these proceedings, and the originals will be
delivered to the settler in order that they may serve him as a title and the
ends convenient. PEDRO FAGES.
Thus with the exception of the propios which would be the private property of
the municipality, provided the king confirmed it (see L. 1, T. 13, Lib. 4, R. I.)
all the lands in the Pueblo of San Jose of which possession had not been given to
individuals, remained the property of the sovereign, a conclusion which it seems
common sense would dictate.
§ 90. I have another commentary of somewhat modern date on the laws of
Spain and the Indies which I have cited to show that the landed property of the
sovereign is not changed or in any manner qualified or restricted by any territo-
rial demarkations whatever. The city of Havana in the Island of Cuba, was
founded in the year 1515. In its municipal ordinances formed by the kings
command, and approved May 27th, 1640, authority was given to the Ayun-
tamiento [see articles 63 to 72] to grant building lots as well as lands outside of
the population for keeping cattle &c [Legislacion Ultramarina V. 3, p. 410.]
They exercised this authority for above a century, but their grants or concessions
did not convey the property, according to the opinion of the Fiscal of the Royal
Hacienda expressed in an informe dated Oct. 6th, 1797,[ib. V. 6, p. 49 § 9] because,
he says "in those which I have seen I do not find that the grants were made in
the Royal name of his Majesty, and as the whole soil of the Island pertains to the
royal patrimony, the said Cabildos (Ayuntamientos) could not grant in any other
mode, nor even in this without special authority from the Sovereign.
"
By a royal cedula of Nov. 23, 1729, they -were prohibited from exercising this
authority any longer, which as it lavs down the law very clearly, I shall read
in English in continuation of my argument:
"The King.—Council, judiciary, and government ofSan Cristobal ofHavana, By
a dispatch of this day I have thought proper to confirm and approve the sale
which Jose Rodsiguez made on the 27th March, 1*721, before Miguel Hernandez
Altuno, Notary Public of that city, to D. Antonio de la Luz, resident of the same,
of some houses and lots [solares] which belonged to him in the place [si^o] called
Molinillo, granted by you in the year 1699, to D. Pedro Garabuni and D. Jose
Manuel Aleman, and tranferred by the said Jose Rodriguez ; and considering that
you have no authority to concede mercedes, lands, and solares and effectuate the sales
and transfer thereof, as you did in ease of those of the said Jose Rodriguez, and that
it belongs and appertains to me exclusively to dispense such favors (gracias) and
concessions and in my royal name to the sub-delegates who are appointed in that
city to the commission for the composition of lands which (appointment) I have given
to D. Diego de Zufiiga, minister of my council by a dispatch of the 5th Dec, 1720,
it has appeared meet to ordain and command as I do, that henceforth you do
abstain from granting merced, lands, and solares of that jurisdiction, which author-
ity can alone be exercised by the said sub-delegates of the aforesaid commission
for composition of lands, and recovery of forfeitures in virtue of the authority
which they may have received from the exclusive judge in this matter. Thus is
my will "Dated in Saville, 23d Nov., 1729. " (Biblioteca de Legislacion Ultra-
marina V. 6, p. 43.)
§ 91. The Ayuntamiento did not pretend to have any right to four leagues, or
any other quantity whatever of vacant lands within their jurisdiction, but repre-
sented to the king that it would be convenient that the authority for making
grants and distribution of lands and solares should be continued to them which
gave occasion for another royal cedula dated the 16th Feb., 1739. This after
reciting that the subject had been maturely considered in the council of the Indies,
commands that the municipal government observe strictly what had before been
enjoined, and thenceforth abstain from exercising the authority that had been
delegated to it in the municipal ordinances (articles above cited) with respect to
making grants and distribution of lands and lots within its jurisdiction, reiterating
what is said in the former cedula, that the authority to do this resides exclusively
in the sub-delegates of the royal Hacienda (ib. p. 44.)
In 1823 a rapid increase of the population having taken place and consequent
advancement in the value of lands outside the walls, it became an object not only
to put the vacant and unclaimed lots in market, but to investigate the right of
those who had usurped the possession of some of them without just titles. They
were accordingly disposed of (those that were vacant) on account of the royal
treasury, the municipal government having no intervention in the business, and
interposing no claim to the lands, and those who were occupying without suffi-
cient titles resorted, not to the municipal government, but to the superintendent
sub-del estate of the royal Treasury, to procure a confirmation by way of composi-
tion (ib. V. 3, p. 313—14.)
§ 92. That towns, by virtue of their establishment and demarkation of ter-
minos, (limitary territory,) become the owners of the lands embraced within such
limits, or that they thus become the owners of four leagues square, four square
leagues, or any other specific quantity of land or other property, is an idea that
does not seem to have had its origin in Spanish countries. Any traces of such a
doctrine will be sought in vain among the statutes, customs or opinions of com-
mentators in those countries. The lex scripta saith it is not in me, and the lex
non scripta saith I know it not, go, seek for it in the lex ignota.
It did not occur to any bod}', it seems, when the Pueblo of Manzanillo was
incorporated, nor to the Governor of Sinoloa when he promulgated the order for
assigning Egidos to the towns in that department (2 Observador Judicial 265),
nor to the King and council of the Indies, or the illustrious Ayuntamiento of the
city of Havana, when that corporation was absolutely inhibited from granting
any lots or lands whatsoever within its jurisdiction and the building lots and
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other lands were assumed without dispute to be the property of the King, nor
was any such right recognized or alluded to, when by a special royal decree the
Ayuntamiento of the city of Mexico wTas authorized for the first time to grant
building lots (ante § 26,) although that noblisima (most noble) and loyal city
had then been established and incorporated under the Spanish rule for a period
of more than one hundred and seventy-five years. Ko such right is recognized,
nor referred to in the royal regulation of 24th Oct. 1781, Tit. 14, respecting the
establishment of towns in California (see ante § 86,) nor in the proceedings
giving possession to the Pobladores of San Jose, and marking out the lands of that
town (ante § 89) nor in the decree of the Spanish Cortes of 4th Jan. 1813, in
which all the lands within the limits of towns, except those of the propios are
regarded as the property of the nation (ante § 55 to 59 ;) no such right is recog-
nized in 1. 9, T. 21, lib. 7, N. R., and 1. 20, T. 12, Lib. 4, R. L, prohibiting the
towns to grant any lands within their limits; nor in 1. 22, T. 12, Lib. 4, R. I,
granting special authority to the villa of Tolu, to make distribution to settlers of
certain lands within the Termino or demarkation ; nor in L. 14, T. 7, Lib. 4, R, 1.,
authorizing the viceroys to set apart lands in one town for the propios of other
towns which may be destitute ; nor in the law of the Mexican Congress of April
18, 1828, granting the lands known as Desierto Viejo to the Pueblos, to which it
was contiguous, of the district of Sa?i Angel for distribution, in the mode speci-
fied in that act; nor in L. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, T. 12, Lib. 4, R. I. (ante § 85), con-
ferring \vpon the viceroys and presidents of the audiencias, the exclusive authority
to grant and distribute lands and lots within, as well as without the limits of
towns ; nor in the royal instruction of Oct. 15, 1754; nor in the 81st Art. of the
Ordinanza de Intendentes, of Dee. 4, 1786; nor in any of the laws and regula-
tions of the Mexican Republic on the subject of colonization.
§ 93. On the contrary, the doctrine referred to is repudiated by all the laws,
and all the commentators, and the practice of the government in all ages, as well
as by common reason itself. The errors which we have committed on this sub-
ject have arisen in part, from our not understanding well the agrarian laws of
Spain, and not comprehending the peculiarities of the political system of that
country, of which the ayuntamientos, consejos, cabildos, curias, or reghnientos of the
towns and cities, have always constituted an essential part, having an interven-
tion in every matter of government affecting persons or things within their ter-
minos or jurisdiction. But we have also been misled by translators, who, with-
out any knowledge, such as could only be acquired by a thorough acquaintance
with the codes and the law writers, of the meaning and application of legal terms,
have by a dash of the pen made at random, laid down the law for us in the most
abstruse subjects.
§ 94. In order that a town may grow up, it is not necessary, nor has it ever
beeu the practice in Spain or Mexico, nor in any other country that I know any-
thing about, for the government to grant the land on which it is founded to any-
body but the settlers individually—to each one the portion which he is permitted
to occupy. Why should the government grant the lots intended for private use
to the corporation, even after the town comes to be erected into a corporation ?
These lands are not destined to the use of the corporation, but to private use ex-
clusively, and if the government should grant them to the corporation it could
be only with the object that the corporation should regrant them to individuals.
Would it not be as well for the government in the first instance to grant the lots
directly, through its local agents, to those for whose use they are destined ? Such
seems to have been the policy of Spain, which has not been changed by any
legislation of the Mexican Republic. "Let the solareshe distributed by lot to
first settlers, continuing from those which correspond to the plaza mayor, and let
the rest remain for us to make grant thereof to those who shall afterwards come
to settle, or whatsoever our pleasure may be," (L. 11, T. 7, Lib. 4, R. I.). And
in the regulation for California, for Oct. 24, 1781, after enjoining upon the governor
to distribute in the king's name, one building lot {solar) and four suertes of laud
for cultivation to each original settler, it is provided, " and of the rest, grants
shall be made by the Governor in the name of his Majesty, to those who newly
come to settle, as likewise of the respective solares" (ante § 87. The same policy
was observed in the colonization laws of Mexico, which necessarily comprehend
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the formation of towns. These laws make no provision for granting any lands to
towns, much less do they contemplate the idle ceremony of granting to towns,
lands which are intended for the use of individual settlers, in order that the
towns may reconvey them for that purpose. Municipal corporations, which, as
we have already seen, were under the perpetual tutilage of government, and
without its especial license could not alienate anything whatever that be-
longed to them (ante § 21, 24), were not invested with the property in those
lands which were intended to be alienated as fast as thej^ could be settled.
§ 95. The regulation of Nov. 21, 1828, contains the authority for the distribu-
tion of lands in towns as well as elsewhere in the territories of the Mexican
Republic. It is delegated by the supreme government to the Gefes Politico*,
and Territorial Deputations, and these have in their turn delegated the power,
with such restrictions as they have thought proper to impose to other inferior
authorities. It is provided in this regulation, that the land to be granted for a
building lot (solar) shall be of one hundred varas (Art. 15), that the union of
many families into a town (poblacion) shall conform (seguird) in its formation, gov-
ernment, and interior police, to the rules established by the laws remaining in force
(vigentes) for the other towns (poblaciones) of the Eepublic, taking especial care in
the new ones that they be built up (se construyan) with all possible regularity (Art.
13). That no contract, however (capithtacion), for founding a new town (poblacion)
shall be admitted, unless the contractor (capitulante) obligate himself to present
as pobladores (original settlers), at least twelve families (Art. 10). In this regu-
lation, and the 16th section of the colonization law of August 18, 1824, we must
look for the authority to grant and distribute lands and lots. The power resides
by law in the supreme government of the Republic, and by the regulation re-
ferred to, has been delegated to the territorial governments, which have again
sub-delegated the same power, under restrictions, to other subordinate au-
thorities.*
§ 96. Subsequent to the regulation of 1828, and after the establishment of the
Constitution of 1836, the power to regulate the distribution of lands in town was
conferred upon the prefects (Law of March 20, 1837, Art. 7*7), a provision which
was adopted by Congress, from the Constitution of the State of Mexico (Art 155).
Governor Alvarado is right when he says, as he does in his deposition, that the
power exercised by the municipal authorities in all the towns in California in
* The 16th section of the general Colonization act of the Mexican Congress of ISth Aug. 1824, pro-
vides that "the Government in conformity with the principles established in this law shall pro-
ceed to colonize the Territories of the Eepublic." It makes no mention of any subordinate func-
tionaries, but provides that the Government, consisting of the President of the Eepublic, and tho
Constitutional Ministry shall execute the law. The President, however, by the regulation of 21st
Nov. 1828, committed to the Governors and Territorial Deputations, a portion of the authority
which the law confers on the Government alone. If this is a delegation of the power, then it
would seem to have been judged, by the Mexican Government at least, that the power so far as
regards granting lands and lots to " contractors,families and private 'persons" maybe delegated.
By the first article of the act of Congress of 20th March, 183T, it is provided that
—
" The interior Government of the Departments shall be encharged to the Governors, Depart-
mental Juntas, Prefects, Sub-Prefects, Ayuutamientos, Alcaldes, and Justices of the Peace."
"Where does this authority begin, and where must it end ? It must begin with the Government,
the Supreme Executive, and under the authority, rules and restrictions which may be given and
prescribed, be contiually exercised by the constitutional agents and subordinates of the Govern-
ment, no one having any power to act without direct authorization of his superior.
At one moment it is said by counsel for the claimant, that the Territorial Government could
not confer on Ayuntamientos power to grant building lots, and in the next moment, that it could
confer this power upon them, and a good deal more with it, namely : the property in the lands
themselves; that is to say, that the Governor and Deputation have the power by implication,
(for it is not pretended that any express law gives it) to grant to a corporation a tract of land which
would embrace a thousand, or a hundred thousand building lots, but would not have the power to
authorize the same corporation, or its authorities, to grant oile lot out of the same tract, to an act-
ual settler ! If the authority which Ayuntamientos, Justices of the Peace, &c, have sometimes
exercised to grant building lots and lands within their demarkation, is not derived by delegation
from the Government, they have acted without authority, for no law has been, or ever can be pro-
duced showing that they ever possessed any other. The power, whenever they have possessed
it, has always been given, restricted, modified, and taken away at the pleasure of the Government.
As to any property which the Corporation may possess, no part of it can be alienated without
express license of Government in each particular case given upon formal information of necessity
and utility (vid. ante § 22, 23). A general license would be equivalent to a repeal of the law im-
posing this restriction, in the same manner as if a judge should assume to give to all minors or
their guardians, within his jurisdiction, general' license to alienate their landed property at
pleasure.
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granting lands or lots, was derived, so far as they really possessed it, either from the
government of the department, or from the prefect. JSfo other authority ever has
been, or ever can be shown. In 1835, the governor, with the concurrence of
the Territorial Deputation, delegated to the ayuntamiento of the Quasi Pueblo of
San Francisco de Asis, the power to grant lots not exceeding 100 varas square
"in the locality (paraje), named Yerba Buena," with the restriction that such
grants should not be made within two hundred varas of the beach, a restriction
which does not seem to have been removed while the Mexican Government con-
tinued (see Doe. No. 6, annexed to the deposition of M. G. Vallejo). Author-
ity was also given from time to time, to make grants in other localities, the gov-
ernor himself continuing to grant within the same limits, whenever he thought
proper, the parties interested resorting to him directly, whenever their applica-
tion was for a larger quantity of land than that which the subordinate authori-
ties were authorized to grant by the superior order which ruled for the time
being.
§ 9*7. It is strange that we should have committed any mistake in respect to
the source from which the authority is derived for granting town lots in those
places which have grown up on lands belonging to the Mexican nation. In towns
which may grow up on private lands, no one would doubt that the authority for
granting lots would reside solely in the proprietor and his duly constituted agents.
It is true that poblaciones (towns) are not permitted to be formed without license
from the supreme power of the State (Compendio del Derecho Publico y Cmnun de
Espana v. 1, p. 330, Ordenanzas de Tierras y Aguas p. 80.) But the prohibition or
the license to form poblaciones has nothing to do with the property in the lands
which may be occupied for that purpose. That must be acquired from the lawful
owner. A simple reference to the archives of the Departmental Government, and
to the records of grants made prior to the American conquest, in the place called
Yerba-buena, and in the seculai'ized Mission of San Francisco which will be found
set forth in detail in Doe. " E." would have set us right on this point. The local
authorities or municipal, of the Msssion and so called Pueblo of San Francisco,
by whom these grants were made in the two places referred to, never pretended
to have any inherent power, or authority ex officio to make them, much less did
they claim for the town any property in the lands granted, but acknowledged that
the authority was derived from the departmental government, taking especial
care to have this appear of record in the book of protocols for the security of the
respective grantees.
§ 98. It appears by the certificate of Washington A. Bartlett, who then filled
the office of Alcalde, by appointment from Capt. Montgomery, dated August, 1846,
that he " applied to Don Jose de Jesus Noe, the Alcalde of said town under the
late Government of California, to surrender all public archives and documents,
When this book (the one on which the certificate is endorsed) was given up as
containing the only record of the grants of lots in said town of Yerba Buena."
This book purports to contain the record of all the grants made in the Pueblo
or Mission of San Francisco and the place called Yerba Buena at any time prior to
the date of its deliveiy over to the American authorities. The dates of grants com-
mence in 1839 and end with the 6th of June, 1846. It commences by recording
the authority of the functionaries by whom the grants are made, and for this
purpose has three titles or headings following each other successively. The first
is as follows
:
"Book in which are evidenced the possession of solares in the point (punto) of
Yerba-buena in virtue of the orders (lo dispuesto) of the Departmental Govern-
ment. "
In the second : " Are evinced those granted in the establishment of Dolores in
pursuance of the authority applied for (lo pedido) by the Prefecture of the district
to the Government of the Department, of which I have cognizance, as evidenced
by the official note which is found on page 2."
The third gives the "Formula showing the mode in which possessions of solares
to form habitations, have been given to the citizens (vecinos) of the jurisdiction of
San Francisco de Asis. "
The official note referred to which was written by Jose F. Castro acting as
Prefect ad interim states that he had received from the Secretary of Government
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an official communication under date of 16th of April, 1851, reciting that when
the Prefect Don Jose Castro made a visit to the North, he bore with him instruc-
tions from the Government on various subjects, and among others it was ordered
that solares might be granted to individuals in the establishment of Dolores, but
they must not exceed fifty varas, which disposition of the Government was now
renewed in consequence of the official communication of the Prefecture dated the
Cth of the same month which his Excellency (the Governor) had seen.
§ 99. In this book are recorded fifty-five grants, in all, including those which
had been made at the Mission and at Yerba Buena ; of these, ten were made either
directly by the Governor or in pursuance of his especial order, four or five were
made in pursuance of a special decree of the Prefect made in each case. These
grants made by the Governor and the Prefect, are as well of fifty vara lots, as of
hundred vara lots, and some of them are also for lots situated more than two
hundred varas from the beach. Two of the grants were made by the Governor
on the 22nd April, 1S46. The remaining grants appear to have been made in
virtue of the authority given by the Departmental Government which is referred
to on the first page. One of the grants made by the Governor, was in the foimi
of a license to erect some sort of machinery, and the decree of concession contains
these unequivocal words respecting the property in the land:—" It being under-
stood that as soon as the said solar shall be disoccupied by the "machine referred
to; it shall remain to the benefit of the nation for the uses convenient."
It will be observed also that no mention is made in this book of any town or
" Pueblo," although reference is frequently made to a plan. The place in which
the grants this side of Mission Creek are made, is designated and identified as the
punto [point] or [paraje] [locality] of Yerba Buena.
§ 100. There is therefore not only no evidence of a grant or appropriation in
any form of any lands to any town or Pueblo, and no evidence that any lands
were ever siqiposed to belong to any town, or were ever claimed by any town
within fifty miles of this, but there is the clearest proof to the contrary. In the
case of the United States vs. New Orleans, [10 Peters] there was evidence that
the corporation had occupied the land in question, for upwards of a century, and
by maps and other evidence, the court thought a dedication of the land to public
use, was sufficiently established, and, in all the cases heretofore investigated in
our courts, where towns have set up claims to lands, the right asserted, has been
sustained by some evidence.
But this claim has none whatever, not even the weakest presumption to rest
upon. No grant, not even the initiatory steps to obtain one, not so much as a de-
sire appears to have ever existed to obtain one, or to have any lands ; no dedica-
tion to public use : no possession or occupancy ; no acts of ownership ; no right
asserted or once alluded to at any period of time, on the part of the imaginary
corporation which the claimant pretends to represent. Surely the case is a very
remarkable one.
§ 101. But in the absence of a single relevant fact, I am willing that the coun-
sel for the claimant, should avail themselves of every conceivable or imaginary
one, that might legally have existed. Keeping themselves within the bounds of
what is legally possible, let them for once only, frame a grant, document, or title
nunc pro time. I will not trouble them with any captious objections about the
formalities preceding or attending its execution ; only let it be reasonable and
possible, for therein consists the true spirit of romance. Let it not conflict with
the laws and the customs and the common sense of the times and the country in
which the thing is got up. I will only beg to be informed by what authority and
under what law the document is issued.
In the case of Cohas vs. Roisin and Leguis, [not yet reported] in the Supreme
Court of California, the Chief Justice said : " I am satisfied that long before the
grant on which this controversy arises was executed, the Pueblo of San Francisco
was organized and a grant of Pueblo or municipal lands made to it by the Gov-
ernor and confirmed by the Territorial Legislature of California," Is this fancy, or
is it fact ? That it is not matter of fact, is evident, for if it were, in a case so needy
as this, his Honor would have received a consular duces tecum invitation to pro-
duce the document. It is fancy then, and it is in point, as I have allowed the
counsel to imagine the best document they can in siipport of their claim.
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§ 102. This imaginary Document then emanated from the Governor and Ter-
ritorial Deputation [not Legislature, for no such body existed] ; as such I shall
proceed to test it by the laws. I presume it will not be pretended that the
Territorial Deputation of California, while that body existed, had any Legislative
authority. For by the constitution of 1824, [art. 50] it belongs exclusively to the
General Congress " to give laws and decrees regulating the interior administra-
tion of the Territories." Much less will it be assumed that they had constitu-
tionally any power to dispose of, or to make laws regulating the disposition of
the National Domain. By the Constitution of 1812, [art. 324] and the law of
23d June 1S13, [chap. 3,] which law remained in force mainly until the organic
law of 20th March, 1837 was enacted, the Political Government of each Province
was declared to be vested in a Superior Political Chief, whose powers and attri-
butions are specially designated, together with those of the Provincial Deputa-
tion, [chap. 2,] which seems to have been not a coordinate but a subordinate
branch of the Provincial Government. After the adoption of the Constitution of
1824, and the organization of the Territories of the Mexican Republic, their in-
terior government and administration continued to be regulated by this law of
the Spanish Cortes, so far as it did not conflict with the new constitution or laws
of the Republic. The Gefe Politicos, continued to be appointed under the
same name, and Territorial Deputations took the place of the Provincial, both
exercising in the main, the powers conferred by the law referred to, with such
additional ones as were given by special acts of Congress.
§ 103. On the 23d Oct. 1835, the Federal system was overthrown, and the
Bases Avere established for a new Constitution, by which the States were reduced
to the condition of Departments of the Nation, the Territories being also placed
on the same footing, and the whole Legislative power of the Republic was to be,
and by the 3d Constitutional law [art. 1 and 44] was vested in a General Con-
gress. The Government of the Departments was encharged to the Governors
with Departmental Juntas as their councils [Bases of 1835, art. 9 and 10—6th
Constitutional law, art. 4,] which were directly subject and responsible to the
General Executive or the General Congress, [Bases art. 10, 6th Constitutional
law, art. 4 and 14]. The general powers of the Governors and Departmental
Juntas were particularly specified in the 6th Constitutional law, and in the law
of 20th March, 1837, regulating the interior government of the Departments
[art. 4 to 60], by which the law of 23d June 1813, and other prior laws relating
to the political—economical government of the Departments were abrogated
[art. 191].
Although
.
the Bases of Tacubaya, and the convention of the Estanzuela (of
28 Sept. and 6 Oct., 1841) clothed the provisional executive with extraordinary
powers, the exercise of which, as to all his acts, was subject to the approbation or
reprobation of the first Constitutional Congress, yet no attempt was made to
change, materially the general law which regulated the interior administration of
the departments, but this continued in full force, and was recognized as the rule
of government in the departments, even after the adoption of the Bases Organi-
cas, [of 13th June, 1843,] and up to the time of the American occupation of this
country, except so far as it is in conflict with the said Bases Organicas. By art.
15 of the 6th Constitutional law, the Departmental Juntas, are prohibited from
exercising any powers but such as are therein expressed, which prohibition is re-
newed in the law of 20th March, 1837, [art. 59.]
§ 104. It is quite clear, therefore, if we bear in mind what has just been
shown, that neither the Territorial Deputation, nor the Departmental Junta,
either with or without the concurrence of the Gefe Politico, or Governor, pos-
sessed, the power to alienate any part of the national domain, either in favor of
individuals or corporations, unless the authority can be found to have been con-
ferred upon them by some law remaining in force in the Mexican Republic. That
power is not contained in the law of 23d June, 1813, nor in the 6th Constitutional
law which went into operation on the 1st of Jan, 1837, nor in the law of 20th
March, 1837, regulating their general powers and duties.
"We must look for it then in some special law. As the government cannot alien-
ate any part of the national domain or national property of any kind without the
consent of Congress, [see ante 80,] it is clearly requisite that the authority must
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have been conferred by some act of the Mexican Congress, either upon the gov-
ernment in general terms, or upon some particular functionary. If it is conferred
upon the government, no subordinate functionary can execute it, until the gov-
ernment has taken the initiative by giving general regulations or special instruc-
tions. It belongs to the supreme executive, and not to any subordinate, to direct
the execution of the law in such cases. The only legislative disposition of the
Mexican Republic, which can be supposed to authorize a gratuitous grant or a
donation of national lands to towns or municipal corporations, is the 16th section
of the colonization law of 18th August, 1824.
§ 105. Tnere are some special acts of Congress donating lands, and several acts
authorizing the sale on account of the treasury of certain lands particularly spe-
cified in them, and in some cases where sales have thus been made, towns may
have purchased with license from the respective superior authority. But the
said 16th section contains the only general provision, in virtue of which the gov-
ernment can be considered as authorized to make donations of public lands to
towns, and that not directly, but as an incident, without which the power to colo-
nize the Territories could not be executed with effect. I shall admit for the sake
of argument that the power may thus have been conferred on the Supreme Gov-
ernment [incidentally'] by the colonization law ; and yet it is perfectly clear, that
so much of the power conferred on the Supreme Government, was not delegated
to the Territorial or Departmental Governments by the regulation of 21st Nov.,
1828, which only authorizes the Gefes JPoliticos "to grant lands in their respec-
tive territories, to impresarios, families, or private persons, Mexican or foreign,
who may petition therefor for the purpose of cultivating or inhabiting them;" and
as no shadow of authority is given them, any action which they might take could
not create any equity against the government.
It will not be pretended that the claimant's " Pueblo" was either a private per-
son, a family, or a contractor, [Empresario.~\ I do not doubt that the Territorial
Government might, by virtue of the power conferred by the regulation of 21 Nov.
1828, and with the cognizance and consent of the Supreme Government, have en-
tered into a capitulacion for founding a new poblacion, with any capitulante who
would obligate himself to present in the character of settlers at least twelve fam-
ilies. But no such case has occurred, and if it had and the contract had been
made conformably with L. 6, T. 7, Lib. 4, R. I. [ante § 62], the lands which the
contractor would have been required to set apart for the town, that is as its pri-
vate property, would embrace but a small portion of the tract assigned to him,
and must have been segregated from the rest, described, and located, before any
right to them could have become vested in the town, [see ante § 80.] But the
power to grant lands directly to any corporation, is not given by this regulation,
and was not possessed at any time by the Territorial Government.
§ 106. This appears to have been the understanding of the Gefe Politico and
Territorial Deputation of California, when in the act of 6 Aug., 1834, they pro-
posed the "Plan ofpropios and arbitrios for municipal funds of the Ayuntamientos
of the Territory of Upper California," [Doc. "A,"] which [by Art. 20], was to be
communicated to the Supreme Government, for the resolution of the General
Congress therein, as appears by an accompanying letter of the same date, directed
to the Minister of Relations, and by reference to article 20 of the "Plan" re-
ferred to.
The reason of its reference to the Supreme Government is apparent. Three
things were proposed, which were beyond the powers of the Gefe Politico and
Deputation. 1st. The concession of lands for propios, and the designation of lands
for ejidos to towns. 2d. A regulation for the administration of propios. This
subject being already minutely regulated by law, it was beyond the powers of
the Deputation to make any alteration in the law, or to introduce any new plan
for the management of the funds of propios. 3d. It was proposed to impose upon
the grantees who should obtain solares for their personal use and occupancy, a
certain pecuniary fee or duty. This authoi'ity is not conferred upon the Gefes
Politicos, and Deputations, by the regulation of 21 Nov., 1828, nor by any other
law or regulation whatever. It was competent, however, for them to propose
those measures and communicate the propositions to the Supreme Government,
as they did, for the corresponding resolution of Congress. It does not appear,
however, that the plan was ever adopted by Congress, or that any application
was ever made by any town for the assignment of lands under it.
§ 107. I have maintained that the Mexican government, that is the executive,
is constitutionally inhibited from alienating any public lands or other national
property for any purpose whatsoever, without the previous consent of Congress,
which can only be legitimately expressed in the form of a public law, and conse-
quently that any disposition of the Spanish Cortes, or of the Spanish Government
conferring siich power of alienation upon any functionaries whatever, must be
considered, quoad hoc, as abrogated. But allowing that this were not so, and
that all the Spanish laws that were ever in force in the Mexican territory, might
be brought into requisition, no authority will be found conferred by any of them
upon any Governor or provincial Deputation to make donation of lands to corpo-
rations of any kind. It is not given by the decree of 4 Jan., 1813, for it would
be in violation of the letter and spirit of that law.
That act was one of a series of radical reforms directed against the accumula-
tion of landed property in the hands of corporations, by which in Spain particu-
larly, a large portion of it had been withdrawn from commerce and from culti-
vation. It decrees the sale and hypothecation of a part of the public and com-
mon lands, on account of the national debt, and the donation of the rest to offi-
cers and soldiers, and to citizens who may be destitute of lands. It makes no
provision for further acquisitions, by municipal corporations, but on the contrary
ordains that those which they already possess shall be reduced to the condition
of private property.
§ 108. The regulation and instruction for the Presidios of the Peninsula of
Californias, <fcc, of 24th Oct. 1781, so far as it relates to the Political Government
and the settlement of the country [tit. 14,] must be considered as superceded
and abrogated by the regulation of 21st Nov. 1828, and the law of 20th March,
1837, [see law 20th March 1837, art. 191 Dictameu of the Junta de fomento de
Californias upon instructions to the superior Gefe Politico, p. 11,] although
while it remained in force it was only a regulation and instruction, prescribed by
royal authority indeed, but not intended to change materially the general laws
of the kingdoms of the Indies, in reference to the establishment of towns and the
distribution of lands to settlers. It has hertofore been shown, that L. 7, and 14,
T. 7, Lib. 4, R. I. are wholly inapplicable as they only prescribe the Bases of
contracts to be entered into by the Government with private capitalists for the
settlement of new places. The designation of lands for ejido dehesa, and propios
is, according to the said law 14, to be made by those who have authority to make
the discovery and new settlement or town \j>oblacion,~\ that is by the contractor
according to the terms of his capitulacion. L. 1, T. 13, Lib. 4, R. I., contains a
general provision relating to the designation of lands for propios. But the power
to make the designation, is, by the very terms of that law, to be exercised only
by the Viceroys and Governors, who ?nay have roycd authority therefor, and subject
to the approbation of the King to whom report is to be made so that he may
order it to be confirmed. The royal instruction of loth Oct. 1754, gives no
authority to Governors or any sub-delegates to make donations of lands to towns
and the Ordinanzas de Intendentes if they contained any such authority were not
applicable to California.
§ 109. Where are the Spanish laws then in virtue of which, the Gefe Politi-
co and Territorial Deputation of California, might make a concession of lands to
municipal corporations for propios? There are none, but if there were, they not
only ceased to have any operation, in consequence of their being repugnant both
to the Spanish Constitution and the Constitution of the Mexican Republic, [see
ante, § 80,] vut were abrogated by the law of 4th Jan., 1813. When the provi-
sions of a law render those of a prior one wholly nugatory, and totally defeat the
object of it, I think it may fairly be asserted that the prior law is effectually ab-
rogated. Such is the character and the effect of the law of 4th Jan., 1813. with
respect to all prior laws contemplating the donation or concession of lands for
propios : That law provides that all the lands of propios and arbitrios, both in
Spain and all its dependencies, shall be reduced to private property. Did the
government which enacted this law intend that any of its agents should still ex-
exercise the power to donate ; or did it contemplate any future donation of pub-
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lie lands to towns for propios, when in the same instant, by the mandate of the
law they must be taken away and converted to private use ? Surely not. It in-
tended to abolish the laws which provided for the reservation of lands for muni-
cipal purposes. It intended to uproot the system which had depopulated the
country and proved destructive to the interests of agriculture. The powerful
and conclusive reasons which had led to the adoption of this important reform
in the agrai'ian laws may be seen very elaborately set forth in an an "In-
forme" of the Sociedad Patriotica of Madrid, in reference to the expediente submit-
ted to it by the Spanish Government upon the " ley agraria,"* presented on their
* The Informe, after having treated largely of the expediency of reducing the common lands
to private ownership and use, (see extract, ante note to §55,) proceed to recommend the same
measure in regard to the lands which the towns, or some of them, possessed with title, under the
character of propios, expressing the views of the Society in the following terms:
" Perhaps it will he convenient to extend the same measure to the tierras eonsejiles, so as to
surrender them up to individual interest Mid place them in a state of useful cultivation. If, on
the one hand, this property is as sacred and worthy of protection as that of private persons, and if
it is the more worthy of attention inasmuch as its revenue is destined to the preservation of the
civil State and municipal establishments of the councils {consejos); on the other hand, it is diffi-
cult to conceive why, until this time it has not been attempted to unite the interest of the Pueblos
themselves with that of their individual members, and to derive from these lands a source of sub-
sistence, and of public wealth. The tierras consejiles divided and distributed in enfiteusis or censo
reservativo without ceasing to be the mayorazgo of the Pueblos, nor to supply most abundantly
all the exigencies of their municipal police, would afford room for the establishment of a great
number of families, which employing individual interest upon them, would cause them to yield
considerable products with great advantage to themselves and to the community to which they
may appertain.
" Tour Highness has felt the force of this truth, when by your dispositions of 1T6S and 1T70
you ordered the distribution of the municipal lands to the pelentrines and small farmers of the
Pueblos But let it be permitted to the Society to observe that these dispositions would receive
greater perfection if the distribution should be made in all parts, and of all the municipal lands
and property; if it should be made by means of'enjiteiisis or censo reservativo and not by tem-
porary renting, although it should be for an indefinite time; and in fine, if the citizens should be
afforded the oppprtupity for the redemption of their pensions, and the acquisition of the absolute
property in their suertes ; without these qualities the effect of so salutary a measure will be
always partial and dubious; because it is only a certain and secure property that can inspire that
lively interest without which the suertes will never be advantageously improved ; that interest
which identified with all the desires of the proprietor, is the first and most powerful stimulous to
banish sloth, and urge him to hard and unceasing toil.
" Nor would the Society think it inexpedient that absolute and unconditional sales should be
made of these lands. It is certainly a very strange maxim which so religiously reserves these
lands, at the same time that it deprives the communities of the most useful establishments. The
draining of a lake, the navigation of a river, the construction of a port, a canal, a road, a bridge,
accomplished with the price of the propios of a community, favoring its agriculture and industry,
facilitating the abundant supply of its markets, and the exportation of its products and manufac-
tures, might permanently secure the felicity of its whole district. "What if the community should
sacrifice its propios for such an object? It is true that the citizens would have to contribute with
taxes to the preservation of the municipal establishments. But if, on the other hand, they should
be enriched, would it not be better for them, having four, to contribute two, than neither to have
nor to pay anything? For this reason, although the Society finds more justice and greater advan-
tages in the rep/artimiento of these lands, it would not disapprove the absolute sale and alienation
of some portions, where their abundance and the avidity of purchasers should induce a preference
of that mode. The price of them entering into the public funds would supply to the commu-
nities a larger revenue, more easy to be administered, and attended with less risk ; the which, ap-
propriated to works of necessity or known utility, would bring to the Pueblos, benefits, much
greater, more secure and permanent, than those which is produced by the ordinary investment
of the municipal revenues.
" The custom of giving to the Pueblos dehesas comunes to secure the breeding of working cat-
tle and colts, may present some modification of the generality of this measure. But if the neces-
sity of such resources finds some support in the present subversion of our rural police, let it not
bedoubted that it will entirely disappear when this branch of legislation shall be brought to per-
fection, for jthen they will not only be unnecessary but injurious. Working cattle will always
deserve the first care on the part of farmers, and in defect of public pasturage, there will be none
who will not secure within their own suerte, in mowing grounds, if the climate permit, or in de-
hesas, if not, all that may be necessary for their herds. What else is seen in those provinces, the
most populous, and best cultivated where such dehesas are unknown ?
" It is very desirable indeed to preserve the race of good and generous horses for the army.
But can it be doubted that private interest will perfect this branch of stock-breeding better than
the laws, and municipal establishments ? That the scarcity itself of good horses, if such should
be a monentary result of the repartimiento of the dehesas de potros (town pastures in which
horses are bred), will be the greatest stimulous to breeders, by the increase of prices consequent
thereon? Why are the best Audalusian horses reared with so much pains in private pastures,
unless because they are well paid for? Has the spontaneous increase of mules any other stimu-
lus than the utility of this enterprize ? How can this truth be doubted by any one who reflects
that they are bred with the greatest care in the fresh pastures of Asturias and Galicia—that the
colts are brought from thence to be sold in the fairs of Leon, that they are taken afterwards to be
fattened on the dry and rich herbage of Mancha, in order to stock the stables of the Corte, (Ma-
drid and its district). Thus it is that industry is stimulated, circulates, and resorts wherever in-
terest calls, multiplying individual property in order to give a grand impulse to agriculture.
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behalf by D. Caspar de Jovillanos, and also in the report of the committee on
agriculture made to the Cortes on the 22d Feb., 1812 ; containing the project of
this law of 4th Jan., 1813, [12 Diario de Cortes, 88,] "The committee," [as they
say] " find themselves deeply impressed with the same views which have gov-
erned Messrs. Gordillo, Terrero, and Oliveros, and the Minister of Marine, ad inte-
rim. Your majesty [the Cortes'] has recognized them more than once, and they
are now axioms with all lovers of the public weal. The preservation of the ba'l-
dios which have erroneously been regarded as most useful to the pueblos, is really
opposed to their felicity, and is one of the principal causes of the diminution of
our population, agriculture and herds.
"Individual interest being disconnected from these extensive lands, the commu-
nity of enjoyment has sterilized, and rendered them generally useless to all.
They are treasures abandoned, which converted into private property -would
cause a vast increase of population, and become a source of wealth and prosperity
to the State? Even the lands of propios, although less extensive, and somewhat
better regulated in their enjoyment, experience the defect of improvement which
is inseparable from all common property. In the possession of individuals they
would produce incomparably more, and thereby much greater benefit would re-
sult to all the pueblos than by preserving their municipal possessions \_posesiones
consejiles,'] the more so as without the necessity of preserving them, they can by
other means secure the funds required for their municipal expenses."
§ 110. The law of 4th Jan. 1813, destroyed the whole system both of town
commons and lands of propios. After it was promulgated no authority existed
anywhere for granting, assigning, or reserving lands to towns, for any such pur-
pose. Neither the King of Spain [while the Constitution was in force] nor the
supreme Executive Government of the Mexican Republic, after its Constitution
was first established, and much less any subordinate functionaries, could grant or
authorize the reservation of any public lands for that purpose, without being
specially empowered by some subsequent law. In the sovereign States, under
the Federal system, the laws on this subject may have varied, because the gene-
ral powers of legislation were vested in the local Congress of each, and the legis-
lative authority of the Federal Government did not extend to subjects connected
with the interior administration of the States. The laws enacted by the States
may likewise have remained unrepealed, and consequently have continued to
govern in matters of this kind, as well as others, after they were reduced to the
condition of Departments, or mere districts and fractions of the national territory
under the consolidated central government. It will be understood therefore that
my remarks are only applicable to those Departments which had previously
existed as territories, and over which consequently, no legislative authority but
that of the General Congress had ever been exercised after the independence.
Such was the condition of California. Texas on the contrary, [with Coahuila,]
was a sovereign and independent State, governed by its own Constitution [adop-
ted 11th March 1827] and laws, and having successfully resisted the centraliza-
tion scheme, was never effectually reduced to the subordinate rank which the
other Departments of the Republic occupied. For these reasons the rules which
govern cases in that country, would would frequently be inapplicable in this.
The designation of lands for ejidos in the Department of Sinaloa, under a decree
or regulation of the Governor formed with the concurrence of the Junta took
place under and by virtue of an express law passed by the Legislature or Con-
gress of the State before it became a department, and which law not being
afterwards repealed by the General Congress, remained in force, according to the
principles laid down by the council of Government in the informe which has
been cited [ante § 5]. No general act of the Mexican Congress has authorized
any authorties to grant the lands or propertv of the nation to any corporation
whatever, and therefore, it will probably be found that in all cases where such
property has been acquired by municipals corporations in the Territories, it has
been granted by a special act of Congress. At all events, it is perfectly clear that
the Territorial Governors and Deputations were never empowered to make such
grants, [See ante § 105].
§ 111. There is then no title for the claimant real or imaginary. Even the
creations of that extraordinary fancy, 'which, witli the assistance of the " able
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researches of couusel " in the case of Cohas vs. Roisin el al.. discovered secrets
that were hidden to all the world, and which from the impossible nature of the
facts assumed, must remain forever hidden, vanish before the light of truth and
reality.
This result is no more than might have been expected. It seems to have been
known several years ago. The author of an abstract of Alcaldes grants, entitled
" Land Titles in San Francisco," observed that he was not aware that any abso-
lute grant of territory was ever made to this town, although himself and others
had diligently searched for it. Greater benefits might have resulted by giving
his researches some other direction. For my part I have to confess that I have
never looked after that grant ; for to suppose it to have any existence but in the
vague conception of those not well acquainted with the subject, would be in con-
tradiction to the laws, customs and uniform policj' of the country from Avhich it
must have been derived. If the search has been fruitless, no wonder, for nobody
ever said that a grant had been made. Let us hereafter leave that grant to its
repose in what may be considered the archives of all such documents—in the
limbo of things lost on earth, and which will not be found in heaven.
§ 112. In the absence of all proof of any legitimate right or title, and in the
face of the clearest evidence that the claim is unfounded, some support is expect-
ed from the 14th section of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1851, entitled "An
Act to ascertain and settle private land claims in the State of California ;" which
declares " that the provisioRS of this Act shall not extend to any town lot, farm
lot, or pasture lot, held under a grant from any corporation or town to which
lands may have been granted for the establishment of a town by the Spanish
or Mexican government, or the lawful authorities thereof, nor to any city, or town,
or village lot, which city, town, or village existed on the seventh day of July,
eighteen hundred and forty-six : but the claim for the same shall be presented
by the corporate authorities of the said town, or where the land on which the
said city, town, or village, was originally granted to an individual, the claim shall
be presented by or in the same of such individual, and the fact of the existence of
the said city, town, or village, on the said seventh of July, eighteen hundred and
forty-six, being duly proved, shall be prima facie evidence of a grant to such cor-
poration, or to the individual under whom the said lot-holders claim ; and where
any city, town, or village shall be in existence at the time of passing this act, the
claim for the land embraced within the limits of the same may be made by the
corporate authority of said city, town, or village."
§ 113. The provisions of this section afford no assistance to the city's claim.
How is it that the provisions of this act, and what "provisions" of it shall not
extend to any town lot, «fcc. ? Undoubtedly, it will not be contented that none
of the provisions of the act extend to the case contemplated in the 14th section,
for if that were the case, it is difficult to see what advantages could be gained by
presenting any claim under it. Without invoking the aid of the other sections of
the act, or some of them, it would be impossible for the Board to take any action
upon it, or for the claimant to derive any benefit from a confirmation. But "the
provisions of this act," contained in the 8th section, which requires "that each
and every person claiming lands in California, by virtue of any right or title, &o.
shall present the same to the said commissioners when sitting as aboard, together
with such documentaiy evidence and testimony of witnesses as the said claimant
relies on in the support of each claim, shall not extend to any town lot, farm lot,
or pasture lot, held under a grant from any corporation or town to which lands
may have been granted for the establishment of a town by the Spanish or Mexican
Government, or the lawful authorities thereof, nor to any city, or town, or village
lot, which city, town or village existed on the seventh day of July, 1846, but the
claim for the same [same what? the same town lot, farm lot, or pasture lot, or
city, town, or village lot, certainly is meant] " shall be presented by the corpo-
rate authorities of the said town," [not always but] " or where the land on which
the said city, town, or village stands, was originally to an individual, the claim
shall be presented in the name of such individual, and [in such eases we, the
American Government will not require the hundreds and thousands of lot holders
in the different towns, in the outset to prove title in their grantor, but so far as
regards their respective claims,] the fact of the existence of the said city, town,
or village on the said seventh day of July, 1846, being duly proved, shall be
prima facie evidence of a grant to such corporation, [if the lot holders have de-
rived their title from the corporation,] or to the individual under whom the lot
holders claim, [where the land on which the said city, town or village stands,
was originally granted to an individual] and where any city, town or village
shall be in existence at the time of the passage of this act, the claim for the land
embraced within the limits of the same may be made by the corporate authority
of the said city, town or village ;" but in this case, no presumption of any grant
to said town, nor to the individuals whose claims may be presented by it, shall
be allowed for three substantial reasons
:
1. The town may have been founded or incorporated since the annexation of
the country to the United States, in which case, it would be absurd to presume
that any grant had been made to it by the Spanish or Mexican Government.
2. Or if founded before, the land may be claimed by the town in its own right,
or may be claimed in part by individuals, or wholly by different individuals, or
various individuals may present distinct claims to the same land, conflicting with
that of the town and conflicting with each other ; in which case such prima facie
evidence, operating equally in favor of all, would in the one case, contradict and
destroy itself, in the other it would give all claimants in towns an undue advan-
tage over all others without any reason for it, or if a discrimination were made
in favor of the town, against individual claimants, or in favor of one private
claimant against another, such a discrhnination would be in violation of the
treaty, as well as the constitutional rights of claimants, and would moreover be
infamously unjust in itself.
3. Because if the town has been built upon lands of the United States, Con-
gress has already provided in the act of 23d May, 1844, and that of 3d March,
1853, that the said lands shall be entered at the proper land office for the several
use and benefit of the occupants thereof, according to their respective interests.*
For these reasons, with others too obvious to require the mention of them, and
not being able just now to determine the exact dates, and boundaries, and the
precedence that ought to be fixed and allowed to grants that may be pretended
under this last clause, we must exclude the claimants frorn the benefit of any
* An Actfor the relief of the citizens of towns upon the lands ofthe United States under cer-
tain circumstances.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in
Congress assembled, That whenever any portion of the surveyed public lands has been, or shall
be settled upon and occupied as a town site, and therefore not subject to entry under the existing
pre-emption laws, it shall be lawful, in case such town or place shall be incorporated, for the cor-
porate authorities thereof, and, if not incorporated, for the judges of the County Court for the
county in which such town may be situated, to enter, at the proper land office, and at the mini-
mum price, the land so occupied and settled, in trust for the several use and benefit of the occu-
pants thereof, according to their respective interests: the execution of which trust, as to the dis-
posal of the lots in such town, and the proceeds of the sales thereof, to be conducted under such
rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of the State or Territory in
which the same is siutated : Provided, That the entry of the land intended by this act, be made
prior to the commencement of the public sale of the body of land in which it is included, and
that the entry shall include only such land as is actually occupied by the town, and be made in
conformity to the legal subdivisions of the public lands authorized by the act of twenty-fourth of
April, one thousand'eight hundred and twenty (April 24, 1S20), and shall not in the whole exceed
three hundred and twenty acres ; and, provided also, That any act of said trustees, not made in
conformity to the rules and regulations herein alluded to, shail be void and of no effect; and, pro-
vided also, That the corporate authority of the the town of Weston, in the county of Platte,
State of Missouri, or the County Court of Platte County, in said State, shall he allowed twelve
months, from and after the passage of this act, to enter at the proper land office, the lands upon
which said town is situate. 5 United States Stat at large, p. 6.
Approved May 23, 1844.
An Act to providefor the Survey of the Public Lands in California, the granting of Pre-
emption Rights thereon, andfor other purposes.
Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That the public lands, not being mineral lands, occupied
as towns or villages, shall not be sub-divided or subject to sale, or to be appropriated by settlers,
under the provisions of this act ; but the whole of such lands, whether settled upon before or after
the survey of the same, shall be subject to the provisions ofthe act entitled "An Act for the relief
of the citizens of towns upon the lands of the United States, under certain circumstances, approved
May 23, 1S44, except such towns as are located on or near mineral lands, the inhabitants of which
shall have the right of occupation and cultivation only, until such time as Congress shall dispose of
the same ; nor shall anv lands specially reserved for public uses be appropriated under the pro-
visions of this Act." U. S. Statutes at large, for 1S52-53. p. 247.
Approved, March 3, 1853.
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extraordinary legal presumption. Tliis is to my understanding, the true reading
of the law, and no other construction can be put on it without rendering it wholly
inoperative.
§ 114. Nothing can be clearer than that the first part of the section which
speaks of town lot, farm lot, pasture lot, or city, village, or town lot, was not in-
tended to give any advantage to any individual or corporation claiming lands, by
virtue of any right or title derived directly from the Spanish or Mexican govern-
ment, but like the Act of 23d May, 1844, and 3d March, 1853, which makes it
the duty of the municipal authorities of corporate towns to enter at the proper
land office, all the lands within their limits for the several use and benefit of the
occupants thereof, according to their respective rights and interests, so this sec-
tion makes it the duty of the corporate authorities of every town, to which land
may have been granted by the Spanish or Mexican governments, and every town
which existed on the 7th day of July, 1846, whether lands had been granted to it
or not, to present before the Board in a general petition all the claims of lot hold-
ers within its limits, and as to those of them who hold under the corporation, a
grant shall be presumed to have been made to the corporation, and as to those
who hold under an individual, a grant shall be presumed to have been made to
the individual.
The existence of the town on the 7th of July, 1846, is not to be prima facie
evidence of a grant to the corporation in all cases, but it is to be "prima facie
evidence of a grant to such corporation or to the individual under whom the
lot holders claim." It was the convenience of the government as well as the
numerous claimants in towns which probably induced this provision, and the
desire to save the lot holders from the great annoyance and expense which
would be occasioned by requiring them to present and prove up their claims,
each one separately.
While the bill constituting this law was under discussion in the Senate, Mr.
Berrien from the Judiciary Committee, by which it had been reported, explained
fully the object and meaning of all its various provisions. I shall refer only to
the remarks which were made upon the 14th section. In the first place Mr. Ber-
rien proposed [Cong. Globe, 34*7,] the following amendment, in the tenth line of
the 14th section : to insert after the word " towns," the words, " or where the
land on on which said city, town or village is situated was originally granted by
an individual, the claim shall be presented by or in the name of such individual,"
and said, "the object of the section is to prevent the provisions of this act from
applying to any town lot, farm lot, or pasture lot held under a grant from any
corporation to which lands may have been granted for the establishment of a
town by the Spanish or Mexican government, or the lawful authorities thereof,
nor city, town, or village lot, which city, town, or village existed on the 7 th day
of July, 1846.
" My information is that besides the city, town and village lots, constituted
under grants from the Spanish and Mexican Government, there are places exist-
ing in California which have been founded by individuals, and which rest upon
the title of an individual. The object of this amendment is to relieve each indi-
vidual lot holder in each case from the necessity of going before these Commis-
sioners, and pursuing his case to the Supreme Court, allowing the claim to be
presented by the Corporation, and in the next place, by or in the name of the
individual under whom the lot holder holds."
This amendment was agreed to, and Mr. Berrien then proposed another to the
same section, by inserting after the words " forty-six," the words " being duly
proved," which was also agreed to, and Mr. Berrien then proceeded to explain in
detail the various provisions of the bill, which, he said, "the committee had
draughted with a view to carry out what was supposed to be the intention of the
Senate." In relation to the 14th section, he remarked:
" The next provision of the Bill regards town lots. In the discussions which
had been before the Senate, the other day, we were informed that there were
cities and towns in California, to which lands had been granted by the Spanish
and Mexican Governments; and that the corporate authorities of those towns
were authorized to issue to individuals grants for town lots, building lots, and for
farm and pasture lots. The Judiciary Committee believed that it would not be
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proper to subject each individual lot holder to the necessity of sustaining his
claim to the town, farm or pasture lot, but deriving the title from the corporate
authority, that it would be sufficient if the claim was presented in the name of
the corporate authorities."
" It was further found that there were certain cities, towns and villages in
California, the land constituting the sites of which, had not been granted by the
Spanish or Mexican government, but by an individual, who has been the founder
of the city, town, or village, or who has conveyed to individuals the lots which
they hold, and upon which property of vast value has been erected. It seemed
to the committee that this also required to be provided for, and, therefore, the
object of the 14th section of the bill is, to declare that in this case it will be suf-
ficient for the claim to be presented by the corporate authority of the city, town,
or village, or the individual, where the title was derived from an individual,
under whom the lot holders hold. And in order to give security to those lots
holders, who hold under the faith of these grants from the Mexican government,
or relying upon the individual title under which they hold, have erected in many
cases extensive and valuable buildings, the Bill provides that the " existence of
such city, town or village on the 7th day of July, 1846, shall be prima facie evi-
dence of a grant to such corporation, or to the individual under whom the said
lot holders claim."
It was on a subsequent occasion proposed by Mr. Benton to amend the Bill by
making a donation of all vacant lands within the corporate limits of towns to
the corporation which was resisted by Mr. Berrien who said that the sole object
of the Bill was not to confer titles but to ascertain them, and the amendment was
not agreed to. [Cong. Globe, p. 427.]
Mr. Senator Gwin always opposed in the Senate any donation to towns, and
said, that " he was against any legislation on the subject." but advocated a lib-
eral policy towards the actual occupants and improvers of lands and lots. [Ap-
pendix to Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 2d Session, p. 58 and 130.]
§ 115. It is true this preoumption of a grant to the town is unnecessary for
the protection of individual lot holders. It would, be sufficient that the muni-
cipal or other functionaries had authority to grant the lots claimed, and this
ought to be presumed if they exercised it, in the absence of proof to the con-
trary. The power to grant in no manner arises from the right of property in
the town, partido, district or department in which the granting officer exercises
his functions, but depends solely upon the authorization of government. Con-
gress, however, seems to have supposed that to sustain the validity of grants by
municipal officers, the town must have the property in the lands granted, where-
as the truth is just the reverse, for having the property, by the Spanish and
Mexican law. they could not alienate it without special authority from govern-
ment in each individual case, given upon full cognizance of the cause, the rea-
sons and the necessity (vide ante, § 22, 23 and 95, note). But Congress seems
to have been under a different impression, and therefore, to save the lot holders,
said, that when they came before the Board claiming under a town, or an indi-
vidual who previously owned the lands on which the town had been built, the
government would consider the fact of the existence of the town on the 7th of
July, 1846, as prima facie evidence of title in their grantor, to avoid the neces-
sity of proving up the same original grant in numerous cases.
§ 116. But in order to this, the existence of the town at that date must be
clearly proved, and must not be left to depend on conjecture or presumption,
but must be proved by legal and competent evidence. Every fact, and every
act, which consists in records and documents, must be proved by the records
and documeuts themselves, and the previous existence of these, and the loss
of them must be clearly established before any secondary evidence can be
admitted. The existence of the town as a corporation must be duly proved,
not some settlement or body of citizens concentrated at some point, however
numerous, but their erection into a body politic, and corporate by competent
authority, and in the form prescribed by law. Because this section speaks of
grants from any corporation or town, and makes the fact of the existence of the
said city, town or village on the 7th day of July, 1846, when duly proved "prima
facie evidence of a grant to such corporation, or to the individual under whom
the said lot holders claim." The claims of the lot holders (that is the claim for
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any city, town or village lot) though derived from an individual to whom the
lands on which the town is built was originally granted, may be presented by
the town in the name of the individual, if the individual does not himself pie-
sent it. It is to be presented by or in the name of the individual, and if the pri-
vate interest of the individual should not induce him to present the claim, or
should he be dead or absent, or should neglect it from any cause, it becomes the
public duty of the corporation to protect its own citizens by presenting it in his
name.
§ 117. It is the duty of the corporate authorities of every town which exis-
ted on the 7th day of July 1846, to present the claim of its citizens for all the
lots which they ho'd under a title derived previous to that period, whether by a
grant from the town or from an individual, and in such case this important ad-
vantage is gained, that the government will consider a prima facie title as made
out in favor of the respective lot holders, claiming under the town, or the indi-
vidual on whose lands the town was built, will consider the fact of the existence
of the town on the said 7th July, 1846, as prima facie evidence of a grant to
such corporation or to the individual under whom the lot holders claim.
This duty the City Fathers of San Francisco have wholly neglected. They have
abandoned the lot holders. They have not presented, acknowledged, or even
referred to the claim or right of a single individual lot holder. They have as-
sumed a position adverse and hostile to all. The law speaks of those claiming
by grantfrom a corporation or town, or from an individual on whose land the
town has been built, and in that spirit of benevolence and liberality which char-
acterises the Federal Government, aims to protect the individual claimants and
occupants of property in all the towns of California. But this protection to
property, if it was once attainable, has been lost by the negligence of the cor-
porate authorities of San Francisco. They have abandoned their constituents.
The corporation claims all the lands within the limits of the city of San Fran-
cisco, and for many miles beyond them, " except so much thereof as had been
granted hy the authorities of said Pueblo in pursuance of law."
§ 118. I will suppose that all which had been granted at all previous to the
date referred to (7th July, 1846,) had been granted "in pursuance of law,"
which must be presumed, yet all these grants do not exceed sixty or seventy
lots, leaving three thousand surveyed lots below Larkin and Johnston streets,
which cannot be estimated at less than thirty millions of dollars exclusive of
improvements, not excepted from the claim of the corporation. But suppose
that a confirmation and patent to the corporation would inure to the benefit of
those who hold under grants made " in pursuance of law," subsequent to the 7th
of July, 1846 and before this city was chartered, how few of the lot holders
would be included in that category, even supposing that the Mexican law and
instructions and authorizations of Government remained in full force ? In the
first place, all the holders of property within 200 varas of the beach would be
excluded. The foundations of property worth at this time twenty millions of
dollars, including improvements, would be overturned, for to this property our
act of the Legislature confirming "Alcaldes" grants, does not extend, and every
body knows that no municipal officers ever had any authority whatever to grant
lots within these limits. If the land were confirmed to the city, the occupants
of this property who have expended so many millions in improvements on it.
would derive no benefit from the confirmation, because they do not hold under
the corporation by a lawful and valid grant, which it would be obliged in law
to acknowledge.
§ 119. In the next place, it is equally clear, that every grant, if made in pur-
suance of any law, must, to have any force or validity, and to confer any right
of property, have been made to a resident citizen for his personal use and occu-
pancy, and that he must have enclosed, built upon, inhabited, cultivated or occu-
pied it in his trade, profession or business, and if he occupied one lot, it is quite
clear that he could not occupy two at the same time, and if he could, two could
not lawfully have been granted to him. Who told an Alcalde, Ayuntamiento
or Justice of the Peace of San Francisco, to do what the Supreme Government
of the Mexican Eepublic could not, to grant, sell or give, five, ten, thirty or fif-
ty town lots to a single individual in a day ? Not the law, certainly. No au-
thority, ancient or modern, can be found for such a scandalous proceeding. It
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is unnecessary to speak of the legal requisites in making grants which must fre-
quently, if not generally have been omitted by American Alcaldes through igno-
rance of the laws under which they were acting. Disregarding forms, and look-
ing at the substantial and unmist akeable language and requisites of the law, it
is certain that not fifty grants made since the war, out of the thousands which
have been mentioned below Larkin and Johnston streets, would possess any sem-
blance of legality such as the present corporation would be bound to acknowl-
edge. Here a confirmation to the city would unsettle the titles to at least twenty
millions of property, nearly all of which has long been occupied and improved
at the expense of many millions more.
§ 120. There is another class of void titles to lots, which would immediately
be brought upon the arena of legal strife, if this claim could be confirmed, the
number of which cannot be easily calculated, but their name is legion. I
mean the grants made nunc pro tunc. Those who have resided here for the last
seven years, and been acquainted with the public records, can appreciate what I
say. Then come the grants made by Alcaldes to themselves through the inter-
vention of third persons, and the distribution made by the JLyuntamientos of the
years 1847, 1848 and 1849 among themselves, all of which are contrary to the ex-
press letter of the law, as well as to the well recognized principles of equity and
morality. It is in vain to say that by some future action of the corporation,
the actual occupants and improvers of this vast amount of property would be
secured in their possessions. It is better to " let well enough alone."
If this claim is rejected, they are already secure by the provisions of the act of
Congress, of May 23, 1844, and March 3, 1853, which give the land to the actual
occupants at the minimum of $1.25 per acre, and if any future action be requis-
ite, who would not rather trust to the just and equal legislation of Congress,
than be left at the mercy of a corporation, whose ill adapted and erroneous pol-
icy on this subject has already destroyed all public confidence.
§ 121. There is, however, one class of titles that would be effectually and ir-
revocably settled by a confirmation to the city, I mean those who hold under
judgment sales, commonly known as " Peter Smith " proprietors. The many
hundreds of lots below the streets which I have mentioned, and the fifty or sixty
thousand beyond those streets would become their lawful prey. I cannot blame
them for pouncing upon it, when it is within their reach, but I would ask what
protection is to be expected from a corporation which has thus abandoned its
constituents to suffer the loss of more than ten millions of property. *
It is matter of public history, that when the JLyuntamiento of 1849 was in-
stalled, this town was free from debt. That body and its successors, after dis-
posing of more than twenty millions of landed property within the short space
of four years, and suffering the sacrifice of neariy all the rest within the city
* Statement of Lands sold on Judgments according to the evidence introduced in this case
oefore the United States Board of Land Commissioners.—The property within and adjoining
this city which has been sold at sheriff's sales, on executions against the city, is as follows:
On the 8th of July, 1851, 2 fifty vara lots (and 5 wharves, all the wharves of the city then built,
or nearly, except Commercial or Long Wharf)
On the 19th of September following, 40 one hundred (or 160 fifty,) and 55 fifty vara lots, making
in all 215 fifty vara lots, were sold, all of which were held either under Alcalde grants, or by the
Commissioners of the Funded Debt of the city.
On the 14th of June, A. D. 1851, the sheriff sold 30 entire blocks and 7 one hundred vara lots,
besides 102 water lots.
On the 26th Movember, 1851, the Sheriff sold 24 entire blocks, comprising about 300 fifty vara
lots, and the entire number brought only $1275, as appears on the official books of the Sheriff.
On the 30th January, A. D. 1852, the Sheriff sold 16 fifty vara lots, 33 hundred vara lots, and
15 entire blocks, and a piece of land, near Johnston street and Mission Creek, containing 5 blocks
making in all about 400 fifty vara lots, and also at the same sale, three large tracts of land extend-
ing in a belt two miles wide, entirely around the surveyed limits of the city except on the water,
which leaving out so much of it as is covered with water, may be described as follows : Beginning
at the intersection of Larkin street with the bay, and running thence along the natural high water
mark of the bay, to the distance of two miles in a straight line, thence south on a line parallel to
the line of Larkin street, about four and a half miles, thence east to the said water mark to the
south of the city, thence along said water mark to a point two miles south of Clay street, thence to
the junction of Folsom and Corbett streets, thence along Corbett to the line of Larkin street, and
along Larkin street to the place of beginning. Only a trifling portion of the water property
around the city which has been sold under the same executions and judgments is included in the
above description.
Note.—It is believed that the whole amount for which the foregoing property was sold, will ba consider-
ably less than $10,000.
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lim its, have left us, as a slight token of remembrance, a debt to cancel of two
millions of dollars.
§ 122. It has been suggested that the rejection of this claim would involve the
city of San Francisco in difficulty on account of the numerous grants and sales
of lots since the 7 th July, 1846. As to the period which elapsed previous to the
incorporation of the city, it is sufficient to say, that if a municipal corporation
existed during that period, and it were the owner of lands, none of the muni-
cipal authorities had any power, to either sell, or grant, or encumber any part
of such lands, and if they attempted to do so, the grant, sale, or encumbrance
would be void, and the functionaries attempting to execute them -would be per-
sonally liable for all consequences both to the corporation and the other parties
injured. Such is unquestionably the Mexican law, which must govern this subject
during the period just referred to. [Ante § 22, 23 and 95, note : § 46.] The
corporation might recover its lands, and the grantees or incumbrancers would
have to look to the delinquent officials personally, for their redress. So that a
confirmation would be the most disastrous result that could take place to almost
every lot holder in the city, and still more so to the Alcaldes and members of
the Ayantamientos of 1847, 1848, 1849 and 1850. Nothing but a rejection of
the claim, can save them, in which event, neither the officials can be arraigned
by the corporation for their mal-feasance in relation to property not its own,
nor the lot holders, by any attempt of the corporation to re-vindicate its prop-
erty. The lot holders will then be secure under the Act of Congress. As respects
any sales made by the city, no liability on the part of the corporation can result
for two reasons. First, it is presumed that the conveyances have been, like
almost all conveyances of public property, without warranty. Secondly, the
occupants who have purchased from the city, as well as those who may have
purchased from other parties, are protected by the Act of Congress before re-
ferred to, and as they are not liable to be evicted, no action would lie, or be even
attempted against their vendor, even though the conveyance has been by war-
ranty. In California it is presumed that no person has been foolish enough to
purchase property, which was in the adverse possession of other parties, posses-
sion having always been regarded here as almost the only evidence of ownership,
and if some have adventured their funds in the purchase of adverse claims from
any person or corporation, out of possession, the loss of them in consequence of
having engaged in transactions which are reprobated by the laws of all well
regulated communities, gives them no claim to any favorable consideration.
§ 123. It will thus be seen that the position taken on the part of the Gov-
ernment, is not in conflict with any rights of property, or claim to the possession
of any property. It aims to disturb no individual in his possessions. It pro-
claims peace and tenders permanent security to all. At one cent per vara for
lands now valued at $1000 per vara, it offers a patent to every occupant of lands
in San Francisco, without respect to persons.
If we regard the interest of this great city as identical with the aggregate
interests, security and welfare of its inhabitants, no event is more ardently to
be prayed for than the rejection of this claim.
The result seems me to be inevitable, but if it could take place as soon as sub-
mitted, so many more days of peace would be given to the citizens, and property
would be secured to its possessors upon a basis never more to be disturbed. It
would be a year of jubilee to all except those who live by plunder. It would
put an end to disputes about titles, and thereby destroy the occupation of some
who make " gain by sooth-saying." It would cancel all outstanding claims,
and relieve the whole population of actual occupants, and improvers of real prop-
erty on which they have expended so many millions, from all fear of future
molestation.
It would produce no panic anywhere but among the holders of Peter Smith
stock, whose visages would very naturally exhibit for a few days, an aspect
somewhat elongated. But this would be only temporary. They would soon
recover their wonted cheerfulness in prospect of some new adventure, and one
universal smile of satisfaction and contentment would lighten up the faces of the
entire community.
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lection it is a copy of the document received by me as above stated.
I don't know where the original of this document is, if it is in
existence. I put it among the archives of the Pueblo, as I did
other documents of that character."
5. Document No. 5, (same) from Governor Figueroa, dated
31st January, 1835, to " Senor Alcalde, Corstl-, de San Fran-
cisco Asis," recognizing his appointment of an Alcalde for
Contra Costa. Francisco de Hara was Alcalde at this time
and resided in the Presidio. Testimony of Sanches.
6. Document No. 6, (same.) Jose Castro to " Sr. Alcalde de
San Francisco de Asis," notifying that the Territorial Deputa-
tion in its session of the 22nd of September, had approved that
the Ayuntamiento of this Pueblo have power to grant house
lots of one hundred varas in the place called Yerba Buena.
Dated Monterey, October 26, 1835.
Francisco Sanches, a witness for the United States'. Ques-
tion by the counsel for the City. " Look at document No. 6,
attached to Vallejo's deposition and say what locality is repre-
sented in that address."
Answer.—At that time the Alcalde, to whom it is addressed,
was at the Presidio. Jose Castro well knew where the place is.
7. Document No. 7, (same) Nicholas Gutierras to " Sr
Alcalde de San Francisco de Asis;?' dated January 19th, 1836,
requiring a report from the tribunals of justice.
8. Document No. 8-9, (same.) Election returns December,
18 37 and January, 1838, for election of officers " in the Pueblo
of San Francisco de Asis." >
9. Document No. 10, (same.) Order of Governor Alvarado,
dated June 17th, 1839, directing an election under the law of the
30th November, 1836, of an " Elector " for several " Pueblos, by
name, among them that of San Francisco." § 3 and § 4 shows
that reference was made, not to San Francisco de Asis ;" but
to the « Pueblo " of the " Port " of San Francisco.
10. Document No. 11, (same.) Governor Micheltorena, on
the 14th of November, 1834, published an order as coming from
the departmental Assembly relative to the law of Elections and
ordering them in the " Pueblo," among others, that of " San
Francisco," for the election of a 1st and 2nd Alcalde. See § 2.
11. Document No. 12, (same.) " Section of San Francisco,"
secondary election in the hall of the tribunals for an Alcalde of
first nomination was elected for the ensuing year 1845, to take
office on 1st of January, of that year, dated " San Francisco,
December 22, 1844," addressed to "citizen Juan N. Padillb,
Alcaide elect of first nomination.
12. Document No. 13, (same.) Letter of Manuel Jimeno
to " Senor Alcalde de San Francisco," dated July 14th, 1844,
enclosing an edict establishing companies of militia.
13. Document No. 14, (same.) An order from Micheltorena
to Ensign Don Juan Prado Mosa to present himself with twelve
or fifteen men of his command to " the Alcalde of 1st Instance?
of Yerba Buena," &c; addressed to "Senor Alcalde de San
Francisco," dated 11th March, 1844.
14. Document No. 15, (same.) Letter from Jimeno, dated
January 2nd, 1844, addressed to " Senor first Alcalde of the
Port of San Francisco, fellow-citizen William Hinkley," who
at the time resided in Yerba Buena.
15. Vallejo. " There was a municipal organization of the
Pueblo of San Francisco from the period of the election above
mentioned (December, 1834,) to the time of the occupation of
California by the United States. The partido of San Francisco
under the jurisdiction of the Ayuntamiento, comprehended the
County on this side of the Bay as far as los Pulgas, and on the
other side of the Bay to the rancho of the Peralto's and Pinale.
The jurisdiction of the Ayuntamiento extended only to the
limits of the Pueblo. The Partido was under the jurisdiction
of civil Alcaldes."
16. Alvarado. " I recollect the circumstances connected
with the establishment of the Ayuntamiento of San Francisco.
It appears to me the Ayuntamiento was established by the
authority of Figueroa. I recollect that the Political chief,
Figueroa, with the Territorial Deputation determined to estab-
lish an Ayuntamiento in San Francisco, and by virtue of this
decree it was established. I knew this place where the city of
San Francisco now stands, before July, 1846, by the name of
the Pueblo of Yerba Buena. At the Presido in 1834, or about
that time, there might have been forty persons, more or less, not
6including soldiers. I think there was an Alcalde for the first
time in 1834. I do not recollect the day or month when the
Ayuntamiento began to hold its sessions there, but I believe it
was in 1834. The Pueblo of Yerba Buena was known by the
people of the County by the name of Yerba Buena, but by
persons who came by sea it was called the Port of San Fran-
cisco."
17. Francisco Sanches. " In 1835, the Pueblo of San Fran-
cisco was at the Presidio. In 1837, at the Mission. The Plaza
spoken of in Document No. 3, is at the Preside There was a
Pueblo there in 1835. The election spoken of in Document
No. 2, 7th December, 1834, was for an electoral Junta held at
the house of the Commandante. No. 3 relates to a second
election held at the same place in December, 1835, for members
of Ayuntamiento to succeed."
To the cross interrogatories put by the counsel of the City, he
answered—to the first. " The primary election was on the first
Sunday of December, 1834. The secondary, on the third, and
the Ayuntamiento was installed on the 1st of January, 1835."
To the second. " The Ayuntamiento was installed by the
Commandante. He administered the oath to the Alcalde, and
he to the balance. M. G. Vallejo was Commandante." To
the third. " The election of 1836, for 1837, was held at the
Presidio." To the fourth. " The Ayuntamiento of 1837 held
its sessions at the Presidio until about the close of 1837, or
beginning of 1838, when they removed to the Mission." To the
fifth. " The Ayuntamiento removed to the Mission, the Gov-
ernor having made it the Capital of the District ; and because
the Pueblo being a military post, a Pueblo could not be estab-
lished there." Question sixth. " Look at Document No. 6,
attached to Vallejo's deposition, and say what locality is
.referred to in that address?" Answer. " At that time the
Alcalde, to whom it is addressed, was at the Presidio. Jose*
Castro well knew where the place is. Don Francisco de Haro
was Alcalde at ' San Francisco de Asis ' in October, 1835. He
was Alcalde and presided over the meeting of the Ayuntamiento
in 1835. There was no Ayuntamiento at the Mission in 1834
or 1835. The Ayuntamiento held its sessions at the Mission
in 1838, and in 1839 it ceased, and the Governor appointed a
Justice of the Peace."
18. William A. Richardson, on the 1st of June 1836, petition-
ed the " Most illustrious Ayuntamento, for the grant of a
hundred Vara lot in Yerba Buena, in front of the Plaza, and
the anchorage? of the ships" in which he represents himself as a
" citizen and resident of this Port," resolved to establish himself
in Yerba Buena, dated at " San Francisco." Richardson's 1st
deposition. The paper purporting to be a map, marked exhibit
No. 2, with the initials A. F., is the original plan ; a copy of it was
sent to the political Government, by order of the same Alcalde
de Haro. I recommended the situation of the limits for the
settlement or town of Yerba Buena, to General Figuearoa"
—
M There was no other plan adopted by the authorities, but the
one here presented marked exhibit No. 2."
19. Document B. session of the Territorial deputation Octo-
ber 31st, 1834, " declaring the just reason which exists for
effecting the formation of an Ayuntamiento in the " Port" of
San Francisco. Referred to the Committee on Government."
20. Session extraordinary of the 3rd November 1834,—" it
then passed to the discussion of the report which the same Com-
mitte presented, referring to the formation of an Ayuntamiento in
" San Francisco." It was put to vote and passed in general.
" The Senor political chief should see that the partido of San
Francisco, proceed to the election of a Constitutional Ayunta-
miento, which shall reside in the Presidio of that name" &c.
21. Document C, petition of the inhabitants of the Ranchos
North of San Antonio and San Pablo, to be joined to the juris-
diction of San Jose", dated 30th of May 1835. This petition
was referred to a Committee of the Territorial deputation, which,
on the 3rd of September 1835, reported—" 1st. That this dis-
patch be transmitted to the Ayuntamiento of the Pueblo of San
Jose and "San Francisco" in order that they may give the proper
information with regard to the desires expressed in it." "2. The
information having been obtained, that this dispatch be remitted
to this deputation for its final judgment. The excellent
deputation approved the two propositions with which the fore-
going report of the Committee on Government concludes."
8And " Don Jose Castro" &c. on the 28th of September 1835
?
decreed that the above dispatch be forwarded to Ayuntamiento
of the " Pueblo" of San Jose Guadalupe" &c. and that a true
copy be sent with a similar object to that of San Francisco,
accompanied with a list of the residents of the neighborhood
of that " Pueblo."
22. On the 16th of January 1840, Francisco Guerrero J. P.
reciting that he did so by order of the departmental Government
dated the 1st of November 1834, granted to Juan Vioget, a lot
100 by 50 varas in " Yurba Buena" in the place called the
" Canutal" to the west of the road to the Mission of San Fran-
cisco, being vacant land."
This evidence beyond all question establishes the fact of the
existence of a Pueblo where the city of San Francisco now
stands, having its commencement in the year 1834. Both, in
the parol and written evidence it has been variously denomina-
ted. Sometimes by that of the " Pueblo of San Francisco ;''
" the port of San Francisco"—" the Pueblo of the port of San
Francisco"—"the Pueblo of Yerba Buena"—"the Pueblo of
San Francisco de Asis" and others by that of the " Pueblo of the
Mission of San Francisco dolores." This diversity, so far
from questioning, maintains the position assumed, that, there
was a pueblo within the present limits of the city. And that it
was in the place of the port is fully demonstrated, as it is clearly
shown^not to have been carved out of the Mission land of the
Mission of San Francisco dolores, which, never extended to the
" port ;" and was in existence and lots granted in 1835, some
three years before the Ayuntamiento ever held a session at the
Mission.
II. That pueblo was in active existence on the 7th of July
1846.
PROOFS.
1. Vallejo—" there was a town on the present site of San
Francisco, on the 7th of July 1846 ; and there was on the 3rd of
March 1851 a town on that site, called San Francisco."
2. Richardson. " There might have been sixty or seventy in-
habitants altogether in the city in July 1846,"—" Don Francisco
de Haro, was Alcalde of the Ayuntaraiento in 1835. Joaquin
Estudillo in 1836, and Gratio Martinez in 1837. De Haro, I
think, in 1838 ; I don't recollect who in 1839 ; the names of the
Alcaldes between 1839 and 1846, are DeHaro, Pendillo, William
Hinckley, Francisco Sanches, Jose" Jesus Nae, Jose" de la Cruz
Sanches." See 1st. deposition.
III. Municipal lands were assigned to the Pueblo in 1834.
PROOFS.
1. Vallejo.—" In 1834, 1 received a paper from Governor Fig-
ueroa, designating the boundaries of the Pueblo de San Fran-
cisco. I have examined document marked exhibit No. 4, and to
the best of my recollection, it is a copy of the document received
by me as above stated." " I don't know where the original of
the document is, if it is in existance, I put it among the Archives
of the Pueblo, as I did other documents of that character."
This document No. 4, which Vallejo says is a copy of the
original received by him from Figueroa, designates the bounda-
ries of the Pueblo, as given in his letter of the 24th of October,
1834, and the " I (he) proceeded to mark out the boundaries,
and sent down to Monterey an expediente thereof; and they
were established by me two weeks after the date of the said
dispatch No. 4." " I have such a recollection of the boundaries
established by me, that I could point them out on the ground."
2. Julius K. Rose, who speaks from the mouth of Guerrero,
Alcalde says—in substance, that in 1849 he gave him the boun-
daries of the Pueblo as given by Vallejo. See his deposition.
3. Henry L. Ford, who came here in 1842 says—that in
March 1844, Hinckley, Alcalde, stated to him the boundaries of
the Pueblo in substance as given by Vallejo. And that Guer-
rero informed him that the land on this side of Mission Creek
pertained to the Pueblo pointing out the boundaries between it
and the Mission, &c. See his deposition.
4. Richardson in his second deposition says
—
question 2nd by
the Law Agent. " What was reported to be the boundaries on
the side toward the port of San Francisco of the old Mission,
and the so called Pueblo of San Francisco Asis ?"
2
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Answer—"Mission Creek was the reputed boundary."
Question 3rd—" Was the place called Yerba Buena or the
peat formed in it for the concession of holders ever considered
as embraced in the actual limits of said Mission, or Pueblo of
San Francisco de Asis ?"
Answer—" No ; it was not."
Cross interrogatories by the Counsel of the City.
1. " What were the old limits of the Mission of San Fran-
cisco de Asis ?
Answer—" I do not know what the limits were to the South-
ward and to the Eastward; but they never passed the Creek
towards the port."
2. " Do you know what the Western boundary of the Mission
was ?"
Answer—" The coast of the Pacific."
3. " Do the Mission buildings stand on the North or South
side of Mission Creek ? and how far from it ?"
Answer—" On the South side and a little over a half mile
from it."
4. " What was the Northern boundary of the Mission land
West of the Mission buildings ?"
Answer—" It follows the Ravine of Mission Creek to a round
hill called the Divisedero. There are two hills of that name.
One where the Telegraph now is. The one furthest South is
the one I mean, and from that to the Pacific coast."
5. " What was your means of knowledge that Mission Creek
was the Northern boundary of the Mission ?"
Answer—" My means of knowledge were that, the lands on
this side (North) was used for pasturing the Mission stock and
frequent disputes arose out of it. I recollect when I first came
there were Indian huts on the North side of the Ravine, on a
line from the Mission North four or five hundred yards distant
;
and I think at that time the stream ran by the huts."
6. " Was the place where those huts were known by- any
particular name ?"
Answer—" It was called a Rancheria."
8. " Do you know a place called " Canuatales" there, and if
so is it to the North or South of the Northern line of the Mission
Jands as you have described the boundaries, and how far from it ?"
11
Answer—" 1 do know such a place. It is to the North of that
line. All the little valleys to the North go by that name. They
take the name from a species of reed growing in them with a
black ring round them."
9. " Do you know the Spanish term by which Indians were
known and designated at that.time?" Answer. " The Chris-
tian Indians were called ' Neophytes ' and the others ' Gentiles.'
"
5. Francisco Guerrero, Justice of the Peace, by order of the
Departmental Government, granted a lot to Juan Vioget, on the
16th of January, 1840, after he had completed his map, of 100
by 50 varas, in the place called the " Canuatal," to the West of
the road to the Mission of San Francisco, being vacant land.
This grant was made at San Francisco.
The boundaries thus indicated in the testimony of Richardson,
as the Northern boundary of the Mission, is the boundary given
by Vallejo to the Pueblo of San Francisco. The testimony of
Rose and Ford corroborates and supports his ; and the grant to
Vioget, bounded by the " Canuatals " to the West of the
Mission road," one of the calls in Vallejo's boundary leaves no
doubt of the understanding of the boundary at the time, and
that the land granted was in the recognized limits of the Pueblo.
But Vallejo on his first examination said—" I did have in my
possession a copy of the original document referred to as
exhibit No. 4, certified by the Secretary, Zamerano. I think I
have that copy among my private papers," &c. Upon his second
examination he says—" I have the paper now in my possession
referred to in my answer to question 12 ; and is now here by me
produced to be attached to this deposition, No. 18. I am
acquainted with the hand writing of the said Zamerano, having
seen him write ; and say that his signature in exhibit No. 18 is
his genuine signature."
Question. " Has or not this document referred to, exhibit No.
18, been in your possession ever since about the period of its
date ?"
Answer. " I was in possession of it except at the Bear revo-
lution, as it is called, in 1846. It, with my other papers, was
taken from me and retained until after my own release. I think
my papers were not returned to me until early in the year 1847,
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by Liet. Revere, of the U. S. Navy. I have no hesitation in
saying that the paper, No. 18, is a true copy of the original,
recorded by me and delivered to the Alcalde."
Question. " Does or not the paper, exhibit 18, contain a true
statement of the boundaries of this Pueblo as marked out by
you ?"
Answer. " It does contain the boundaries as established by
me."
The Government has attempted to show by the negative
testimony of Hartnell, Alvarado, Castro and Richardson, that
document, No. 18, is spurious.
Question to W. E. P. Hartnell. " Examine the paper marked,
&c, No. 18, attached to the deposition of M. G. Vallejo, here-
tofore taken in this case, and say, if you recognize the hand
writing in which the body of the paper is written ?"
Answer. " I do not. I think the signature of Zamerano
affixed to the paper, a very suspicious one at least ; and I do
not believe it to be in his hand writing."
Alvarado. " I have seen the document marked, &c, No. 18,
purporting to be a copy of a dispatch from Jose Figueroa to Don
Mariano G. Vallejo, Military Commandant of San Francisco.
Consider the words ' escopia conforme ' and the signature,
Zamerano, and cannot justify the words nor the signature,
because I do not find it exactly as he used to write it. 1 am not
acquainted with the hand writing of the body of the letter."
Jose Castro. " I was well acquainted with Zamerano, former
Secretary of Governor Figueroa, and very familiar with his
hand writing, &c. The signature, Zamerano, to the document,
H. J. T., No. 18, annexed to the deposition of M. G. Vallejo,
filed in this case, is not genuine ; the rubric is more imperfect
than the name ; according to my judgment it is not his. The
words ' escopia conforme,' written on the same paper above his
name, is not his hand writing. I do not know the hand writing
of the body of said document. I can say that Governor
Figuerao never had a clerk in his office. According; to the best
of myjudgment, he wrote a hand writing such as this."
Thus it geems that neither Hartnell, Alvarado or Castro speak
with certainty in relation to the verity of this document, while
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Castro says that, " according to the best of my judgment, he
(Figueroa,) wrote a hand writing such as this," the body of
document 18.
But Richardson, after declaring his acquaintance with the
hand writing of Zamerano, says : " The signature at the
bottom of the last mentioned paper, (document 18) is not the
signature of Zamerano; the words "escopia conforme," imme-
diately preceding the signature are not in his hand writing. I
never heard of a town called San Francisco being laid off, as
represented in this document, nor of a grant to a town of that
name. I have heard of a grant of land to a town or pueblo
called Yerba Buena."
This witness is unworthy of credit.
* 1st. He says—" In the early part of the month of October,
1835, I received a one hundred vara lot in Yerba Buena, situ-
ated in what is now Dupont street, on the South-west side of
that street, on the North side of the Adelphia Theatre," &c. " I
received by the order of the Territorial Deputation to the
Alcalde of the Mission of San Francisco de Asis, in 1835,
in the month of October, the 'Alcalde of the Mission of San
Francisco de Asis, Don Francisco de Haro received orders from
the Political Government to lay off a small town at the place
Yerba Buena," &c, " as the place called Yerba Buena was
the general anchorage for the shipping at the time. The same
orders directed me to assist de Haro in doing it, and the orders
also directed de Haro to give me a hundred vara lot," &c,
" and to make a plan of the place selected and measured off
for the town. It was laid off as represented by the plan or
map, marked exhibit No. 2," &c. " A copy of this plan was
delivered to the magistrate, de Haro ; he requested me to keep
the original in my possession. The limits established by the
magistrate were as follows :—they first measured off two
hundred varas from the beach," &c. " Then they measured off
a certain distance to a place intended for a street, which they
called ' Calle de La Fondacion.' I think this was two hundred
varas from the Reserve. From this street they then measured
off three hundred varas more in the same direction to the South-
west ; then from the South-east they commenced on the first
14
sand hill and measured in a North-west direction along the said
' Calle de La Fondacion,' four hundred varas ; and there located
my lot. It was the fifth one hundred vara lot," &c. " These
boundaries of the Pueblo of Yerba Buena were approved by
the Territorial Government."
Now, the grant made to Richardson, of a hundred vara lot,
and the only one made to him, was made on the 2nd of June, 1836,
by Jose* Joaquin Estudillo, Alcade, and not by de Haro, as sworn
by him ; upon his petition of the 1st of June, 1836, in which he
declares himself a resident of the " Port," resolved to establish
himself in Yerba Buena and asks for a grant of a hundred vara
lot in " front of the Plaza and anchorage of the ships," to build
a house on. Not a word in reference to his plat, the " Calle de
La Fondacion," the number of the lot desired, or that he was
to have a lot for making his plan. And the grant was made in
consideration of the "good services that the party requesting
has rendered to this jurisdiction since his arrival in this country
with his different trades, as brick-maker, surgeon and carpenter,
and having married one of the first in the country. See copies
of the originals and translations from the public records.
Without further showing, who can doubt but that this plan
is an after thought, fabricated to serve as a peg upon which to
hang the Limantour claim ?
2 Juan Vioget says—that in the winter of 1839, he made
a plan of the town by the request of Francisco Guerrero,
Alcalde. Made it to throw the former grants which had been
made in an irregular form, into blocks or squares. The "West
side of Montgomery street was made the base line or city front.
He then drew Sacramento, Clay, Washington, Jackson and
Pacific streets, as they are now known ; and laid off at right
angles, Kearny and Dupont streets. At the same time marked
off Richardson's lot, but made no corresponding street. The
The only instructions received from Guerrero were to regulate
the grants then made, and to have a plan by which to make
future ones. There were no limits stated to me. Did not make
more streets. Did not think them necessary at the time, but
dotted the extension of those made. Guerrero told me that
Governor Alvarado had ordered the survey. At the time I
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made my map I had no knowledge of any previous one. Never
saw or heard of one. Richardson's family was living in his
house in Dupont street. He was sailing about in the harbor all
the time. Whether he knew or not of it, I can't say. He must
have known shortly after. I was sometime doing the work.
There was but few people here. They saw me at it and must
have known what I was about.
Question 2. " When and from whom did you first hear of
the map said to be made by Richardson ?"
Answer. " I never knew any such map was in existence
until Jose" Y. Limantour spoke to me about it last year."
3. Richardson, in his first deposition says—" From July,
1835 to June, 1841, I resided at Yerba Buena. I never knew of
an Ayuntamiento setting at the Presidio ; when I came here in
1835, they were sitting at the Mission ; they always sat at the
Mission."
Francisco Sanches, another witness for the United States and
an official of the Pueblo in several capacities from its first
organization, says—that the Ayuntamiento held its sessions at
the Presidio from its installation, 1st of January, 1835, to the
latter part of the year 1837, or the beginning of 1838; and
that " there was no Ayuntamiento at the Mission in 1834
or 1835."
These contradictions and discrepancies, with others not noted,
but which are abundant, and apparent in the testimony, must
destroy all confidence in that of Richardson. But, if it were
otherwise, we hold upon principle that the affirmative of
testimony of Vallejo as to the verity of document No. 18,
supported as it is, cannot be shaken by the negative testimony
of a host of witnesses as to hand writing.
But, suppose it were admitted that No. 18 is a spurious
ducument as relates to the words " escopia conforme," and the
signature of Zamerano
;
yet, Vallejo swears that it is a copy of
the original, under which he designated the boundaries of the
Pueblo ; and which original he placed in the Pueblo archives.
That original, after the most dilegent search, is not to be found.
Its existence is' proved, if Vallejo is to be believed; and the
best possible evidence of its contents is the documents 4 and 18.
16
POINTS OF LAW.
I. Ayuntamientos were alone accorded to cities and towns
by the Spanish and Mexican Governments, and not to partidos,
or other political divisions of Territory.
II. The ten league question does not arise in Pueblo claims
for municipal lands.
1. They were not subject to colonization under the law of
the 18th of August, 1824. § 2. And consequently, not to the
prohibition in the 4th section.
2. The Presidios in California were all established prior to
the colonization law of 1824; were all established as well as
the Missions, which they were intended to support within ten
leagues of the coast ; and by the existing law, Presido grants
were authorized within the range of four square leagues,
measuring from the centre of the Plaza. Decree of de Noroa,
22nd March, 1791. Rockwell, p. 451.
3. Mexico, on the 17th of August, 1833, passed an act
for the secularization of the Missions and their reduction to
Pueblos. The Territorial Deputation, enacted on the same
subject, on the 6th of August, 1834. And the Governor,
Figueroa, on the 9th of the same month, published his regu-
lations converting the Missions into Pueblos ; the heads of
families to have grants of the Mission lands. Section 5 of
his Regulations.
III. The formation of Pueblos were favored by the Spanish
and Mexican Governments, both of which, always accorded
to them municipal lands, for solaros, proprios, and Egedos.
And this, whether established by Emprerarios, or direct action
of the Government.
Lib. III. Title III. Law 28, Rec'd Ind. 2 White's Rec. p. 41
Lib. IV. " « " 8 " " " " 43
Lib. " " " " 28 " " " " 43
Lib. " "V "6 " " " " 44
Lib. " " " " 7 " u _" " 44
Lib. " " " " 9 " " " " 45
Lib. " " '• " 10 " " " " 45
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Lib. IV. Title VII. Law 7, Rec'd Ind. 2 White's Rec. p. 46
Lib. " " " " 11 " " " " 47
Lib. " " " " 14 " " " " 47
And so sacred was this right held under the Spanish Govern-
ment, that grants made of them by the King were declared
void.
Lib. VII. Title 16, Law 1, Rec'd Ind. 2 White's Rec. p. 100
Lib. " " 16 " 2 " " " " 100
N. • " 13 " 1 " " " " 55
United States vs. New Orleans, 10 Peters, 701.730.
Cohas vs. Lagree, and another Supreme Court, California.
The same principle is recognized in the Mexican Constitution,
imposing restrictions upon the power of the President. " The
President cannot occupy the property of any individual or
corporation, nor disturb them in the possession or use of the
same." 1 White's Rec. p. 402. § 4. Article 112.
Pueblos with an Ayuntamiento were corporations under both
the Spanish and Mexican Governments.
Alvarado, in answer to the question—" By what authority,
after the Mexican Independence, were municipal lands or
Engidos assigned to towns ?" said—" I recollect a law given
by the" Cortez of Spain in 1813," &c. " This law provides the
manner in which the municipal lands shall be assigned to
towns already established, or which may hereafter be estab-
lished. I do not recollect any decree of the Congress or President
of Mexico recognizing those laws as in force in California,
but I am certain the said Spanish law was ordered by the
Mexican Government to be observed by all the Governors
within the Territories of the Mexican Republic ; and it was
acted upon."
On the 6th of August, 1834, the Territorial Deputation
enacted—" Section 1st. The Ayuntamientos shall make appli-
cation, through the usual channels, requesting lands to be
assigned to each Pueblo for Engidos and proprios."
Vallejo shows that he received an order from Fiqueroa, then
Governor, dated the 4th of November, 1834, assigning boun-
daries to the Pueblo of San Francisco. That he established
the boundaries as directed, within two weeks from the date
3
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of the order. That he deposited the original in the archives
of the Pueblo. That documents No. 4 and 18, attached to
his deposition are substantial, if not literal copies of it. And
that his recollection of the boundaries are such as to enable
him now to point them out on the ground.
And on the 26th of October 1835, Jose* Castro, the acting
Governor, in a communication to the Alcalde, Francisco De
Haro, who then resided at the Presidio. Testimony of Sanches,
made known to him that—"the Territorial deputation in its
Session of the 22nd of September, approved that the Ayunta-
miento of this Pueblo, have power to grant house lots, which
should not exceed 100 varas." Document No. 6, Vallejo's
deposition.
IV. The Municipal organization of Pueblo, was by the
giving to them Ayuntamientos ; and thus organized the right
to Municipal lands resulted for solares, proprios and Egedos*
Lib. iv. T. 6 L 7. 2 White's Rec. 45. Lib. iv. T. 17, L. 5, White
Rec. 55. Lib. vii. T. 16, L. 1. 2. 2 White's Rec. 100.
The Ayuntamiento was organized and inducted into office at
the Presidio On the 1st day of January 1835.
V. Formal grants of land were never made to Pueblo, either,
by the Spanish or Mexican Governments. They were assigned,
designated, bounded or laid off, so as to separate them from the
balance of the domain. When established by an Emprerario
his contract governed ; when by the Government, the laws gave
the right. Not as a grant of the fee, but as a dedication to the
uses for which designed. 2 Green 1, oc. §662 ; and cases cited,
Chotoan vs Eeckhart 2 Howard 344, 372, MCay vs Dillon, 4
Howard 421. New Orleans vs United States, 10 Peter 662, 701,
730.
The cases in Howard are referred to, to show upon how much
weaker testimony than in this case, the Pueblo rights were con-
firmed ; and the case in Peters, to show that these rights were
from dedication and not from grant.
VI. The act of Congress, March 3rd 1837 §121—" shall not
extend to any town lot, farm lot, or pasture lot, held" &c. " nor
to any city, or town, or village lot, which city, town or village?
existed on the 7th day of July 1846," &c. " and the fact of the
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existence of the said city, town, or village on the said 7th July
1846, being duly proved, shall be prima facie evidence of a grant
to such corporation," &c.
The word " Grant" used in this section must be interpreted
" right." Any other would render the provision negatory. "What
right? A right to Municipal lands. To what extent? When
assigned to the boundary designated, and when not to four
square leagues.
Now: it cannot be questioned: 1st. But, that there was a
town here on the 7th day of July 1846. 2d. But, that the pres-
ent city of San Francisco, succeeded to the rights and incurred
the responsibilities to which that town was subject, at the time
of its incorporation, April 15th 1850, and not to the rights and
responsibilities of the Mission of San Francisco de Asis. 3rd.
But, that the presumption declared in said section was declared
in favor of the city as the successor oi the town. 4th. But>
that, so far from the evidence in the case disproving the pre-
sumption declared, it favors it. If not according to the letter,
and Grant, certainly, according to the spirit and intent of the
Act. " Shall be prima facie evidence of a Grant ;" prima facie
evidence in its favor, of being entitled to the ordinary rights of a
town to Municipal lands, solares, proprios and Egedos.
VIII. " And where any city, town, or village shall be in
existence at the time of the passage of this Act, the claim for
the land embraced within the limits of the same may be made
by the corporate authorities of the said city, town, or village.''
This city was incorporated by act of the Legislature on the
15th of April 1850, with definate boundaries, and a clause
resigning to her all rights which she might have exterior to them.
The quotation at the head of this point is part of the sentence,
Section 14 Act of Congress, March 1851, and the presumption
declared in the previous part, must equally apply to it, or, if not,
the claim of land spoken of in it, to be made by " any city,
town, or village in existence at the time of its passage, must
intend a confirmation within the corporate limits, as a donation,
to such city, town, or village, so far as the United States is con-
cerned, and that without limitation or condition.
ISAAC THOMAS,
Assistant Counselfor Claimant.
**
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CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
) No . w,._Befffre v_ s. Land
C Commissioners.UNITED STATES.
The undersigned, on behalf of the claimant, respectfully submits the fol-
lowing reasons why the said claim ought to be confirmed
:
Before adverting to the testimony, however, it may be well to premise,
that the claim is for four square leagues, bounded on the north and east by
the Bay of San Francisco, on the west by the ocean, and on the south by a
due east and west line, including the area aforesaid. There is, therefore, no
difficulty in ascertaining the precise land claimed.
The title of the city is predicated upon three grounds, to wit
:
1. That for some years prior to the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, there
was at this place a Pueblo or town, called and known as "Terba Buena," or
" San Francisco," and which has since been duly incorporated as the City of
San Francisco ; and that as such Pueblo, it was entitled, under the Mexican
and Spanish law, to four square leagues, as a part of its municipal rights,
even though no express grant be shown.
2. That in November, 1834, the Pueblo was duly and formally established
by a decree of the Governor and Departmental Legislature of California, and
its lands expressly assigned to it, by metes and bounds, and by competent
authority.
3. That on the 7th day of July, 1846, the town of Terba Buena or San
Francisco was in existence, and that by the fourteenth section of the act of
Congress of March 3d, 1851, organizing this Board, a grant will be pre-
sumed, until the contrary appears ; and in this case, nothing has been shown
to repel this presumption.
I propose to discuss these propositions in the order in which they are
stated ; but before proceeding to do so in detail, would invite the attention
of the Board to the general nature of the village right to common and other
lands, under the laws and usages of the Spanish and Mexican Governments,
as recognized not only in the legislation of Congress, and in numerous de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and other courts of high
Al~m
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authority, but also as established both by the positive enactments and long
contiuued usage of the Mexican and Spanish Governments.
The treaty of 1803, by which Louisiana was ceded to the United States,
afforded the first occasion on which Congress was called upon to legislate
concerning this village right. For many years prior to that period, Louisi-
ana had been a Spanish province, and even then was sparsely populated
;
and the inhabitants of which resided chiefly in villages, cultivating the con-
tiguous lands for their support, and invariably having common lands, for
pasturage and fuel, conveniently located near the village. In this condi-
tion, Congress found the country at the date of the cession, and at once or-
ganized a Commission, for the adjudication of private claims, on the most
liberal and equitable, basis. But it was soon ascertained that, owing: to the
'
.
primitive habits of the pedple, and the very loose manner in which lands had
« been^granted ana cohv^ed, great hardship would ensue, if the inhabitants of
,%t %***&& v^lla^es weffi cmpelled to establish even informal grants to the town lots
on"whichthey had been born, and the common lands over which their cattle
had roameWor inWftyfiars. Therefore, on the 13th of June, 1812, Congress,
in a commendable spirit of liberality, passed a law, the first section of which
enacts " that the rights, titles and claims, to town or village lots, out lots,
common field lots, and commons, in, adjoining and belonging to the several
towns or- villages of Portage des Sioux, Saint Charles, Saint Louis, Saint
Ferdinand, Tillage a Eobert, Carondelet, Saint Genevieve, New Madrid,
New Bourbon, Little Prairie and Arkansas, in the territory of Missouri,
which lots have been inhabited, cultivated, or possessed, prior to the 20th
day of December, 1803, shall be, and the same are hereby confirmed to the
• inhabitants of the respective towns or villages aforesaid, according to their
N^w> •.** j several right or rights in common thereto." [2 Statutes at Large, 748.]
JjAThis has been repeatedly construed by the courts to be a legislative grant or
^confirmation, as effective as a patent to convey whatever title was in the
*•••<%*% •^Government of the United States. It will be observed that this act requires
no proof of a prior grant, nor any other evidence of title except that which
• *rt+± ' results from occupation, cultivation, or possession, prior to the 20th day of
,
, "December, 1803—the date of the treaty of cession. In a spirit of liberal for-
bearance towards the ignorant and peaceful villagers, who claimed these lots
Congress demanded of them no other proof of title than that derived from
their prior occupancy. It will be observsd, also, that the act embraces not
only "town lots, out lots, and common-field lots," but "commons" also
—
thereby distinctly recognizing a " common" as appurtenant to each of these
villages. In 1831, when these villages had (some of them) grown into cities,
and particularly Saint Louis, Congress, in order still further to perfect the
title in the inhabitants, in a convenient, practical form, released, in the most
explicit manner, to the corporate authorities, whatever title the United 8tates
held to the commons. In virtue of these two acts, the City of Saint Louis
obtained, as her common lands, over 6,000 acres, whilst the village of Saint
Charles obtained over 14,000, and Carondelet, a small French village, only
six miles distant from Saint Louis, over 12,000 acres. I cite these facts to
(3)
prove, first, that Congress distinctly admits the existence of a " common," as
appurtenant to a Spanish village ; and second, the very liberal spirit evinced
by the Government towards these village claims.
In the case of Chouteau vs. Eckert, (2 Howard, 344,) the controversy re"
lated to a lot in the commons of Saint Charles ; and Justice Catron, in de-
livering the opinion of the Court, says :
" The character and nature of the village right in this country is somewhat
peculiar. The inhabitants of upper Louisiana resided in villages almost ex-
clusively, and cultivated common fields enclosed by only one fence ; each
person who cultivated the soil having assigned to him by the syndics of the
town, a certain portion of land to cultivate. In this manner the chief tillage
of the soil was carried on ; the other parts of the country being in the forest
state. The villages also required commons for pasturage for their horned
cattle and horses, and for fuel and timber, this part not being enclosed.
The quantity included in the field, for pasturage, timber and wood, was regu-
lated by the nature of the soil and timber, and accommodated to the wants
of the inhabitants, and conceded at the discretion of the Government—usual-
ly to a very liberal amount. As the principal support of the population was
derived from agriculture and pasturage, the village commons were deemed of
primary importance by the people and Government, and as a common title,
more favored than individual titles in cases of conflict. In this situation, the
United States found the country, when they came into possession of it, in
March, 1804, as the successor of France, or rather Spain, in virtue of the
treaty of cession. So great has been the change by the introduction of a
population with different habits and modes of agriculture, that it is difficult
to estimate at this day the former importance of the village common to the
French inhabitants. It was the basis on which their society was formed, to
such an extent, that the early acts of Congress could not be well understood
without a reference to this important circumstance ; and especially not the
sweeping act of 1812."
These remarks of the learned Judge are entitled to especial consideration,
as applied to the villages of California, which, far more than the villages of
Louisiana, required commons for pasturage for their cattle and horses, and «
for fuel and timber. It is emphatically true of them that the " principal ,
support of the population was derived from agriculture and pasturage," and
^
'•
that " the village commons were deemed of primary importance by the people ',\ j'* .
^
and Government, and as a common title, more favored than individual titles
in cases of conflict." That Congress was deeply impressed with the truth " I *#^j, y
of these views, and regarded with especial favor the claim for village lots and »
commons, is evident from the fact that in 1812, without any previous con-
firmation by a Board of Commissioners, and without any evidence of an ex-
press grant, but exclusively on the ground of prior possession, and the prac-
tice and usages of the French and Spanish Governments, Congress confirmed
to the inhabitants not only their town lots, but their common lands, in the
utmost extent to which they had ever been claimed as such. The nature of
these village claims, and the very imperfect evidence of any express grant,
(4)
will appear from the case above cited, (Chouteau vs. Eckert, 2 How. 344,)
and Mackey vs-. Dillon, (4 How. 421.)
But in the leading case of Strother vs. Lucas, [12 Peters, 440-1,] the
rules and regulations of the Spanish government, concerning the founding-
of towns and villages, and the allotment of the common lands to them, are
collated at great length ; and from the authorities there cited, it is evident
beyond dispute, that commons were not only deemed indispensable, but were
regarded as so inviolable that even the king himself could not despoil his
towns and cities of them. For further particulars of the Spanish law on the
same subject, see 1 White's Eecopilacion, 74 et seq.; New Orleans vs.
United States, 10 Peters, 662 ; Bird vs. Montgomery, 6 Missouri E. 610.
In the latter case, the Court says, " It seems to have been the custom with
the kings of Prance and Spain, to grant to towns and villages a portion of
land contiguous thereto, as a common, for the supply of fuel to the commoners
and to furnish pasturage for their cattle ; and the Icing himself could not
alienate such common. A careful examination of the laws and usages of
both these countries, led the Supreme Court of the United States to the
conclusion that these sovereigns could exercise a certain jurisdiction over
these commons and other places similarly situated ; but it was purely a
police regulation Indeed, what kind of proprietory interest can we
imagine existing in the crown, which is inalienable ? The very terms of an
absolute dominion imply the power of alienation. The dominion retained by
the king of Spain, then, was not proprietary, but purely political—a do-
minion never severed from the sovereignty of any country, and nowise in-
consistent with the absolute ownership of a subject."
The Court then proceeds to say, " It is needless, however, to enter into any
minute inquiry in relation to the exact nature of the ownership of the com-
moners under the Spanish government. Whether corporeal or incorporeal,
it was absolute and allodial, and no fee, according to the feudal understanding
of that term, was outstanding in the king or any one else."
But the rights which towns and cities, under the Spanish law, acquired in
their common lands, was more fully and perhaps more satisfactorily discussed
in the leading case of the city of New Orleans vs. United States, [10 Peters,
662,] than in any other case decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The controversy in that case was concerning the quay at New
f jg Orleans, and the proof established that whilst Louisiana belonged to France,
(^^^d^i a charter was granted to a corporation styled the " Western Company," by
jvhich the company was authorized to grant lands allodially in Louisiana
;
and under its authority, the ground on which New Orleans stands was selected
6 m A as the site for a town, which was accordingly laid out, and a map thereof
/y^^ *** made, on which the space along the river in front of the town was designated
as a " quay." After the building of the town had been commenced, the
Western Company surrendered its charter to the crown of France ; and it
was claimed on behalf of the United States, that upon the cession of Loui-
siana, this government succeeded to all the rights which appertained to
France ; and that inasmuch as France, prior to the cession, had not granted
iffafi^
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the ground designated as the " quay," the United States as the successor of
France, became vested with the fee. The Court says, " it is admitted that
the power of the sovereign over the streets of a city is limited. He cannot
aliene them, nor deprive the inhabitants of their use ; because, such use is
essential to their enjoyment of urban property ; and a distinction is drawn
in this respect between the streets of a city and other grounds dedicated to
public use. ..The latter, it is contended, is not only under the supervision of
the king as to its use, but he may sell and convey it. Now it would seem in
reason that the principle is the same in both cases. The inhabitants of a
town cannot be deprived of their streets, as the streets are essential to the
enjoyment of their property. In other words, by closing the streets, the
value of the buildings would be greatly reduced, if not entirely destroyed
;
and if ground dedicated to public use, which adds to the beauty, the wealth,
the convenience and the value of town property, be arbitrarily appropriated
by the sovereign to other purposes, is not the value of the property which
has been bought and sold in reference to it, greatly impaired ? But it is ,»* ,
said, if the dedication was made by the king, the citizens of New Orleans or • t*& "< * ^
the public did not acquire a right paramount to this, and that having a right %
to regulate the use and the fee never having been conveyed by him to the * **4$ %• *
city by grant or otherwise, he must of course retain the power. of disposing
of the property.—The right of the King to this property is compared to the
right of a City, which is vested with the fee and the use, and as in such cases
the corporation may dispose of the property dedicated, with the sanction of
the sovereign power, the sovereign it is contended having the right of pro-
perty, and the power to regulate the use, may alien. *.#*,*
Though certain places may be dedicated to public purposes by the Supreme
Power, and may be said to be withdrawn from commerce, still it is insisted,
when no grant has been made and private rights have not become vested in
the property, it is not withdrawn from the spvereign power. That the
King under the law of nations, was entitled to the right of soil in Louisiana,
is not contested : * * * but the conclusion which is drawn from this,
that, as no grant was given, the King had a right, to alien the ground in •/•
contest, the same as any other part of Louisiana, is not admitted. * ¥ *
* * Does not this long acquiescence of the monarch, and enjoyment of the
property by the city, afford some evidence of right ? * * * The public
use of this commonfor so great a number of years, and the general recognition
of itfrom the time it was dedicated, in numerous private and official transac-
tions, and the acquiescence of the French King, offered no unsatisfactory evi-
dence of right. If a grant from the King were necessary to confirm the
claim of the city, might it not be presumed under such circumstances ?
The Court then proceeds to enquire, whether the transfer of Louisiana
from France to Spain prior to its cession to the United States, in any man-
ner impaired the rights of the city to its common property. After quoting
copious extracts from the Spanish laws and ordinances, as contained in the
Partidas and other works of high authority, the Court proceeds as follows
:
"A faithful observance of these laws would have preserved the rights of
•X-
1foi *l
tfw»*
(6)
the city, as to the common, free from invasion. No law'was cited in the
argument which showed the power of the King of Spain to alienate land
which had been dedicated to the public use ; and it is clear that the exercise
of such a power would have violated the public law which is understood to
have limited the exercise of the sovereign power in this respect."
The Court sums up its conclusions on this branch of the subject with the
following emphatic language : «
" From a careful examination of the jurisdiction exercised over this com-
mon by the governments of Prance and Spain, and the laws which regulated
this description of property in both countries, the conclusion seems not to
be authorized, that it was considered as a part of the public domain or com-
mon land which the King could sell or convey. This power was not exer-
cised by the King of France, and the exercise of the power by the Spanish
governor in the instances stated, was in violation of the laws of Spain, and
equally against its usages. The land having been dedicated to public use,
^A was withdrawn from commerce ; and so long as it continued to be thus used,
could not become the property of any individual. So careful was the King
of Spain to guard against the alienation of property which had been dedi-
cated to public use, that in a law cited, all such conveyances are declared to
be void."
But it was argued, that even though the Kings of Spain and France could
not alienate the land, yet they retained the power to regulate its use, and
that on the cession of Louisiana, the United States succeeded to this right
and might therefore interpose to prevent the city of New Orleans from sell-
ing the property to private individuals in derogation of the public easement.
But the Court decides that under the Constitution of the United States, the
Federal government cannot hold or exercise such a power, and that if it
exists anywhere, it rests with the State government to enforce the trust, and
prevent what they shall deem a violation of it by the city authorities.
I have made these copious extracts from the learned opinion of the court,
because they cast much light upon the rights of the claimant in this cause.
In my judgment this decision conclusively establishes the following proposi-
tions, to wit : 1st, that in favor of long usage and in the absence of an ex-
press grant, the law will presume a grant ; 2d, that under the Spanish law,
land once dedicated to public use, cannot be alienated even by the king
;
3d, that in relation to common lands, either expressly or by implication, de-
dicated to public use, before the cession of foreign territory, the United
States, as the successor of the former sovereign, acquires no title either in fee
or otherwise to such common lands ; 4th, that in respect to such commons
the Federal government cannot interpose to prevent a sale thereof, or a
breach of the trust by which they were dedicated ; that subject being ex-
clusively within the jurisdiction of the state authorities.
I think the conclusion is irresistible, from these authorities, that it was
not only a custom and usage, but a positive enactment of the Spanish govern-
ment, that in the founding of towns and infant settlements in the provinces,
not only town lots were to be assigned to the inhabitants, but commons for
m
pasturage and fuel, the title to which was vested in the inhabitants for public
use, and which the king himself could not alienate.
I propose in the next place to enquire, whether these regulations were ap-
plicable in a peculiar degree to Californiaf so long as it remained a Spanish
province. It is a matter of history, that at least as early as the year 1777,
an effort was being made by the Crown of Spain, to civilize and christianize
the Indians of California by the establishment of " missions" in theirjnidst.
For the protection of these missions, presidios or military posts ftjere esta-
blished, and very soon afterwards it was deemed necessary to encourage co-
lonization by the establishment of pueblos or villages with extraordinary
privileges. Indeed, it is evident from the history of the times, that settle-
ments could not then safely be made, except in towns or villages ; and hence
the government earnestly endeavoured to promote that form of settlement.
Hence we find that the first express authority for granting lands in California
related to " commons" for the use of the inhabitants of pueblos and villages.
As early as the 17th August, 1773, the viceroy in his instructions to the
commandante of this province, Art. 12, says : " with the desire to establish
population more speedily, I for the present grant the commandante power to
designate common lands, and also even to make individual concessions to
such Indians as may most dedicate themselves to agriculture and the raising
of cattle ; for having property of their own, the love of it will cause them
to plant themselves more firmly ; but the commandante must bear it in mind,
that it is very advisable not to allow them to live dispersed, each on the
land given him ; but that they must have their house arnd habitation in the
town or mission where they have been gathered or settled." From this, it was
evidently the intention of the government, to commence the settlement of
the country by the establishment of towns or villages. In furtherance of
this policy, the commandante was first to designate common lands for the use
of the people. This was to be the chief mode of granting ; but in meritor-
ious cases he might grant lands to individuals on condition they would reside
in the villages.
Art. 6 enjoins upon the Commandante the importance of congregating the
Indians in the Mission Pueblos, " in order that they may be civilized and led
to a rational life."
Arts. 7 and 8 contain directions as to the proper sites for new settlements,
in relation to water, timber, &c, and the instruction of the Indians in the
arts of building, &c.
Art. 9 recites that all new settlements beginning with few families, may
afterwards grow into large cities.
Art. 10 provides, that as the mission settlements are hereafter to become
cities, care should be taken that the houses be built in line, with wide streets
and good market squares, &c.
Art. 11 provides that for the preservation of the new mission settlements,
it is very essential that near them should be eneouraged the raising of cattle,
cultivation, and the planting of trees.
These instructions may be found at large, appended to the Reports of
i(8)
Capt. Halleck and "William Carey Jones, and taken together, they evince
most clearly that it was the policy of the government to commence the settle-
ment of the country with towns and .milages.
It was also found necessawto Stfca^ljsh in California depots of provisions
for supplying Spanish mjpels from the East Indies, and for the support of
jL the Presidios ; arfjl JwAhat end instructions were sent by the viceroy, in
t s June, 1771, to fflron Philip Neve, the then Governor of California, to estab-
• lish tm) ftieblos ; one on the Eio Guadalupe, and the other on the Eio
Pojpncjflo ; and to allot lands to the " pobladores," or colonists. Having
estabnshed the Pueblos in pursuance of his instructions, the Governor, on
the 1st of June, 1779, established certain regulations for the government of
the Californias, which direct with much minuteness how the affairs of the
. Pueblos are to be oonducted, and define with great precision the rights not
only of the inhabitants, but of the Pueblos in their municipal character.
f \ Article 1st recites that the Pueblo of San Jose had been established es-
pecially to encourage agriculture and the breeding of cattle, so that it might
furnish supplies for the Presidios, &c.
Article 2nd secures a liberal payor bounty to the "pobladores," or set-
•* tiers in the Pueblo.
Article 3rd allots to them certain cattle and farming implements ; some
•
' for the use of the settlers severally, and the remainder to be used by all in
common.
f
Article 4th provides for the allotment of house lots to the inhabitants, to
be designated by the Government ; and also of common lands, pasture grounds,
'* and sowing lands, to be designated and set apart for the Pueblo, for munici-
pal purposes.
P Article 5th defines the size and number of the lots to be assigned to the
9
m inhabitants in severalty, and then provides that " of the Eoyal lands, as
much as may be considered necessary, shall be separated for the purposes of
the Pueblo."
Article 8th provides that the colonists shall enjoy, for the maintenance of
their cattle, the common use of the water and pasturage, fire-wood and tim-
ber, of the commons, forests and meadows, to be designated according to the
laws to each new Pueblo ; and besides, each one shall separately enjoy the
pasturage of his own lands.
Article 9th, amongst other things, provides that a storehouse shall be
erected, in which must be kept the produce of the "public sowing," which at
the rate of one " almud" of maize per inhabitant, must be made, from the
third to the fifth year inclusive, in the lands designatedfor municipal purposes.
For further particulars concerning these regulations, see the reports of
Halleck & Jones. These regulations were fully approved by a Eoyal order
of the 14th of October, 1781.
I submit, therefore, that these documents establish conclusively the early
policy of the Spanish Government, for the encouragement of Pueblos or
towns in California ; and the further fact, that in founding such towns, the
" commons," in the language of Justice Catron, in Chouteau vs. Eckhart,
*-/
1*
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"were deemed of primary importance by the people and Government," and
were in fact "the basis of their society."
But it will perhaps be said in reply, that even though all this were con-
ceded to the fullest extent claimed, it would prove nothing as to the estab-
lishment or rights of a Pueblo under Mexican law, in 1834, or at a later pe-
riod. In answer to this argument, I maintain
—
1. That the laws, customs and usages of Spain, which were in force when
Mexico renounced her allegiance to the Spanish Crown, continued in force
in Mexico after that event, unless they were abrogated by some enactment
of the new Eepublic. This principle is too well known to need illustration,
or the citation of authorities. If Mexico, by her legislation, has in any re-
spect changed, or modified, either the policy or plans of Spain, for the found- ' V
ing of Pueblos in California, it will be for the counsel for the Government to
establish the fact ; which I apprehend they will be unable to do.
2. Nothing short of an explicit act of the Mexican nation to that effect,
would justify the conclusion that, in the founding of towns in her frontier
provinces, she intended to abandon a poliey, not only wise in itself, but so
firmly established by long usage, and so congenial to the habits of her people.
3. The legislation of Mexico, since her independence, so far from indi-
cating any change of policy in this respect, conclusively establishes a strict
adherence to it. The first act of Mexico touching the disposition of her
public domain, was the colonization law of 1824, the second article of which ^V**/*^**^
is as follows : "Those lands of the nation, which, not being private property,
nor belonging to any corporation or town, may be colonized."
In the regulations of 1828, for carrying into effect the law of 1824, the
13th article provides that " the union of many families into one town shall
follow, in its formation, interior government and policy, the rules established
by the existing laws of the other towns—special care being taken that the
new ones shall be built with all possible regularity."
From these provisions, it is evident that the colonization laws contem-
plated the founding of new towns, with the same rights and privileges which
appertained to other towns of the Republic.
By an act of the Mexican Congress of the 17th of August, 1833, the Mis-
sions of the Californias were ordered to be secularized ; and in order to carry
this law into effect, the Territorial Deputation of California, on the 6th of
August, 1834, decreed as follows :
" 1. The Ayuntamientos shall make application through the usual chan-
nels, requesting lands to be assigned to each Pueblo, for egiclos and propios."
" 2. The lands assigned to each Pueblo for propios shall be subdivided in
to middling-sized and small portions, and may be rented out or sold at public
auction, subject to an emphyteutic rent or tax ; the present possessors of
lands belonging to the propios, will pay an annual tax, to be imposed by the
Ayuntamientos—the opinion of three intelligent and honest men being first
taken."
The third article prescribes the prices for building lots.
yjy
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Three days after the date of this decree, to wit, on the 9th of August, 1834,
Jose Figueroa, the Governor of California, issued certain regulations to be
observed in the secularization of the Missions, the first article of which is as
follows
:
" The Governor, agreeably with the spirit of the law of August 17th, 1833,
and with the instructions which he has received from the Supreme Govern-
ment, will, with the co-operation of the Prelates of the Missions, partially
convert into Pueblos the Missions of this Territory ; beginning with the next
month of August, and commencing at first with ten Missions, and afterwards
with the others,"
The fifth article, amongst other things, provides that " common lands shall
be assigned to each Pueblo, and when convenint municipal lands also."
The fourteenth article is as follows : " The political government of the
Pueblos ahall be organized in perfect conformity with the existing laws.
The Government will give the necessary instructions to have Ayuntamientos
established, and elections made."
Article fifteenth provides that " the economical government of the Pueblos
shall be under the charge of the Ayuntamientos ; but as far as regards the
administration of justice, in litigated matters, they will be subject to the pri-
% mary judges of the nearest towns constitutionally established."
*'*$• *\
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Article twenty-third establishes rules for the enforcement of these regula-
• »J • ,-', tions, and amongst others, provides that rancherias situated at a distance
from the Missions, and containing more than twenty-five families, may, if
they choose, form a separate Pueblo ; and those containing less than twenty-
five families, form a district, to be attached to the nearest Pueblo."
From these documents it is evident, the Governor and Territorial Deputa-
tion felt fully authorized to establish new Pueblos at their discretion ; and
the Governor recites that in doing so he is acting in pursuance of instructions
from the Supreme Government. It is further evident, that egidos and pro-
pios, or common and municipal lands, were to be assigned to the new Pueblos,
in accordance with the ancient customs and usages of the country. On the
20th of March, 1837, the Mexican Congress made a new law for the internal
government of the Departments, of which California was one ; and by this
act it is provided, that " the interior government of the Department shall be
under the charge of the Governor, Departmental Legislature, Prefects and
Sub-Prefects, Ayuntamientos, Alcaldes, and Justices of the Peace ;" and
provides also that the Governor shall be appointed by the President. The
Governor was to appoint the Prefects, approve the appointment of Sub-Pre-
fects and Justices of the Peace, and might remove any of them, at his discre-
tion. The Departmental Legislature was authorized " to pass laws relative
to taxes, public education, industry, trade, and^nranicipal administration ;"
and amongst other things, might authorize the Ayuntamientos to alienate
certain property belonging to the municipal funds. Amongst other duties
imposed upon the Prefect, he was authorized, agreeably to the laws, to regu-
late the distribution of common lands, in the towns of his district. The act
also defines the mode of appointing the Ayuntamientos, Alcaldes, and other
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inferior officers, and defines their duties. This law remained in force up to
the date of the acquisition of California by the United States.
I submit, that these documents establish, in the most conclusive manner,
not only that the ancient usages of the Spanish Government, tpuching the
allotment of common lands to Pueblos, was not only not abrogated by Mexi-
co, but has been ratified and adopted in every act of the general or local
authorities, pertaining to the subject, up to the latest period when the Mexi-
can law prevailed.
I propose next to inquire whether, in the absence of all proof establishing
either a special grant of municipal lands,for the designation of them by metes
and bounds, the law will fix the quantity ; and if so, how the particular lands
are to be set apart. The petition claims four square leagues, and the ques-
tion is whether or not the law and evidence establish that claim.
As early as March, 1791, the Commandant General of the Internal Prov-
inces of the West, in a letter of instructions to the Commandant of Califor-
nia, conveys the following explicit declarations on this subject : " In conform- C\tjtA^*
ity with the opinion of this Gommandancia General, I have determined, in a
J
decree of this date, that notwithstanding the provision made in the eighty
first article of the ordinance for the establishment and instruction of Intend-
ants, the Captains of Presidios are authorized to grant and distribute house
lots and lands to the soldiers and citizens who may solicit them, to fix their
residences on ; and considering the extent of four common leagues, measured
from the centre of the Presidio square, viz : two leagues in every direction,
to be sufficient for the new Pueblos to be formed under the direction of said
Presidios, I have likewise determined, in order to avoid doubts and disputes
in future, that said Captains restrict themselves henceforward to the quantity
of house lots and lands within the said four leagues, without exceeding in any
manner said limits, leaving free and open the exclusive jurisdictionToelonging
to the managers of the Eoyal Hacienda, respecting the sale, composition and
distribution of the remainder of the lands in the respective districts. And
that this order may be punctually observed and carried into effect, you will
circulate it to the Captains and Commandants of the Presidios of your prov-
ince, informing me of having done so."
The eighty-first article of the ordinance referred to in this letter of instruc-
tion, may be found in 2 White's Recopilacion, (page 71,) from which it ap-
pears that the Intendants were invested with authority to decide as to the
proper mode of distribnting lands, in the provinces within their respective
districts. It has been frequently decided by the Supreme G ourt of the United
States, that in reference to lands in Louisiana, whilst a province of Spain,
the absolute power of granting lands, with complete titles, was vested in the
Intendant General, by the Spanish Government ; and the same powers were
doubtless conferred upon the Intendants of other provinces, as sufficiently
appears by the eighty-first article of the ordidance above quoted. The in-
struction to the Commandant of California is explicit, and as it came from
competent authority, it appears to establish very conclusively that four
leagnes, measuring from the centre, was to be assigned to the new Pueblos,
"*V
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where no other limits were actually defined. There is nothing to justify the
inference that Mexico, after its independence, ever changed, abolished, or
modified this rule.
2. I proceed now to the second ground relied upon in support of the
claimants' title, to wit, that in November, 1834, the Pueblo was duly estab-
lished by competent authority, and its lands formally assigned to it by metes
and bounds. This proposition, involves two questions—the first, a question
of fact, to wit, whether or not proceedings were had, and if so, what pro-
ceedings to establish the Pueblo and define its limits ; and the second, a
question of law, to-wit, whether or not such proceedings emanated from
competent authority and were effectual for the ends contemplated.
In support of the first point, I consider it established very satisfactorily
—
1. That the Territorial Deputation, on the 6th August, 1834, passed an
act directing the ayuntamientos to apply through the proper channels for
lands to be assigned to new pueblos for egidos and propios, directing the
%
^^ M ^ propios to be rented out at auction, and fixing the price of house lots for
building.
2. That on the 9th of the same month, the Governor (Figueroa) issued
his decree for secularizing the Missions and converting them into Pueblos
;
and in the fifth article, directs common and municipal lands to be assigned
to them.
3. That on the 3d November, 1834, the Territorial Legislature approved
and ratified the decree of the Governor, and on the same day instructed the Gov-
ernor to cause the Partido of San Francisco to hold an election for an Ayun-
tamiento, " who should reside in the Presidio" and to be composed of one Al-
calde, two Regidors, and one Syndico ; and that the Ayuntamiento, when
chosen, should, in the shortest time, " mark out the limits of its municipality"
and reduce to its political jurisdiction the neighboring population.
4. That on the following day, to wit : Nov. 4th, 1834, the Governor
'
enclosed a copy of this decree to M. G. Vallejo, the Commandant, and di-
rected him to see to its fulfillment, and notifying him that after the organi-
zation of the Ayuntamiento, the Commandant will no longer exercise civil
functions (leaving those to the Ayuntamiento), and will confine himself solely
to his military duties.
5. That on the same day (Nov. 4th, 1834), the Governor addressed an
official despatch to the Commandant, notifying him that with the consent of
the Territorial Deputation, he had adopted, entire, the plan before them sub-
mitted by the Commandant with respect to the Pueblo of San Francisco
;
declaring its boundaries to be the same recommended by the Commandant
and which are specially set forth in the despatch ; and declaring that Mission
Creek shall form the boundary " between the Municipal jurisdiction of that
Pueblo and the said Mission of Dolores ;" also, ordering the Commandant to
cause an Ayuntamiento to be elected, so that they might be installed by the
1st January, 1835, and to designate the particular house in which they should
meet. A copy of this despatch is appended to the deposition of Vallejo
and as its authenticity is disputed, I shall remark upon that point hereafter.
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6. That on the 7th December, 1834, an election for the Ayuntamiento was
held at the Presidio. This was a primary election for electors who were to
select the Ayuntamiento. A copy of the official paper, certifying the pro-
ceedings, is also filed in this cause. In the body of this paper, it is stated
that the election is held " in compliance with what is ordered by the Political
Chief, on the 4th\November of this year.'" The official account of the annual
election by the electors of the Ayuntamiento is not produced, but Yallejo
testifies that they were elected.
1. That annually thereafter an Ayuntamiento was regularly elected, and
exercised jurisdiction over the newly organized Pueblo, embracing the pres-
ent site of the City of San Francisco, up to the period of the conquest by
the Americans. This is abundantly established by the documentary and oral
evidence in the cause.
8. That within a few weeks after receiving the Governor's despatch of the
4th November, the Commandant actually went upon the ground with a num-
ber of citizens, marked out and designated the boundaries as specified in the
despatch, and returned an expediente or official account thereof to the Governor
at Monterey. All this is positively sworn to by Yallejo, as a matter dis-
tinctly within his recollection ; and he mentions the names of several persons
now deceased whom he remembers to have accompanied him in thus marking
out the limits of the Pueblo. These are facts about which Vallejo cannot
have been mistaken. He has either willfully perjured himself, or the facts
which he thus testified to, occurred as he relates them. His character for
veracity stands wholly unimpeached, and in no material particular is his testi-
mony contradicted.
9. That the existence of the Pueblo, has been recognized in numerous
official documents from 1834 to 1846, emanating from the Territorial Legis-
lature, the Governors, Alcaldes, and other high functionaries. For example,
on 31st January, 1835, Governor Figueroa addressed a communication to
" Senor Alcalde Conste. de San Francisco de Asis." On the 26th October,
1835, Jose Castro, then Governor ad interim, addressed a communication to
the same Alcalde, informing him that on the 22d of the previous month, the
Territorial Deputation had " approved that the Ayuntamiento of this Pueblo
have power to grant house lots, which should not exceed one hundred varas.
for the building of houses in the place called Yerba Buena, at a distance of
two hundred varas back from the beach ; the grantees paying the fee which
is fixed by law, as pertaining to the propios, and binding themselves to con-
struct their buildings in accordance with the best police regulations. I re-
peat this to you in order that you may make it known to your neighbors of
that Pueblo, that they may not come with their memorials to this Govern-
ment for favors which the Ayuntamientos have power to grant." This im-
portant document establishes several undeniable facts, to wit : 1st, it admits
distinctly the existence of the Pueblo, by designating it as such ; 2d, it recog-
nizes " the place called Yerba Buena " as within the jurisdiction of the
Ayuntamiento and as a part of the Pueblo ; 3d, it establishes that Yerba
Buena, was embraced within the propios or municipal lands of the Pueblo.
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The site of the present Gity of San Francisco, is the same formerly known
as the Tillage of Terba Buena, and consequently is within the limits of the
Pueblo referred to by Governor Castro. The existence of the Pueblo is
further established by the official statement of the primary selection of elec-
tors on the 3d December, 1837, and the subsequent election of the Alcalde
and other officers of the Pueblo, on the 8th January, 1838 ; also, by the
proclamation of Governor Alvarado of the 17th June, 1839, for the organi-
zation of the constitutional system established by the law of 30th November,
1836, in which proclamation the various Pueblos are specially named (and
amongst them that of San Francisco), and are required to hold elections as
prescribed by said law ; also, by the proclamation of Governor Micheltorena
of November 14th, 1843, in which the several Pueblos are required to hold
elections in pursuance of the law of March 20th, 1837. The Pueblo of San
Francisco is one of those named in the proclamation. On the 11th March,
1844, the same Governor (Micheltorena) addressed an official despatch to the
" Alcalde de San Francisco," enclosing an extract from an order addressed
to an officer at the Presidio, directing him to march with a file of soldiers to
Terba Buena, and there place himself under the direction of " the Alcalde or
1st Instance of Yerba Buena," for the purpose of suppressing a riot.
On the 15th January, 1846, Sanchez, a retiring Alcalde of the Pueblo, de-
livers to Noe, a Justice of the Peace, all the archives of the Pueblo from its
foundation, in 1835, up to that date, with an inventory or index thereof. This
document is dated at Yerba Buena, 15th January, 1846 ; and from the index
it appears that the archives from 1829 to 1834 inclusive, were in charge of
the " Military command ;" but in the subsequent years, of the " civil tribu-
nal," thus strongly corroborating Tallejo's testimony, as to the founding of
the Pueblo in the latter part of 1834, or early in 1835 ; up to which period,
the Military Commandant had exercised also civil powers, which ceased on
the organization of the Ayuntamiento in January, 1835. The fact that the
inventory is dated at Yerba Buena establishes, at least prima facie, that the
archives of the Pueblo were kept at that place, and this is a strong, if not
conclusive circumstance, to establish both the existence of the Pueblo and that
Terba Buena was within it.
10. It is established beyond the possibility of doubt, by the proof already
adverted to, and the testimony of the witnesses, that a Pueblo was established
and regularly organized, and that it was known as the Pueblo of San Fran-
cisco or Terba Buena ; and this Pueblo we claim, embraced the land marked
out by Tallejo, by whatsoever name the Pueblo may have been called.
On the whole, I consider the proposition conclusively established, as to the
founding of the Pueblo and marking out its limits.
I propose now briefly to consider what objections are likely to be urged
by the Law Agent adversely to the conclusions I have deduced on this
branch of the case, and as far as possible, to anticipate the argument on the
other side.
1. It will be claimed that the document dated November 4th, 1834, pur-
porting to be a dispatch from Gov. Figuerra, and certified by Zamorano,
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secretary, is not an authentic document. It purports to be a copy from an
original, and to be attested by Zamorano, the Governor's Secretary. The
witnesses,.Richardson, Alvarado, Hartwell and Gastro, testify that they were
well acquainted with Zamorano, and knew his hand-writing ; and in their
opinion, neither the body or signature to this instrument is in his hand-
writing. This, however, is but a matter of opinion, as to the hand-writing
of a party, twenty years ago, about which they may have easily been mis-
taken. On the other hand, Tallejo, who had quite as good an opportunity
to acquire a knowledge of the hand-writing, testifies in strong terms to its
genuineness ; and he further deposes, that he has been in actual possession
of this identical document ever since its date, with the exception of a short
period during his captivity after the " Bear Revolution" of 1846, and with
the exception, also, of about three months, during which his papers were in
possession of Desaldo. He further testifies, that he has a distinct recollection
of receiving from Figueroa, about that date, a dispatch similar in purport, and
of which he believes this to be an accurate copy. The original he delivered to
the Alcalde de Haro, and after performing the duties devolved upon him in the
dispatch, he made an expediente of the whole transaction, which he sent to
the Governor at Monterey. Is it possible that Vallejo could be mistaken in
all this ? There is no room for snch an inference ; and if the facts he deposes
to never occurred, it simply presents a case of wilful false-swearing, of which
there is not the slightest ground for suspicion. The absence of all motive to
perjure himself, the numerous corroborating circumstances, all sustaining his
testimony, and above all, the irreproachable and highly honorable character
of the witness, all repel the presumption that he has in any respect varied
from the truth. The fact that such a document existed, is established and
fortified by the following strong chain of corroborating circumstances :
1. That on the 3rd of November, 1834, the Territorial Deputation, by its
decree of that date, directed the Governor to do precisely what he purports
to have done, and what Vallejo swears he did do, by his dispatch of the fol-
lowing day.
2. The certificate of the primary election held at the Presidio, on the 7th
of December, 1834, distinctly and in terms refers to " the notice of the Politi-
cal Chief on the 4th of November of this year," as the authority for holding
the election.
3. An Ayuntamiento had jurisdiction only co-extensive with a Pueblo
Its municipal authority did not extend beyond the limits of the Pueblo for
which it was chosen. That an Ayuntamiento was organized, and that its
sessions' were to have been holden at the Presidio, I presume will not be con
tested by any one. Is not the inference irresistible, that in proceeding to
organize the Ayuntamiento, the Governor, as the first step towards it, would
cause to be defined the territorial limits of its jurisdiction ? This he did in
the dispatch of the 4th of November. A neglect to define the limits of the
Pueblo, would be like organizing a town council under our system, for a city
without limits, or a county court for a county without boundaries. There is
inherent in the very nature of the corporation, a limit to its territorial juris-
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tion ; and as there could not be an Ayuntamiento without a Pueblo, so there
could not be a Pueblo without boundaries, either expressly assigned to it, or
fixed by some general law or custom. The first step, therefore, in establish-
ing the Pueblo, was to fix its boundaries ; and this the Governor did in his
dispatch of the 4th of November ; and by his other dispatch of the same date,
he directed the Ayuntamiento to be organized—both being indispensable to
the establishment of the Pueblo.
4. Captain Halleck testifies that amongst the archives, whilst at Monte-
rey, he saw papers, (not now to be found,) being correspondence between the
Governor, Military Commandant, and Alcaldes of the Presidio and Pueblo
of Yerba Buena and San Francisco, (which names were used indifferently,)
in which the municipal and common lands of the Pueblo were frequently
mentioned ; and he further deposes that amongst the archives at this place,
in the Alcalde's office, he recollects to have seen a paper, (not now to be
found,) and which was a letter from Governor Figueroa, subsequent in date
to the 4th of November, 1834, in reference to the boundaries of the Pueblo,
which were to be fixed by the military authority. He also found many other
papers in the Alcalde's office relating to the boundaries, and which consisted
of official letters, decrees, &c, all which are now missing, and cannot be
found. This testimony strongly fortifies Vallejo's statement, and I think is
conclusive evidence of its verity.
5. William A. Richardson, whose testimony is much relied upon by the
Law Agent for the Government, deposes as follows : " I have heard of a grant
of land to a town or Pueblo called Yerba Buena ;" and Juan B. Alvarado,
another witness for the Government, says, in reference to Yerba Buena, " At
one time some portion of land was designated to this town, by the Political
Chief; as regards the limits, I do not recollect of their ever having been
fixed as a town." This, at all events, tends to show that some lands were
assigned to the town of Yerba Buena, and to that extent fortifies Yallejo's
statement.
6. The testimony of Julius K. Rose and Henry L. Ford establishes that
Guerrero and Hinckley, two of the Alcaldes under the former Government,
and who had for many years resided at this place or the Mission, and are
now deceased, described the boundaries of the Pueblo lands precisely as they
have been defined by Yallejo. One of them (Guerrero) produced a map or
sketch of the Pueblo, and pointed out to witness the lines on the map, and
afterwards went with him on the ground and pointed them out there.
All these facts tend conclusively to establish the authenticity of the dis-
patch of the 4th November, and to render it certain that whether the signa-
ture of Zamorano be genuine or not, it is, at all events, evident that such a
document did exist; and whether the one in evidence be in fact an attested
copy, or only a copy of a copy, is wholly immaterial, provided the Court
is satisfied that the original existed.
2. On behalf of the Government, it will probably also be imsisted upon,
as a fair inference from the proof, that if a Pueblo was established at all, it
was a Pueblo formed out of the Mission lands, and in furtherance of the law
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for the secularization of the Missions ; and that Yallejo has confounded that
Pueblo with the other, which he supposes to have been founded in 1834.
Let us see how far the facts proved will support this inference. In the first
place, it will be conceded, I presume, on all sides, that a Pueblo was founded
in 1834, either wholly upon the Mission lands, or upon the lands claimed to
be embraced within the Yallejo line, or upon the two jointly. No one can
read the proof in this cause, and doubt for a moment that a Pueblo was es-
lished upon one or the other, or both these tracts. What proof is there in
the cause, to show that the Pueblo was to be formed exclusively of the Mis-
sion lands ? I insist there is none whatever. No witness has testified to
such a fact, and not a document in evidence proves, or, in myjudgment, tends
to prove it. If such a Pueblo was established, no limits were ever assigned
to it, no lands set apart for it, and no Ayuntamiento organized for its gov-
ernment. There was but one Ayuntamiento ; and though this held its ses-
sions sometimes at the Mission, and sometimes at the Presidio, yet it is un-
deniable that it was first organized at the Presidio. The first primary elec-
tion for electors to choose the members of the Ayuntamiento, was held at the
Presidio. The first meetings of the Ayuntamiento, after it was chosen, were
held at the Presidio. Alvarado proves this, and Halleck testifies that
amongst the archives at Monterey, he saw about a half dozen letters from the
Alcalde of this Pueblo to the Governor, concerning the holding of the sessions
of the Ayuntamiento at the Mission instead of the Presidio. The Governor
at first refused to sanction the change, but subsequently assented to it.
Motives of convenience doubtless prompted the change. The mass of the
population resided at the Mission, and there were suitable buildings there
for the transaction of business ; whereas there were only a few soldiers and
indifferent buildings at the Presidio. "With so small a population and so
little business to transact, it was not very material whether the Ayuntamiento
met within the Pueblo at the Presidio, or at the Mission, a few hundred yards
across the line ; and therefore the Governor consented to a change in the
place of meeting,—little dreaming, perhaps, that so trivial a circumstance
within a few years would afford ground for an argument affecting the rights
of a city of fifty thousand inhabitants, and property of almost incalculable
value. There is another fact which tends conclusively to establish that the
Mission was not embraced within the Pueblo, as established in 1834, to wit :
that no lots were granted at or about the Mission, by the Alcalde, or under
the authority of the Ayuntamiento, so far as the proof shows. This is a preg-
nant circumstance, and is scarcely reconcileable with the hypothesis that the
Ayuntamiento considered the Mission lands as within its jurisdiction.
For the following reasons, therefore, I infer that the Pueblo was not estab-
lished exclusively on the Mission lands,fto wit : 1. Because no witness proves
the fact, and no documentary evidence establishes it. 2. No limits, or com-
mon lands, were ever assigned to such a Pueblo. 3. The decree of the Ter-
ritorial Deputation, of the 3rd of Novemher, 1834, directs that the Ayunta-
miento shall reside at the Presidio. 4. The first primary election, and the
first meetings of the Ayuntamiento, were held at the Presidio. 5. The place
C
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of meeting could not be changed without the assent of the Governor. 6. No
lots or lands were granted, under the authority of the Ayuntamiento, at or
about the Mission.
I will now proceed to state why I infer that the Pueblo was founded with-
in the limits described by Tallejo. 1. It 'is positively sworn to as a fact
within his knowledge, by Vallejo, who is a credible and unimpeached witness*
2. It is proved by the dispatch from Governor Figueroa, of the 4th of No-
vember, 1834. 3. Vallejo swears that the Ayuntamiento had jurisdiction
only within the limits of the Pueblo ; and as the Ayuntamiento was organ-
ized at the Presidio, and held its first meetings there, and could hold them
no where else without the consent of the Governor, the inference is irresisti-
ble that the Presidio was within the Pueblo. 4. The Alcalde granted lots
at Yerba Buena, which he could not lawfally have done if it had not been
within his jurisdiction. 5. No lots were granted by the Alcalde, outside of the
Vallejo line. 7. Guerrero and Hinckley, two of the Alcaldes, now deceased,
described the limits of the Pueblo precisely as they are defined by Vallejo.
8. A number of the witnesses speak of the "Pueblo of Yerba Buena,"
and it is so designated in many official documents. Richardson, a witness
for the Government, in referring to the limits of the town as defined on his
map, says : " these limits of the Pueblo of Yerba Buena were approved by
the Territorial Government." Alvarado says : " the Pueblo of Yerba Buena
was known by the people of the country by the name of Yerba Buena ; but
by persons who came by sea it was called the Port of San Francisco-
Halleck says that in official documents, which he saw amongst the archives
it was termed indifferently " Pueblo of Yerba Buena" or of " San Francisco."
9
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In the grant to the De Haros for the Protrero Nueva, lying just south
of Mission Creek, the north line of that grant is made subject to the line of
the pueblo, so as to avoid infringing on the pueblo lands. Jimeno, the secre-
tary of the Governor who made the grant, stated to Halleck, that it was so
made because the Governor did not know precisely where the south line of
the Pueblo was ; but Jimeno supposed it to be about Mission Creek. This
is a distinct recognition of a Pueblo north of Mission Creek.
10. The inventory of the archives of the Pueblo, made by the retiring
Alcalde in 1846, is dated at " Yerba Buena ;" thus showing that the ar-
chives were kept at the latter place ; which would not have been the case if
it had not been within the Pueblo.
11. Every thing favors the presumption, that the Governor in 1834, per-
ceived the necessity of establishing a Pueblo, at this place, for the conveni-
ence of the shipping, and in view of the fact that an important commercial
town was likely to grow up at Yerba Buena. This was the place of an-
chorage for all the shipping ; and Richardson admits that he perceived at a
very early day, its advantages in a commercial point of view. Hence, he
applied to the Governor as far back as 1825, and again in 1828, for a grant
of land on the beach, between Rincon Point and Clark's Point. His peti-
tion was refused, and he renewed it in 1834, and again in 1840 ; but always
without success, because, as there is every reason to believe, the Governor
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foresaw the importance of reserving the lands fronting the beach, for pur-
poses of commerce. Governor Figueroa had his attention specially directed
to it in 1834, as appears from Richardson's testimony. He told Richardson
that he had seen a communication of his to Governor Echendea respecting
the anchorage at Terba Buena, and inquired of him as to the possibility of
laying off a town here. Richardson furnished him a sketch of the ground,
and as he deposes, was soon after instructed to make a map of the town,
which he did in October, 1835. At this period, Richardson was the only
settler at Terba Buena : and yet, in view of its commercial advantages, the
Governor directed a town to be laid out. Entertaining these views of its
importance, and future growth, it is not surprising that the Governor, in the
latter part of the year 1834, ordered it to be erected into a Pueblo.
12. The peculiar location of the ground rendered it especially proper that
it should be erected into a Pueblo. Surrounded on two sides by the Bay
—
on a third by the ocean, and on the remaining side by the Mission lands and
Mission Creek—commanding as it does the entrance from the Ocean to the
Bay, and embracing not only the Presidio and Old Fort, but the anchorage
for vessels, the most superficial observer could not have failed to perceive that
it was destined speedily to become one of the most important points on the
Pacific coast. It is scarcely probable that its advantages were overlooked
by Governor Figueroa ; and therefore, in breaking up the Mission establish-
ment, he would very naturally have decided what should be done with the
important peninsula to the north of it. That he would proceed to erect it
into a separate Pueblo is almost a necessary conclusion from the facts ; and
that he did do so, I think is abundantly established in proof. On the whole
;
there is no room to doubt, in my judgment, that but one Pueblo was esta-
blished, and that within the limits described by Yallejo.
13. It will probably be argued by the Law Agent that no lands were ever
assigned to Terba Buena except those embraced in Richardson's map or
sketch of the plan for the village. The argument on this point will be
chiefly predicated on Richardson's testimony, which is by no means freed
from suspicion. But conceding to the fullest extent the truth of all he de-
poses to, it establishes literally nothing in opposition to the views I have
presented. The sum and substance of it is, that in October, 1835, he was
directed by Jose Castro, Governor ad interim, to make a plan of the village
about to be commenced at Terba Buena—that he did make the plan, which
was approved by the Governor and Legislature, and that he never heard of
any other allotment of lands to the town than this. Richardson, in his testi-
mony, is very minute in defining the boundaries of the plan made by him, and
considerable stress is laid upon the fact that no provision was made for ex-
tending the boundaries as the population should increase. Hence, it is ar-
gued, the oily town lawfully established was that embraced by Richardson's
map. I confess I am at a loss to understand how all this can, in any degree,
militate against the idea that the Pueblo was established in 1834. As the
settlement of Terba Buena was about to be commenced, it was quite natural
that the Governor should cause the particular spot for the village to be de-
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signaled and laid out into street and blocks, both for the sake of uniformity,
and with a view to the granting of building lots to the inhabitants. But the
fact that a plan for the village was formed and adopted, no more disproves
the existence of a Pu bio, than the laying out of a county town would dis-
prove the existence of the couaty, or the founding of a State capital the ex-
istence of the State, or the location of a village on a farmer's lands would
prove that he owned no lands outside the village. So far as the founding of
the village in 1835 proves anything germain to the subject, it certainly forti-
fies the inference that the Pueblo had already been established, and the vil-
lage about to be formed was to be the nucleus of the new settlement. As a
necessary part of the new Pueblo, there was needed a village in which build-
ing lots could be granted, and to which the municipal lands were to be ap-
purtenant. The founding of the village, therefore, very speedily followed the
establishment of the Pueblo ; and instead of disproving the existence of the
latter, is a strong circumstance in its support.
Against this overwhelming mass of testimony, all tending to maintain the
fact that the Pueblo was established, as asserted by Vallejo, what proof has
been offered in rebuttal, by the Government? I think I am justified in say-
ing none whatever, except a few trivial facts, not inconsistent with the posi-
tions I have assumed, and for the most part of a purely negative character.
For example, there are several witnesses,—Richardson, Alvarado, Castro,
and perhaps others,—who testify that they never heard of the allotment of
the lands and the marking out of the boundaries, as described by Vallejo.
That may be so ; and yet it goes a very little way towards establishing that
the lands were not assigned and the boundaries fixed ; and as opposed to the
affirmative testimony of Vallejo, Halleck, Eose, Ford, and others, and espe-
cially the strong documentary evidence in the cause, is not entitled to the
weight of a feather. Richardson, Alvarado and Castro were not residing
here in 1834, and therefore could have had no personal knowledge of the
marking out of the boundaries. If they heard of it at the time, they may
well have forgotten it ; and there is nothing improbable in the assumption
that they did not hear of it, though the facts proved by Vallejo all transpired.
In the then rude state of the country, when property was of little value, and
the population was engaged almost exclusively in the breeding of cattle, but
little attention was given to public affairs ; and the fact of marking out a
new Pueblo, embracing a territory almost uninhabited, was not likely to ex-
cite any special interest, or become a subject of general notoriety. Lands
were of little or no value, as is proved by the enormous grants made gratui-
tously by the Government to private citizens ; and it i3 altogether probable
that the founding of the new Pueblo excited so little interest at the time, that
it was but little talked of, and soon forgotten by the majority of those who
heard of it. There were then no newspapers in California, to keep before
the public the history of passing events ; and no eager land speculators, on
the look-out for good bargains in water-lots, (except perhaps the witness
Richardson, who at a very early period had an eye upon the space between
Rincon and Clark's Points ;) and no cunning traders, claiming a monopoly
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of the whole of this valuable peninsula—one Jose T. Limantour, whose name
has since become very familiar to the people of this city, not having then
made his advent into California. It is easy, therefore, to comprehend why
the witnesses referred to may not have heard of so unimportant an event as
the founding of a new Pueblo, in a territory almost without inhabitants ; and
still more easy to understand why they may not now remember it, even though
they heard it at the time. Richardson, the chief witness relied upon by the
j Government, testifies under circumstances well calculated to excite suspicion
as to his fairness. He was in the city of Mexico in June, 1-852, and met his
former acquaintance, Limantour, there, and conversed with him about the
enormons claim which the latter was then about to assert, to almost the
whole of the lands claimed by the city in this case ; and yet, according to
Richardson's testimony, not a word was said between them as to the bounda-
ries of the Pueblo lands, or the limits of the village of Yerba Buena. Liman-
tour must have known that Richardson was the first settler at Yerba Buena>
and in conversing about the claim of the former to lands of such immense
value, bounding on the village, it is certainly a little strange that nothiDg
was said about the limits of the town. Richardson further testifies that when
Vioget was making his map of the village, in 1839, he (Richardson) was very
particular in pointing out to him the old limits, as defined on Richardson's
nap. Vioget remembers nothing of this, and says, on the contrary, that he
never saw or heard of Richardson's map until it was shown to him at Rich-
ardson's house, about a year ago, by Limantour. His position as a witness
is, to say the least of it, equivocal ; and if the facts he deposes to were really
important, (which they are not,) his testimony is entitled to but little weight.
On the whole, no testimony entitled to be seriously considered has been
offered by the Government, to rebut that adduced by the claimant. But
though the claim of the city, in my judgment, is satisfactorily established, it
is quite evident that very much of its most important documentary evidence
has been lost by the destruction and mutilation of the archives at Monterey,
and by the ravages of fire, and from carelessness or fraud in relation to the
archives in the Alcalde's office at San Francisco. The testimony of Capt.
Halleck is conclusive on this point. If, therefore, important links should be
wanting in the chain of documentary proof, its absence may be readily ac-
counted for by the facts already adverted to. Considering that the archives
at Monterey, for many weeks, were piled up in a loose heap, on the floor of a
room used as a hospital for soldiers and marines, and were used as waste pa-
per ; and in view of the fact that no provision was made by law for preserv-
ing the archives of the Alcalde's office, and that several destructive fires have
swept over that portion of the city in which the public offices were situated ;
the only matter of surprise is that we have been able to present so much doc-
umentary proof, and not that we have not offered more.
I conclude, therefore, that' we have fnlly established the fact that the
Pueblo was formed, and its limits defined, in November, 1834.
The next point to be considered is, whether or not the Governor and Ter-
hf
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ritorial Deputation had the lawful authority so to establish the Pueblo ; and
on this point I shall offer only a few remarks.
In the first place, it is a principle very often recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States, that "the acts of an officer to whom a public
duty is assigned by his Government, within the sphere of that duty, are
prima facice, taken to be within his power." (United States vs. Aredondo,
6 Pet. 691 ; United States vs. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51 ; United States vs-
Clarke, 8 Pet. 436.)
In Delassus vs. United States, (9 Pet. 134,) the Court says "A grant 4$ 0^1
concession made *&tf that officer, who is by law authorized to make it, carries
with it prima facice. evidence, that it is within his powers. No excess of
them, or departure from them, is to be presumed. He violates his duty by
such excess, and is responsible for it. He who alleges that an officer intrusted
with an important duty has violated his instructions, must show it."
So far has the principle been carried, that " where the act done is contrary
to the written order of the King, produced at the trial, without any explana-
tion, it shall be presumed that the power has not been exceeded ; that the act
was done on the motives set out therein, and according to some order known
to the King and his. officers, though not to his subjects." (Strother vs. Lucas,
12 Pet. 438.)
In United States vs. Percheman, (7 Pet. 95,) the Court says : " Papers
translated from a foreign language, respecting the transactions of foreign offi-
cers, with those powers and authorities we are not well acquainted, contain-
ing uncertain and incomplete references to things well understood by the par-
ties, but not understood by the Court, should be carefully examined before we
pronounce that an officer, holding a high place of trust and confidence, has
exceeded his authority."
In the case now under consideration, the act in question, to wit, the es-
tablishment of a new Pueblo, was done by the Governor and Territorial De-
putation, exercising the highest political power conferred upon any officer or
body politic in the Departments of the Mexican Republic. They were au-
thorized to grant lands, collect taxes, and by suitable laws provide for the
general welfare ; and by the act of the 17th of August, 1833, were specially
authorized to secularize the Missions and convert them into Pueblos. All
police and economic regulations were peculiarly within the sphere of their
powers, and I think it is evident that upon the principles established in the
decisions above quoted, the Court will infer that they had the power to do
what they have done. But if it be incumbent on us to show, in express
terms, the authority to perform the act, the task will not be a difficult one.
The decree of the Departmental Deputation ofthe 3rd of November, 1834,
directing the Governor to proceed to the election of an Ayuntamiento for the
new Pueblo is stated by Governor Figueroa, in his despatch to Vallejo of
the 4th of November, enclosing a copy of the decree, to have been predicated
on the powers conferred upon the Deputation by the law of the 23rd of June,
1813. The first section of that law is as follows
:
" Art. 1. It being the duty of the Provincial Deputations to see to the es-
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tablishment of Ayuntamientos in the Pueblos where there are none, in the
manner prescribed by article 335 of the Constitution, they shall take an ex-
act account of the number of inhabitants in each Pueblo where an Ayunta-
miento ie to be establissed, so that if of itself or with the adjoining district it
should have a population of one thousand souls, one be established immedi-
ately ; or if the population do not amount to that number, but for other rea-
sons of public utility it would be necessary to establish it, that the " expe-
diente" be formed proving this fact ; these proceedings and those which the
Deputation may form, having previously obtained the necessary information
from towns in the district, relative to the limits of the Pueblo where the new
Ayuntamiento is to be established, will be remitted by the Political Chief,
with the assent of the Deputation, to the Government."
This law continued in force after the independence of Mexico, and plainly
prescribed the duties of the Deputation, in the establishment of Ayuntamien-
tos in the new Pueblos. It may be argued, however, by the Law Agent,
that by this law the Deputation could only establish the Ayuntamiento where
the population of the new Pueblo of itself, or with the adjoining district,
amounted to one thousand souls ; and that otherwise the matter was to be
referred to the Government for its approval. Conceding, for the sake of the
argument, that this is the proper interpretation of the Act, I maintain, 1st,
that the Deputation is to decide the fact whether or not there is sufficient
population (to wit, 1000) to authorize the immediate establishment of the
Pueblo, and if it proceeds to establish it, the law will infer that it was prop-
erly done, and that the power was lawfully exercised. It is a familiar prin-
ciple, that where certain preliminary steps are to be taken by a public officer,
in the performance of a duty, he will be presumed to have done all that was
essential to give validity to the Act. When the Deputation therefore de-
cided to establish the Ayuntamiento, the law presumes it had taken all the
necessary preliminary steps for that purpose ; 2d, it is evident, that where
the population was ascertained to be less than one thousand, the Deputation,
under the law above quoted, was nevertheless to proceed to establish the
Ayuntamiento, if reasons of public utility demanded it ; in that event, how-
ever, transmitting a copy of its proceedings, and a statement of the limits of
the Pueblo, to the Government for its approval. In the meantime, until this
approval was had, the Ayuntamiento proceeded to perform its functions, and
until disapproved by the supreme Government, would continue in office as
fully in all respects as if its organization had been expressly ratified. I may
remark here also, without much digression, that the reference by Figueroa to
the Act of 23d June, 1813, as the authority for the proceedings of the De-
putation, affords another convincing proof of the formation of the Pueblo.
That portion of the Act which confers the authority, relates exclusively to
the establishment of Ayuntamientos in Pueblos where none before existed.
The proceeding, therefore, under this Act to establish an Ayuntamiento is a
distinct admission of the fact that there was a Pueblo requiring an Ayun-
tamiento.
Inasmuch, therefore, as it was incumbent on the Deputation and Political
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Chief to provide Ayuntamientos for new Pueblos, and in fact to administer
all the internal affairs of the department, there is no room to doubt that
they were fully authorized to establish new pueblos. The remote and isolated
condition of the frontier provinces rendered it indispensable that this powea
should be confided to the home functionaries, without the necessity of apply-
ing to the Supreme Government. It is scarcely probable, that in Califor-
nia, two thousand miles removed from the Capital of the Republic, no power
was delegated to the highest local functionaries to perform so unimportant
an act as the founding of a new pueblo for the convenience of the inhabitants,
or the benefit of trade and agriculture. On the breaking up of the Missions, as
we have seen, this power was expressly conferred, in reference to the Mission
establishments ; nor can it be doubted, I think, that the same power before
existed in reference to pueblos generally. In the case of the Missions, it
required a special delegation of authority, because the Mission lands had be-
fore then been excepted from such uses, and dedicated to another purpose.
This concludes all that I have to submit, in reference to the establishment
f of the Pueblo, and defining its boundaries.
• I proceed now to the last proposition, which I shall bring to the attention
of the Board, to wit : That on the 7th July, 1846, the town of Terba Bue-
.- na or San Francisco was in existence, and that by the 14th section of the
j . Act of Congress, of March 3d, 1851, organizing this Board, a grant will be
* 2 presumed.
The section above referred to, provides " that the provisions of this Act
shall not extend to any town lot, farm lot, or pasture lot, held under a grant
from any corporation or town to which lands may have been granted for the
* establishment of a town by the Spanish or Mexican Government, or the law-
. ful authorities thereof ; nor to any city, or town, or village lot, which city,
.* town or village existed on the 7th day of July, 1846, but the claim for the
[ , same shall be presented by the corporate authorities of the said town, or
where the land on which the said city, town or village was originally granted
to an individual, the claim shall be presented by or in the name of such in-
dividual ; and the fact of the existence of the said city, town or village on
the said 7th July, 1846, being duly proved, shall be prima faciae evidence of a
grant to such corporation, or to the individual under whom the said lot-hold-
ers claim."
In this provision the Government has exhibited another proof of its lib-
erality towards the towns and villages of the- newly acquired territory. It
has placed them upon a favored footing, and given them the fullest benefit of
all presumptions in their favor. As in 1812, they confirmed by a special act,
all the village claims in upper Louisiana, without any other proof of title
than that derived from prior occupancy, so in this enactment they require
no other proof of title to city, town, or village lots, than that the town ex-
isted at the time when the United States took possession of the country on
the 7th July, 1846. But it will be perceived that the Act provides for two
classes of cases, to wit : 1st, town lots, farm lots and pasture lots, " held un-
der a grant from any corporation or town to which lands may have been
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granted for the establishment of a town by the Spanish or Mexican Gov-
ernments or the lawful authorities thereof ;" and, 2nd, city, town or village
lots, " which city, town, or village existed on the 7th day of July, 1846."
In either case, the claim is not only to be presented by the corporate authori-
ties, but the fact that the town existed on the 7th July, 1846, will raise a
presumption of a grant. The question, however, will naturally arise, " a
grant for what ?" Is it for all the land claimed, or for that embraced by the
limits of the town as they were known and recognized or established by law
on the 7th July, 1846 ? The latter is my construction of the Act. If, for
example, the town claims under no grant from the former Government, and
is, therefore, entitled to no " farm lots" or " pasture lots," then its claim can
only extend to the limits of the town, as they were known or established on
the 7th July, '46. But, if it claims farm lots and pasture lots, by virtue of
an alleged grant, then on proving the limits embracing the said lots as the
same were known or established on the said 7th day of July, a grant shall
be presumed co-extensive with those limits. The Act can scarcely mean,
that where farm lots and pasture lots are claimed there must be actual proof
of a grant before the town can claim the benefit of the Act. If it could
establish the grant in proof, it would stand in no need of the presumption
which the Act raises in its behalf. It would rest upon the grant itself as a
sufficient title, and the section above quoted would be a mere nullity, so far
as it relates to this class of cases. It is obvious, I think, that where farm
lots and pasture lots are claimed, it is only incumbent on the town to prove
the boundaries of such lots as they were known or established on the 7th of
July, '46, and then the law will presume a grant to that extent. Any other
construction than this renders the Act a piece of useless verbiage, so far as
it affects farm lots and pasture lots. But Congress manifestly designed to
confer some especial benefit upon the claimants of farm and pasture lots. It
did not intend to say to them, " first prove you have a valid grant, and then
the law, as a special boon, shall presume a grant." It meant no such mock-
ery as this ; but simply, as before stated, that on proof of the boundaries as
they were claimed or known in July, '46, a grant shall be presumed for all
the land within the boundaries. That this is the proper construction, is
proved by the last clause of the section, which provides that " where any
city, town or village shall be in existence tf^-thiftime of passing this act,
| the claim for the land embraced within the limits of the same may be made
\ by the corporate authority of the said city, town or village." This clause
| establishes a third class of cases, to wit : those in which the city, town or
\ village did not exist on the 7th July, 1846, but did exist at the passage of
j
the Act. In the latter case, the claim might be presented by the corporate
! authorities ; but there was to arise no presumption of a grant. This is the
j
distinguishing feature between the last class and the two former ones ; and
I the reason is perfectly obvious, to wit : that when the towns existed, whilst
1 the country was under the dominion of Mexico, the United States would re-
quire no evidence of a grant, carrying out the same liberal policy which was
! extended by the Act of 1812 to the villages of upper Louisiana. But where
D
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the towns were purely of American growth, and sprung up after we took
possession of the country, there was no motive for the same liberality, and
no reason whatever why a grant should be presumed. I think this interpre-
tation of the Act is too obvious to require further argument, and I conclude
that in the case of farm and pasture lots, all that is needed to raise a pre-
sumption of a grant is, that they were claimed as such on the 7th July, 1846,
and to establish their boundaries as claimed.
But what is meant in the Act by " farm lots and pasture lots ?" The
Courts of Missouri have had considerable difficulty in determining what was
meant in the Act of 1812 by " town or village lots, out lots, common field
lots and commons, in, adjoining, and belonging to the several towns," &c.
The difficulty has arisen chiefly in construing the terms " out lots" and
" common field lots ;" but, as I do not propose to enter at length into a dis-
cussion of those terms, 1 refer the Board to the following cases, in which the
whole subject has been elaborately treated by the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri :
—
Page vs. Scheibel, 11 Mo. R. 167.
Harrison vs. Page, 16 Mo. R. 182.
Kissell vs. Schools, 16 Mo. R. 553.
Hammond vs. Schools, 8 Mo. R. 65.
Trotter vs. Schools, 11 Mo. R. 69.
Eberle w. Schools, 11 Mo. R. 247.
From an examination of these cases, it will appear, that in ascertaining
the meaning of those terms, reference must be had to the laws, usages and
customs of the former Government. When the Act of 1812 speaks of a
" common field lot," it of course intends to designate something which was
known by that description, under the customs and usages of the former Gov-
ernment. So when the Act of March 3d, 1851, speaks of " farm lots and
pasture lots" as appurtenant to a village, it necessarily refers to lands which,
according to the usages of the Mexican Government and people, come un-
der that designation. Congress evidently meant by that description what
would more properly perhaps have been designated as common lands and
municipal lands, (egidos and prOpios,) the former being used for pasturage
and the latter for cultivation. These were the only lands appurtenant to a
town, except garden lots (mmsHtn) and the inference is irresistible that it
was the •' egidos and propios" to which Congress refers as " farm lots and
pasture lots." Otherwise, these terms can have no effect as applied to a
Mexican village ; and considering that at the passage of the Act, we had
but recently acquired the country, and were not familiar with the tenure by
which village lands were held, the terms employed by Congress should not
be very accurately criticised, but should receive such a construction as will
most effectively carry out the liberal views entertained by the Government
in reference to these village claims. I conclude, therefore, that the terms
" fa*m lots and pasture lots" are synonymous with common lands and munici-
pal lands, or " egidos and propios." According to the views I have pre-
sented, it is incumbent on us, in order to come within the provisions of
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the 14th section, to prove two facts, to wit : 1st, that the town existed on
the 7th July, 1846, which has been proved and will not be denied ; 2d, that
at that date, there were "egidos and propios" claimed and known as such*
with defined limits, and which were appurtenant to the town. This fact, we
insist, has been conclusively established by the testimony of Vallejo, Hal-
leck, Rose, Ford, and others, as well as by the documentary evidence ; and
therefore, under the 14th section, the law will presume a grant to the extent
of those limits. Upon this ground we claim to be entitled to a confirmation
to the Vallejo line.
I have thus at great length, and perhaps with more minuteness of detail
than was necessary, presented my views of this important cause. But the
magnitude of the interests involved, and the numerous questions of law and
fact, (some of them novel and complicated in their character,) which have
arisen in the progress of the cause, must be my apology for the prolixity
with which I have discussed them. It is the first time in the history of the
United States, and perhaps of the world, when the title to all the real estate
in a city of fifty thousand inhabitants is to be submittd in a single cause to
a Judicial tribunal. In such a cause I am duly conscious of the vast re-
sponsibility which rests upon the counsel and the Court ; and having now to
the best of my ability, discharged my duty, I respectfully submit the cause
to the Board for its decision.
J. B. CROCKETT,
Of Counsel for Claimant.
San Francisco, 16th May, 1854.
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u THE LIMANTOUR CLAIM."
TO THE PUBLIC.
In the month of February, 1853, Jose Y. Limantour presented
his petition to the Honorable the Board of Land Commissioners
appointed to ascertain and settle private land claims in the
State of California, to have confirmed to him two certain tracts
of land, situate in the county of San Francisco. The lands
claimed were described in the petition.
Soon after Mr. Limantour had presented his petition to the
Board of Commissioners, the press called public attention to
the claim, published the petition, commented upon it with great
severity, and evinced an evident intent to prejudice the public
mind against it.
From that time to the present, there has occasionally
appeared, in some of the city papers, notices of the " Limantour
Claim," with hints, inuendoes and imputations of fraud or
forgery, or some other dark crime, as connected with it.
Not a few individuals, pretending to claim large tracts of very
valuable land within the boundaries of the Limantour claim,
have been busy in their street conversations, in denouncing the
claim as false and fraudulent.
While these charges have been freely made, unaccompanied
and unsustained by the slightest show of evidence, Mr,
Limantour has pursued the even tenor of his way, submitting
his papers and his documentary evidence, taking his proofs in
the legal form and preparing, in a quiet, unostentatious manner,
to submit his claim to the consideration of the enlightened
tribunal established by law to pass upon its validity.
Severe newspaper articles, false rumors and slanderous
imputations, he has not thought it worth his while, hitherto,
to notice. He does not feel that his duty to himself, considering
the right which he has, in common with all his fellow-men, to
protect his own good name and credit, nor that his duty to the
public requires him longer to remain silent ; he therefore instructs
the undersigned, his agent and attorney, to prepare a plain
statement of the facts of his case—to present therein, fairly, his
documentary and other evidence, that the same may be laid
before the public in a pamphlet form—that all who have an
interest or a desire, may refer to it for the purpose of satisfying
their own minds, from their own examination, of the truth and
validity—or the falsity and fraud of his claim to the lands
described in his petition.
In performing the duty required of the undersigned, by his
client, it is proper to inform the public who Senor Jose Yves
Limantour is, and briefly to state the business to which he has
devoted himself for the last fifteen years of his life.
He is by birth a Frenchman, and he still claims France as
the country to which he owes allegiance. His early life he
passed upon the sea, engaged in navigation and commerce.
In the year 1831, he came from France to the port of Vera
Cruz, in Mexico, and for several years subsequent to that period,
was engaged in commercial enterprises from his native country
to that, the most important Mexican port on the Gulf.
In the year 1836, Mr. Limantour came round into the Pacific,
and prosecuted his business along the coast of that ocean, from
Lima northward. Since the time last mentioned, this Pacific
coast has been the theatre of his navigating and commercial
operations.
In the month of September 1841, he made a voyage to the
ports of Mexico and Lower and Upper California.
On the 26th day of October, A. D. 1841, while attempting to
make the entrance of the Bay of San Francisco, he had the
misfortune to lose his vessel, the Ayucucho, on the point El
Reyes. His vessel was lost, but some portion of the cargo was
saved. By the aid and kind assistance of some people at
Saucelito, Sonoma and other places, his money, goods and
merchandize were saved from the wreck of his vessel, and he
was enabled to reach this place, then called Yerba Buena.
Mr. Limantour was detained here nearly a whole year, being
unable to procure a suitable vessel to get away, with safety to
himself and the property which he had secured from his lost ship.
I must request those who think proper to read this statement,
to note this date, viz : the last of October or first of November,
1841, when Mr. Limantour arrived here in Yerba Buena, as
then called, now San Francisco, and the fact of his detention
here until the autumn of the year 1842.
During his stay here he had abundant opportunity, and he
availed himself of it, to become intimately acquainted with this
wonderful Bay of San Francisco—the country around it, and
particularly with the little town of Yerba Buena—then just
beginning to assume some importance in the eye of an
experienced, practical navigator and a diligent, sagacious, skillful
merchant.
In December, A. D. 1841, while Mr. Limantour resided on
the then almost desert shore of Yerba Buena, a vessel came
into the Bay from Oregon with several of the officers of the
Hudson's Bay Company on board. Amongst the passengers
on that vessel was an agent of the French Government, Mr.
Duflot de Maufras, who had been sent on a special mission to
this coast with a view of enlightening them on the resources
and the importance of California and Oregon. M. Duflot de
Maufras, who has since published an elaborate and able work
on California, having learned on his arrival that there was a
countryman of his at Yerba Buena, sought him out and
imparted to him the impression he and the English officers
entertained of the importance of the Bay of San Francisco,
commercially, as well as politically, and the almost certainty of
the country soon belonging to England, which was anxious to
obtain it in payment of the debt due British capitalists by
Mexico. M. de Maufras remarked that the whole conversation
of the Hudson's Bay agents turned on that subject, and that if
6he, Mr. Limantour, " could obtain a grant of land on the Bay
of San Francisco, he would one day be as rich as a prince."
Mr. Limantour replied—" Since your conviction is so strong in
this respect, why don't you petition for them or buy them
yourself?" "It is impossible," rejoined M. Dufiot de Maufras;
" I wear the public livery—I am a public servant—I must go
through with the mission chalked out for me."
This conversation settled deep into Mr. Limantour's mind
and had a powerful influence with him in the bargain he
subsequently made for the purchase of the property he now
claims, and which is set forth in his petition in the case under
consideration.
During Mr. Limantour's stay at Yerba Buena, from October
1841, to the autumn of 1842, he learnt its whole history from
those longest and best acquainted with it. There was hardly a
person of any consequence residing here, or at the Mission
Dolores, or in the country immediately surrounding the Bay,
whom he did not know personally, and with whom he was not
on terms of intimate acquaintance. He understood their
language sufficiently to hold free and familiar intercourse with
all of them.
After a detention here of some eleven months, viz : until late
in the autumn of 1842, he succeeded in procuring a small vessel
from General M. G. Vallejo, and which, in honor of one of the
daughters of the General, he named " The Fanny." On this
small vessel he embarked the remainder of his goods and effects
and sailed down the coast, stopping at the ports of Monterey,
Santa Barbara and San Pedro.
It will not be improper here to say that Mr. Limantour, by
his energy as a navigator, and his indefatigable industry,
enterprise and skill as a merchant, had, at that time, become a
man of large property and abundant means. On his passage
down the coast in the autumn of 1842, he went into the port of
San Pedro, and there anchored his little craft on the first or
second day of January, A. D. 1843.
It is proper here to direct attention to another train of events
which had been going on for a few years previous to 1842, in
California and Mexico. In the years 1835 and 1836 California
had been agitated by some political dissensions. The Governors
who had been sent from Mexico, had been forcibly driven from
Upper California. In 1837 Upper California assumed, for a
short time, the attitude of an independent state, with Don Juan
B. Alvarado at its head.
Mexico, in order to preserve the Department of Upper Cali-
fornia in its connexion with the mother country, and to prevent
its separation therefrom, found it necessary to temporize for a
while, and thought it advisable to confer upon Seflor Don Juan
B. Alvarado the office of " Gefe politico," or Governor, by which
measure of policy the Home Government hoped to bring back the
revolting State to its former allegiance.
The measure was successful for the time being. Governor
Alvarado accepted the office tendered to him by the government
in power in Mexico ; acknowledged the Supreme Government
thereof, and thereby put an end to the " Independent State of
Alta California."
Governor Alvarado continued to exercise the functions of that
office until the year 1842. At this last date, viz. 1842, His Ex-
cellency Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, was at the height of his
power ; in fact, absolute Dictator of Mexico. His Excellency
Santa Anna, seized the occasion which was then afforded him,
by the local jealousies existing between some of the prominent
men in Upper California, to secure, more perfectly, that Depart-
ment to Mexico, by the appointment of Seflor Don Manuel
Micheltorrena, a general officer in the Mexican Army, a devoted
and unwavering friend of General Santa Anna, as Governor of
the Department of the Californias.
His Excellency President Santa Anna's instructions to Michel-
torrena, were issued on the 11th of February, A. D. 1842, in the
City of Mexico.
The Treasury of Mexico was then destitute of funds. The
Supreme Government were unable to furnish their recently ap-
pointed Governor with the means necessary to carry on the
Departmental Government. Micheltorrena was sent from Mexi-
co for the seat of his new Goverment in the summer of 1842.
He arrived in Upper California about September of that year.
He had under his command some four or five hundred men, who
8had been furnished him by Mexico, and who were called soldiers,
but he was almost entirely destitute of provisions, money, muni-
tions, means of transportation, or supplies of any kind for his
own support or that of his followers.
From the want of such supplies he was detained at the small
town of Los Angeles, in the south part of Upper California, for
some months. It,was while Governor Micheltorrena was thus
detained there, that Sefior Jose* Y. Limantour arrived in the port
of San Pedro with his little vessel, which he had purchased from
General Vallejo, as before stated.
The port of San Pedro is some twenty or twenty-five miles
from the town of Los Angeles.
The attentive reader will observe the relative position of Gov-
ernor Micheltorrena and of Mr. Limantour, in regard to place, at
the commencement of the year 1843.
The remaining part of this pamphlet will consist principally of
copies of the documentary evidence and other proofs now on file
before the Honorable the Board of Land Commissioners, which
Mr. Limantour has taken thus far in support of his claim, with
such brief notes as may be deemed important in explanation, and
for the more readily applying and understanding their force and
bearing.
To these documents and proofs Mr. Limantour solicits the
careful and scrutinizing attention of the public.
First—Attention is solicited to an original letter written by
Gov. Micheltorrena to Serior Don Jose* Y. Limantour, dated on
the 8th day of January, A. D. 1843, at the town of Los Angeles.
The original is on file ; its genuineness abundantly proved, as
will be seen by the certified copy from the Secretary of the Board
of Commissioners, and the following depositions. It is as follows
:
Snr D. Jose Y. Limantour.
Township of Los Angeles, January 8th, 1843.
Dear Sir:
Three months have nearly elapsed, since for want of
all species of resources, I have not been able to march my
troops towards the Capital. I am in a very wretched position.
Mr. D. Luis Vignes, a countryman of yours, has apprized me
9of your arrival, and that you have on board both money and
merchandise. I would be under obligations to you, if you
could let me have such money as is in your power, as well as
such of your merchandise, my troops and officers stand in need
of. I will give in payment, sight drafts, payable at Mazatlan,
by the house of Beecher & Co. I further promise to secure to
you the contracts of all that which the Department may require,
and also that which you may want for your vessel, to carry
a profitable trade. I will use my best endeavors so that you
realize great advantages. Should you prefer lands in this
country, I can give you such of them as you may select, which
are vacant, inasmuch as I have full powers to that effect in both
the Californias. And above all, that it is necessary for my
troops to live, and extricate ourselves from this wretched
condition.
If you can, Mr. Limantour, do me the /favor to call and see
me forthwith, we will talk over the offers I make and which I
hope you will accept.
I am desirous of the honor of conversing with you ; meanwhile,
I remain your polite servant, and affectionate friend, (B. S. M.)
MANL. MICHELTA.
The undersigned, principal Clerk of the Ministry of Foreign
Relations,
( Ministry of Re- \ Certify the signature of
I
lations, L. S. \ Sr. D. MANUEL MXCHELTORENA,
Former Governor and Commandant-
General of the Department of the Californias, found on the
reverse, to be authentic. Mexico, Oct. 29th, 1852.
Fees, four dollars. I. MIGUEL ARROYO.
No. 1738. Consulate of the U. S. of America,
Mexico, November 2nd, 1852.
I, the undersigned, for the city of Mexico, hereby certify that
the signature of I. Miguel Arroyo, subscribed to the foregoing
certificate, is in the proper hand-writing of said person, the same
as used by him in all his official acts, who is well known to me,
and was at the time of subscribing the same, first clerk of the
B
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Department of Interior and Foreign Relations of the Mexican
Government, and that all his official acts are entitled to full
faith and credence as such.
( Register F, folio 263. ) In testimony whereof, I have hereunto
\ Fees, $2. L. S. ) set my hand and affixed the Consular
Seal, the day and year first above written.
JOHN BLACK, Consul
I, George Fisher, Secretary of the Board of United States
Commissioners, to ascertain and settle the private land claims
in the State of California, hereby certify that the foregoing is a
true and correct translation of an original paper on file in this
office, in case No. 548, J. Y. Limantour, and in my charge and
keeping, as such Secretary.
"Witness my hand this twenty-third day of July, 1853.
(Signed) GEO. FISHER, Sec'y.
The second document is the application of Seflor Jose" Y.
Limantour to Governor Micheltorena, dated at the Pueblo de
Los Angeles, on the tenth day of January, A. D. 1843, in
which Mr. Limantour proposes to purchase for a price named,
the two tracts of land claimed in his petition. The original
of this document is found among some of the archives of the
former government, now in the possession and under the
custody of J. Gleason, Esq., the Deputy Clerk of Monterey
County. As to its genuineness, the reader will please to refer
to the depositions of Gomez and Hartnell, as also to the
corroborating testimony of Jimero and Francisco Arce, and
others hereinafter to be found.
[a. p.]
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TRANSLATION.
Seal of the fourth class, two reals.
Authorized provisionally by the Maratime Custom House of
the port of Monterey, in the Department of the Californias, for
the year Eighteen Hundred and Forty-Three.
(Signed) MICHELTORENA.
(Signed) MANUEL CASTANARES.
Custom House
Seal.
Jurisdiction of San Fran-
cisco,
Let this be remitted to
the competent justice, for
him to report whether the
two tracts of land men-
tioned in the present
memorial of the French
citizen, Joseph Liman-
tour, belong to private
persons, corporation or
community, and after the
corresponding investiga-
tions have been made,
let the Expediente be
returned for the necessary
ends which may be re-
quired.
Pueblo de los Angeles,
January llth, 1843.
(Signed)
MICHELTORENA.
Most Excellent Governor :
I, Joseph Y. Limantotjr, Captain
of the French Marine, before the justice
of your Excellency, do with due respect
make the following proposals :
First. That I will deliver to the
Departmental Treasury a receipt for the
sum of Four Thousand Dollars, on
account of a larger amount due me from
the public hacinda.
Second. That your Excellency will
be pleased to grant me for said receipt,
the ownership of the two tracts of vacant
land, whereof I accompany the plots, and
that in first in the land comprised from
the line of the Pueblo of Yerba Buena,
at the distance of four hundred varas
from Mr. William Richardson's old
established house ( casa fundadora,
)
towards the S. E., according to a rough
map which I have seen in said Richard-
son's house, and according to the
information of the inhabitants and the
justices of the peace, beginning at the
beach on the N. E. and following all the
edge of the beach, turning round Rincon
Point to the S. E. and following the Bay
to the mouth of the Mission Creek,
including the salt-water plains, and
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following the Canada to the S. W. to where the fresh water
runs for use, passing on the N. W. side about two hundred
varas from the Mission, until where the two leagues (a little
more or less) are completed from the N. E. and S. W., in
length and in breadth what there may be from the line of the
Pueblo from S. E. to N. "W. to the Kincon, as appears by the
plot which accompanies No. 1.
Third. Two leagues of land, a little more or less, beginning
on the beach of the Estacada, at the old anchorage of the port
of San Francisco, underneath the Castle, and following towards
the S. E., passing the Presidio—following the Mission road and
the line of the S. "W. to the beach which runs to the S. of the
port—taking said beach on the N. W., turning round Point
Lobos, and following to the N. E. all along the beach of the
Castle, leaving free the land occupied by said Castle—that is
to say, about two hundred varas, and following the beach to the
Estacada, where the accompanying plot No. 2 begins.
I therefore request that your Excellency will grant me in
payment of the said sum of Pour Thousand Dollars, the two
tracts of land above mentioned, under the express condition
that I may take possession of them when it may best suit me,
and without being under the obligation of subjecting myself to
any of the conditions prescribed by the colonization law,
because my object is to receive said lands not in the class of a
gratuitous grant for colonizing, but in the class of a real and
true purchase, so that I may sell them—and in fine, enjoy
them as may best suit me as my property.
Pueblo de los Angeles, January 10th, 1843.
(Signed) J. LIMANTOUR.
Angeles, February 25th, 1843.
The competent justice having taken and made all the
necessary steps and investigations respecting the two tracts of
land asked for by the French citizen, Joseph Limantour, and
the result being, that said two tracts of land are vacant—the
former situated one league, a little more or less, from the line of
the Pueblo of Yerba Buena (at the distance of four hundred
varas from the house of Mr. William Richardson) to the Bay, and
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two leagues N. E. S. W. a little more or less ;—the second, one
league, a little more or less, N. E. S. W., and one league and a
half in length, leaving free the land of the Castle, two hundred
varas (200 varas,) the said tracts of land mentioned by the said
Don Jose" Limantour, Captain of the French Marine, in his
petition are granted to him.
Let the title of ownership for the said two tracts of land be
made out, in consideration of the good services which he has
rendered to the Departntent.
(Signed) MICHELTORENA.
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify the foregoing to be a
true and faithful translation of the original document in the county
Recorder's office of Monterey county ; and I furthermore certify,
that I know the signatures of Manuel Micheltorena, and Joseph
Limantour, attached to said original, to be the genuine
signatures of the parties purporting to having signed the same.
(Signed) W. E. P. HARTNELL,
State Translator.
Monterey, 29th June, 1853.
I, George Fisher, Secretary of the Board of United States
Commissioners, to ascertain and settle the private land claims
in the State of California, hereby certify that the foregoing is a
full, true, and correct copy of a paper on file among the archives
of said Board, and in my care and custody, as such Secretary.
Witness my hand this 26th day of July, 1853.
(Signed) GEORGE FISHER, Sec'y.
A true copy of an original document in this office.
(Signed) GEO. FISHER, Sec'y.
The third document is a letter from Don Manuel Jimeno,
Secretary to Governor Micheltorena, written under the direction
of the Governor to Don Guillermo A. Richardson, Captain of
•the port of San Francisco, making inquiries in regard to the
lands which Mr. Limantour proposed to purchase, and for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or no the lands were vacant.
The letter is dated at Los Angeles, on the 14th day of January,
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1843. In connection with this letter, the reader will please to
consult the depositions of Jimeno, Richardson and Arce. The
original letter is on file, and its genuineness fully proved-
" His Excellency the Governor and Commandant General, de-
sires to have in view information of all the vacant lands, existing
in the margin ofthe bay of San Francisco, and those appertaining
to the " Pueblo de Yerba Buena." He requires of you an exact
information, accompanied with a plan <g>r map showing clearly
the desires of the Government itself, combining for the purpose
with the Judge of that jurisdiction. Captain Don Jose" Y.
Limantour has asked by way of payment, a grant of two leagues
long by one wide, a little more or less, in the lands that he says
do not appertain to the Puebla de la Yerba Buena, its boundaries
commencing about four hundred varas of from your house,
beginning from the side of the same beach, where it turns the
whole side to two hundred varas distant from the Mission, and
besides Capt. Limantour asks one league of land wide and one
and a half long, commencing from " laEstacada" on "fondeadaro
antique," taking along the beach to the N. W. turning to the
" Punta de Lobos," and following to the N. E. along the beach
of the castle, leaving the tract which said castle occupies, distant
two hundred " varas," and following the beach to the " Estacada,"
where it began.
Therefore his Excellency the Governor orders me to state
to you, that he relies on your theoretical and practical know-
lege, in order that you send the required information.
God and Liberty; Angeles, January 14, 1843.
(Signed) MANUEL JIMENO."
Senor Capitan of the Port )
of San Francisco, >
Don Guillermo A. Richardson. )
I, George Fisher, Secretary to the Board of U. S. Commis-
sioners to ascertain and settle the private land claims in Cali-
fornia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct
copy of a paper filed in case No. 548, (wherein Jose* Y. Liman-
tour is claimant,) endorsed " Translation of Exhibit No. 1, A. F."
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annexed to deposition of " Wm. A. Richardson," and among
the archives of said Board, in my care and custody as such
Secretary.
Given under my tiand, this 22d day of September, 1853.
GEORGE FISHER, Secretary.
The fourth Document to which attention is asked, is a private
letter from Sefior Jimeno to Mr. Limantour, dated at Los
Angeles on the 2d day.of February, 1843, relating to the same
business. The original is on file, and proved to be in Jimeno's
hand writing, it is offered to show the progress of the business in
regard to the land proposed to be purchased by Limantour.
Snr. D. Jose Limantour, Captain, Angeles, 2d February, 1843.
Dear Sir : I have received your polite letter, and have commu-
nicated it to the General, who is courteous to all, but having
asked certain informations, it will be good to delay for a few
days, and for you to call and see him. On my part I will do all
that lays in my power, and should I leave him, you will be well
recommended to my successor.
It will afford me pleasure to see you on your return from
Mexico ; meanwhile I remain your ob't. servant, &c. (B. S. M.)
MANUEL JIMENO.
I, George Fisher, Secretary of the Board of United States
Commissioners to ascertain and settle the private land claims in
the State of California, hereby certify that the foregoing is a
true and correct translation of an original paper on file in this
office, • (No. 548, J. Y. Limantour,) and in my charge and
keeping as such Secretary.
Witness my hand this 23d day of July, 1853.
GEORGE FISHER, Sec'ry.
If the reader will take time to reflect a moment upon the
foregoing documents, he will not fail to observe the dates of
each, and the place were they were written and executed.
On the eighth day of January, 1843, Micheltorena writes to
Limantour, soliciting in the most urgent manner, supplies of
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money and merchandise, and stating to Mr. Limantour that he
could repay in drafts—that he, the Governor, would recommend
him for government contracts ;—and last of all and above all,
stating to Mr. Limantour that he had full power to grant vacant
lands in the Californias, and would do so if he and Mr.
Limantour could negotiate. On the tenth of January, 1843,
Mr. Limantour makes his application to purchase the two tracts
of land now claimed by him in this case. On the eleventh of
January, 1843, Governor Micheltorena makes his order for the
inquiry, to ascertain if the lands which Mr. Limantour proposes
to purchase, are vacant. On the fourteenth Jan'y, 1843, Jimeno
addresses the letter of inquiry to Richardson, and on the
twenty-fifth of February, 1843, Governor Micheltorena completes
the expediente by saying, as in document No. 2, hereinbefore
set forth, that " the compstent justice had taken the necessary
" steps and investigations respecting the said two tracts of land
" asked for by the French citizen, Jose* Limantour, and the result
" being, that they were vacant," &c. " The said two tracts of
"land mentioned by the said Don Jose" Limantour, in his
" petition are granted to him. Let the title of ownership for
" the said two tracts of land be made out in consideration of
" the good services which he has rendered to the Department."
Now, here comes the grant itself—executed in the town of
Los Angeles, on the twenty-seventh day of February, A. D«
1843. Approved by the proper minister, connected with the
Supreme Government of Mexico, on the eighteenth day of
April, A. D. 1843. Read it—and say, who can, that my client
is attempting to make available a false, fraudulent or simulated
claim. The original document is on file with the Secretary of
of the Board of Commissioners. It has been there for months.
The genuineness of the signature of Governor Micheltorena
thereto, has been abundantly proved. The most virulent
opposer of the claim admits its genuineness, and hitherto not
one scintilla of evidence has been offered to impeach the
genuineness or validity of this document.
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FIRST STAMPS. EIGHT DOLLARS.
Legalized temporarily, by the Maritime Custom House, of the
port of Monterey, in the Department of the Californias, for the
year One Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty-Three.
(Signed) MICHELTORENA.
(Signed) MANUEL CASTA&ARES.
( Maritime Custom House ) The citizen, Manuel Michelto-
I of Monterey. \ rena, Brigadier General of the
Mexican Army, Adjutant GenH of the Staff of the same, Governor
and Commandant General of the Department of the Californias
:
Whereas, Don Jose Y. Limantour
Captain of the French Navy, and a
denizen of the Department has negotiated,
in consideration of loans, in merchandise
and ready money, which he has made to
this Government at different times, to
obtain the grant of the land contained
from the line of the Pueblo de la Yerba
Buena, distant four hundred varas from
the settlement house (casa fundadora) of
Don William Richardson to the south-
east, beginning on the beach at the north-
east and following it along its whole edge
(margin,) turning round the point of
Rincon to the south-east, and following
the bay as far as the mouth of the estuary
of the Mission, including the deposits of
salt water and following the valley
(Canada) to the south-west, where the
fresh water runs, passing to the north-
west side, about two hundred varas from
the Mission to where it completes two
leagues north-east and south-west to the
Rincon as represented by the plat
(diseno) No. 1, which accompanies the
Expediente.
Second. Two leagues of land, more.
April \Sth, 1843.
The Supreme Provis-
ional Government of the
Mexican Republic, in the
exercise of the extraordi-
nary powers, with which
it is invested, and taking
into consideration the
good services rendered
I by the French citizen,
Don. J. Y. Limantour,
ratifies and approves the
grant made—based upon
preexisting lawful provis-
'ions, and granted to the
local authority of Califor-
nia, and by which it con-
firms the property granted
j of the vacant lands, which
this document makes
^mention, which is return-
led to the party interested.
(Signed)
BOCANEGRA.
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or less, beginning on the beach of the "Estacada" at the
ancient anchorage of the port of San Francisco, below the
Castle (castilio,) following to the south-east, passing the
" Presidio " (military post)—following the road of the Mission,
and the line to the south-west as far as the beach which runs to
.
the south from the port, taking the said beach to the north-west,
turning round the Point Lobos and following to the north-east,
along the whole beach of the Castle (castilio,) two hundred
varas, and following the beach as far as the " Estacada," where
begins the plat (diseiio) No. 2. Having previously instituted
!
the suitable proceedings and investigations, and resulting from
them, that the two before mentioned tracts of land are vacant,
exercising the authority with which I am invested, in the name
of the Mexican nation, I have resolved to make him a complete
and absolute grant of the said two tracts of land, that he may
enjoy them in the manner and when it may suit him, declaring
them by these present letters his legal property. In consequence
whereof, he may occupy the mentioned two tracts of land when
it may most suit him, destining them to such use or culture as i
may best accommodate him. In consequence whereof, I;
command that the present title, being held firm and valid, a
record of the same be made in the office of the Secretary
of the Despatch, and that it be delivered to the party interested
for- his security.
Given in the town of Los Angeles, the twenty-seventh day
of February One Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty-Three.
(Signed) MANUEL MICHELTORENA.
{L.S.}
The undersigned, chief clerk of the Department of the Interior
and Foreign Relations, certifies that the signatures of
Bocanegra, who was Minister of Relations, and that of Manuel
Micheltorena, who was Governor and Commandant General of
the Department of the Californias, which appear in this
document, are genuine signatures.
(Signed) I. MIGUEL ARROYO.
Mexico, October 29, 1852.
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No. 1751. Consulate of the United States of America,
Mexico, November 2nd, 1852.
I, the undersigned, Consul of the United States of America,
for the city of Mexico, hereby certify that the signature of
I. Miguel Arroyo, subscribed in the foregoing certificate, is in
the proper hand-writing of said person, the same as used by
him in all his official acts, who is well known to me, and was
at the time of subscribing the same, first clerk of the
Department of Interior and Foreign Relations of the Mexican
Government, and that all his official acts are entitled to full
faith and credit as such.
j Register F, Folio 264. ) In testimony whereof, I have hereunto
\ Fees, $2. L. S. ) set my hand, and affixed the Consular
Seal, the day and year first before written.
(Signed) JOHN BLACK, Consul.
I, George Fisher, Secretary to the Board of United States
Commissioners to ascertain and settle the private land claims
in the State of California, hereby certify the foregoing to be a
true and correct translation of an original paper on file in this
office, in case No. 548, Jose Y. Limantour, and in my care and
custody, as such Secretary.
Witness my hand this 26th day of July, 1853.
(Signed) GEORGE FISHER, Sec'y.
A true copy of an original on file.
GEORGE FISHER, Sec'y.
In the foregoing pages, the correspondence between Governor
Micheltorena and Senor Limantour, and the correspondence by
| the Secretary of the Governor, making inquiries about the
\ lands—the orders and decrees of the Governor—the original
i grant of the two tracts of land to Senor Limantour, by
'Governor Micheltorena, together with the approval of the
I
Supreme Governor of Mexico of the grant, with the certificates
(of the chief clerk of the Department of the Interior and
i Foreign Relations, and of the American Consul at Mexico,
(have all been laid before the public.
The next document is a copy of a communication written by
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order of the most Excellent Senor President Santa Anna—by
his Minister of Exterior Relations and Government—Bocanegra,
to His Excellency Don Manuel Micheltorena, approving of the
grants which had been made to Senor Limantour, and also
granting permission for further grants to him of city, town or
country property by the said Governor of the Californias.
This document bears date in the city of Mexico on the seventh
day of October, 1843, and the copy on file, verified by Governor
Micheltorena and Secretary Jimeno, is dated the twenty-fifth of
December, 1843. The proof of this document will be found
in the second deposition of Mr. W. E. P. Hartnell.
The document is as follows :
—
FIRST STAMP. EIGHT DOLLARS.
Provisionally legalized by the Maritime Custom House of the
port of Monterey, in the Department of the Californias, for the
year One Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty-Three.
MICHELTORENA.
MANUEL CASTAftARES.
Stamp.
Manuel Micheltorena, Brgadier General of the Mexican Army,
Adjutant General of the Staff of the same, Governor, and
Commandant General of the Department of the Californias
:
I certify that by the last mail arrived from the interior, I have
received a note of the following tenor
:
" Ministry of Exterior Relations and Government."—Account
having been given to the Most Excellent Senor President of the
official note of Your Excellency dated the 24th Feb. last, wherein
you enclosed the memorial which Don Jose* Y.Limantour, Captain
of the French marine, made to this Government in order to
acquire property in that portion of the frontier, His Excellency
in consideration of the good deportment and services, which this
foreign individual has rendered to that very Department, and
conformable with Article 9th, of the Decree of the 11th of March
of the year last past, whereby the Government reserved to itself
the power of granting to foreigners that sort of permission, has
been pleased to grant to him, the said Limantour, sufficient
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leave, that he may acquire, besides the property which he has
already acquired and have been recognized by the Supreme
Government, further country, town or any other property, con-
formably with the said decree, and other laws of colonization,
which I have the honor to communicate to Your Excellency for
your knowledge, and the purposes regarding thereto
;
presenting
to Your Excellency again, the assurances of my high estima-
tion and distinct esteem.
God and Liberty. BOCANEGRA.
Mexico, October 7, 1843.
To His Excellency the Governor and Commandafite
General of the Department of the Californias. And at the
request of said Limantour I grant these presents, containing a
legal copy, the original remaining in the archives of the Govern-
ment, which (copy) in testimony I sign with the Secretary of
Despatch in Monterey, the 25th December, 1848.
(Signed) MANUEL MICHELTORENA.
(Signed) MANUEL JIMENO.
I, George Fisher, Secretary of the United States Land Com-
mission to ascertain and settle private land claims in the State
of California, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and
correct translation of a Spanish document in the case No. 548,
(Jose Y. Limantour,) now on file in this office.
(Signed) GEORGE FISHER, Sec'y.
San Francisco, October, 1853.
Having presented the foregoing documents, I propose now to
submit to the public for examination and full and mature
consideration, perfect and entire copies of the depositions taken
hitherto in support of the claim of Senor Limantour, to the two
tracts of land mentioned in the deed of Governor Micheltorena
to him, dated February 27th, 1843, and herein before set forth.
The first deposition is that of Senor Don Manuel Jimeno.
In regard to this deposition of Senor Jimeno, in justice to
myself I ought to say that it was taken within a very few days
after the petition of Senor Limantour was filed with the Secretary
of the Board of Land Commissioners. I had only a short time
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to examine the papers of my client, and was much embarrassed
in my investigations of his cause, by not being able at that time,
to read the Spanish language with facility, or to converse freely
with a witness who spoke no other. Senor Jimeno- was about
leaving California for the City of Mexico, on the 15th of Feb'y.
1853, when his deposition was taken, and I was obliged to take
his deposition somewhat in a hurry, and before I had obtained
that full knowledge of all the facts and documents relating
thereto, which I have acquired since that time. I can only say
that I should be most happy if I could now have the opportunity
of a further examination of Senor Jemino ; a witness so intelli-
gent, honest and conscientious,—with the advantage I should
now have of calling his attention to various original letters,
papers, documents and books in the archives of the former
Government, the existence of which I did not know at the time
his deposition was taken. This witness is not in California, and
has not been to my knowledge since February, 1853, and I do
not know as it will be in my power to get his further testimony.
His deposition is submitted as follows:
San Francisco, Feb. 15th, 1853.
On this day, before Commissioner H. I. Thornton, came
Manuel Jimeno, a witness in behalf of the claimant, Jose" Y.
Limantour, petition No. 548, and was duly sworn, his evidence
being interpreted by the Secretary.
QUESTIONS BY CLAIMANT.
Question 1.—What is your name, age and place of residence?
Ansiver.—My name is Manuel Jimeno—my age forty-nine
years, and my residence in Monterey county.
Question 2.—Do you know Don Manuel Micheltorena,
formerly Governor of California, and do you know Jose* Y.
Limantour, the petitioner in this case ? -
Answer.—I am acquainted with both these persons.
Question 3.—Do you know if those two persons were together
in the city of Los Angeles in Upper California, in the winter of
1842 and 1843. If yes, state if you know that negotiations
were at that time going on between' them, and what were those
23
negotiations about. Please to state all you know about that
matter ?
Answer.—I know that those persons, Micheltorena and
Limantour were at the city of Los Angeles at the close of the
year 1842, and the beginning of the year 1843 ; as to the
business between those persons, I know that Limantour sold on
credit to Micheltorena for the use of the army goods, in payment
of which he received drafts on the Custom House at Mazatlan
and on the Government of Mexico, as I understood from Mich-
eltorena. I understood that he was soliciting from Micheltorena
grants of land, but I do not know whether he obtained them.
Question 4.—Did you leave Los Angeles before they
completed their negotiations?
Answer.—1 left there in the commencement of the year 1843,
and • before they had concluded the business they were
negotiating.
Question 5.—Do you know whether Micheltorena was
procuring money for the use of himself and his forces from
Limantour, as well as goods ?
Answer.—I know that Micheltorena received money from
Limantour, but I don't recollect how much.
Question 6.—At what time of the year 1843, did Governor
Micheltorena arrive at Monterey ?
Answer.—About the month of August, of that year, as I think,
I am not positive.
Question 7.—After Governor Micheltorena arrived in Monterey
in the year 1843, did you understand from the Governor
aforesaid, that he had made a grant of land to Limantour in
consideration of the goods and moneys that Limantour had
furnished to him ?
Answer.—I did not so understand from Micheltorena.
Question 8.—Have you at any time understood from Governor
Micheltorena that he had granted to Limantour lands adjoining
the Pueblo Yerba Buena and Mission Creek, and also in the
neighborhood of the Presidio ?
Answer.—I have never heard him say so.
Question 9.—Have you ever known from the archives of the
Government of California of the grants of land by Governor
24
Micheltorena to Limantour, adjoining the Pueblo Yerba Buena
and near the Presidio ?
Answer.—I understand that Limantour petitioned for land,
but I do not know that the grant was made. I recollect that
information was asked for some lands that Limantour petitioned
for. I, as Secretary, asked for this information, but of what
authority I asked this information, I do not recollect.
CROSS QUESTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES LAW AGENT.
Question 1.—When did Micheltorena first arrive in Monterey?
Answer.—I believe it was in the month of August.
Question 2.—Did you see the Governor from the time you
left him at Los Angeles, until he arrived in Monterey ?
Answer.—I did not see him during that time.
Question 3.—Did Micheltorena have a Secretary at Los
Angeles, and if so, who was it?
Answer.—He had. It was Don Francisco Arce.
Question 4.—Do you know if Micheltorena made any grants
of land at Los Angeles after you left ?
Answer.—He did make many.
Question 5.—Were Expedientes kept of these grants ?
Ansiver.—In some of those grants there were no Expedientes
found in the office—in others, there were.
Question 6.—Was a registry kept of all those grants made
by Micheltorena?
Ansiver.—In some there was no such registry.
Question 7.—Do you recollect to whom any of the grants
made by Micheltorena at Los Angeles were given ?
Ansiver.—One of them was made to Mariana Guadalupe
Vallejo, of the place called Rancho National. I don't recollect
any others, though there were several persons.
Question 8.—When did you see Limantour next after leaving
at Los Angeles ?
Ansiver.—I saw him frequently in Monterey, but do not
recollect the time. He used to come there often with his vessel.
Question 9.—Did Limantour himself tell you that he had
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received from Micheltorena grants of land near San Francisco ?
Answer.—I have heard him say that the Governor did attend
to his petition. I did not understand Limantour to say
positively that he had received a grant from Micheltorena.
(Signed) MANUEL JIMENO.
U. S. Law Agent present.
.Sworn to and subscribed before me, this fifteenth day of
February, 1853.
HARRY I. THORNTON,
Commissioner.
I, George Fisher, Secretary of the Board of United States
Commissioners, to ascertain and settle private land claims in
the State of California, hereby certify that the foregoing is a
full, true and correct copy of a paper on file, among the
archives of said Board, and in my care and custody, as such
Secretary.
Witness my hand this twentieth day of October, A. D. 1853.
GEORGE FISHER, Sec'y.
The next deposition is that of SeSor Don Vicente Prefect©
Gomez. His testimony relates to the document found in the
archives at Monterey, and is what is termed the Expediente,
consisting of Sefior Limantour's proposal to purchase the two
tracts of land adjoining Yerba Buena and near the Presidio,
—
dated January 10th, 1843 ; and Governor Micheltorena's decrees
thereon, of the 11th of January, 1843, and 25th of February,
1843. It is the second document hereinbefore set forth on
the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth pages of this pamphlet.
San Francisco, July 6th 1853.
On this day before Commissioner Alpheus Felch, came Vicente
Prefecto Gomez, a witness on the part of Jose" Y. Limantour,
claimant in case No. 548, and was duly sworn, his evidence
being interpreted by the Secretary.
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The United States Associate Law Agent was present,
QUESTIONS BY GENERAL WILSON, ATTORNEY FOR THE CLAIMANT.
• Question 1.—What is your name, age and place of residence,
and how long have you lived at your present place of residence ?
Answer.—My name is Vicente Perfecto Gomez. I am about
thirty years of age, and live at Monterey, where I have resided
since the year that Micheltorena went to Monterey.
Question 2.—Was you with Governor Micheltorena at Los
Angeles, and if so, in what capacity was you with him there ?
Ansvjer.—At Los Angeles I was with him in my individual
capacity, and had no official position. I was with Micheltorena
while he was at Monterey and was one of the clerks in the
Governor's office, and also in the Departmental Treasury.
Question^.—Have you ever seen any papers or documents
purporting to be a petition made by Don Jose Y. Limantour to
Don Manuel Micheltorena, Governor of California, soliciting a
tract of land adjoining the Pueblo of Yerba Buena, and any
order of Governor Micheltorena on said petition.
Ansiver.—I have seen it, and I know where the original is in
the hand-writing of Mr. Limantour, and the order is in the
hand-writing of Governor Micheltorena, written without the
intervention of any other person.
Question 4.—When did you first see these papers ?
Answer.—In the year 1843.
Question 5.—Where did you see them at that time ?
Ansiver.—In the Secretary's office of Governor Micheltorena.
Question 6.—Since giving your answer to the former inter-
rogatories, have you seen the said original papers again?
Ansiver.—I have. I saw them at Monterey on the 29th June
last, in the afternoon of that day.
Question 7.—Please look at the paper here presented, marked
" Exhibit A," and say if it is a true and certified copy of the
original paper and document referred to in your former answer ?
Answer.—It is. It is copied faithfully from the original and
is in my own hand-writing. It is certified by the Recorder of
the county of Monterey, at my own request.
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Question 8.—You say that you first saw the original in the
office of the Secretary of the Governor in 1843. Please to
state the circumstances under which you first saw the original
papers in the office of the Recorder of Monterey ?
Answer.—At the request of Jose Castro, I went to the office
of the Recorder to examine the papers in reference to some
property which he had ' at San Juan Bautista. On that
examination, looking over the old archives in search of the
documents required, I found these papers. After finding these
papers, I put them back again into the bundle, and put the
bundle back again. I went and got Dr. Olarte of Monterey,
to go with me to the Recorder's office. 1 then, in presence of
Olarte, made a copy of the documents. The Recorder
afterwards compared the copy with the original most scrupu-
lously, and then certified it. After I first found the paper I went
and consulted Jose" Abrigo, and he advised me to take a copy
of it, which I did, as I have above stated, and which is the
paper marked " Exhibit A."
QUESTIONS BY MR. GREENHOW, LAW AGENT.
Question 1.—When you saw the papers at the Recorder's
office at Monterey, did you recollect of ever seeing it before ?
Answer.—I did recollect of seeing it before. I was attached
to the Secretary's office of Governor Micheltorena and recol-
lected having seen it at that time, having known the party, Mr.
Limantour, also at that time.
Question 2.—Had you any intercourse with Mr. Limantour
since his last arrival in California and prior to your finding
these documents ?
Answer.—I had not, and if Mr. Abrigo's son had not pointed
out to me Mr. Limantour at the Washington Hotel in San
Francisco, I should not have known him:
Question 3.—Whose hand-writing appears on the original
papers ?
Answer.—No other hand-writing appears on the original
papers but Mr. Limantour's and Governor Micheltorena's.
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Question 4.—Did yon recognize Mr. Limantour's hand-writ-
ing when you first saw it, from your recollection of it ?
Answer.—I did not the hand-writing of Mr. Limantour, but
I did that of Micheltorena.
Question 5.—Did you find at the Recorder's office any of the
papers of which you were in search for Mr. Castro ?
Answer.—I did not look for them any longer after I found
those of Mr. Limantour's.
Question 6.
—
"Was the Recorder or any one else present when
you found these papers ?
Answer.—The Recorder was present when I found them. He
was at that time conversing with me and standing off a little at
one side.
Question 7.—Did you say any thing to the Recorder about it
at the moment when you found the papers ?
Answer.—I did not say any thing to him ; when I found the
papers I put them back immediately and did not say any thing.
Question 8.—Had you examined the said papers often before ?
Answer.—Since the American Government has taken pos-
session of this country I have not been in any office. While
the Mexican Government existed here I often examined these
papers, but since the Americans took possession I have never
examined them.
Question 9.—Before the Americans took possession where
were these papers kept ?
Answer.—All I can say conscientiously is, that these papers
ought to have been in the office of the Secretary of State of
the Departmental Government while the Mexican Government
existed here, but I believe these papers have got into the office
of the Justice of the Peace by some accident, during the revo-
lution with Micheltorena, or during the American war.
(Signed) VICENTE PERFECTO GOMEZ.
Sworn and subscribed before me this sixth day of July, A. D.
1853. That portion of this deposition which precedes the 6th
Question on the part of the claimant, was taken on the 23d
June, 1853, and the remaining portion on the day last above
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written. Mr. Greenhow, the Law Agent, was present during
the whole time of taking the deposition.
ALPHEUS FELCH,
Commissioner.
I, George Fisher, Secretary to the Board of Commissioners,
to ascertain and settle the private land claims in California, do
hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy
of the deposition of Vicente Perfecto Gomez, filed in Case No.
548, wherein Jose Y. Limantour is claimant, among the archives
of said Board, and in my care and custody as such Secretary.
Given under my hand at the city of San Francisco this 19th
day of October, A. D. 1853.
GEO. FISHER, Sec'y.
The next two depositions are made and sworn to by W. E.
P. Hartnell, Esq. It is entirely unnecessary to inform any body
who has known the public men of California for the last quarter
of a century, who he is. Every body knows him ; every body
respects, honors and esteems him. His word is truth—always.
He is incapable of having any thing to do with falsehood or
fraud in any form, and no man in his senses, would ever dream
of asking W. E. P. Hartnell to verify a spurious or simulated
paper or document.
The documents referred to in these depositions are as fol-
lows, viz:
Exhibit No. 1, in the 1st Deposition, is the Expediente found
in the archives at Monterey, viz : Limantour's proposition to
purchase the lands, with Governor Micheltorena's decrees of the
11th January and the 25th February, 1843 thereon.
Exhibit No. 2, is the original letter from Governor Michelto-
rena to Senor Limantour, dated on the 8th of January, 1843,
written at Los Angeles.
Exhibit No. 3, is the original letter written by Manuel Jimeno
to Senor Limantour dated Los Angeles, February 2d, 1843.
Exhibit No. 4, is the original deed from Governor Michelto-
rena to Senor Limantour, dated February 27, 1843.
Exhibit No. 1, annexed to the 2d deposition of Mr. Hartnell,
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is the copy of the approval by the Supreme Government of
Mexico, of the grants made by Governor Micheltorena to Sefior
Limantour, dated at Mexico on the 7th day of October, A. D-
1843, and certified by Governor Micheltorena and Secretary
Jimeno on the 25th day of December, 1843.
San Francisco, July 14, 1853.
At this day, before Commissioner Alpheus Felch, came W.
E. P. Hartnell, a witness produced in behalf of Jose" Y. Liman-
tour, claimant in Case No. 548, and was duly sworn, his evi-
dence being given in the English language.
The United States Law Agent and Assistant Law Agent
were notified and attended.
QUESTIONS BY GEN. WILSON, ATTORNEY FOR CLAIMANT.
Question 1.—What is your name, age and place of residence?
Answer.—My name is W. E. P. Hartnell, my age fifty-five
years, and I reside at Monterey in California, and I have resided
at that place thirty-one years.
Question 2.—What offices did you hold under the govern-
ment while Mexican authority continued in Upper California ?
Answer.—1 have held a great many; among others I was
Inspector General of the Missions. I have been Appraiser of
the Custom House, Collector of the Custom House and Regi-
dor, and acting Alcalde. I was Director of a College two years
and a half.
Question 3.—Please look at the papers here shown to you,
marked at the top of the first page A. F., and also on the back
as " Exhibit No. 1," and say if it is in your hand-writing ; is it
as you have certified, a true translation of the original papers
which you refer to in your certificate written thereon ?
Ansvjer.—I have looked on it. It is in my hand-writing, and
is a true translation of the paper referred to in my certificate
written on it.
Question 4.—Where is the original paper now, according to
the best of your knowledge and belief?
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Answer.—I believe it to be in the Recorder's office at Mon-
terey. The Recorder's name is James Gleason.
Question 5.—State what you know of said original papers,
when and where you first saw it, the circumstances which
called your attention to it.
Answer.—The first time I saw it was about a month or six
weeks ago. The Recorder first called my attention to it. He
said he had in his possession a paper respecting Mr. Liman-
tour's claim, which he believed to be original, and desired me to
look and give my opinion.
Question 6.—Have you seen Jose" Y. Limantour write, and
have you seen Don Manuel Micheltorena write, and are you
acquainted with their hand-writing ? If yes, state whose hand-
writing appears on said original paper, as well the body of the
writing as the signature.
Answer.—I have seen both of them write, but Manuel Michel-
torena much more frequently than Limantour. The body of
the petition in said original paper and the signature thereto, are,
I believe, in the hand-writing of the said Limantour ; and both
the body and the signature of the two Decrees in said original
paper I know to be in the hand-writing of said Micheltorena.
Question 7.—From your examination of said original paper
have you any doubt of the genuineness of the signatures of
those persons or of the paper itself ?
Ansiver.—I have no doubt whatever.
Question 8.—How long have you been acquainted with Don
Jose Y. Limantour ? Did you know of his being on terms of
intimacy and having extensive business transactions with Don
Manuel Micheltorena while he was Governor of California ?
Answer.—J have known Mr. Limantour since the year 1841
or 1842. I know he was very intimate with Micheltorena, and
had several business transactions with him.
Question 9.—Look at the paper here presented, marked at the
top of the first page with the initials " A. F." and on the back
" Exhibit No. 2," and state whether you know the hand-writing
of the body of the letter and the signature thereto.
Answer.—I know them both to be in the hand-writing of
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Manuel Micheltorena. I know nothing of the hand-writing of
the certificate on the back of the letter.
Question 10.—Look on the paper here presented, marked at
the top thereof with the initials " A. F." and on the back thereof
as " Exhibit No. 3," and say whether you know the hand-writing
of the body of the paper and the signature.
Answer.—They are in the hand-writing of Manuel Jimeno
both the body of the letter and the signature. Manuel Jimeno
was Secretary to Governor Micheltorena.
Question 11.—Look on the document here presented, marked
at the top of the first page u A. F." and on the back as " Ex-
hibit No. 4," purporting to be the original deed from Manuel
Micheltorena, Governor of California, to Don Jose Y. Liman-
tour, dated at Los Angeles on the twenty-seventh day of Feb-
ruary in the year eighteen hundred and forty-three, and say
whether the signature of Don Manuel Micheltorena thereto is
genuine.
Answer.—It is the signature of Manuel Micheltorena.
Question 12.—Please state what you know of the manner in
which the public archives were kept while the Mexican authority
continued in Upper California, and during the various revolu-
tions and disturbances which occurred during the latter part of
the Mexican rule, and at the time and subsequent to the Ameri-
cans taking possession.
Answer.—I knew the archives to be in several different houses
in Monterey. I also knew them to be moved from Monterey
to Los Angeles, and to be returned again to Monterey. After
they were returned to Monterey, I knew them to be thrown into
a confused heap into the Custom House. This was about the
the time Americans took possession of the country. I was desired
by General Kearny to have the archives removed into the
Government office for the purpose of having them arranged ; in
consequence whereof several cart-loads were transferred into
the Government office. This was the same buildinsr in which
is now the Recorder's office at Monterey. I likewise knew that
several documents belonging to the Government Archives have
been found in the Alcalde's offices at Monterey, and many in
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the hands of private persons, some of which I myself have
placed in the archives by order of Governor Mason, giving the
parties in lieu thereof certified copies or translations of the same.
"Whenever any such document was restored to the archives, it
was always endorsed either by the Governor, by Mr. Halleck,
who was Secretary, or by myself, with the date and name of
the person by whom it was deposited.
Question 13.—Did you see Mr. Limantour at Monterey, from
the time the Americans took possession of the country, until
since you saw the original document in the Recorder's office at
that place, of which document you have made the translation,
as above in this deposition stated.
Answer.—To the best of my recollection, I did not see him
there during that time.
QUESTIONS BY MR. GREENHOW, ASSISTANT LAW AGENT, AND MR.
HOWARD, LAW AGENT.
Question 1.—Look at the original deed marked " A. F." and
" Exhibit No. 4," and say whether you consider the rubricas of
Micheltorena and Manuel Castarlares, affixed to the stamp on
the first page to be genuine ?
Answer.—The rubrica of Micheltorena is not so clearly made
as his rubricas in general are, but I have no motive for
supposing either of the two rubricas to be forgeries. When
the Governors of California had to put their rubricas to stamped
paper, there were placed before them at times some hundred
sheets, and they were necessarily careless how they made their
rubricas.
.
Question 2.—Look at the writing of the body of said
document, and say whether you are acquainted with the hand-
writing ?
Answer.—I do not know the hand-writing.
Question 3.—When did you first see the paper above
mentioned marked " A. F." and " Exhibit No. 4."
Answer.—I saw it to-day for the first time.
Question 4.—What has been your opportunity of knowing
about the existence of grants of land in California ?
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Answer.—During the whole time of the existence of the
military government here, under the United States, I had the
situation of Government Translator, and I made an Index of
all the California land titles which I could find. I had nothing
to do with the Government Archives under the Mexican
Government.
Question 5.—When did you first hear of the existence of the
above described grant to Mr. Limantour ?
Answer.—I first heard of it lately by public rumor, since Mr.
Limantour came to San Francisco to make his claim.
Question 6.—How many times have you seen Mr. Limantour
in California since 1841, and when?
Answer.—I cannot recollect . dates well. I saw him in
Monterey frequently between 1841 and 1845 or 1846.
Question 4.—Has Mr. Limantour ever had any occupancy or
actual possession of the land described in the grant?
Answer.—Not to my knowledge.
Question 8.—Where has Mr. Limantour had his residence
from the time you first knew him until the present time ?
Answer.—I never knew that he had any fixed residence in
California. I knew him to come back and forth to Monterey
in a vessel. His occupation was that of a merchant. He
came as Captain and owner of the vessel and cargo.
(Signed) W. E. P. HARTNELL.
Sworn and signed before me, this fourteenth day of July, A.
D. 1853, at San Francisco, and I have annexed hereto the
Exhibit, presented at the time of taking this deposition, and
referred to therein. The Law Agent objected to the third, fourth,
fifth, sixth and seventh interrogatories propounded by the
claimant's attorney, and the answers thereto ; and the same
were received subject to such objection.
(Signed) ALPHEUS FELCH, Commissioner.
I, George Fisher, Secretary to the Board of Commissioners
to ascertain and settle the private land claims in California, do
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of
the deposition of W. E. P. Hartnell, filed in case No. 548,
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(wherein Jose Y. Limantour is claimant,) among the archives
of said Board, and in my care and custody, as such Secretary.
Given under my hand, at the city of San Francisco, this
eighteenth day of October, A. D. 1853.
(Signed) GEO. FISHER.
SECOND DEPOSITION OF MR. HARTNELL.
Office of the Board of U. S. Commissioners, Sfc.
This day, before Commissioner Alpheus Felch, came Wm.
E. P. Hartnell, a witness in behalf of claimant, Jose Y. Liman-
tour, No. 548, who after being duly sworn, deposed as follows
:
QUESTIONS BY GEN. JAMES WILSON, ATTORNEY FOR CLAIMANT.
Question 1.—What is your name, age and place of resi-
dence?
Answer.—My name is William E. P. Hartnell, my age fifty-
five years, and I reside at Monterey in California.
Question 2.—Look on the document now here presented,
marked " Exhibit No. 1," with the initials " A. F." annexed to
this deposition, and purporting to be a copy of an order from
the General Government of Mexico, approving of the grant of
land by Governor Micheltorena to Don Jose" Y. Limantour in
the Californias, and also authorizing said Governor Michelto-
rena to make further grants to said Limantour, bearing date at
Mexico on the 7th day of October, A. D. 1843, and state whether
the signatures of Manuel Micheltorena and Manuel Jimeno
thereto are genuine signatures, and whether you recognize the
hand-writing of the body of said paper, and if so, state whose
writing you believe it to be.
Answer.—I have examined said document ; the signatures of
Manuel Micheltorena and of Manuel Jimeno appearing thereto,
are the genuine signatures of Manuel Micheltorena and Manuel
Jimeno, respectively. 1 have frequently seen both of them
write, and have no doubt at all of the genuineness of those sig-
natures. As to the hand-writing of the body of the document?
I am not positive whose it is, but I believe it to be in the hand-
writing of Francisco Arce.
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QUESTION BY MR. GREENHOW, ASSOCIATE LAW AGENT.
Question 1.—When did you first see the document above-
mentioned ?
Answer.—I do not recollect ever having seen it before yester-
day, nor did I ever hear of it before.
(Signed) W. E. P. HARTNELL.
Subscribed and sworn to before me at San Francisco, this
29th September, 1853.
(Signed) ALPHEUS FELCH,
Commissioner.
September 29, 1853.
It is agreed that the foregoing deposition and the document
proved hereby, may be used in cases No. 549 and 715.
(Signed) J. WILSON.
(Signed) ROBERT GREENHOW,
Associate Law Agent.
I, George Fisher, Secretary to the Board of Commissioners,
to ascertain and settle the private land claims in California, do
hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, correct and true copy
of the deposition of W. E. P. Hartnell, filed in case No. 548,
(wherein Jose* Y. Limantour is claimant,) among the archives
of said Board in my care and custody as such Secretary.
Given under my hand this 17th day of October at San Fran-
cisco, A. D. 1853.
GEORGE FISHER, Sec'y.
DEPOSITION OF WM. A. RICHARDSON.
Office of Commissioners of Land Claims in California.
This day before Commissioner Alpheus Felch, came William
A. Richardson, a witness in behalf of claimant, Jose* Y. Liman-
tour, case No. 548, who after being duly sworn, deposed as fol-
lows:
QUESTIONS BY GEN. WILSON, ATTORNEY FOR CLAIMANT.
Question 1.—What is your name, age and place of residence ?
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Answer.—My name is William A. Richardson, my age fifty-
eight years, and I reside at Saucelito in Marin County in the
State of California. I have resided in California thirty-one
years.
Question 2.—What was your profession or business in early
life?
Answer.—A sea-faring life. I came to California as first
officer of a vessel.
Question 3.—What offices have you held in California ?
Answer.—I never held any public office until 1835 when I
was appointed Captain of the Port of San Francisco.
Question 4.—What year was it when you arrived in Califor-
nia, and at what particular place did you reside during the six
or seven years next after your arrival ?
Answer.—I arrived on the 2d day of August, A. D. 1822, and
lived from that time until the year 1829 at the Presidio of San
Francisco.
Question 5.—Was you married during that time, and if so, to
whom ?
Answer.—I was married on the 12th day of May, A. D. 1825,
to the eldest daughter of Don Ignacio Martinez, the then Com-
mandant and Commissary of the Presidio. He was in full com-
mand there at that time.
Question 6.—What was your employment or business while
you resided at the Presidio of San Francisco from 1822 to 1829 ?
Answer.—I was employed generally in the Bay of San Fran-
cisco with launches, freighting for the Government and assist-
ing the Commandante as Interpreter in the entering of foreign
vessels into port. I also acted as pilot to such vessels. I also
cultivated some small pieces of land in the neighborhood. Dur-
ing that time, I was once down the coast to San Diego with a
small vessel, belonging to William Hartnell of Monterey.
Question 7. From 1822 to 1829 where was the anchorage
for vessels after coming through the " Golden Gate," into the
Bay of San Francisco ?
Answer.—For merchant vessels, it was at the eastward of the
fort, about three cables' length from the fort, in a small bay op-
posite the Presidio. They anchored at that place up to Decern-
ber, 1824. Whale ships used to go to Saucelito to anchor for
the benefit of fresh water. From December, 1824, the merchant
vessels came to anchor at the Yerba Buena Cove.
Question 8.—What was the reason of removing that anchor-
age?
Answer.—On account of the strong ebb tide, occasioned by
the heavy freshet from the rivers, it being a very remarkable
season for heavy rains. The old anchorage, by reason of this,
was a dangerous one. The heavy freshet washed away the
beach greatly and part of the land which the fort stands upon,
and the vessels were very near being taken to sea.
Question 9.—Was there any communication made to the
Governor of California in relation to the removal of the anchor-
age ? If so, at what time, and by whose order ?
Answer.—In 1828 orders came from General Eschendea, then
Governor of California, to the Commandante of the Presidio, to
obligate vessels to anchor at the old anchorage, at which the
Commandante requested me to write a communication to the
Governor, stating the impossibility of vessels anchoring at the
old anchorage, as formerly. I made the communication as
directed ; in answer to which the Governor sent orders to the
Commandante to permit vessels to anchor at the anchorage of
Yerba Buena, and to be very particular in putting a guard on
board of each vessel, and not to allow any private individual to
locate on any pretence whatever in that vicinity ; and from that
time it was always considered the general anchorage for the
Port of San Francisco.
Question 10.—Where did you go to reside after leaving the
Presidio of San Francisco, in 1829 ?
Answer.—I went to the Mission of San Gabriel, near to the
Pueblo of Los Angeles, where I resided until the early part of
the year 1835.
Question 11.—What Was your business at San Gabriel?
Answer.—I was employed superintending the building of
a small vessel belonging to the Padres of the Mission, and I
also sailed along the coast in the same vessel and also in other
vessels belonging to the Mission. I went during that time a
voyage to Callao, on the coast of Peru, and two voyages to
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Mazatlan and San Bias. The vessel above mentioned was
built in the creek on the Bay of San Pedro, the seaport of Los
Angeles, and twelve or thirteen leagues from the Mission of San
Gabriel. My wife and family during that time resided at the
Mission of San Gabriel.
Question 12.—Was you during the time mentioned in your
answer to the tenth interrogatory, often back and forth from the
Bay of San Pedro to the Bay of San Francisco ?
Answer.—I was.
Question 13.—When did you leave San Gabriel, and where
did you then go to reside ?
Answer.—I left there in May, 1835, and went to reside at
the Yerba Buena.
Question 14.—State the circumstances under which you came
to the Yerba Buena; upon whose application, and the object of
your coming to Yerba Buena.
Answer—By the request of General Figueroa, who was at
the Mission of San Gabriel in May, 1835. He requested me to
come to Yerba Buena, to establish me as Captain of the Port
of San Francisco, as he had seen a communication written by
me in 1828, respecting the anchorage at Yerba Buena, and he
wished to lay off a small settlement for the convenience of pub-
lic offices at the anchorage of Yerba Buena.
Mr. Howard, Law Agent, objects to the above answer as to-
the contents of writings, without the production and proofs.
Question 15.—Did you comply with Gov. Figueroa's request
in leaving San Gabriel and coming to Yerba Buena ?
Answer.—I did.
Question 16.—Please state the manner you came, and in
whose company.
Answer.—I came by land with my family, in company wirh
General Figueroa. Sometimes he was a little ahead and some-
times I was, while we were on the way, until we got to the
Mission of Solidad. At that place he left me and took the
road to Monterey.
Question 17.—State what orders General Figueroa gave you
in relation to founding a settlement at Yerba Buena, for the
convenience of the anchorage.
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Answer.—He gave me verbal orders to come to the Yerba
Buena and await his orders, as he had to order a meeting of the
Departmental Assembly to lay off the small village at Yerba
Buena.
Mr. Howard objects to the testimony, and to any evidence by
parol of orders from Figueroa to the witness, and of orders from
the Departmental Assembly to Figueroa-
Question 18.—Did you come to Yerba Buena in pursuance of
the directions of the Governor ?
Answer.—I did.
Mr. Howard objects to the question as a leading one, and to
the answer thereto.
"Question 19.—When did you arrive at Yerba Buena ?
Answer.—About the month of June the same year.
Question 20.—Where did you next hear from Mr. Figueroa ?
Answer.—In the month of August following; not directly
from him, but from one of the officers belonging to his Staff,
Lieutenant Navareta.
Question 21.—What communication did he make to you ?
Answer.—He ordered me immediately to go to Monterey, as
the General wished to see me very much. It was a written order.
Mr. Howard objects to all testimony on the subject, without
the production of the written order.
Question 22.—Did you go to Monterey, immediately after
that?
Answer.—I went in about eighteen hours after I received the
order.
Question 23.—Did you or did you not see Governor Figueroa
when you arrived there ?
Answer.—I did not see him alive ; I saw him dead.
Question 24.—Who succeeded Governor Figueroa in the office
of Governor after his death ?
Answer.—Don Jose" Castro. He was the first person I saw on
my arrival.
Question 25.—Had you any conversation with Don Jos6
Castro at that time, at Monterey, in relation to your business at
that place ? If so, state what.
Mr. Howard objects to all evidence of conversation with Don
Jose" Castro.
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Answer.—I did. He is still living. He first mentioned to
me that General Figueroa was very anxious to see me, as he had
made arrangements with the Assembly about laying off a small
village at Yerba Buena ; as he particularly wished for me to get
a lot for my habitation there, where he wished to establish me
as Captain of the Port of San Francisco. At the same time
Castro told me that I could not locate within two hundred varas
of the beach for a private residence, as that was reserved for
public offices. He was then Political Governor, but could not
attend to any business until after the ceremonies of the funeral
of General Figueroa were over, and then he would despatch me.
I told him my family were entirely alone in a tent here at Yerba
Buena, and wished him to permit me to return immediately to
my family, until he had time to attend to laying off the town or
village. He told me that I could return immediately, and that
he would send up orders to the Civil Authority to lay off the
village at Yerba Buena, and requested me to assist the Civil
Authorities in laying it off, which I told him I would do.
Question 26.—Was the Departmental Assembly, or some of
the members of it, at that time, in attendance at Monterey ?
Answer.—They were there, but I do not know whether they
were doing any particular business just at that moment. I
came away directly.
Question 27.—When did you next hear from Monterey, and
from whom ?
Answer.—The first time I next heard from Monterey, was
from Don Francisco De Haro, Alcalde, then residing at the
Mission of San Francisco de Assis.
Question 28.—What did De Haro communicate to you, in
regard to the establishment of the small village of Yerba Buena ?
Answer.—He had a letter from the Political Government
directing him to lay off a small village at Yerba Buena, and to
give me the first one hundred vara lot after the village was laid
off. But he could not then do it, because he had not the
Ayuntamiento collected together. They were then scattered
about. He requested me to be present when he laid it off, and
required my assistance, and said he would let me know when he
was ready to do it. I was then living in my tent on the hill, at
F
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the edge of the woods, within the limits of Yerba Buena. Abont
two days after this, he collected the Ayuntamiento and came
with them to my tent, and he told me he was then ready to lay
off the village, and required my assistance in so doing. He told
me his first orders were to reserve two hundred varas all along
the beach opposite the anchorage, for Government offices.
Mr. Howard objects to the testimony in answer to interroga-
tory 28.
Question 29.—Please to state what the Ayuntamiento did at
that time?
Answer.—They measured off two hundred "varas" from the
beach, in a south-west direction, and then told me I could select
some place out of that limit on the clear land as represented
for my one hundred "vara" lot. I told them I wished to go a
little higher up to the south-west from the foot of the hill.
They then measured off another one hundred vara in the same
direction. I told them I wished to locate my lot somewhere in
that limit from the beach. The magistrate, Don Francisco De
Haro, told me in presence of the Ayuntamiento, that he must
have a starting point from the south-east, so that he could fix
the lot. He then appointed the first sand hill to the south-east
from where we were standing, as the south-east boundary. He
than went to that first sand hill with the Ayuntamiento and I
accompanied them ; and he pointed the direction in which the
streets must lay. He then told me that I could take the first
one hundred vara lot from the starting point, or any one
hundred vara lot in the direction to the north-west. He
commenced measuring and measured off the first one hundred
vara lots, and in measuring the fourth one, I wished to take one
half of the fourth and one-half of the fifth lot,, as these parts
were just where it come on the cleared part of the plain, and
left it more open. He told me he could not give me a half lot,
but I might take any one complete one hundred vara lot any
where in that direction. I selected the fifth one hundred vara
lot from the starting point. He measured off more, in that
direction, but declared all the land in direction on that line
to the waters of the bay on the north-west boundary for the
small settlement of " Yerba Buena," and at the same time laid
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off the street in that same direction which he called " Calle de
la Fundacion." and measured two hundred varas more from
the south-west side of my lot to the south-west, running into the
hills, which he called the south-west boundary
—
(being parallel to
the street above named) of the small village of Yerba Buena. The
south-east limits were three hundred varas from said street in a
south-west direction from the commencement of the street, and
from the same street in a north-east direction along: the sand
hill into the bay. The borders of the water from that point all
around towards the north-west to what is now called the North
Beach at the point where the south-west boundary came to the
bay, formed the other boundary. The first two hundred varas
measured off on the beach were reserved for government
purposes.
(Mr. Howard objects to this question, as asking parole evidence
of matters in writing, and to the answer for the same reason, and
because it is irrelevant, hearsay, and statements of conversations
between third parties, and in other respects illegal and
incompetent.)
Question 30.—Please to state how far the south-eastern
limit of the small settlement of Yerba Buena was from the
south line of your one hundred vara lot.
Answer.—Four hundred varas to the south-east limits.
(Mr. Howard objects to this question because it assumes a
fact, and also to the answer thereto.)
Question 31.—Did you make a plan or map, showing the
limits of the small settlement of Yerba Buena. If yes, by
whose direction ?
Answer.—I did, by order of the magistrate, Don Francisco
De Haro.
Question 32.—Look at the paper now here shown to you,
marked " Exhibit No. 2," with the initials " A. F." annexed to
your deposition given in case No. 280, and say whether it is
the map made by you by order of De Haro, as above stated.
| Answer.—It is the same.
Question 33.—Did you immediately after make a copy of
the map. If so, by whose order and for what purpose ?
Answer.—I made a copy immediately after by order of the
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Magistrate, Don Francisco De Haro, to send to the Political
Government.
Question 34.—Look at the document, now here shown to you,
marked " Exhibit No. 1," with the initials " A. F." annexed to
your deposition in Case No. 280, and say whether it is a letter
which you received from Jose" Castro, acting Governor of Cali-
fornia, under date of the 20th October, A. D. 1835 ?
Answer.—It is. I received it about the latter part of October,
1835. It was delivered to me by Don Francisco De Haro, the
Magistrate.
Question 35.—Are you acquainted with the hand-writing of
Jose Castro ? Have you seen him write ?—if yea, is his signa-
ture to that letter his genuine signature ?
Answer.—I have seen him write and am acquainted with his
hand-writing. The signature to the letter is his genuine signature-
Question 36.—How long did you continue to live in the little
settlement of Yerba Buena, after returning here in 1835 ?
Answer.—I lived here until the year 1841, the early part, when
I went to reside on my farm at Saucelito, where I now live.
Question 37.—During that period of time were there any
grants of land made in the settlement of Yerba Buena outside
of the limits you have above stated, to your knowledge ?
Answer.—Previous to the year 1841 there were no grants
made outside those limits. (Mr. Howard objects to this ques-
tion and answer, the grant not being produced.)
Question 38.—Did you continue to hold after moving to your
farm, the office of Captain of the Port of San Francisco ?
Answer.—I did. I held it until the latter part of the year 1844.
Question 39.—Did you ever know of any grants of land for
settlement in the immediate neighborhood of Yerba Buena, out-
side of the limits above described, until after the Americans
took possession.
Answer.—Not any.
(Mr. Howard objects to the question and answer.)
Question 40.—Are you acquainted with Jose" Y. Limantour,
and when and where did you first become acquainted with him ?
Answer.—I am acquainted with him. I first became acquain-
ted with him at my house, at the Saucelito farm, on the 9th day
of November, in the year 1841.
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Question 41.—How long did Mr. Limantour remain in this
neighborhood, subsequent to that time ?
Answer.—He remained here nearly a twelve-month. His ves-
sel was cast away on the Point de Reyes. He hired a vessel
and went to the point, to bring down the part of the cargo which
was saved, and brought it down and put it in an old adobe
house here, which formerly belonged to me, where he remained
with it most of the time. He finally left here in a small schooner,
which he bought of General Vallejo, about October, A. D. 1842.
Question 42.—Have you since that time had any further
communication with the Mexican authorities about the limits
of Yerba Buena, and the vacant lands in the neighborhood of
it ?—if yea, please to produce any correspondence or communi-
cation you have had on the subject.
Answer.—I have had a communication,—that which I now
produce is it.
Witness here produces a paper purporting to be signed Man-
uel Jimeno and dated 14th January, 1843, and written in the
Spanish Language, which paper is annexed to this deposition
and marked " Exhibit No. 1., with the initials " A. F."
Question 43.—Are you acquainted with the hand-writing of
Don Manuel Jimeno,—have you seen him write and is his signa-
ture to the letter that you now produce, his genuine signature ?
Answer.—I am acquainted with his hand-writing, and have
seen him,—this is his signature.
Question 44.—State by whose hand you received that letter ?
Answer.—By that of the former Magistrate of San Francisco,
Don Francisco De Haro.
Question 45.—About what time ?
Answer.—About the latter part of January, A. D. 1843.
Question 46.—Did Francisco De Haro show to you at the
same time a communication which he had received from the
Government upon the same subject?
Answer.—He showed me a communication on the same sub-
ject addressed to him.
(Mr. Greenhow objects to this question and answer, the com-
munication not being produced.)
Question 47.—Did you and Mr. De Haro answer the said
46
communications, and did you accompany the answer with any
map or plan ? and if so, what ?
Answer.—I answered the letter and sent a copy of the original
plan which is here presented, marked " Exhibit No. 2," with the
initials " A. F." and filed with my Deposition in Case No. 280.
(Mr. Howard objects to this question and answer.)
Question 48.—To whom did you send a copy of your map, as
stated in your last answer ?
Answer.—To General Micheltorena.
Question 49.—Did you write a letter in reply to the one ad-
dressed by you from Jimeno, annexed to this Deposition, marked
" Exhibit No. 1," with the initials " A. F.," and if so, to whom
did you address your reply ?
Answer.—I answered the letter, and addressed it to General
Micheltorena.
Question 50.—Did you see Mr. Limantour here in the harbor
of San Francisco, subsequent to the fall of 1842 ? If so, state
when.
Answer.—I saw him here in 1844, and again in 1847.
Question 51.—Have you had any other correspondence with
any of the Mexican authorities, civil or military, in regard to
vacant lands at the Yerba Buena ? If so, please to produce it.
Answer.—I have. The paper now produced by me is a letter
from General Vallejo. [The letter here produced by the witness
purports to be a letter signed by M. G. Vallejo, dated Sonoma*
Nov. 7, 1843, addressed to the witness and written in the Span-
ish language. The same is annexed to this deposition and
marked " Exhibit No. 2," with the initials " A. F."]
Question 52.—Are you acquainted with General Vallejo's
hand-writing? Have you seen him write? If so, state whether
this letter and the signature are in his own hand-writing.
Answer.—I am acquainted with his hand-writing, and have
seen him write, and this letter is in his own hand-writing, and
so is the signature.
QUESTIONS BY MR. GREENHOW, ASSISTANT LAW AGENT.
Question 1.—Does the street, called by you Calle de la Fun-
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dacion, correspond in direction with any street in the city of
San Francisco, at present.
Answer.—It does not correspond in location with any street.
The new streets laid out in the south-east part of the town were
nearly in the same direction.
Question 2.—Describe, as nearly as you can, with reference
to the present streets in San Francisco, the position of the first
sand hill, which you say formed the limit of the town of Yerba
Buena on the south-east, agreeably to your plan.
Answer.—The first sand hill was between the streets now
called California street and Pine street, and it wTas nearest to
Pine street.
Question 3.—State the position, as nearly as you can, of the
starting point of the Calle de la Fundacion at the sand-hills
from which the lots were measured.
Answer.—That starting point is now the present corner of
Pine and Kearny streets, but not quite so far south as Pine
street. I could tell the place within a vara by going on the
ground and measuring the distance from my lot.
Question 4.—What was the course or direction of the sand
hills from that point towards the bay.
Answer.—About north-east.
Question 5.—When was the direction or course of the streets
changed from the course laid down by you on the maps ?
Answer.—They were first changed in 1839 by a survey made
by Captain Vioget. They were surveyed at different times
afterwards, but I did not take any particular notice how they
were laid off after that.
Question 6.—Did you know or ever hear of any decree or
order of the Territorial Deputation or Departmental Assembly
adopting the plan and limits recommended by you for the town
of Yerba Buena, or any other plan or limits ?
Answer.—I never saw or heard of any except that which I
have presented.
Question 7.—What was the most southern lot occupied by
any individual in Yerba Buena in July, 1846 ?
Answer.—I do not recollect any further south than that occu-
pied by John Fuller. That lot was located at the north of the
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Calle de la Fundacion, near what is now Pine street, and a
little to the northward and westward of that street.
QUESTIONS BY MR. HOWARD, LAW AGENT.
Question 1.—When did you first hear of the Limantour
grant ?
Answer.—In the early part of 1843 I first heard of this appli-
cation for a grant.
Question 2.—When did Mr. Limantour first settle upon or
occupy any portion of the grant ?
Answer.—I never saw him occupy or settle on the land. He
never built a house on it, nor occupied it, nor built any fence on
it, as I ever saw.
Question 3.—Where does Micheltorena live, and where has
he lived since July, 1846 ?
Answer.—I do not know. I think he lives about Mexico in
some place. In 1852 he was living very near the city of
Mexico.
Question 4.—Do you know whether Micheltorena has any
interest in this Limantour grant?
Answer.—Not any that I know of, I never heard it men-
tioned.
Question 5.—Did you ever have any conversation with Li-
mantour 'touching an interest of Micheltorena in this grant?
Answer.—No conversation whatever.
Question 6.—Have you never seen a draft drawn by Michel-
torena, or in favor of Micheltorena, or by or in favor of Liman-
tour, for a purchase or sale of a grant of land in California, and
if so, what grant ?
Answer.—I have never seen any.
Question 7.—Where has Limantour resided since 1846 ?
Answer.—I do not know where his residence is. In 1852 I
saw him in his establishment in the city of Mexico.
Question 8.—What business was he engaged in at that time?
Answer.—He had a very large store of arms, and he repre-
sented to me that he was supplying the government with arms
and ammunition. I saw him at his store.
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Question 9.—Did he inform you how many years he had been
supplying the Mexican Government with arms?
Answer.—He did not inform me exactly the time, but he said
he had always been supplying them.
Question 10.—Do you know how many, or what years he
had supplied them ?
Answer.—I do not. I know that in the early part of the year
1844 he brought on arms to California for the Mexican Govern-
ment.
Question 11.—Do you know any thing about his vessel being
detained, or being himself arrested by an officer of the United
States navy or army, on a charge of supplying the Mexican
Government with arms in the year 1845, 1846, ] 847, or 1848 ?
Answer.—I heard of his being arrested by an American ves-
sel of war on the coast of California, during the war of 1846 or
1847.
Question 12.—What did Limantour say to you in regard to
this arrest?
Answer.—He said that he had every satisfaction from it that
he required. I think he said he got satisfaction from the United
States Charge D' Affairs in Mexico.
Question 13.—During what year did he get this satisfaction ?
Answer.—I do not know, he did not inform me.
Question 14.—What did he tell you about claiming the pro-
tection of the French Government as a citizen of France ?
Answer.—He never told me any thing about the French
Government in respect to protection.
Question 15.—During what years since 1843 have you seen
Mr. Limantour in California?
Answer.—I saw him here in 1844 and in 1847, and again in
the last part of 1852, and in the early part of the present year.
Question 16.—At whose house did you see Mr. Limantour in
the city of Mexico ?
Answer.—I saw him at his own store, and at his dwelling-
house.
Question 17.—What conversation occurred at that time in
relation to this grant of land ?
Answer.—The first thing he asked me was, how the Commis-
50
sioners were getting on, and then he said, " My lands are at the
Yerba Buena, are they occupying them ? " I told him they were
occupying them, and that he ought to be there to defend his
lands, or send on his documents, as the Commissioners were in
session. He said that his papers had no conditions at all, and
that he could present them at any time when the Board was
sitting. He said his documents were all substantiated by the
proof of signatures by the United States Consul in the city of
Mexico, or the United States Minister, and that he heard the
Commissioners were very particular about it. He showed me
his documents and opened them in his hands, but I did not ex-
amine them. He said his documents were all right, he was
satisfied with them, though he heard the Commissioners were
very particular in respect to signatures. I advised him to come
on immediately with them, but he said he could not come then?
but must wait until a packet arrived from France.
Question 18.—Did you see Abrigo in the city of Mexico in
1852, and if so, at whose house ?
Answer.—I never saw him in Mexico.
Question 19.—Did you see Micheltorena and Limantour to-
gether at that time in the city of Mexico ?
Answer.—I never saw Micheltorena in Mexico.
Question 20.—Did you borrow any money of Limantour in
Mexico ?
Answer.—I borrowed no money of him. I paid him the
amount I owed him, five thousand dollars.
Question 21.—How much money did you take to Mexico
with you ?
Answer.—I took five hundred dollars, given to me by G. B.
Post & Co. of San Francisco, and gave my note for three hun-
dred more, which I borrowed in Acapulco of Don Marcus Ba-
tani, which my agent, W. P. Davis, paid after in San Francisco-
It was paid two or three months after my return.
Question 22.—How long before you went to Mexico had you
owed five thousand dollars to Limantour ?
Answer.—From the latter part of 1841 to the latter part of
1842, I had dealings with him, and was indebted to him in that
sum.
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Question 23.—Did you pay him that amount in the city of
Mexico ?
Answer.—I gave him my note of hand payable in San Fran-
cisco.
Question 24.—To whom was that note payable ?
Answer.—To Bolton, Barron & Co. of San Francisco.
Question 25.—Did you pay the note to Bolton, Barron & Co.?
Answer.—I did not pay it to them. I was not here when it
became due.
Question 26.—To whom and when did you pay it ?
Answer.—I paid it to Limantour. I cannot tell the exact
time, but it was some five or six months ago that I paid the
last. I paid two thousand dollars first, and afterwards three
thousand.
Question 27.—How did you pay it ?
Answer.—In hard dollars, with my own hand.
Question 28.—Where did you pay it?
Answer.—The first two thousand dollars in my own house,
and the last three thousand in the house of my son-in-law,
Manuel Forres, which is near my own habitation.
Question 29.—Was any person present when you paid the
first two thousand dollars ?
Answer.—My wife was present. I do not recollect any body
else, except Indian servants.
Question 30.—Who was present at the last payment ?
Answer.—No one was present when I paid him the money.
It was the office of my son-in-law. My daughter was in and
out at different times, but whether she took any notice I cannot
say.
Question 31.—Was the note endorsed by Bolton, Barron
& Co.?
Answer.—I think not. I think it was endorsed by some per-
son, I cannot recollect the name.
Question 32.—Did Bolton, Barron & Co. authorize you to
draw on them for five thousand dollars, or for any sum ?
Answer.—They did not.
Question 33.—How came you to make your note payable to
Bolton, Barron & Co. ?
52
Answer.—I gave the note to Limantour, he must have passed
it to Bolton, Barron & Co. I did not know any thing about it
until I got a note from them that it was due.
Question 34.—When Limantour showed you his grant in
Mexico, did you examine his papers in relation to it ?
Answer.—I took no notice of the papers. They were first
shown to me in his hand, and I did not examine any thing.
Question 35.—Did you examine a map attached to the grant ?
Answer.—I examined nothing belonging to the papers.
Question 36.—When did you reach the city of Mexico ?
Answer.—I left San Francisco on the first day of June, 1852,
and got back on the twenty-ninth day of July in the same year,
and spent about eleven days in the city of Mexico. I was
about eight days in going to Acapulco, and nine or ten from
that place to the city of Mexico. I was two or three days in
Acapulco. I was about seven days in returning from the city
of Mexico to Acapulco, and spent eight or nine days in that
place waiting for a steamboat, and we were about eleven days
coming to San Francisco.
Question 37.—During what portion of the time spent by you
in the city of Mexico was it, that you had this conversation
with Limantour about his papers ?
It was the first day that I arrived. This was the only con-
versation on that subject. I had other conversations with him
on other subjects.
Question 38.—Who was present when Mr. Limantour showed
you these papers ?
Answer.—No one but him and me.
Question 39.—Had you ever seen these papers before ?
Answer.—I never had.
Question 40.—Did Mr. Limantour invite you to look at those
papers, or could you have examined them if you had chosen ?
Answer.—He did not invite me to look at them, but he
opened them and put them before me, and I could have exam-
ined them if I had wished ; but I did not.
Question 41.—Did Mr. Limantour give you a description of
the lands of which these papers purported to be a grant ?
Answer.—He gave me no description more than I mentioned
before. He said they were his papers of the Yerba Buena.
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Question 42.—Did you have any knowledge at that time of
the land of which these papers purported to be a grant ?
Answer.—From information I had knowledge, but never saw
this grant until that time.
Question 43.—Of what quantity of land had you information
that he had a grant ?
Answer.—The land from the South East limits of the village
of Yerba Buena to the Mission, including Rincon Point, but I
don't know what other limits.
Question 44.—Who gave you that information?
Answer.—The first persons who mentioned it to me, were
Robert Ridley and Don Francisco De Haro.
Question 45.—When ?
Answer.—De Haro, a very short time after Micheltorena had
written to him and me for information respecting the unoccupied
land in Yerba Buena, told me that Limantour had got a grant
for the land. Ridley spoke to me about it in 1844, and again in
1847. Ridley often officiated for me as Captain of the Port
when I was away, and Limantour was here in 1844, and also in
1847, and Ridley told me he was knocking up a great fuss about
his lands. He told me this in 1844 and also in 1847.
Question 46.—Where is De Haro ?
Answer.—He is dead.
Question 47.—Where is Ridley?
Answer.—He is dead likewise.
Question 48.—What was the object of your visit to Mexico?
Answer.—Private business. I heard from my son-in-law, that
the law was going to be enforced not to allow any grants of
land within ten leagues of the sea shore, and I said if that was
so, my Saucelito property would be lost, but as to the grant
which I had from the Mexican Government, for services ren-
dered, lying on the sea coast likewise, I would go to Mexico to
see if I could get from that government another grant in Lower
California, in stead of it. I started for Mexico the next morn-
ing after my son-in-law told me.
(Signed,) WILLIAM A. RICHARDSON.
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The signatures with which this deposition closes, from and
including the 20th question, were propounded by Mr. Peachy
for Mr. Howard, and without objection. Subscribed and sworn
to before me at San Francisco, this 5th day of Sept., A. D. 1853.
(Signed,) ALPHEUS FELCH, Comm'r.
I, George Fisher, Secretary of the Board of U. S. Commis-
sioners, to ascertain and settle the private Land Claims in the
State of California, hereby certify the foregoing to be a full,
true and carrect copy of a paper on file among the archives of
said Board, and in my care and custody as such Secretary.
GEO. FISHER, Secretary.
Connected with the Deposition of Captain Richardson, is a
letter written to him by Gen. M. G. Vallejo relating to a grant
of land at Yerba Buena, and also referring to the fact that
Senor Limantour was aiding Gen. Micheltorena with funds, and
soliciting lands from the Governor at Yerba Buena. The reader
will please to note particularly the date of the letter, [November
7, 1843,) and the fact that the Senor Castanares, for whom he
solicits the information from Richardson in regard to the lands
at Yerba Buena, is the same who was connected with the
Government of California as Collector of the Customs at the
Maratime Custom House at Monterey, the capitol of the De-
partment.
I would also ask the attention of the reader to another docu-
ment which is on file in case No. 280, on the Docket of the
Honorable the Board of Land Commissioners, and annexed to
the Deposition of Wm. A. Richardson, taken in that case.
—
Case No. 280 is the petition of the City of San Francisco for
certain lands. The deposition of Richardson was taken by the
Law Agent of the United States, against the claim of the city,
and the document I refer to, and which is annexed to his depo-
sition in that case, is the letter of Sefior Don Jose* Castro, Gov-
ernor ad interim, dated at Monterey, Oct. 20th, 1835, and
addressed to Captain Richardson. It is inserted here for refer-
ence and to show the relevancy of parts of Captain Richardson's
testimony.
so
GENERAL VALLEJO S LETTER.
Sonoma, Nov. 7th, 1843.
Senor Don Guillermo Richardson :— Esteemed Sponsor,,
(compadre) ; Senor Don Manuel Castanares writes to me re-
questing to inform him about the vacant lands existing in the
" Yerba Buena," and particularly on the sea-beach ; as Senor
Don Manuel seems to be a little jealous of the extensive grants
which Senor Don Manuel Micheltorena has made to other indi-
viduals, as you know Senor Castanares wishes to enjoy also the
same rights that the foreigners do. You know that he has held
several offices, and that to-day he is the Collector of the Mara-
time Custom House, and he wishes also to get something, as all
the rest. He solicits to obtain a tract of a thousand " varas "
long by two hundred " varas " wide, and besides fifty " varas "
in the sea, the whole length to make a wharf.
It seems to me, sponsor, that this Senor works to have the
Custom House brought to San Francisco—let us see. You
know that always it was my project, that the Custom House
should be removed to San Francisco, and I believe that my
riend Castanares knows something, for he came from Mexico
full of the projects of Bandini, Hisar, Pardres and Aranjo, who,
had they not fallen into disfavor, would have consummated said
removal. However, we shall see how the thing goes. I for my
part, don't think that the Custom House may remain in Monte-
rey. Whether the lands be given to foreigners or natives^
matters us little, after the object being obtained. But it would
be far better that he should have such land in preference to other
strangers as I came to understand.
I send you also the letter of Don Francisco Sanchez, about
the subject, to whom I have written already as Alcalde" of the
place, to state which are the vacant lands of such dimensions
as you will see, he indicates to me the boundaries of a devil of
a tract. I think that you know better of the grants made, so I
hope you will have the goodness to give me your opinion, that I
may write to Senor Don Manuel Castanares, about his solicita-
tion to water privileges, which he is going to ask the Governor,
following the example of Leese, Salvador, and the Russians,
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&c. ; also that you may give me an idea about the land, with a
delineation of the sea-beach, although I think it be a foolishness
to ask for since it is worth but little, it is deep bottom, there
are so large rocks, that Capt. Steel on one or two occasions, got
his vessel struck, while I was on board, and besides you know
that at the very place there lay the wreck of the Spanish Brig
of War, " San Carlos," which was cast away, I think, in 1812.
I believe that your statement about the subject will be of
much weight in favor of Serlor Castanares, and will be
considered the best report as may be given, since by your
practical knowledge as a resident of the place, you have been
Captain of the Port many years, and this is of much considera-
tion to the subject in question.
Also, I understand, that our friend, the well-known Liman-
tour, who you will recollect wrecked on " Punta de Reyes," and
whom we helped to save a part of his goods, with thousand
troubles, has furnished large sums to General Micheltorena, and
that if he does not intrigue, at least he endeavors to obtain
some grants in that and other places, taking advantage of the
poverty and scarcity of the revenue of the Treasury of the
Department.
Finally, we should endeavor as a first point in view, to get
and bring the Custom House to San Francisco—since from
that, it will not only result a good to the country, but to
ourselves particularly. I have sent the exposition made to the
Government, printed here officially ; and this, it seems to me,
has opened the eyes of Serlor Castanares, who has no property
in Monterey. Besides, you know, that I have many friends in
Mexico, and particularly the friendship of the President of the
Republic, to whom, both privately and officially, I have written
extensively ; and according to my political and financial
barometer at the Capitol, Serlor Virmond, the thing takes a
very favorable aspect.
Senor Castanares has told me in private conversation, that
he thought of establishing a rancho here, and I offered to give
him cattle, horses and Indians, in this way calculating upon his
friendship, as we shall predispose him in our favor. The
General himself is well disposed to foster the advancement of
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the country. I can operate, as you know, so efficaciously that
almost I am able to assure you that the thing will be done.
This companion and friend wishes you prosperty.
(Signed) M. G. VALLEJO.
I, George Fisher, Secretary of the Board of the United States
Commissioners to ascertain and settle private land claims
in the State of California, certify the foregoing to be a
translation of a Spanish document on file in this office, in case
No. 548, Jose" Y. Limantour, and under my charge and custody,
as such Secretary.
Witness my hand this 22nd day of September, 1853.
(Signed) GEORGE FISHER, Sec'y.
GOVERNOR CASTRO'S LETTER.
Political Government ad Interim of the
Upper California.
This Government conforming with the good desire of my
predecessor, Sefior Don Jose Figuerao, regarding the settling of
a town in the place called "la.Yerba Buena," and attending
likewise to the statement made by you in the name of the resi-
dents of the port of San Francisco, the welfare of which I sin-
cerely desire, I have approved the plan which you have formed
for the commencement of said town, under which, and while
other matters are being arranged as well for the system of civil
authorities, it will be born in mind for the cases of granting lots
to the individuals who may solicit them.
All which I state to you for your satisfaction, thuaking you
for the services which gratuitously you propose to do in favor of
those residents. God and Liberty.
(Signed)
.
JOSE CASTRO.
Monterey, Oct 20th, 1835.
To Sefior Don Guillermo Richardson,
Captain of the Port of San Francisco.
I, George Fisher, Secretary of the Board of United States
Commissioners, to ascertain and settle private land claims in
H
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California, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and
correct copy of a paper endorsed " Translation of Exhibit No.
1, A. F." annexed to deposition of Wm. A. Richardson, and
filed in case No. 280, wherein the city of San Francisco is
claimant, among the archives of said Board, in my care and
custody as such Secretary.
Given under my hand this 22d day of Sept. 1853.
GEORGE FISHER, Sec'y.
The following deposition of Senor Don Francisco Arce is
important. It shows the inception of the negotiations between
Governor Micheltorena and Seiior Limantour. The document
referred to in the 3d Interogatory as " Exhibit No. 1," with the
initials " A. F." annexed to the deposition of "Wm. A. Richard-
son, is the original letter from Manuel Jimeno to Capt. Richard-
son, dated at Los Angeles, January 14th, 1843, seeking infor-
mation in regard, to the lands at Yerba Buena, which Senor
Limantour proposed to purchase and to ascertain if they were
vacant. Please to mark the answers of the witness to the ques-
tions in this deposition. \
The document referred to in Question 5th, as " Exhibit No.
2," annexed to the deposition of W. E. P. Hartnell, is Governor
Micheltorena's Letter to Senor Limantour, dated at Los An-
geles, January 8th, 1843.
The document referred to in the 8th Question, as marked
" Exhibit No. 4," with the initials " A. F»" and annexed to the
deposition of W. E. P. Hartnell, is the original deed from Gov-
ernor Micheltorena to Jose Y. Limantour. The attentive reader
who is anxious to learn the truth, will not fail to consider this
testimony in connexion with these important documents referred
to in it, and subject both to a rigid scrutiny and critical exami-
nation.
DEPOSITION OF FRANCISCO ARCE.
Office of the Board of U. S. Commissioners.
This day, before Commissioner Alpheus Felch, came Fran-
cisco Arce, a witness in behalf of claimant, Jose" Y. Limentour,
No. 548, who after being duly sworn, deposed as follows
:
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"QUESTIONS BY GEN. JAMES WILSON, ATTORNEY FOR THE CLAIMANT.
Question 1.—What is your name, age and place of residence ?
Answer.—My name is Francisco Arce, my age is thirty years,
and I reside in Santa Clara County, in the State of California.
Question 2.—What offices have you held in the Government
of California, and at what times ?
Answer.—From April, A. D. 1836 to February, A. D. 1846, I
was Chief Clerk in the office of the Secretary of the Depart-
mental Government, the commission for which I now hold in
my possession. I also acted as Secretary, ad interim, for a short
time at Los Angeles, under a commission from Governor Mi-
cheltorena. Some papers are certified by me as Chief Clerk,
and some as Secretary, ad interim.
Question 3.—Please look on the document now shown to you
marked " Exhibit No. 1," with the initials " A. F." annexed to
the deposition of William A. Richardson, taken and filed in
this case, and state if you know in whose hand-writing the body
of said papers is written, and the direction thereto, and in whose
hand-writing the signature thereto is.
Answer.—I have examined the paper ; the body of it is my
own hand-writing, and the signature thereto is in the hand-writ-
ing of Manuel Jimeno. The address or direction at the bottom
of the second page is in my own hand-writing. It is directed
to William A. Richardson, Captain of the port of San Fran-
cisco.
Question 4.—At the time the said paper purports to be dated,
was you a clerk in the office of Manuel Jimeno, and what office
did Jimeno hold at that time under the government of Cali-
fornia ?
[Mr. Howard objects to this question.]
Answer.—I was clerk in the office of said Jimeno at that
time, and he was Secretary of the Departmental Government
of California.
Question 5.—Please look on the document now shown you,
marked " Exhibit No. 2," and annexed to the deposition of W.
E. P. Hartnell, heretofore taken and filed in this case, and state
whether you know the hand-writing, both of the body and sig-
natures thereof.
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[Mr. Howard objects to the proof of the document as a mere
private paper.]
Answer.—I have examined them ; the body and signature
are both in the hand-writing of Manuel Micheltorena.
Question 6.—Are you acquainted with Jose Y. Limantour,
and if so, when and where did you first become acquainted
with him ?
Answer.—I knew him and first became acquainted with him
at Monterey, in 1840 or 1841, I cannot distinctly recollect which.
He was then captain of a merchant schooner, under the Mexi-
can flag.
Question 7.—Did you see said Limantour at Los Angeles in
January, 1843, and do you know whether he had any business
with Governor Micheltorena at that time ? if so, state what that
business was, as far as you know.
[Mr. Howard objects to this question.]
Answer.—I saw said Limantour in Los Angeles, but cannot
state exactly the time. I believe it was about the time above
mentioned. He had business with Governor Micheltorena at
that and several other times. His business with Governor
Micheltorena was that of furnishing the Governor for the use
of the troops, with money and goods, provisions and other
things required for them, which acts are public and notorious in
California.
Question 8.—Please to look on the document now shown to
you marked " Exhibit No. 4," and also with the initials " A. F.,"
and annexed to the deposition of W. E. P. Hartnell, heretofore
taken and filed in this case, and state whether you recognize
the hand-writing of the body of said papers, and of the
signatures thereto—and if so, state in whose hand-writing they
are ?
[Mr. Howard objects to this question as to the form in which
it is put, and also to the competency of the paper offered to be
proved as evidence of title.]
Answer.—The hand-writing of the body of the paper is that
of Captain Marciel, as I believe, who was one of the clerks in
the office of the Commandante General Micheltorena, and the
signature thereto is the signature of Manuel Micheltorena,
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Governor and Commandante General. It is the signature
which he used and was in the habit of using.
Question 9.—State if you know whether any answer,
accompanied by any plat or map, was received by the Governor
or the Secretary, to the letter which you have before stated was
written in your own hand-writing, and signed by Manuel
Jimeno ?
[Mr. Howard objects to this question.]
Answer.—I do not recollect, but I believe that there was.
QUESTIONS BY MR. HOWARD, LAW AGENT.
Question 1.—Have you any recollection of the paper above
mentioned, marked " Exhibit No. 1," other than that which you
received from its having been shown to you within a recent
period ?
Answer.—I recollect the paper very well.
Question 2.—Do you recollect the paper from any other
circumstance than the appearance of the paper and the hand-
writing ?
Answer.—I do recollect it.
Question 3.—From what circumstances do you recollect it?
Answer.—I recollect from the circumstance of being engaged
in other business. Mr. Limantour came frequently to the office
and molested me on the subject, to be despatched in order to
leave in his vessel.
(Signed) FRANCISCO ARCE.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this nineteenth day of
September, A. D. 1853.
(Signed) ALPHEUS FELCtt
I, George Fisher, Secretary of the Board of Commissioners
to ascertain and settle the private land claims in California, do
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, correct and full copy
of the deposition of Francisco Arce, filed in case No. 548,
(wherein Jose" Y. Limantour is claimant) among the archives
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of said Board, and in my care and custody as such Sec-
retary.
Given under my hand, at the city of San Francisco, this
seventeenth day of October, A. D. 1843.
GEORGE FISHER, Sec'y.
Office of the Board of U. S. Commissioners, Sfc.
This day before Commissioner Alpheus Felch, came Jose"
Abrego, a witness in behalf of claimant Jose" Y. Limantour, No.
549, who after being duly sworn, deposed as follows
:
QUESTIONS BY GENERAL JAMES WILSON, ATTORNEY FOR CLAIMANT.
Question 1.—What is your name, age and place ofresidence?
Answer.—My name is Jose Abrego, my age forty years, and
I reside in Monterey, California.
Question 2.—Are you acquainted with Jose" Y. Limantour ?
If yea, when did you first become acquainted with him.
Answer.—I am acquainted with him, and have known him a
little more or less, since the year 1841.
Question 3.—What office did you hold in California during
the time of Governor Micheltorena's administration here?
Answer.—I was Commissary, and as such had charge of the
accounts.
Question 4.—Do you or do you not know of Jose" Y. Liman-
tour furnishing money, goods and supplies, to Governor
Micheltorena, for himself and his troops, and for the support of
his administration while Governor of California ?
Answer.—Said Limantour did at different times furnish
Micheltorena and his Officers with goods and money, and at
one time, Mr. Thomas O. Larkin received from Limantour, by
order of Micheltorena, some thirty thousand dollars, a little more
or less, which said Larkin distributed according to Micheltorena's
orders.
Question 5.—What amount did said Limantour furnish to
Micheltorena in all ?
Answer.—According to an account presented by Micheltorena
himself to this deponent, in order that he might remit the same
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to Mexico, it appeared that he had received from Limantour in
all, eighty thousand dollars or thereabouts. That account was
liquidated by an order on the Government of Mexico, in favor
of said Limantour, for some sixty or sixty-six thousand dollars,
and the balance was retained by said Micheltorena, in payment
for certain lands granted to said Limantour, in Upper and
Lower California.
Question 6.—Instating your accounts to remit to the Govern-
ment of Mexico, were the facts mentioned in your last answer,
entered upon it.
Answer.—The accounts belonging to the Commissary's office,
embraced the amounts distributed by the Commissary himself,
but the accounts of Micheltorena embraced the sums received by
Micheltorena himself, and of which he himself rendered an
account. The Government of Mexico required me, as Commis-
sary, to send the accounts of Micheltorena to them at Mexico;
and I sent the original account, with such explanations as I
thought fit. I sent with the account also a certificate of Thomas
O. Larkin, of the amount received by him from Limantour.
Question 7.—During the time of Governor Micheltorena's
administration in California, had he, to your knowledge, any
other source upon which to rely for money, goods or supplies,
except on the said Jose Y. Limantour.
Answer.—Yes ; he received funds from the Custom House at
Mazatlan, from the Custom House at Monterey, from different
merchants, and amongst others from Larkin, to whom he
remained indebted ten thousand dollars. He received about
one hundred and twenty thousand dollars from the Custom
House at Monterey.
QUESTIONS BY MR. GREENHOW, ASSOCIATE LAW AGENT.
Question 1.—Have you any account books or papers relating-
to your office as Commissary, which support or establish what
you have stated with regard to advances made by Mr. Liman-
tour ?
Answer.—I have none in my possession. The Commissary's
accounts were kept by debit and credit entries, in books destined
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to that purpose ; but the accounts of Micheltorena were handed
to the Commissary by Micheltorena himself, on separate strips
or pieces of paper, showing the different amounts which he had
received, and which he had paid out. I remitted to Mexico the
original receipts and papers given to me by Micheltorena,
addressed to the General Treasury.
Question 2.—How did you know that lands were granted to
Limantour by Micheltorena, in return for supplies advanced as
already stated by you ?
Answer.—I know it from Micheltorena's own account, in
which the fact was stated.
Question 3.—Did you know any other foreigner having
received lands from Micheltorena, in return for supplies ?
Answer.—I do not know of any such.
(Signed) JOS^ ABREGO.
It is agreed that this deposition be read and considered in
case No. 715.
(Signed) J. WILSON.
(Signed) ROBERT GREENHOW, Ass't Law Agent.
This testimony was given in the Spanish language, Wm. E.
P. Hartnell acting by consent of the Attorneys on both sides, as
interpreter, having first been duly sworn by me for that purpose.
Subscribed and sworn to before me at San Francisco, this
twenty-ninth day of September, 1853.
(Signed) ALPHEUS FELCH.
I, George Fisher, Secretary of the Board of United States
Commissioners to ascertain and settle the private land claims in
the State of California, hereby certify that the foregoing is a
full, true and correct copy of a paper on file among the archives
of said Board, and in my care and custody as such Secretary.
Witness my hand this 25th day of November, 1853.
GEORGE FISHER, Sec'y.
"(.
The documentary evidence, with the testimony of witnesses,
which up to this time has been taken in support of the claim of
Sefior Limantour, has now been laid fully before the public in
the foregoing pages.
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It is proper here again • to refer to the condition of political
affairs in California and in Mexico at the time the grant of
these lands was made by Governor Micheltorena to Senor
Limantour. Governor Micheltorena was sent into California
to quiet the political elements, which had been seriously
disturbed, and to bring back the Department of Upper California
to a firmer union with Mexico.
For some time prior to his appointment, Mexico herself had
been subject to serious civil commotions, and frequent
successions of revolutionary governments had occurred in that
country. Those contests, however, were brought to an end by
what is known as the Basis of Government established at
Tacubaya, and the election of His Excellency Senor Don
Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna as Dictator.
That basis of Government was established on the 28th of
September, A. D. 1841, and ratified on the 6th of October, 1841.
(See the first volume of the Observador Judicial, page 7.) The
7th article of that Basis of Government is as follows :— " The
''powers of the Provisional Executive are all those necessary
" for the organization of all branches of the Public Administra-
« tion."
Thus full power had been conferred upon His Excellency?
Santa Anna, and he continued in the uninterrupted exercise of
it until near the close of the year 1843, and still retained, sub-
stantially, the executive power of the Mexican nation until the
year 1844. The Mexican federation was broken up in 1835.
The States were reduced to Territories, and the Territories
created into " Departments." It was not until the year 1846-7
that the federative system with the Constitution of 1824 was
restored. The full powers of the Provisional Executive, held
by His Excellency, Santa Anna, was conferred, by him, upon
Governor Micheltorena in reference to the Californias, by his
letter of instructions, dated February 11th, 1842, a translation
of which is here inserted, as follows :
" Most Excellent Sir : His Excellency the President ad interim
being desirous that the Department of California should take
advantage of all the resources which it possesses for its pros-
perity, for placing itself in a state of defence, and for acquiring
i
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that happiness which nature itself invites her to take possession
of; and bearing in mind the disturbances which have taken
place in the country, and which, on account of the distance, the
National Government has not been able to avoid ; the situation
in which Your Excellency will be placed and the measures which
you will have to adopt, and which will not produce the desired ef-
fect if you wait for the proper time to put them into execution, for
there are matters which do not admit of the least delay, and in
the persuasion that Your Excellency will not abuse your powers
but that you will exercise them for the welfare and service of the
inhabitants of that interesting and fertile Department which the
Supreme Government has placed under your charge and respon-
sibility, he (the President) has been pleased to grant to Your Ex-
cellency over and above the attributions assigned to you by the ex-
isting laws and regulations, as Govornor, Commandant General
and Inspector, all the powers which the Supreme Government can
confer upon you, in order that by virtuue thereof you may re-
move from office all such civil and military officers dependent on
said Government who shall not fulfil their duties or act up to
the confidence reposed in them by the same, and fill their situa-
tions by appointing worthy citizens who shall take their places
and enter upon their duties, but with the understanding never-
theless that you report to Government the motives of your
proceedings for its approbation. The views of the Supreme
Magistrate do not only refer to Upper California, but extend
likewise to Lower California, where certain seditious move-
ments have appeared, which being fomented by hidden enemies,
it has caused some foreigners to take part when their very
quality of foreigners prohibits them from intermeddling in
domestic strife ; and as the President is resolved to protect the
troops, authorities, and citizens of said Peninsula, he has deter-
mined that your military command shall likewise extend to
Lower California as well as the civil command, separating it
from Sinaloa, and the Commandant General of the Department
of Sonora and Sinaloa will continue to furnish you with the
resources and assistance which you may require for the purpose
of securing peace, furnishing the troops, providing for the wants
of the citizens and enabling you to provide for the prosperity
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and happiness of the whole Department. Although the first
article of the law of 2d November, 1839, derogated the articles
of that of the 18th February, of the same year which subjected
the subordination of the staff of the army, and the 13th article
of the first mentioned decree merely leaves the Commandant
General of the East and West with the former attributions of
Inspector which they possessed in the Companies of Presidios,
His Excellency the President has determined that your powers
shall extend as Inspector to the permanent Batalion of California
and that you take charge of all the mechanism thereof and re-
port to the staff of the army. You will become acquainted
with the good or bad management of the Maritime Custom
Houses of both Californias
;
you will have to examine the situ-
ation of all the Missions with respect to their management,
improvement and state of accounts
;
you will have to proceed to
the inspection and reorganization of the Companies of the
Presidios, and in all cases (were you not to act) the evil would
have to remain until Government could resolve. The Supreme
Government trusting in your justice and activity, desires that
you should meet with no obstacles, and therefore the powers
conferred upon you are made extensive to those branches and to
all others which may conduce to the welfare of the country,
including amongst others, the administration of the Post Office
Department, Colonization, the establishment of Presidios, the
improvement of Ports, the safety of Towns, the civilization of
wild Indians, the education of youth, the opening of roads, the
furtherance of the arts, the protection of agriculture and com-
merce, the establishment of houses of correction, and the estab-
lishment of Towns.
You know the views of the Supreme Government, and are
well aware that being a friend to improvement it merely desires
the union of Mexicans, and that the community in general may
enjoy the protection of the laws, be obedient to their authorities}
understand that it is our duty to
.
procure the welfare of every
one and avoid that all others be injured. I therefore will not
detain myself by recommending you to propagate these prin-
ciples, and will merely mention that when the Supreme Magis-
trate dictated his instructions, he wished to manifest to you his
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esteem, and the importance of the command he has confided to
you, and to assure the inhabitants of California that the present
administration desires their happiness, disavows all apathy, and
is ready to impart to that Department all the resources which it
may desire and be able to furnish it.
I communicate this to Your Excellency for your satisfaction.
God and Liberty. Mexico, 11 February, 1842.=Tornel.=To
General Don Manuel Micheltorena."
I also think it proper to insert here the translations of a few
sections of a general decree issued and published by His
Excellency Santa Anna, on the 14th day of March, A. D. 1842,
in relation to the right of foreigners to take and hold property in
lands in any of the Departments of Mexico.
The entire decree may be found in the book entitled
" Ordenanzes de Tierras y Aguas," at pages 64, 65, 66 and 67.
" Article 1.—Foreigners established and residing in the
Republic, may acquire and possess town and country property
by sale, adjudication, denouncement, or any other title estab-
lished by law." Article second, allows foreigners to acquire
property in mines, &c.
Article 8, relates to the sale and transfer of property acquired
by foreigners.
" Article 9.—These provisions do not comprehend the
" Departments on the frontiers or boundaries of other nations,
" respecting which special laws of Colonization will be issued,
" and no foreigner shall ever be entitled to acquire property
"therein without the express permission of the Supreme
" Government of the Republic."
That express provision Sefior Limantour did procure, as fully
shown above.
It has not been required of me, by my client, in the preparation
of this pamphlet, to write out an argument, either upon the law or
the facts of the case. That is to be done before another tribunal.
In the conclusion of my labor upon this statement, I cannot
forego the .remark that this case has now been in my hands full
ten months. The best powers that I possess have been faith-
mrally, diligently, and I may say anxiously applied to its
investigation.
If it is a false, fraudulent, or a simulated claim, there is not a
man in this community more desirous to know it than the
humble individual who now writes this sentence. I hope I
have too much self respect, and too high a regard for common
honesty, to prosecute a false or fraudulent claim.
With a perfect knowledge of all the papers and documents in
the case ; a careful consideration of all the testimony taken, I
am constrained to say, and T do most conscientiously say, that
there is not, and in my firm belief there cannot possibly be, the
slightest indicia of fraud in it, or in any way connected with if.
" Fraud is to be proved, not inferred."
The claimant, Senor Don Jose Y. Limantour, comes here
from the city of Mexico, where he resides, and where he has
had his home for the last ten years of his life. He brought
with him testimonials of high character and integrity from per-
sons of the highest official positions in the Government of Mex-
ico, and the representatives of other nations resident near that
Government. He has been here, at this time, well-nigh a year,
and is known to a great many of the older residents of Califor-
nia, native and foreign. His case was presented before the
Honorable the Board of Land Commissioners to ascertain and
settle private land claims, in February last. His documents
have been open for examination and inspection, and they have
been thoroughly examined and scrutinized by sagacious men
having deep interests at stake, and learned lawyers ready for
liberal fees ; and hitherto, not a shade of doubt has been cast
upon any of the documents ; not a particle of testimony taken
to throw a cloud, or the shadow of a cloud, upon his claim.
How then can I doubt its validity ? What honest, disinterested
man can doubt it? If not valid, what becomes of human tes-
timony to establish rights to property ?
Governor Micheltorena was here as Governor of California,
with full powers from the Supreme Government of Mexico.
Mexico owned the lands ; Governor Micheltorena "was distress-
ingly in want of Senor Limantour's money and goods. He
says so to Senor Limantour, and states distinctly to him, that
70
he has ample powers to give him lands in exchange ; the nego-
tiation is completed ; Limantour delivers his goods and his
money upon that assurance ; Micheltorena delivers his deed
upon that consideration, conveying a full, absolute, uncondi-
tional title; the deed is taken to the Supreme Government at
the city of Mexico, clothed as it was, and exercising as it did,
de facto, absolute powers, and that Supreme Government en-
dorses its full, absolute, unqualified approbation upon the deed
of grant. Say that deed of grant is not valid ! Never—never !
It cannot be so said without rushing rough-shod and blindfold
over all the facts in the case, and all the law and equity in
Christendom.
JAMES WILSON,
Attorney to J. Y. Limantour.
San Francisco, Nov. 28, 1853.
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Since tile foregoing sheets were put to press, an additional
deposition has been taken in support of Senor Limantour's
claim. The binding of the pamphlet has been stopped, that
the deposition may be printed and bound with what precedes.
J. W.
December 1, 1853.
Office of the Board of U. S. Land Commissioners
San Francisco, Nov. 30th, 1853.
On this day, before Commissioner Alpheus Felch, came
Victor Prudon, a witness for the claimant, Jose* Y. Limantour,
petition No. 548, and being duly sworn, deposed as follows
:
QUESTIONS BY GENERAL JAMES WILSON, ATTORNEY FOR CLAIMANT.
Question 1.—What are your name, age, profession and place
of residence ?
Answer.—My name is Victor Prudon. My age, forty-four
years. My place of residence is San Francisco, in California.
Before the taking of the country by the Americans, I was
Lieutenant Colonel of the Mexican Army. I was also at one
time Secretary of the Civil Government, and at another, Secre-
tary to the Military Department in California. I have been a
resident of California since 1834.
Question 2.—Are you acquainted with Jose* Y. Limantour
—
If yea, where and when did you first become acquainted with
him?
Answer.—I am acquainted with him. I first knew him some
time about the fall of 1841, here at Yerba Buena, after his
shipwreck at Punta del Reyes.
Question 3.—What was Mr. Limantour engaged in or doing
at that time ?
Answer.—He was known here as the Captain of a Mexican
vessel, and the owner of said vessel and cargo. From that
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time (1841) until 1847, he made several voyages between Mexico
and the coast of California in the same character, exchanging
his goods for hides and tallow, as was customary in the country,
and then selling the hides and tallow to the American ships for
cash.
Question 4.—Do you know anything about advances of
money, sales of provisions or merchandise by said Limantour
to Micheltorena, Governor of California, in the years 1843 and
1844 ?—If yea, state all the circumstances and your means of
knowledge.
Answer.—I know Captain Limantour made several advances
of money and sales of provisions and merchandise to the
Government of California in 1843 and 1844, and I remember
particularly these circuustances : at the latter part of 1842 and
beginning of 1843, I was at Los Angeles with General Michel-
torena, whom I conducted there from Mexico in virtue of a
special Military Commission, with which I was invested by the
Commander in Chief of California, General M. G. Vallejo,
with the object of obtaining from the Supreme Government of
Mexico a sufficient force to protect and defend this country
against any foreign invasion. General Santa Anna, who was
then President of the Mexican Republic, on my representation,
ordered the expedition of General Micheltorena, whom I con-
ducted under orders with five hundred men to Los Angeles,
where we established provisionally our head-quarters ; awaiting
meanwhile, the arrival from Mazatlan of stores, money, provis-
ions, &c. Some three or four months having elapsed without
the arrival of the expected supplies, the troops being in a
complete state of destitution, that occasioned amongst them
an alarming discontent and frequent desertions, General
Micheltorena sent me to San Pedro with a letter directed to
Captain Limantour, for the purpose of obtaining from him the
money and supplies which we in vain expected from Mazatlan,
and solicited at Los Angeles. Captain Limantour accompa-
nied me back to head-quarters at Los Angeles, and there and
then made arrangements with Governor Micheltorena for
furnishing him with the money and supplies that he wanted.
This was in 1843.
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In 1844, 1 knew officially, of other supplies made by Liman-
tour to Governor Micheltorena at Monterey.
Question 5.—Please to look on the paper now exhibited to
you marked at the top with the initials " A. F.," endorsed on the
back " Exhibit No. 2," and annexed to the deposition of W. E.
P. Hartnell, heretofore taken in this case, and purporting to be
an original letter from Governor Micheltorena to Jose" Y.
Limantour, dated at Los Angeles on the 8th day of January,
1843, and state whether you have seen said letter before, and
explain all you know about it.
Answer. I have looked on said document. This same letter
I carried from Los Angeles to San Pedro. It is all in the
hand-writing of Micheltorena himself. I recognize the letter
because I read it to Limantour at his request, as at that time
he was very imperfectly acquainted with the Spanish language.
I carried the letter to said Limantour at the time before men-
tioned.
Question 6. Do you or did you know of any grants of land
made by the Mexican Government in California, or Governor
Micheltorena to Mr. Limantour ? If yea, state what lands
were so granted, the circumstances under which they were
granted, and your means of knowledge in relation thereto.
Answer. What I know is that in discussing the letter of
Micheltorena, above mentioned, I learned that Limantour in-
tended to ask all the vacant land between the Yerba Buena
and the Mission'of Dolores, and another tract about the Presidio.
The idea made me laugh, and I advised him to ask at the same
time the privilege of monopolizing the wind and sand. Then
I knew that the idea was not his own, but suggested to him by
Mr. Duflot De Mofras, who visited California invested with a
Scientific and Political Mission by the French Government,
and who then said that those lands should before long acquire
an immense value. I then objected to Limantour, that notwith-
standing the promise of Governor Micheltorena in his letter, I
did not know how he, Limantour, being a foreigner not nat-
uralized, could hold lands in the Mexican Territory. We made
a bet on the subject, and when the case was submitted to Gen-
eral Micheltorena, he (Micheltorena) convinced me by showing
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me a decree of Santa Anna, in the year 1842, allowing to for-
eigners the right to hold real estate in the Mexican Republic.
Said decree I did not know before. After that I translated into
Spanish, at the request of Limantour, a petition that he had
written in French, asking for the vacant lands between Yerba
Buena and the Mission of Dolores, and another tract about the
Presidio. Said petition, rendered into Spanish by me, was
transcribed by Limantour and so presented to Governor Michel-
torena, and I recollect to have seen the same some time after-
wards in the Secretary's office, with a decree of General Mich-
eltorena, granting to Limantour said lands and ordering the
issue of titles.
Question 7. You say you laughed at Limantour's idea of
purchasing the lands referred to in your last answer. Please
to state the condition of those lands—what were they fit for,
and what was their value at that time ?
Answer. The only value they had then was the wood which
was on them, and which was good for firewood or charcoal.
They were hilly, sandy, and covered with bushes and trees ; a
part of the land was in that condition, and the other part con-
tained lowlands, marshes, lagoons, and corrupted water through-
out the year. There was no improvement on any portion of
the land.
Question 8. Please to state the time when you came to live
in Yerba Buena, and how long you continued to reside at that
place.
Answer. I lived in Yerba Buena from 1839 until 1841, in-
clusive.
Question 9. What was the extent or the dimensions of the
place called Yerba Buena, at that time ? and the number or
amount of the population?
Answer. The extent was about five or six hundred varas in
breadth, from Leese's house to Spear's house, and about twelve
hundred varas in length, from Fuller's house to Juan Brione's
house, which dimensions corresponded nearly to the space in-
cluded between Stockton and Montgomery streets and between
California or Pine street and Green street. The population
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amounted to about twenty inhabitants, of whom one only was
a Mexican by birth, that was Juan Briones.
Question 10. What do you know, if any thing, of there
having been a Pueblo where San Francisco now is ?
Answer. I never knew that there was anything here but a
little hamlet of the description above given. There was never
in Yerba Buena a Municipal Hall nor a Parochial Church, two
things very essential in the Mexican Pueblo ; and I never heard
the place of Yerba Buena called otherwise than Yerba Buena,
or Loma Alta, whilst it was always customary to say the
Pueblo of San Jos6, the Pueblo of Los Angeles, &c.
Question 11. Do you know anything of a survey having
been made of Yerba Buena ? If yea, when and by whom ?
Answer. I recollect that there was a survey and map of
Yerba Buena made by Capt. Vioget. I think it was in the
latter part of 1839 or beginning of 1840, when Francisco Guer-
reno was Sub Prefect and residing at the Mission of Dolores.
The limits of that map, which I have seen several times, cor-
respond very near to those which I have described.
Question 12. How long did you continue in the service of
the Government, and near the Governor, after coming into
California with Governor Micheltorena? and in "what capacity ?
Answer. I remained in the service of Mexico until 1846,
when I was made prisoner by the Americans at Sonoma. I
remained with Micheltorena until about the middle of 1843,
acting as Secretary of the Military Department, and then I was
sent to Sonoma, where I was Commandante of that post until
1846, and in the exercise of my service, had frequent occasions
to go to Monterey and confer with General Micheltorena.
Question 13. Please to look at the document now exhibited
to you, marked with the initials " A. F.," Exhibit No. 4, annex-
ed to the deposition of Wm; E. P. Hartnell, heretofore taken
and filed in this case, purporting to be the original deed from
Governor Micheltorena to Jose' Y. Limantour of the lands
claimed in this case, and say whether you recognize the hand-
writing of the body of said deed ? if yea, state whose it is.
Answer. I have looked on said document. I think it is the
hand-writing of Captain Maciel, then a Captain in General
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Micheltorena's expedition. It is not in the hand-writing of any
of the Clerks at the Government office ; but it was customary
when they were pressed with too much writing, for some other
person employed in the service to render them aid, and Maciel
was often employed in that capacity. The signature to the
document I believe to be Governor Micheltorena's.
QUESTIONS BY MR. GREENHOW, ASSOCIATE LAW AGENT.
Question 1. Who was the Secretary of the Civil Depart-
ment under Governor Micheltorena during the winter of 1842-3 ?
Answer. General Micheltorena had no Civil Secretary until
he arrived at Monterey, which was, I think, about the latter part
of 1843. After he arrived there Manuel Jimeno was his Civil
Secretary. The business of the Civil Department was per-
formed by either of the officers who had the best hand-writing,
or was the most capable of writing properly, until Jimeno as-
sumed the duties.
Question 2. What was Manuel Jimeno's business at Los
Angeles, during the winter of 1842-3 ?
Answer. He went there as the Governor ad interim to put
General Micheltorena in possession of the Government to
which he was appointed by Mexico. I do not know how long
Jimeno remained at Los Angeles, but it was only a short time.
Question 3. Did Governor Micheltorena pay Mr. Limantour
for the supplies furnished to him in any other way than by
grants of land?
Answer. I only know that General Micheltorena gave to
Limantonr some drafts or orders against the Custom House at
Mazatlan ; but I do not know whether they were paid or not.
I know that the Custom House at Mazatlan had orders from
the Government of Mexico to pay Limantour eight thousand
dollars a month during the time Micheltorena should remain in
California.
Question 4. Did you see Mr. Limantour in Yerba Buena
after the period last mentioned ? if so, when ?
Answer. I have seen him several times since then at Sonoma,
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Yerba Buena, and Monterey. I cannot tell positively or sepa-
rately the dates when I saw him at either of those places.
Question 5. Did you see him at either of those in the sum-
mer of 1847 ?
Answer. I saw him at Yerba Buena some time in the year
1847.
Question 6. Do you recollect whether Mr. Limantour in
1847 spoke in any manner publicly of his title to lands in or
near this place ?
Answer. I cannot recollect.
Question 7. Was any part of the land now claimed by
Limantour at this place then occupied under grants from the
authorities of this City ?
Answer. In the first place I do not know exactly which
lands Mr. Limantour claims, but no part of the land between
the dimensions of Yerba Buena, as I have above described them
and the Mission of Dolores was then occupied, nor ever granted
to or solicited by any body else to my knowledge.
Question 8. Did you see Limantour in California from 1847
until within the last year ?
Answer. I did not.
QUESTIONS BY GENERAL WILSON.
Question 1. Was it known to the prominent men in Cali-
fornia that the lands near the Yerba Buena and the Presidio
had been granted to Limantour by Governor Micheltorena ?
Answer. I believe that it was known by all the principal
persons, and I am sure that it was known by several of the
principal persons of California. It was known to Micheltorena
and many officers of his expedition. It was also known by
Alvarado, Jose Castro, Jimeno,Gaudalupe, and Salvador Vallejo,
Arce, Sanchez, myself and some others. The Sanchez meant
now lives at Monterey, and was one of Micheltorena's officers.
(Signed) VICTOR PRUDON.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 30th day of Novem-
ber, 1853. '
(Signed) ALPHEUS FELCH, Commissioner.
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I, George Fisher, Secretary ofthe Board of U. S. Commissioners
to ascertain and settle the private land claims in California, do
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, correct and full copy
of a paper on file among the archives of said Board, and in
my care and Custody as such Secretary.
Witness my hand, this 1st day of December, A. D. 1853.
GEORGE FISHER, Sec'y.
A REPORT
SUBSTAICE OE A SPEECH,
DELIVERED BY
E. D. BAKEE,
BEFORE THE SENATE OF CALIFORNIA, ON THE FIRST AND
SECOND OF FEBRUARY, IN SUPPORT OF THE CHARGE OF
AN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT BRIBERY,
MR. PECK, SENATOR FROM BUTTE COUNTY
10
JOSEPH C. PALMER,
SAN FRANCISCO
:
PLACER TIMES AND TRANSCRIPT PRINT,
1854.

DEFENCE.
Mr. President and Gentlemen op the Senate ;
—
I am very glad that at last I am permitted to open my lips in the defence of a
gentleman who has entrusted his character and his honor, in some sense, to my
hands. I am glad that I am allowed to defend him before a tribunal which em-
bodies within itself much of whatever of dignity there is in Republican Institu-
tions, and I beg leave to say that I feel as sensibly as gentlemen upon the other
side, the respect, the veneration, due to the tribunal before which I stand. I
know very well that there is here no display of pomp, no gorgeous trappings of
power, but I know that the dignity of the Senate is deeply felt by the people of
this Commonwealth, for whom you are here to legislate. I know when these pil-
lars shall have crumbled, and the men who compose this body shall have passed
away, the manner in which ycu upheld your own dignity, shall be felt and re-
membered for good or for evil.
In that spirit I approach the task assigned to me, and if there have been some
things which I could have wished otherwise, I am inclined to view them rather as
an evidence of the strict impartiality of the Senate, than as proof of any bias
or feeling against the man whose case I am here to plead. It is a spectacle of
surpassing interest to observe the strict sense of justice which causes this Senate
to forget its relations to individuals. It is a matter perhaps of proud observa-
tion, that when a Senator, a member of this body, an equal, is arraigned, if he
is not denied the privilege accorded to the meanest criminal, nothing else is al-
lowed him; his statements pass for nothing; his character stands him in no stead;
his word, his motives, his oath, is at every step disputed; instead of saying, as
the Senate might have said, he is a member of our body, we will accord to him
common honesty.and honor; he is in the beginning confronted with a fearful ad-
versary, surrounded by able and numerous counsel; instead of making his state-
ments a mere prelimenary to further proceedings, he is subjected to a cross ex-
amination, acute, bitter, prolonged, pitiless; unt^l, if I did not fear to say the
word, the dignity of the Senate has been outraged in the person of a Senator;
in fact, counsel have been allowed to ask questions in a tone so scornful, that the
very pages upon the floor have been taught to sneer at your equal. But this I
mention as an evidence of the strict impartiality of the Senate.
What the Senate of Rome would never have allowed, or would have punished
as a contempt, in Julius or Augustus Ceasar, you have not only admitted hut
applauded, in a private citizen. According to every form you have adopted, you
have put your own Senator upon trial, and professing to be actuated by a sense
of justice, you try him like a criminal and compel him to struggle for what is
more than life.
When an offence has been committed against the character of a deliberative
body, it has, hitherto, raquired but the statement of a Senator or Representa-
tive, by virtue of his office as proof of the charge, to put the defendant upon his
defence. I do not say that the statement of a Senator or Representative in Con-
gress would affirmatively establish the truth of a charge; that might at least
depend upon the testimony; but for the purpose of preliminary proceedings, a
mere statement has been sufficient to found a charge, fix the proceedings, and
call the criminal to the bar. Hitherto, in all civilized countries, the mere state-
ment of a Senator or a Representative, has been held sufficient. Not so here.
No sooner has the charge been made from a sense of public duty, than a labored
attempt is made to go into an investigation, where there is not one but two par-
ties, and if possible, to show that the Senate is inclined to be more than impar-
tial, or rather to act with strict impartiality, the criminal, the accused, the offen-
der, is allowed to be confronted with the man who makes the charge, to deny
and to add to that denial the sanctity of an oath. Is not this an evidence of
strict impartiality. The Senate will not err at least from kindness to one of
their own body.
Whoever heard or dreamed that in a court of Justice the word of a criminal
was taken, although it was the word of a man revelling in wealth. If Mr.
Palmer had been accused in a Court of perjury or forgery—what Court, what
Judge, what courtesy would allow him to come up, and deny, beyond the plea
of not guilty ? What Court, I repeat, would permit him to hurl back the charge
and bring his accuser to trial ? Where else would he be allowed to give his evi-
dence under oath, and that too, without being subjected to cross examination ?
It is a mode of jurisprudence which may be just, but it is unusual ; and I ask,
is there any known Court where such a procedure would be allowed ?
It is said that this proceeding is in the nature of a Bill in Equity, and with a
play upon words more creditable to his fancy than his legal knowledge, my learn-
ed friend has asked, " will not the Senate deal in equity?"
Why should all forms thus be reversed ? What is there in the character of this
transaction to turn this into a Bill of Equity, and this Senate Chamber into a
Court of Chancery ?
I remember I was once called upon to defend a man who was charged with a
contempt of court. He had called the presiding officer by a name which I will
not now repeat ; I was then inexperienced and I contended that J had a right to
empannel a jury to try the fact as to whether he was rightly called. I feel the
shame for that folly, which gentlemen should feel now for the attempt to turn a
proceeding against the dignity of this body into a Bill of Equity, and this for
purpose of directing the oath of the accused against the accuser. Fontleroy, the
English Banker, was accused of forgery, and had he been allowed to swear in his
ewn defence he would have said that he was innocent and persecuted A man
who would commit the first offence, would back it up by perjury ; and the kind-
ness of friends does him an injustice when they compel him to come in here and
purge himself by an oath. The descent to crime is gradual ; a man driven by
hate or love or fear or avarice, to eommit one crime, will not stop at a solemn
assertion of his innocence to coneeal it. Every word of the denial of an accused
is but an appeal to the aecuser to prove the fact, and the attempt to allow Mr„
Palmer to prove his innocence upon oath is unjust—unknown to all the teachings
of the law, to all forms of legislation in all countries, civilized or barbarous,
on the earth.
The position of these parties gives this ease an importance which it would not
otherwise have possessed. It is a question whether a contempt has been commit-
ted against the dignity' of the Senate. (N© very deadly crime until these perju-
ries had been committed.) Either a hasty or wanton attempt to corrupt a member
«f this body, thereby reflecting contempt upon this body itself—and if something
were not peculiar in the relation which this party occupies towards the commu-
nity—and that the crime itself bears a peculiar prominence in the history of this
commuaity—the interest which is now felt in this case would be without cause
or foundation.
The State of California is a new State'—wealthy—and the means of creating
wealth has assumed new forms and sought new revenues. There is a feeling that
is prevalent in the community that these vast fortunes which have suddenly
sprung ,up (like the palace of Alladia in a single night,) have not always been
gained by fair, open, manly, honorable exertion ; skill will do much, enterprise
snuch, good fortune mere ; but neither the skill or fortune, nor all the enterprise
ever combined im the hand or brain of one man would have sufficed to have rear-
ed those princely palaces which emulate and rival the marts of India or Europe.
There are colossal fortunes held by persons who seek to eontrol the means of
acquiring wealth by governing the politics of the Commonwealth.
I need not say to you that it is a matter of public history, that—tampering
with Legislatures ; with Common Councils ; with Municipal Organizations ; agents
of the State Government—agents of the Federal Government—are charges that
are as familiar as household words. No man denies that this is so.. Not a Sena-
tor fresh from the mountains, not a Representative coming from gulch and hollow.,
that is not able to go into the city of San Francisco and point out store after
store, palace after palace, that have arisen as if by magic, and have not arisen
by fair means in the opinion of the whole community.
One of these merchant princes is here
^ one of these deep, designing, artfuL
ingenious, bold, able men, is here, whose name is, has be^n, perhaps yet will be,
connected with every vast scheme of doubtful enterprise with which California
lias so much abounded- I need not name the measures,, one by one—they are
knows.
I am far from saying thai all these charges are true ^ most of them occurred
before I became a resident ef this State, but I have heard the charges made, in
common with your fellow citizens, and I speak of this as being one cause that
imparts importance to this cause which nothing else can give it.
Sir, it is but justice to myself to admit that against this party, this array of
wealth, power and strength my feeble powers are most unequally matched.
6Upon the other side we have a man who, thirty days ago, was as utterly
unknown to the world as if such a man had never existed—the people of hia
county, from their knowledge of his character—trusting not in his ability, for he
has but little—but from their knowledge of his truth and worth, which will
prove better than the highest ability, have sent him here. He comes here simple r
innocent—from the mountains—he was but little qualified to cope with the mas-
ter spirits here, who with a nod could shake the financial or politioal interests of
the State. He comes here simple as a child, and he comes forward and tells
you his plain, unpretending story. He had been a book-keeper for a short time
in San Francisco, but he had been living for the last two years among the
mountains, until sent as a Senator here. He did not know a member of your
body. At the time this attempt was made to bribe him he said that he knew
Col. May. How did he know him ? He roomed with him. Therefore knew him.
He had not found out where he stood. Broderick, he had heard of, but whether
he was a myth or a reality he did not know. Palmer. Cook & Co., he did not
know by name, much less that there was such a third power in the State—even
the virtuous Selover he did not know. Of their power to raise or depress—to*
scatter blessings or convulse the State—of all this was Mr. Peck profoundly
ignorant. Sir, he was so most unfortunately, for the very first thing he does is
to bring himselfinto deadly conflict with all these powers.
The first thing, according to their theory, that the man does—simple, unlearned,
ignorant, sent here by accident—the first thing that he does is to set himself
alone by a deliberate attempt, by forgery of facts, perjury of words, wicked;
base, malignant perjury, to charge the most powerful institutions in this State-
—possessing the greatest influence ever known, with an offence, whieh, if proved
upon them, would reflect shame and disgrace upon Broderick, Palmer, Wright
& Co., and even upon Mr. Selover.
I seek no occasion to charge Mr. Broderick—distinguished as he is said to be
by the power which he possesses over the hearts of his countrymen. In common
with my fellow citizens I have a profound respect for Mr. Broderick, and if the
extent of his influence does somewhat surprise me I repress that surprise. As
far as he is concerned, there is no proof that convicts him of the slightest
knowledge of the transaction. Mr. Peck never would have dared—it never
occurred to his simple head to attack Mr. Broderick, and because Mr. Palmer fol-
lowed up a well known usual plan, I see no reason that Mr. Broderick should be
charged. I protest against Mr. Broderick's name being used in one way or the
other.
In one opinion of my learned friend I concur. After expressing his pity for
Mr. Peck, he says that he has either told the truth, or sworn to a lie, and on
this I agree with him. Now then, he has done it alone, or had help, and I call
upon the counsel to tell me whether they intend to insist that there was a con-
spiracy against Broderick, Palmer, Cook & Company, or that Mr. Peck
has undertaken this alone, and I will take either line of argument and
disprove it. My theory is that Mr. Palmer did make the attempt and is now
attempting to swear himself clear from it. All their attempts to pity Peck are
not facts
;
all this commiseration for his circumstances is not argument. Mr.
Peck knows truth from falsehood, and he is here now an innocent, persecuted,
maligned, conspired-against man, or else he alone, or in company with others
whose names have been meationed here has been perjuring himself, and conspir-
ing against one of the most powerful companies in our State.
The learned counsel has told us how he pitied Mr. Peck. What can he do
against a banker ? Simple minded man from the country, what can he do ? no
friends, no money. If he talks with Truett and Hammond he is charged with
conspiracy ; when he tells what happens to himself alone he is charged with per-
jury ; but in either case, whether conspiring or committing perjury, he is to be
pitied, and yet Mr. Peck is neither more nor less than a Senator upon this floor,
and what he has done has been done from motives of public interest and public
welfare alone. He has done many things which my judgment does not approve
—
many things which, if he had remained here one month longer, he never would
have done. Going to Palmer, Cook & Co.'s oflice, going to Broderick's head-
quarters, intimidated by Selover. He is not a hero or a lion, but he is armed
with truth and able to bear himself with truth against all his foes ; aud I rejoice
that I am permitted once more in my life to stand up on the side of poverty,
against all the wealth and power, and influence of this State or any other State.
One of two things is to be taken as true in their line of defence. There is either
a conspiracy against Mr. Palmer or against Mr. Broderick. or Mr. Peck has com-
mitted all this alone. I don't wish to discuss both propositions. If counsel will
tell me which line they will attempt to prove, I care not which, I will disprove
it. It is either Peck alone, or Peck, Truett and Hammond, or the criminal is
sitting there. I heard of this conspiracy, this combination for an unholy pur-
pose, and until I came to this city I was led to believe that there might be some
foundation for it, but what do we hear ? Mr. Hammond says he has not said
one word. His interest is said to be at stake ; Hammond against Broderick.
Mr. Palmer having left Mr. Gwin, he is supposed to be out of the way. Once the
life and soul of the Gwin party, Mr. Palmer has deserted him and he has fallen so
low that there are " none so poor as do him reverence." When they say there is
a conspiracy on foot to defeat Mr. Broderick this is what they maintain, that Mr.
Peck has been induced to come forward and say that Mr. Palmer has offered him
a bribe—that this is a lie ; that being a lie, Truett, Hammond & Co. are push-
ing forward this investigation for the purpose of defeating Mr. Broderick. That
is the plain English of this charge of conspiracy. To that there is but one reply.
Here or there are the conspirators. I don't stop to make comparisons, but I
know this man, (Mr. Hammond,) and I care not what Mr. Palmer cannot do
what Mr. Broderick can do, but I say that Mr. Hammond is incapable of such sm
act. I say this of one whom I am proud to regard as a personal friend. Sir, he
can compare with the proudest of them all—in the counsels of the State, in the
most responsible offices, on the field of battle, in all the relations of life—known,
honored, trusted by all around him. I make no invidious comparison, but I
challenge any man to assert that by word or deed Mr. Hammond is a conspirator
where perjury is the foundation and fraud the superstructure. Such aspersions
have no credence, sure, in the minds of men whose malignity leads them to sus-
pect what they scarcely dare openly to avow.
They talk of conspirators, conspiracy. Who pledges himself to the fact? where
are the witnesses ? The whole chargejs without foundation, from the beginning
to the end.
Mr. Truett is supposed not to like Mr. Broderick ; no great crime in that. Mr.
8Broderick can well afford to love Mr. Truett. he Las been eminently snccesfhl,
and whether he is right or wrong in this family quarrel I neither know nor care.
I should not be very sorry if they were to occur more frequently, nor should I
greatly grieve if the present dominant party were to lose some of their spring
feathers.
I think that Mr. Truett was glad that he had an opportunity of exposing the
rascality of the other side. I believe that if Mr. Truett had been allowed to
speak, he would have said that he believed every word of Peck's story—that the
effort was made to get one or two votes more, and to elect Mr. Broderick, and
that he was especially glad when Mr. Peck told him that this event had occurred;
he would have been more or less than man had he not felt so, not thinking very
much at the time ofMs friendship for Mr. Peek-
Here is a charge made against what they call a faction ; but why do they
blame Truett or Hammand for what Mr. Peck never said or did ? Whom have
they bought? Whom have they paid?' Whom have they suborned? But, say
they, Mr. Peck has gone to the heads of the Democratic party instead of the heads
of the Whig party. What is the reason ? In the first place. I do- not say that Mr.
Peck ia a very wise man ; next, it is difficult to find the heads of the Whig party.
We are like lost sheep upon the mountains of Sin, and if I were to look for the
heads of the Whig party, when I had found some seven or eight gentlemen for
whom I have the highest personal regard, I should be very much troubled to find
their followers ; and besides, he knew no Whigs here. He was acquainted with
Col. May because he roomed with him, but he had no introduction, as yet, to the
gentlemen who were members of the Whig party.
Sir, he was in San Francisco, and he happened to know Mr. Truett, not as a
politician, but as a merchant, and so he went and told Truett at that stage of the
proceedings. But, says one, what does Peck mean—why does he not knock
Palmer down ? What does Peck mean, says another, by keeping it from Saturday
until Tuesday,—why did he not mention it directly? Ah, says another, what a
d—d fool Peck was, not to take Joe Palmer's five thousand dollars, and then
fool him. Thus we see that each man would have acted differently. And even
admitting that Mr. Peck did not take the surest course—that he did not do right
who is there among us who can look upon his past life and not see a great many
things that might have been done better, with our present experience to guide us ?
Vain were were the man, and false as- vain,
Who said were he ordaiaed to run
His course of being o'er again,
He wowid do all ihat he had done.
I suppose that Mr. Peck does not read poetry, but he subscribes to the senti-
ment. He gets a secret upon his mind—he never was bought—he never was
worth buying before—he did not know what to do with himself. After thinking
two or three days, he goes and tells his friend Truett. I ask you, do you believe
that when Peck did this, he said to himself, "Now I have told a lie, and have
offered to be bribed, and I will be bribed not merely to vote for a Senator, but 1
will be bribed to lie so basely, so calumniously, that it v, ill vie in crime and atro-
city with the worst crimes of brigands and murderers ever recorded in history.
He tells'the story to Mr. Truett; Mr. Truett takes him home to Mr. Hammond; Mr.
Hammond sits ensconced in the dignity of the Custom House, and says not a word,
Mr. Peck arrives at Benicia, and Mr. Sclovcr arrives in haste, when an exposure
9is threatened, and threats and badgers—intimidates Mr. Peck, until friends com©
to his relief and demand that the whole story shall be told, and when it is told
what do they reply ?—that it is a conspiracy. Where is the conspiracy ? Where
are the conspirators ? The forger, the perjurer is here (Peck) or there (Palmer)
or no where. Mr. Peck may say in the words of Benton,—" Solitary and alone
I have set this ball in motion."
Let me contrast the position of these parties, not with regard to the commu-
nity, but as they appear in this case.
In olden times, I had almost said, in better times, a charge and denial of this
kind would have led to deadly conflict, spear to spear, horse to horse, man to
man, but in the present day intellectual effort alone can be used; it can be made
as deadly a conflict by intellect alone as ever was displayed on the field of bat-
tle. Mr. Palmer says I will bring able, numerous counsel into Court, and I will
examine Peck to death, so that he shall be made to deny his assertions, and if to
wear out a man's patience, to brow-beat, to intimidate, with a voice the lowest
tones of which are always impressive—stop, sir ! put that down—Palmer here,
Selover there, three learned counsel in combination; if all this is not sufficient
to puzzle the brains of one little mountain Senator, I do not know what is.
I do not mean to blame the practise of cross examination; but it may be car-
ried on so far as to weary the patience of the tribunal. It may be carried to a
further extent than for the purpose for which it is allowed by the law, to elicit
the truth and the whole truth from the witness.
A cross examination should be to test the truth; lawyers know that it is fre-
quently perverted to perplex and embarrass a witness ; and there never was a
witness yet who,rintending to speak the truth, could be cross examined for a day
and a half and could adhere precisely to the same story in its minor points.
What the counsel have alleged to be a sovereign test of truth, (strict adherence
to one story without variation) is indeed a test of falsehood, and so it is laid
down in every book on the philosophy of testimony.
Some of you came to Benicia last Monday; can you tell what was said ? whom
you talked with upon that occasion ? You have been engaged in important trans-
actions in your life; you know the fact; but can you tell the words that surroun-
ded that fact, and if you told the words to-day, by the pressure of a rigid cross
examination, could you tell the same to-morrow?
Mr. Wright testifies as to a conversation hehad about Mr. Gwin; Iheard him,
but I did not understand the conversation to be the same as he stated here; yet
I may have been mistaken; perhaps neither of us could repeat the conversation
exactly; and I should be false to every instinct of my nature were I to say that
because a man cannot repeat a conversation exactly as it happened on little mat-
ters, that therefore he must be telling a falsehood.
Do you remember what you said when you asked your wife to become yours ?
you can't remember what you said or what she said ; you know the fact that you
was accepted, and leaving a little palpitation of the heart out of the question,
you can't remember the words at all.
The most solemn articles of our faith, our deepest convictions of the truths qf
immortality and eternal life depend upon the testimony of men who give a differ-
ent narration. No college man, no divine, pretends that the Evangalists recite
alike the story of Christ's resurrection, yet philosophers and critics have agreed
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that this very difference, so far from destroying their claims to validity, only
proves the fact.
I ask you to apply the argument; again, men differ in their capacity to bear
cross examination, according to their moral and physical strength.
There are men who could not have borne such a cross examination half an
hour; there are men who would have failed to recollect the minor portions, or have
flatly contradicted themselves. If Mr. Peck had been intending to tell a lie from
beginning to end, why does he commit himself to so many adversaries? Why
does he go to Mr. Lent, not indeed an adversary,, but known to be deeply inter-
ested in the success of Mr. Broderick. Why does this simple minded man go to
their room, Mr. Mahoney sitting down endeavoring to get a statement in his wayi
A chiel's among ye taking notes,
And faith he'll print 'em.
Why does Mr. Peck go there like a sheep, that ought to have been dumb and
was not, in the presence of men that were watching his every word, and why
did he say that which, had he been telling a lie, would never have risen to his-
lips?
But they say that Mr. Peck had not sense enough. I should have told him,
had I been advised with, to this effect : Mr Peck, do not say a word about this
matter till the proper time and place, and until so told, make no statement—say
not a word to any one on the subject, on your life. And such would have been
his course had he been an artful, cunning man ; but I defy any man, lawyer or
not, to see otherwise than that the leading idea of this man's mind was truth,
simplicity, weakness, if you please so to term it—but yet truth. He tells Mr.
Lent, and mourns over the fact, that Mr. Broderick would not speak to him.
What then ? He can live without Mr. Broderick, here or there—he has the free
air—the open sky—God's sunshine—Broderick or no Broderick. He can stand
it as well as his counsel, for I array myself against this monied power, and I
shall speak of things and persons as I think they deserve, now and ever.
If Mr. Peck had been telling a lie he would never have allowed them to con-
tradict him as to one important fact, and in one important statement they do
contradict him. And the difference is this. You may contradict a man as to
what he has said, or admissions that he has made in conversation, it is not of
much value : but if you contradict him as to a fact, that is another affair. I
never yet heard a witness, who, in the course of a long examination, did not, if he
were speaking the truth, contradict himself in minor points, when questioned afc
different times. But when an important fact is contradicted—that requires
earnest, deliberate consideration, and in making this admission I will apply it to
this case fully.
Mr. Mahoney and Mr. Lent do not relate the conversation the same as Mr.
Selover stated it was—How is this?—"Mr. Selover would not tell a lie."
And I have no intention to impute a want of veracity to either Mr. Mahoney or
Mr. Lent, but I desire the same allowance should be given to Mr. Peck, when
they bring up his admissions to stultify himself. Would the most foolish person
in the world make such admissions ? What does it all prove ? Merely the
weakness of human memory as to the recollection of conversation in contradic-
tion to facts as required by the courts ofjustice and the rules of law, and by
this rule I insist that my client can be sustained.
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Mr. Peck says, " we conversed upon the common topics of the day, on our
way up." Afterwards he said that there had been a conversation about Senators.
Ah, says Mr. Williams, now I have caught him. Do you call that conversation
the mere talking upon the common topics of the day? So, after a while, he
finds out that there was three conversations. What was the use of dividing and
subdividing—making that three which was in reality but one ? Ah, but says
the counsel, your client swears it was going down. Ours swears that it was
going up. Undoubtedly he does so swear. What man would not plunge his
steed deeper in order to get out of the slough ? Any man would. Once in,
there is no escape—he must plunge through or fail. What sort of consideration
does it deserve whether it was going up or down ? What difference does it
make as to the fact whether he told Col. May on the steps of the Union Hotel, or
o n the steamboat ? Is not this an imperfection to which human nature is liable ?
And I would ask, what particular necessity existed for Mr. Peck to say it was
going down, if it actually happened on going up ? Why could he not afford to
tell the truth as to that particular ? In what respect would a lie as to the time
up or down benefit him ?
Mr. Selover was asked by Mr. Williams, in slow and measured tones, when
—
did
—
you—first—learn—that—Mr.—Peck—had—offered—to—be—bribed—by
Mr.—Palmer ?
And Mr. Selover answered in the same slow measured language ; on—the
—Steamer—Senator—on—her—way—down.
I do not desire to embarrass any man. I have no wish to charge perjury upon
any person without foundation ; so with my usual frankness, I said, repeat that
again, perhaps you are mistaken ; and the flush of shame rose to his face not on
account of the mistake he had made, but because he felt how hard it was to ac-
cuse Mr. Peck because he could not recollect each unimportant particular, while
he himself could not tell accurately a statement to which he came here to swear.
Every contradictory statement that the counsel has elicited must be referred
to the same cause
;
the conversation with Col. May was on board the steamboat
;
it was not on the steps of the Union Hotel. We can prove by Col. May that such
a conversation really did take place, but were not allowed—a cross examination
of two days, a sufficient time to bewilder almost any man. And why, I would
ask, did Mr. Peck tell this story if it was not true ? It could not strengthen his
case ; the evidence was not allowed to confirm his story—but the knowledge that
it can be proved, must confirm the belief that he intended to tell the truth.
I sir, make one remark in all earnestness and sincerity—if there be this con"
flict between the testimony of Mr. Palmer and Mr. Peck, the one a Senator, the
other a Banker ; one having power, the other having official station ; I' ask that
Mr. Palmer and Mr. Peck shall each submit the best evidence they can offer and
let the Senate decide between them. Mr. Palmer or Mr. Peck has sworn to a lie.
Mr. Peck has no influence ; Mr. Palmer has all. If you censure Mr. Palmer
what good will it do Mr. Peck ; he is struggling against wind and tide ; a single
man against power and wealth and political influence ; he is as Mr. Selover said,
in a gulf begirt with fiery serpents. Either faction ready to crush him if he can
escape from the gulf, and is still to live.
Charges, such as these, have been made against Mr. Palmer before ; the
country is rife with them, I dare them to deny it, I dare them to disprove it
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upon the floor of this Senate. Therefore I considered it necessary that Mr. Peck
should produce evidence as to his character if he wished to stamp this statement
as truth. I said to Mr. Peck when he came to me " if you can prove your good
character
—
prove that you are a man of honor
—
you can sustain your case ; if
not—if you have been engaged in any doubtful transactions—it will be doubtful.
He told me that he could and you have heard his character spoken of. You see
him before you ; he is not learned nor well connected, nor well educated, nor
rich, nor powerful ; but he is an honest man. Prom his boyhood up, no man's
lip has defamed him ; no man's tongue has maligned him ; no doubtful reputation
precedes him or pursues him. He is now upon his first trial upon his entrance
into public life ; he is in a gulf surrounded by serpents, almost alone, and he
calls upon his character to be his staff through the dark valley he has been called
upon to tread.
Where is the other man's character? I have not taken counsel by surprise-
I warned them that where there was a doubt, that character would be called upon
to save or destroy.
I know the covered insolence of their intentions. I know what they mean.
What, say they, shall we put the character of a poor mountain miner, without a
dollar to bless himself, without a friend in the world, in competition with the
character of the great Banker, the associate of merchant princes ? Deeply con-
nected with every colossal scheme of enterprise or politics of this State ?
What, says the counsel, " don't you know Mr. Palmer, the banker, the great
banker ? We do not require to prove our character." But still that is just what
the law requires you to prove.
Mr. Peck comes forward and demands that his character shall stand in his
stead, and although Mr. Palmer may sell bills and discount notes, yet he may not
be able to prove that he possesses the character of an upright, honorable man.
How is this. You senators heard me make that offer in all fairness days ago.
I said I have proved the character ofMr. Peck ; it has not a taint upon it. I call
upon you now to prove your client's character. If you do not, I shall insist that
you cannot. If you do I shall impeach it ; and I am here to ask you senators if
any haughty assumption of superior rank or influence can or shouldweigh against
the character of an honest man ?
The rank is but the guinea's stamp,
The man's the gold for a' that.
If that were not the rule of law and sense, what is character made for ? What
good does it do—what is gained by it ? Providence has wisely arranged that
every worthy effort is rewarded,—not indeed in every human event, but in the
general course of human events. It is true that uprightness and honor bring
their own reward, and although in the sunny days of prosperity, surrounded by
friends wielding influence, you may not feel so much the inestimable treasure of
a good character, yet you will feel it when the time of trial comes on—when
friends fall away and influence has departed—still you have a defense, it is " the
shadow of a great rock in a weary land." You can repose upon the proud con-
sciousness of the past, and so doing defy the malice of your enemies. Is it not
just? Is it not right? Thus, and thus only, you place the poor and the rich on
the same equality.
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Now if Mr. Palmer had a good character, why did he not show it by witnesses ?
I dwell upon this point because I feel that this refusal is a haughty assumption
of power. If Mr. Palmer had been a poor man, with this charge against him, if
he had a good character, he would have proved it. Now wealth and influence
stand in the place of character, and they look down with scorn upon the only
appeal we can make.
I say that it is incumbent upon Mr. Palmer to prove his reputation, and that
I have a right to assume that he has no such reputation ifhe does not. It is law.
[Here Mr. Baker read various authorities, sustaining this proposition.]
Hampered by enemies, liable to misapprehension, a good character is in the
day of trouble, a tower of strength. No haughty assumption of power, no
wealth, influence, or political strength, will stand in its stead. The man of good
character may rejoice in its strength. The man of bad or doubtful character
must always be fearful.
In this case there existed a peculiar necessity why this should have been prov"
ed, for this attempt at bribery is an offence that is said to have been often com-
mitted in our unfortunate state. It is said this man is at the very head and
front of the offenders. This may not be true. But when they have the audacity
to offer their oath against our's—their statement against another man's—they
must mean to say, " my character is as good as your's," or, " ifmy statement is
doubtful, your's is doubtful." Let us then appeal to past history—to the char-
acter formed of us by our neighbors and friends, and I have a right so to speak,
for if they did offer to prove it, I could disprove it again and again.
This particular crime has tainted the reputation of many men. These men
can go upon change ; their names are good for the endorsement of a bill ; but
this particular crime has been charged upon them again and again, ever since
the passage of the Water Lot Bill.
I do not make this charge upon my own responsibility. I don't know it to be
so, but I do say, that if they had presented his character we should have tried it,
and I should have been glad to have put the mountain against the city—the val-
ley against the growing marts, and I would have endeavored to show the truth
as it is.
Men may intrigue and frame bills that may pass legislatures, may pass munici-
palities
; they may make money, but they may fail to gain honor. If a man will
sell his soul to mammon he must expect that when the day of trial comes his
refuge and his defence will fail him. My client can stand proudly in this light,
like the shepherd boy of old ; he has but his sling and his stone, but his character
is his weapon, and it will smite the giant in the forehead.
[At this point in Mr. Baker's argument the Senate adjourned till the next
morning.]
Mr. President, and Gentlemen of the Senate.
I should consider myself wanting in my duty if I did not seize this occasion to
return my profound and respectful acknowledgments for the courtesy with which
I was listened to by the Senate yesterday.
In common with yourself, I am sure, Mr. President, I felt pleased and flattered
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with the rather unusual fact that the presence of a number of the fairer portion
of our community graced your halls, and I was remindedwhen I saw them bright-
ening the precincts of this Assembly of the golden and purple hues of sun-light
playing around the edges of the dark cloud within whose bosom the thunderbolt
is sleeping. Sir, do we not join in the wish that this Senate may ever so preserve
its dignity as to attract such an audience, and that so fair a presence may be
found to grace your Assembly as long as these streams may roll and these moun-
tains endure
I have been properly reminded that some of the remarks I made yesterday
might in some sense be considered as invidious, in drawing a comparison between
the population of the conntry and the city.
It is difficult for an advocate, (and I am here but a poor advocate before a
high deliberative body,) difficult to choose the precise words at all times, by
which he can give expression to his ideas.
Sir, no man can be otherwise than proud of the diverse interests of our whole
population. I am not here for the miserable purpose of arraying one portion of
our population against the other, and I have not one word to say against the
vast mercantile and commercial interests which have grown up in our midst, but
I did say that according to common apprehension some of the stately buildings
in San Francisco are an evidence of the particular crime here charged ; that this
crime has laid the foundation of colossal fortunes, and I repeat the assertion But
I am proud to draw a line of distinction. There are fortunes gained there with
undoubted honor. There is a population as hardy and as vigorous as ever
breathed the mountain air. There are men whom neither the storm at sea, the
tempest on land, or the breath of fiery conflagrations that have successively
swept over the city, can repress or weary men of irrepressible energy, untiring
industry and far-seeing wisdom
; and if in such a population there are some of
doubtful character who have reared their fortunes to a colossal pitch of grandeur,
these are the exceptions, not the rule ; the rule being integrity and honor, the
exception the reverse ; and to the exception alone did I allude.
An attempt to draw a distinction between the coast and the mountain can
have no profitable effect upon this controversy. I did not draw a distinction
between San Francisco and the county of Butte between our level valleys and
leaping mountains; but between this man and his defamer; between this weakness
and that strength; between that array and this loveliness; between this inexpe-
rience and that cunning. What I said yesterday relates to the individual facts
in this particular case, no further ; and I qualify and explain if what I said yes-
terday was misunderstood. Sir, it is our whole population, our whole interests,
of which we have a right to be proud—mountain, valley, hill, plain, city, we may
indeed say
—
What constitutes a State 1
Not high reared battlement nor labor'd mound,
Thick walls nor moated gates,
Not cities proud, with spires and turret crown'd,
Not bays nor broad armed ports,
Where laughing at the storm rich, navies ride
;
Not starred and spangled Courts
Where low brow'd baseness yields perfume to pride
;
But meu ; high minded men
;
Men who their duties know,
15'
But know their rights and knowing dare maintain,
Prevent the long aimed blow
;
And crush the tyrant while they rend the chain.
These constitute,^ State!
I attempted on yesterday, to enforce two or three propositions by general
argument, and I beg leave to call your attention to what I shall have here to
offer in conclusion. I alluded to the nature of this controversy, and the position
of these parties
;
I alluded to the manner in which this charge has been attempt-
ed to be rebutted. I said that it consists with but one single marked exception,
of attempts to contradict a witness upon points not material to the real issue ;
upon statements he had previously made ; upon the recollection of other wit-
nesses ; any foundation for a charge of departure from truth, being wisely pro-
nounced fallacious by the law of testimony.
I endeavored in my general argument to present to the consideration of the
Senate, that every impulse ofthe human mind, every examination of the motives
that governs man's actions, point out to us the fact that this man tells the truth,
that the other is compelled to resort to falsehood.
I pointed out the position of my client as evidence of the fact ; he has nothing
to gain but everything to lose by the falsehood. It is contrary to the experience
of human actions that a man such as he is, and has been, should come here and
commit the most demoniacal perjury against a powerful citizen for nothing.
I endeavored to show that the charge of conspiracy was a signal and an utter
failure
; that in the nature of things there could be no such conspiracy. I en-
deavored to show that to take their own view of the case, it was a doubtful state
of facts. They claim the right to be heard upon oath, and if you give Mr.
Palmer the privilege of his oath as a witness ; if you make this a Bill in Equity,
it is assertion and denial, oath against oath, and in that point of view I urged
before the Senate the question of character ; I urged that previous good charac-
ter should add to credibility, and I felt that I appealed successfully to every legal
mind in the Assembly.
I beg leave to add that where a party is a defendant, not a witness, his charac-
ter cannot be first attacked. If the other party chooses to consider Mr. Peck as
a witness, fhey can impeach him ; if he was merely a defendant, you cannot
impeach his general character until he attempts to sustain it. Mr. Palmer is not
a witness—he is a defendant, and if they had introduced evidence of general
good character we must abide by it or rebut it. I gave notice that after having
proved the character of Mr. Peck, if they attempted to prove the character of
Mr. Palmer; I should impeach him; if they did not, I should assume that they
could not. Mr. President-
Money is not character. Proof of correct money dealings is not character.
A man may have a bad character yet his.note may be as good as a Shylock's or
a Baring's, fand I insist that it is in their power, if they had a good cha-
racter, to prove it. They have failed even to attempt it, and are justly liable to
the imputation that they cannot. The man who in a doubtful position does not
throw himself upon his past reputation, is liable to the charge that he cannot do
so, and I appeal to the whole experience of human like in support of my asser-
tion.
I shall now discuss for a few moments the nature of the charge, and the kind
of proces by which it is reasonable to suppose that it can be sustained.
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This is a charge of an attempt to bribe, and from its very nature must be an
offence committed privately. I am not now speaking of whether this offence has
been committed at all or not, but merely as to the general nature of the offence.
There are some offences that from their character, must be committed in open
day, and in the presence of a number of witnesses; such as levying war against
the State. There are, then, other offences which, from their very nature, must
be secret and private.
Take for instance, forgery. That must be an offence secret and private. You
can seldom bring up witnesses upon the stand to swear to the commission of the
act, for the effect can only be accomplished when it is [committed secretly
and privately. Now the offence of bribery is of this character. No man comes
into this Senate and says I will give you $5000 for your vote, and the only rea-
son they are now charged, is the unblushing boldness of the approach of the firm
of Palmer, Cook & Co.
Mr. Wright testified in his cross examination that he had not said he would give
$100,000 to defeat Gwin, but he sees proper to qualify his expression, and says
that he has made use of terms publicly, broad cast over the State, which shows
his meaning, and lays his glittering piles of wealth before the doubtful and the
wavering.
A decent respect for the opinions of men, the necessity for some sort of appear-
ance, prevents him from coming up in openj Senate and saying, I will give you
money to vote to bring on the Senatorial election.
He says he would not now give any man a dollar. Yet if any Senator or "Rep-
resentative will vote for his friend for sympathy for him, this ingenious gentle-
mansays that hejwould divide his last dollar with them ; is the fact denied by him.
What a tender appeal to the affections of the sympathetic. What a line of ar-
gument this suggests to the mind of the doubtful. Says the doubtful member,
it wont answer for them to come to me and offer me $10,000 or $20,000, clearly
not; but Mr. Wright is a man of a sympathetic nature, answering chords res-
pond in my bosom, and sweep the master-strings of my spirit, when I have cast
my vote, when Gwin is humbled and Broderick triumphant, "the observed of all
observers," then I will go down to San Francisco, I will see Mr.jWright—there
heart to heart, the swelling tears flowing from each, while we are in each others
embrace; there, even there I will touch the almighty dollar.
Gentlemen, these are golden sympathies, you may speculate on the nature of
bribery ; can it assume a bolder shape than that. I will not bribe you, but if
your sympathies can flow in a common current with mine, what have I that I
will not give you ? to my last dollar I will divide. Unexampled generosity.
"Why even the just Selover when he thinks it necessary to produce an effect upon
the public mind, (and he never bribes) says he does not, he never exposes his own
weakness, says he does not, but even Mr. Selover says that he thinks their side
has got as much money as the other side, and he thinks a little more.
What does this man mean ? And again it is followed up. According to Mr.
Palmer's statement, when Mr. Peck offers his vote for $5000, Mr. Palmer does
not say, sir, we do not bribe ; but he talks off, suggests that he will give some-
thing by his manner, says that it is a great deal of money. We want, says he
to himself, eight Senators, eight times 5000 is 40,000 for a single Senatorial elec.
tion, and the enmity of Gwin for sis years to boot; and Palmer wonders whethe
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the house can stand the drain. Further, he can get no help from Broderick, for
incorruptible as he is, and as we have no reason to doubt he is, he cannot be call-
ed upon to throw a portion of his fund into the common treasury, because, with
a delicate appreciation of Broderick's feelings, Mr. Palmer says that David is
not to know anything about it, as it would shock his virtuous soul.
I mention this in the direct line of argument, to show the nature of the crime
and the manner of its approach. It storms the citadel with bags of gold; makes
its approaches, not in open day-light, not in frowning columns or serried battal-
ions, but sinuously, artfully, quietly, secretly, to one man alone, or if to men in
public, by a general offer—they make broad cast suggestions at which the virtu-
ous may frown but the doubtful may nibble.
I ask every Senator- suppose, when Mr. Wright said that he would not give a
dollar now, but that if auy member would vote through sympathy with him, he
would divide his last dollar with him, and suppose there was some easy soul
—
some poor Eve of the other sex—who listened as our first mother listened to the
voice of the tempter—would not this suggestion that he would divide hie last
dollar, make a Senator or Representative nibble at it if he was weak minded.
If you were contemplating a change of friends—about to yield to the malig-
nity which is persecuting Mr. Gwiu to the death, and fall into the ranks of the
successful faction—if you were waiting to find some decent opportunity to
worship the golden calf—would not the words of Wright sound like the voice of
the charmer in your ears. 100,000—sympathy—divide his last dollar. What
does he mean ? That is an appeal made to the weakest part of man's nature.
Our necessities are supposed to throw us in the market, and evil suggestions are
offered to our ear.
Sir, if any man expects to see bribery assume any other shape than this, he is
mistaken. Men do^not marry corruption as they do a beautiful woman—they do
not say to it, I will take you and hug you to my bosom—they do not take it in the
open eye of day, but in private places—doubtful men—in secrecy—in a crowd
;
(for a m*n is never more alone than in a crowd) ; in such places the voice of the
seducer is heard as was the voice of the serpent of old.
If it had been true that Mr. Palmer had offered any of you a bribe, there could
have been but your oath ; he would not do it in public—he could not come
in the Senate except by the line that Mr. Wright adopted, and you must take
the statements of a single man if you wish to convict of bribery. We talk some-
times of corruption ; does any man see it ? can you clutch it ? It is as impalpa-
ble as the air-drawn dagger of Macbeth, when he says
—
" Is this a dagger that I see before me ?"
So with bribery ; it is formless, though not voiceless.
I repeat that to employ the argument that this is not to be believed, is con-
trary to the whole philosophy of testimony in such a case. There must be a cor-
respondence between the nature of the proof and the charge, They must par-
j
take of the same nature ; if the crime is secret, the proof cannot be given by
I
many. For instance : You don't prove a physical fact as you prove a moral one.
: You do not prove a law of gravity as you prove a law of exchange, because the
3
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propositions differ j and there must be a natural and proper correspondence be-
tween the nature of the thing to be proved and the mode to prove it.
Newton proved the law of gravitation, but he did not bring a witness into
court to prove it. Locke established important doctrines as to the human mind,
and proved it, but he did not introduce a single deposition. So with bribery
;
the proof must correspond with the nature of the offence. It is secret and pri-
vate, and must frequently be charged by the oath of one man.
From this there flows another fact : that when the proof of bribery consists of
the testimony of one simple witness, it is liable to all that class of invalidation
which the counsel have directed to bear against it.
Again : no man who tells the truth studies what he will say, or what will be
the effect of all the corresponding circumstances around him. And if, gentle-
men, you insist that the man who makes the charge upon his own oath, is to make
the proof clear, by an accurate statement of all the minor matters, or that he
will at all times repeat exactly the same story, that it will not vary in minor
points under a cross-examination, you expeet to see what will not happen,—what
you will look for in vain,
* Whoe'er expects a faultless work to see,"
Seeks what ne'er has, nor is, nor e'er shall be.
And he who expects to find a witness who, by admissions in evidence, is not
somewhat tangled in the narration of inferior circumstances, looks for that which
never was, and never will be in a court of justice or elsewhere.
I will examine the nature of the contradictions against Mr. Peck, and feel con-
fident that you will bring the argument I have offered to bear upon them. I do
not deny that in his admissions and statements he has said things which appear
in some sense to be at variance from each other. I offered the reasons why it
was so. He would not have been innocent otherwise. If some conspirators had
got hold of him
;
if he had been artful and cunning he would have told a story
that could not be contradicted. It is not so. He tells you just what came to his
mind, in the cross examination, submitting to all the questions asked of him.
I admit that his recollection is far from perfect. Not about the main charge.
They cannot shake him as to that fact. What do they make of the admissions?
Does it change the fact? A fact is that which has happened. When once a fact
has happened—I speak it with all reverence—the Almighty himself cannot
change it. He may strike it from every human recollection in the Universe,
erase from all created minds all impression of the fact, but a ffect that has once
happened remains a fact, and an admission does not alter it or change it.
So with a different narrative of the fact. You may change the narration of it,
but the main fact remains unchanged.
Mr. Peek does not recollect that he told Mr. Palmer about his circumstances.
Mr. Lent says that he said, he thought he did. Mr. Mahoney is stronger, and
Mr. Selover is the strongest of all, and is sure he did, and with some little expe-
rience in discerning truth, I think it probable that he did say something about
his circumstances. I don't know that Mr. Palmer would have been so foolish as
to say he would count him down $5000, without something had led toit.
Mr. President, let me request you to observe the circumstance. Here is an
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election proposed to be held, whieh is said to be an innovation on every precedent
•on the subject ; whether it is so or not, it is none of my business, but there are
people who do care a good deal about it. Mr. Palmer does, so does Mr. Wright-
,
and Mr. Selover, and Mr. Broderick. This question has been canvassed again
and again, and it had been ascertained that but a few votes more would carry
the election.
People knew pretty well how men were expected to stand, and when Mr. Peck
came from the mountains, perhaps feeling a little of his own importance, I think
it very probable that something was said about the expenses of the election and
his poverty, and his pay of $12 per day was running through his mind—calcu-
lating whether that would "make him whole."
He talked too much. The serpent could not have anything to go upon had
not Mr. Peck commenced the conversation. Had he said nothing, probably this
never would have occurred. He should have felt that he was watched—noticed.
When the lion roams abroad the jackall will follow, and when Palmer travels
abroad Selover is sure to be not far off. It were vain to deny him his just meed
of praise—watchful, cunning, prying "he hopes he don't intrude," but he says,
"won't you introduce me to Mr. Peck ?" That's done. The next move is—"Mr.
Palmer," " Mr. Peck," That's done. Mr. Selover retires. The jackall has
done his duty, and is roaming in the forest for fresh prey.
Sir, I think that Mr. Peck did lay himself liable by his artless, foolish conver-
sation to these approaches : but, gentlemen, does that disprove his statement?
Is it not in the natural order of things ? Is it not so that men act ?
Then comes the argument of Mr. Selover, that Mr. Palmer would not offer a
bribe upon so short an acquaintance. I don't say, says Mr. Selover, that Mr.
Palmer is an honest man—we are too knowing for that, but I do say, that Mr.
Palmer is a right smart man. If this had been the third or fourth talk I should
not have been surprised—but at the first, it is quite contrary to our rules. That
is what Selover says.
What does this man mean ? He does not say that he had confidence in the
integrity and honor of Mr. Palmer—that he would not do such a thing. No,
but ho would not do it on " so short an acquaintance. 1 ' He had too much of that
p rascally virtue, prudence," to do it. Not that he had too much integrity and
honor to do it. I think that Mr. Selover was quite mistaken in saying that he
was too smart to do it in so short a time—he would have been smarter still if Mr.
Selover could have said "My friend is too honest, too just, to commit such a
crime. They rely not upon his character, but upon his head.
Sir, it is expecting too much of Mr. Palmer to suppose him capable of com-
mitting a crime, and then to require him to do it with unerring skill. The
highest intellects which stoop to crime are not exempt from the danger of detec-
tion. Safan himself was weak enough to rebel—for all crime is weakness—and
against the consequences of that guilt no wisdom could shield, no power protect
;
no art could save, no arms defend—he fell " to rise no more."
Guilt is perpetually unveiling its own secrets : when it plunges itself in the
deepest caverns, and imagines that it is forever out of sight, it lifts its head to
behold itself in the full blaze of a meridan day. Is not this human experience ?
With what faee can a lawyer say, " My client did not commit forgery—he is top
smart.. But this is their argument.
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They talk of conspiracy, but is there no signs of one on the other side ? Who
rides in the deep midnight ? Who braves the tempest ? Why does he not wait
for the following morning for the steamboat? Mr. Selover is a real estate auc-
tioneer ; does his business lead him to this unwonted ride ? He says, we have
got more money than the other side. Who is the we ? How >loes it happen that
every fact opposed to us comes from those who in feeling and interest are con-
nected together ? How does it happen that not upon admissions, mere statements,
but upon very facts we contradict them ? I will show you how.
By a rule of the Senate it was decided that Mr. Palmer should not prove con-
versations with Mr. Selover. The next thing was to say what Mr. Palmer told
him. He said that he knew of Peck's offer to be bribed almost as soon as it hap-
pened, and I could not help their getting it out ; it is not the first time that a
mistake has been made by avoiding the naked truth.
Mr. Selover says that coming up on the boat he was told by Mr. Palmer that
Mr. Peck wanted to be bought. Now their whole souls were engaged in this
business of bringing on the election. Suppose you had been in Mr. Palmer's con-
dition and had found out that there was a man to be bribed and that you could
probably get another vote ; if upright you would have said I will not buy ; or
have yielded as Mr. Palmer admitted he did, and said it was a great deal of money;
or you would have told Messrs. Broderick, Lent and Mahoney, and they and you
would have been specially glad. While I think these gentlemen would have
been incapable of the purpose of buying Mr. Peck or any body else, yet from their
characters and intelligence they could not have objected to have learnt the dear,
tender secret, and it would not have particularly displeased any of these gentle-
men to have known that a vote had been offered, and that Mr. Palmer could buy
it if he choose. If they could find a little secret of that kind should they not hug
it to their bosoms.
Is it not Rochefoucault, Mr. President, who says " something there is that does
not entirely displease us even in the misfortunes of our best friends ;" certainly
it would not if it happened to our enemies. And as a matter of party tactics
would not Selover have said Mr. Peck can be bought, he has offered himself, if
we do not choose to buy him, we can expose him. Watch him, if he does not go
strait, threaten to expose him. Such a course would have been natural, but what
does Selover do ? he remains silent. He does not tell Mr. Broderick, or let the
senators, his friends, know—he kept the secret from mortal ears, tells no one this
important fact which can change the whole aspect of nations by placing Mr. Brod-
erick in the Senate. He is silent ; is that human nature ? should it have been so ?
would any man do so ? According to all the rules of human conduct it would
not, and I affirm that the argument cannot be shaken. Connected as he was with
these men by every tie, his statement that he kept it locked in his own breast, is
contrary to what every reasonable man would have done in the premises. A
man may tell a lie, but he cannot act contrary to the experience of all the
world.
But there is another point. If Mr. Peck bad gone to the banking house first,
the facts would have been against us. Mr. Selover returned to San Francisco
without saying a word about this matter until Tuesday. But Mr. Selover then
stated that he did not introduce Mr. Peck to Mr. Palmer at all, and persisted in
that statement until he found that it could be proved by another witness. I ask-
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ed Mr. Selover the question, who introduced Mr. Peck to Mr. Palmer ? Auction-
eer, as he is, he hesitated to knock off truth to the highest bidder ; he had to say
going, going, before he was gone. But he said that he did. I then asked him if
he had not said it was a damn'd lie ? He admitted he had declared it so, but said
he had forgotten the fact. Could he forget ? Did he forget ? For what purpose
did he introduce Mr. Peck to Mr. Palmer ? He had no social qualities that were
likely to be attractive to Mr. Palmer. Mr. Peck is a gentleman of ordinary
courtesy—ordinary intelligence. But Mr. Selover did not do it for that purpose.
He had friends—rich, powerful friends. He wandered in search of prey, and he
found it ; and if Mr. Palmer had denied that he had been of service, Selover
might justly have complained. " I found him, I introduced him, I took the over-
land route, and now you deny my jackall-ship."
Did Selover forget the main fact for which he was here ; as well might you
expect a woman to forget her conquests, or a mother her love for her child. He
had performed his mission, then he retired gracefully. Did he forget the purpose
that he so successfully accomplished ? most assuredly not.
This was the turning point in this case—this was the connecting link. We un-
derstood that Mr. Taylor was about going home to the States, and I was in dis-
pair
;
but he remained long enough to testify to this fact. Then Mr. Selover re-
membered—I am afraid that Mr. Selover had a willing memory—when he had
performed his duty he tried to forget everything about the facts.
Let me show you another thing about which there can be no dispute, to show
what Selover came here for, and why he came.
It seems a Whig Senator had offered to be bribed, and had made this offer to
two persons ; they had, therefore, two witnesses—direct proof to overwhem Peck
and expel him from the Senate, and they hear, to their profound astonishment,
that the bribee charges them with being the bribers.
If I were to attempt to do you some deadly iujury, and it came to your ears
that I was going to charge you with the same fact, you would scorn, defy, repel
me. What do they do?
Would Selover come up to remonstrate with a man who is going to commit
the deadliest perjury? He comes suddenly, for fear that it would be urged that
Mr. Palmer was part and parcel of the act. Yet it was said that Mr. Palmer
opposed the coming and that Mr. Wr ght's motives to come were because Mr.
Palmer opposed it.
Mr. Wright says that Mr. Selover and Mr. Palmer were both opposed to it.
Selover says he wanted to come—a contradiction, not a perjury ; but one of those
things about which there is misapprehension and mis-statement. It is all inno-
cent and pure. One train of reasoning shows why Selover wanted to come ; an-
other shows that both he and Mr. Palmer were opposed to it. But what harm
could Peck do while they wielded a thunderbolt to crush him.
What harm had Mr. Palmer to apprehend from Mr. Peck, if he did swear to a
lie ? What did they come here for at all ?
They came because, like the corrupt judge in ancient story, they feared and
trembled. They came here to intimidate Mr. Peck, in a moral sense, at least, tc-
bring him in their power.
What does Selover say ? Does he say—Mr. Peck, how dare you do this? don't
you know you offered to be bought in my presence ? how dare you make this
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charge ? That would have been his language if he had been an honest man
; but
he comes worming, twining, seeking, spying
—
goes to David's head-quarters, se-
duces Peck to make statements—Makoney waiting to write them down.
It is to disguise, cover up, not to admit the truth, not to confront Mr. Peck,
that Selover comes. In a criminal prosecution, when a man is charged and flies,
the presumption of guilt is strong—"the wicked flee when no man pursueth."
Selover fled to Benicia when no truth had yet appeared. The presumption
arising from a man's conduct is an irresistible argument. It qualifies and ex-
plains the motives of his inmost soul. No man's reputation or innocence can be
at the mercy of a base conspiracy, when he has facts upon which he can rest
secure. He can rest upon his magnanimity, upon his country and upon the final
judgment. Mr. Palmer did not rely much upon the justice of his country. He
had tried it too often.
Selover got here. What did he do ? He intimidated Mr. Peck. You saw his
manner when he was subjected to cross-examination. You saw the broad
attempt to intimidate Mr. Peck ; a man somewhat deficient in experience and
judgment.
And yet I do not hesitate to avouch that in personal couraee and honor, he is
equal to any one of them.
Hence came the picture of the variegated serpents—the gulf—hence the threat,
that he would be crushed by contending factions ; the very thing that Selover
wanted
;
what else did he want but to crush him. True Selover calls it sym-
pathy. Sympathy for a man who could invent a lie. Does not he profess to feel
in the words of Homer,
"Whom want itself can force untruth to tell,
My soul detests him as the gates of Hell."
Virtuous to a fault, Selover is ; he comes hereto compromise; listen to his
language. He does not say, Mr. Peck you have told a lie; he says, Mr. Peck it
is a mistake. Now when a man knocks another down, it is rather an awkward
apology to say it is a mistake. If Selover was telling the truth, Peck was a liar,
and he knew it. It was either the truth or a bitter, base, malignant falsehood,
that would press to the earth, the head of any one who dared to utter it. He
did not come here and say, Mr. Peck you are about to perjure yourself. Oh I
no. Mr. Peck it is a mistake. Come down—writedown—see Mr. Palmer
—
give
Mr. Truett a writing to treat it as though it never had happened.
The whole statement is inconsistent, if the fact had not really happened. It
is against all human experience, which is the best argument and the best evi-
dence.
There is some contradiction about the statements as to the times Peck went to
see Mr. Palmer. Peck stopped at the door while somebody went in to get a.
drink. Now Peck was not smart, and I will tell you why.
If Mr. Peck had been as smart as experience will teach him to be now, he would
either have resented it at the moment, or said nothing until he had conversed
with friends—then acted promptly, or not at all ; in the meanwhile have refused
to see Palmer. That would have been wise. But upon the other hand, no two
men would have done the same thing. Senator Wade would have knocked him
down. Senator Tuttle would have considered before he said anything ; other
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gentlemen might have adopted a different course. That proves nothing against
Mr. Peck. Like a woman—when Mr. Peck had a secret, he must tell it ; so he
went to Truett, because he knew him as a merchant—the only man he knew.
He did not want to go to Mr. Broderick—Mr. Palmer had told him not to do
so. And from the moment he told Truett, he, in some sense, is mixed up with
politics.
Mr. Peck now hesitates. He does not want to get into trouble. He begins to
see by the rushing smoke, what the flame must be, and with that moral timidity
which gentlemen have charged him with, he wishes he was out of it.
What is Mr. Peck's condition ? Put to immense expense—traduced—his repu-
tation, his character, friends, position, all at stake. For what? For whom?
Whom does he serve ? If he is successful—if the Senate reprimands Mr. Pal-
mer, what then ? Mr. Peck takes his seat as before—sinks into the level of a
common man, if not—
I leave it to Senators what must be his position if at this solemn moment of
his life, the Senate shall refuse to sustain him.
But they say that he offered to be bribed again, but that is only by Selover,
and that on a forced construction entirely. But then it is oath against oath-
Palmer is not a witness. The most material point remains untouched, and that
brings me to the discussion of another branch of the law of evidence.
Mr. Palmer is not a witness ; his oath is not to be taken ; it is the simple de-
nial of a criminal. They have other facts—collateral facts, that Mr. Peck told
him that he had a desire to be whole, or make himself whole. Mr. Peck says he
did not. Whom will you believe, Peck or Selover ? I say nothing of the fact
that Mr. Peck, in the origin of this controversy had no motive to lie. It is oath
against oath, and by the rules of law, if you do not know which to believe, you
must leave out the fact as if it did not exist.
[Here Mr. Baker read several authorities.]
The meaning of that is this ; where a story is told that does not necessarily
involve perjury, and oath is sworn against oath, you are bound to believe that
it is a mistake, rather than a perjury. For instance—Selover said Peck said
what he never did. This must be considered a mistake ; an over anxiety on the
part of Selover to find somebody to bribe, rather than that Peck was guilty of
perjury. Peck may have said something about his expenses—he may have said
something about being made whole, but he denies the construction which Selover
places upon it, and so denying you are bound to reject the whole.
But the whole story is consistent with the story of an innocent man. It has
cost him something to pay his expenses, it has cost him something to get here,
and he expects to get whole by his pay as a Senator. I deny that the conversa-
tion with Selover will bear the construction he places on it from the beginning
to the end.
But they say he went to Palmer again. He went to Palmer because he under-
stood that Mr. Palmer wanted to see him. Truett told him to go. Truett
wanted to catch them ; he wanted the bribery confirmed ; he was not a Broderick
or a Palmer man ; nay more, he had not this weakness, this pleasant amiability
that Mr. Selover had ; he did not care about exposing them ; he wished to pro-
claim to the world that Mr. Broderick wanted to buy a poor Whig ; and if he
could catch them he desired to do it. Peck went by Truett's advice. Now they
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say he went twice, but on this point, like the others I have mentioned, there is a
subdivision not founded in fact. They say he went twice ; but if I were to ask
them to fix the time, it would trouble them. At what and how many times do
the learned counsel intend to prove that Mr. Peck went on Tuesday ?
"Williams—He went some two or three times ; what he went for I can't guess
from his testimony.
Baker—Do you insist that he went there twice ?
Williams—Yes.
Baker—Mr. Palmer says it was about one or two o'clock, he had not seenhim
at the time of lunch. Mr. Wright swears that it was before twelve, but that he
did not speak to him at all. A man lunches when he is hungry, and to predicate
perjury upon the wants of the stomach, is absurd.
Now see how it turns out ; Peck went to Truett, told him the story ; sometime
in the afternoon, he met Denver who said Mr. Palmer had been inquiring for
him ; he goes to Truett—Truett advises him to go, and he goes. And thus this
talk of several times, is not so.
Do you doubt that Peck went to Truett and said to him that Mr. Palmer was
inquiring for him. Mr. Denver had told him so ; they don't deny it, they know
that it is so.
Graham says it was between two and three. Mr. Palmer between one and two.
Selover says he saw Peck going about two o'clock. Mr. Peck could not foretell
what Mr. Denver would say to him. We prove that he went but once, then by
request of Denver and advice of Truett.
Mr. Denver says it was four o'elock. "We say it was not. Nobody, not even
Mr. Williams, pretends that he came after that conversation in which Mr. Palmer
declined the private conversation. Yet if Mr. Denver's statement is correct, it
was four o'clock, and Mr. Peck was at the boat. The truth is, it was between
one and three, and only one visit. A little while we had it that Mr. Palmer
came in his buggy
;
now he was talking to Graham. But Peck could not tell
what Mr, Denver would tell him, and we prove that he mentioned the fact of
Gen. Denver telling him before he went at all.
There is one contradiction of fact between Mr. Graham and Mr. Peck ; there
is upon one fact a mistake or a perjury. But you must suppose that it is a mis-
take, if you cannot determine, and throw it out entirely ; such is the law.
First, it is of no sort of importance whether Mr. Palmer wanted to bribe Mr.
Peck a seeond time, if he did at first; nor whether Graham is to be believed.
I go back upon my line of argument. Mr. Palmer has too much interest at
stake to be allowed to testify here
; his oath is not to be taken ; he is on trial.
To deny this doctrine would be to lift the criminal to the level of the accuser,
and swell him up to the grand proportions of an indignant prosecutor calling for
justice, instead of an infamous defendant.
Mr. Peck is a Senator, a man of honor, of known relations in life, father of a
family.
"Who is Hicks Graham ? Twenty-eight years of age, who from his deposition
never appears to have earned a dollar in his life ; intimately connected with
Palmer
;
a Filibuster
;
(lawyer, not much of one,) speculator, attache to the
Legislature, by which he means scribbling for the papers, writing Broderick arti-
cles for the Commercial Advertiser.
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We have a right to rely on Mr. Peck ; we have a right to doubt Mr. Graham.
Not that we wish to say he is perjured, for we wish to deal with him In all chari-
ty and candor ; but according to his own affidavit, the blowing up of the boat
injured his recollection, his memory is a little impaired. Why brand Peck with
the charge of perjury, upon this statement of Graham's ? Why make him false
to his enemies, false to his friends, false to everybody ; it is too ridiculous ; and
it all rests upon Graham's statement. He says that Mr. Palmer said to Mr.
Peck, I am engaged, I cannot see you ; there were probably twenty people in
the Banking House. Graham's attention not particularly directed to Mr. Peck.
It might not have been Peck ; he might have mistaken one man's voice for an-
other ; it is easier to suppose that Graham was mistaken than that Mr. Peck
should forge this deliberate lie, thus breaking the tenor of his past life. What
reason was there that Palmer should not see him : the pretence is that Palmer
was so indignant that he would not see Peck. Very singular, that very evening
they were so particularly anxious to see Mr. Peck that they came over land all
the way to find him. Does that accord with the statement of Mr. Palmer ; I
can't see you sir ! Within two hours they came to Benicia in hot haste ; beseech-
ing Mr. Peck not to destroy Mr. Broderick's interest, nor defeat the growing
aspirations of Palmer, Cook & Co. It is not reasonable ; Mr. Graham must be
mistaken when he says that Mr. Palmer would not see him.
The geaeral rules by -which Courts of Justice are governed when witnesses
contradict each other, is to make the evidence agree with the truth and veracity
of all parties if it is possible.
Nobody can believe more than I do the natural inclination of man to tell the
truth ; the first impulse of the mind is to tell the truth ; all truth is consistent
with itself, and it inclines to leap, like the bright sword of a warrior from its
scabbard, from the heart to the lips. Interest, passion, pride may prevent it,
but the inclination is there ; and so far as I can see and judge, I am inclined to
believe, where it is possible, that the witnesses intend to speak truth.
I demand that this testimony shall be viewed in that light ; I ask you as men,
Senators, Judges, to reconcile this to truth a« far as you can ; allow for mistakes
—for human weakness—for failure of recollection ; read it as fallible men liable
to err, and willing to allow for error, and Mr. Peck's case is in all respects safe.
There is indeed in this case one wide and unfortunate difference between Mr*
Peck and Mr. Palmer, and they can never more cross and stand upon the same
platform ; but as far as the rest of the testimony is concerned, a little charity
will cover all mistakes and errors.
If there is a conspiracy still to be charged, I say that this man is guiltless.
But I say that upon the other side, every motive, party pride, feeling, friend-
ship, bound these men together with a band as of iron, and that not one witness
can we get that is not attached to and dependent upon Palmer, Cook & Co.
Take Graham for instance—attachee to Palmer, Cook & Co. I dont say he is
a Broderick man—but every fact, every statement shows that the interest of
these witnesses are combined against this man, Mr. Peck.
It is a little singulnr that within five minutes of the time that Graham says he
saw Peck, Mr. Palmer counts him down four or five hundred dollars. I know
that this was to buy up scrip ; I know that this was a business transaction ; I
know that Mr. Graham had found where he could make a speculation at the ex-
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peme of same poor County, or of the poor State. All this I admit, tut they
cannot deny that every witness is bound to them as with hooks of steel ; if there
ss a conspiracy it is upon their side, not owns.
I have thus endeavored, Mr, President, to present a series of suggestions?
which arise to my mind, from the proofs before the Senate. I should have feared
to weary you with a more labored discussion, and while I willing' y avoid more,
the importance of the controversy will not justify me in saying less.
The argument which I have offered is, ss you will resiember, m support of
these propositions,
First. That the testimony of Mr, Peck is true, because he has made a charge ia
which he cannot be mistaken, and one which he has no conceivable motive to
fabricate; because he has offered the only kind of proof which the necessary cor-
respondence between the nature of the charge and the ©hamster of the testimony
will allow 5 because having made a charge upon his solemn oath, which, when
proved, can be of no benefit to him, but which on the contrary involves him in
intense difficulties, he is able to maintain it by the pledge of an unsullied repu-
tation
; because the whole of the trial has shown that while he is an inexperi-
enced and perhaps timid man, it has also shown him to be utterly incapable of
forging a story so monstrous even with the strongest motives, much less with no
motive
; because the incidental and collateral fasts presented by the testimony,
support and explain his original statement.
We show, seeondly, that the defence of Mr. Palme? is untrue, because, so fair
as it is based on his own oath, he is- not entitled to be considered as a witness,
and because he has every conceivable motive to falsify the truth j because his de-
nial is but the usual step downwards which the first error compels ; because there
is no mode of trial known to the civilized world which will allow such an expur-
gation ; because he has failed to support his statement by proof of former charac-
ter, although warned of the presumption which this failure an ould raise a gainsU
him ; because his silence as to the facts implicating Peck until the charge was
made public is evidence of guilt ; because the attempt to induce Peek to conceal
or retract, and failing in this to intimidate him, confirms that guilt ; because the
attempt to charge conspiracy is proof of a fraudulent intention, which is incon-
sistent with innocence ; because the vain endeavor to shift his ground and to be-
come the accuser is one of the commonest devises of crime, from the time of
Potiphar's wife till now.
We show, thirdly, that the effort to invalidate Peek's testimony has been
mainly confined to proof of admissions, conversations, variances in minor detail
which confirm rather than weaken his statement.
Fourthly, That even this is proved by witnesses who, in point of feeling, inte-
rest, friendship, and conduct, are allied with Palmer, from Selover down to Gra-
ham, and who are all peculiarly liable to the same method of attack.
And now, Sir, having thus presented some of the arguments by which, in my
judgment, the truth and honor of my client can be sustained, I am about to sub-
mit this case to the judgment of the Senate.
' The facts charged upon Mr. Palmer do not affect Mr. Peck, but they injure the
dignity of the Senate, and strike at the welfare of the State. The charge has
not been made for private purposes and its truth should not be determined upon
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for private Interests. I do not trust myself to discuss farther the anomly by
which the witness who accuses the criminal, is himself arraigned and compelled
to employ counsel in his defence. The history of this proceeding i3 already be-
fore the country.
Although we have witnessed the presence of the greatest personal and political
influences known to the State, entering and acting on this arena. I will not
douht that they are exerted in a legitimate sphere, and above all, I will not
doubt that the Senate will preserve its own respect and the respect of the coun-
try. Sir, it is in the power of this body to present to the people a noble specta-
cle ; since it can show how weak wealth and influence may be when arrayed
against truth and right. Nor is the occasion unworthy of such a judgment.
—
Who can calculate its effects upon the public morals. Here is an offender begirt
with friends and armed with gold—here is a crime which corrupts the very heart
of the body politic
;
and poisons the air we breathe ; here is an accuser " in bonds
for the truth," surrounded by hissing serpents, relying for his deliverance upon
that impartial justice which should find its last and holiest home within these
walls. Sir, if to-day you "put ,the axe to the root oi tree," you will strike a
trunk beneath whose shade ravenous beasts of prey gather—within whose spread-
ing branches unclean birds love to make their nests.
When the Hebrew prophet struck the roek
—
w From Horeb's flinty side
Issued a river,"
So the blow that strikes the defendant at your bar, shall open a fountain whose
swelling waters will sweep away the festering corruptions which have plagued
the State.
Mr. President, my client has had no reason to make this accusation, but his
sense of public obligation. The consciousness of duty performed, is his only
possible reward. But the art and the falsehood of the accused hav,e so placed
him as to compel him to demand your acquital, as if he too were a defendant.
He feels as a man should feel, the peril of his position, and he knows the impor-
tance of your justification. I feel that he has a right to demand it—I am assured
he will receive it.
Mr. President—the scene of which we make part, and the occasion of which
of which I have spoken, will soon pass away. The consequences will remain
—
they will remain to the State, to the criminal, and they will remain to my client.
It has sometimes been my fortune to stand up as the advocate for a hopeless,
friendless wretch, pursued by the avenging ministers of the law, and the fiercer
vengeance of a guilty conscience. How often has my heart quailed as I looked
into the terrible future which awaited him, and saw in his face that he too was
gazing into the tempestuous gloom. I do not seek to read the emotion which
the defendant feels as he conducts this struggle, where fraud and perjury are the
weapons he is obliged to wield. My concern is with the accuser ; but he, too, is
on trial, and they have sought by a felon's word to strike him from the " rolls of
honor." My mind will wander, as I speak the last word of his defence, to that
future which your word can create. Sir, I will not indulge the thought. He is
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an honest man ; his honor is in the hands of a high and just tribunal. The best
feelings of the human heart, and the truest dictates of an unbought judgment
will unite for his defence, and his blameless life and upright purpose, which haye
walked with him through " this firey trial will bear him unhurt amid the
conflagration.
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